

HISTORY
OF
G R E E C E
FROM
THE EARLIEST TIMES
TO ITS
FINAL SUBJECTION TO ROME.

*PUBLISHED UNDER THE SUPERINTENDENCE OF THE SOCIETY
FOR THE DIFFUSION OF USEFUL KNOWLEDGE.*

LONDON:
BALDWIN AND CRADOCK, PATERNOSTER-ROW;

M DCCCXXXIX.

LONDON
Printed by W. Clive,
St. Dunford Street.

CONTENTS.

CHAP. I. Of Greece before the Trojan War. p. 1.

Geographical position and natural divisions of Greece. Its first inhabitants. Pelasgians and Hellenes. Ionians, Æolians, and Dorians. Barbarism of the early Greeks. Improvement begun by Egyptian and Phœnician colonies. Cecrops. Foundation of Athens. Foundation of Argos. Danaus. Pelops. Atreus, Agamemnon. Great Phœnician migration. Settlement of the Cadmeians in Boeotia, and foundation of Thebes. Legislation of Minos in Crete. Predatory habits of the Greeks. Minos forms a navy, and represses piracy. Rapid growth of Athens, and early political state of Attica. Theseus. Union of the Attic towns. Origin and character of Grecian religion. Arts of the Egyptian priesthood. Double religion in Egypt, thence communicated to Greece. Orgies or Mysteries. Mysterious discipline in philosophy. Orpheus and Pythagoras. Auguries and oracles. Dodona. Delphi.

datory habits of the Greeks. Minos forms a navy, and represses piracy. Rapid growth of Athens, and early political state of Attica. Theseus. Union of the Attic towns. Origin and character of Grecian religion. Arts of the Egyptian priesthood. Double religion in Egypt, thence communicated to Greece. Orgies or Mysteries. Mysterious discipline in philosophy. Orpheus and Pythagoras. Auguries and oracles. Dodona. Delphi.

CHAP. II. Of Peloponnesus, from the Trojan War to the end of the second Messenian War. p. 8.

Argonautic expedition. Rape of Helen. Power of Agamemnon. Trojan War. Iliad and Odyssey. Grecian manners in the Homeric age. Return from Troy, and revolutions ensuing. Ulysses. Agamemnon murdered by Clytemnestra. Orestes. Return of the Heraclids. Institution of the Olympic festivals; also of the Pythian, Isthmian, and Nemean festivals. Governments established by the Heraclids. Political changes. Abolition of royalty. Lacedæmon. Legislation of Lycurgus. First Messenian War. Second Messenian War. Aristomenes,

Argonautic expedition. Rape of Helen. Power of Agamemnon. Trojan War. Iliad and Odyssey. Grecian manners in the Homeric age. Return from Troy, and revolutions ensuing. Ulysses. Agamemnon murdered by Clytemnestra. Orestes. Return of the Heraclids. Institution of the Olympic festivals; also of the Pythian, Isthmian, and Nemean festivals. Governments established by the Heraclids. Political changes. Abolition of royalty. Lacedæmon. Legislation of Lycurgus. First Messenian War. Second Messenian War. Aristomenes,

CHAP. III. Of Athens, from the Trojan War to the political Alterations of Cleisthenes, and the first Interference of Persia in the Affairs of Greece; and of the general Transactions of Greece, during the latter Part of the same Period. p. 18.

Increase of Athens. War with the Peloponnesian Dorians. Codrus. Median perpetual archon. Emigration of Athenians to Asia. (Ionic migration.) Previous emigration of Æolians to Asia. (Æolic migration.) Various other Grecian settlements. Charops first decemviral archon. Institution of annual archons. Sedition of Cylon. Legislation of Dracon. Revolt, re-conquest, and second revolt of Salamis. Epimenides. Legislation of Solon. Peisistratus. Hippasus and Hipparchus. Harmodius and Aristodemus. Death of Hipparchus. Expulsion of Hippasus.

Disputes between Isagoras and Cleisthenes. Violent interference of Cleomenes king of Lacedæmon. Cleomenes expelled from Athens. Embassy to Sardis. War with Lacedæmon, Boeotia, and Chalcis. Corinthians refuse to join. Boeotians and Chalcidians chastized by Athens. Hippasus canvasses the Peloponnesians unsuccessfully. Prevails on Artaphernes, satrap of Lydia, to require his mediation. Athenians refuse to submit. Government of Athens becomes substantially democratical, under the lead of Cleisthenes and the Alcmeonidae.

CHAP. IV. Of Greece and its Colonies, from the first Persian Conquest of Ionia, to the Defeat of Xerxes' Invasion of Greece, and the Establishment of Athens as a leading State. p. 26. 33.

SECT. I. Persian conquest of Lydia. Croesus. Cyrus. Conquest of Ionia. Emigration of Phœceans and Teians. Entire subjugation of Asia Minor. Death of Cyrus. Camby ses. Darius the son of Hystaspes. Invasion of Scythia. Hystaspes tyrant of Miletus. Aristagoras. Revolt of Asiatic Greeks. Burning of Sardis. Reconquest of Asiatic Greeks, and taking of Miletus. Mardonius establishes democracies in the Ionian and Æolian cities. Fails in an expedition against Greece. Earth and water demanded by Darius of all the Greeks. Refused by Athens and Lacedæmon. Cleomenes in Ægina. Deposition of his colleague Demaratus. Defeat of the Argians by Cleomenes, and insurrection of the slaves. Suicide of Cleomenes. War between Athens and Ægina. Persian invasion of Greece. Miltiades. Battle of Marathon. Attack of Miltiades on Paros. His trial, and death in prison.

SECT. II. Preparations of Darius for a second invasion of Greece. General weakness of great empires

formed by conquest. Revolt of Egypt. Death of Darius. Xerxes. Submission of Egypt. Second Persian invasion of Greece. Sperthias and Boulis. Themistocles. Gelon tyrant of Syracuse. Battles at Thermopylae. Self-deposition of Leonidas, with the Spartans and Thespians. Sea-fights off Artemisium. Eubœa overrun by the Persians. Stratagem of Themistocles. Repulse of the Persians from Delphi. Unworthy conduct of Lacedæmon. Taking of Athens. Disputes in the fleet, and conduct of Themistocles. Aristides. Battle of Salamis. Return of Xerxes. Mardonius commander in chief. Themistocles. Operations of Mardonius. Resolute fidelity of the Athenians, and backwardness of the Lacedæmonians. Battle of Platæa. Battle of Mycale. Athens rebuilt. Lacedæmonians oppose the rebuilding of the walls. Crafty policy of Themistocles. Pausanias. Beginning of Athenian empire. Flight of Themistocles. His death. Transactions in Sicily. Victories over the Carthaginians.

CHAP. V. Of Greece, from the Establishment of Athens as a leading State, to the Beginning of the Peloponnesian War. p. 46.

Organization of the Athenian confederacy. Assessment of Aristides. Quarrels of Athens with the allies. Conquest of Naxos. Battle of the Eurymedon. Conquest of Thasos. Earthquake at Sparta, and revolt of Helots. Third Messenian War. Megara allies herself with Athens. Long walls, first of Megara, and then of Athens. Corinthian War, and victory of Myronides. Original Dorians assisted by Lacedæmon against the Phocians. Discontent among the rich in Athens. Maritime power among the Greeks always favourable to democracy. Battles of Tanagra and Cnophyta. Submission of Boeotia, Phocis, and Ægina. Five years' truce. Greatest extent of Athenian dominion. Habits, character, and political state of the Athenian people. Cimon. Pericles.

Growth of literature and art. Expedition to Egypt. Reconciliation of Cimon and Pericles. The Long wall. Athenian cavalry restored. Athenian settlement in the Thracian Chersonese. Death of Cimon. Temple at Delphi given in charge to the Delphians by Lacedæmon, and restored to the Phocians by Athens. Battle of Coroneia. Revolt of Boeotia, Eubœa, and Megara. Invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians, and sudden retreat. Impeachment of Cleisthenes, king of Lacedæmon. Eubœa recovered by Athens. Thirty years' truce. Pericles and Thucydides. Ostracism of Thucydides. War with Samos and Byzantium. War between Corcyra and Corinth. Athens receives Corcyra into alliance. Disputes with the Peloponnesian confederacy.

CHAP. VI. Of the Peloponnesian War. p. 56. 70. 77.

SECT. I. Attempt of the Thebans on Platæa. Invasion of Attica by the Peloponnesians. Conduct of Pericles. Resources of Athens. Operations of the Athenian fleet. Expulsion of the Æginetan people. Alliance of Athens with Sitacles, king of Thrace. Second Peloponnesian invasion. Plague of Athens. Peloponnesian ambassadors to Persia put to death by the Athenians. Surrender of Potidea. Death of Pericles. Siege of Platæa. Naval victories of Phormion. Attempt of the Lacedæmonians to surprise Peiræus. Success overruns Macedonia. Third Peloponnesian invasion of Attica. Revolt of Mitylene. Fourth invasion of Attica. Lacedæmonian fleet on the coast of Asia. Surrender of Mitylene. Cruel decree of the Athenian people. Cleon. Decree reversed. Platæa taken, and the garrison put to death by the Lacedæmonians. Corcyrean sedition. Plague revives in Athens. Defeat of Demosthenes in Ætolia. His successes in Acarnania. Athenian fleet sent to Sicily. Affair of Pylos. Lacedæmonians sue for peace. Cleon, Nicias. End of Corcyrean sedition. Peace in Sicily. Struggles in Megara. Brasidas. Chalcidians of Thrace ask aid of Lacedæmon. Murder of Helots. Battle of Delium. Brasidas. Thrace. Gains Amphipolis and other places. Thucydides the historian. Truce for a year. Disputes about towns in Thrace. Quarrel between Brasidas and Perdiccas. Thebes oppressed by Thebes. Aristophanes. Cleon general in Thrace. Battle of Amphipolis. Deaths of Brasidas and Cleon. Peace between Athens and Lacedæmon.

Cimon. Boeotians, Corinthians, Eleians, and Megarians, protest against the treaty.

SECT. II. Alliance of Athens and Lacedæmon. Counter alliance of Argos, Corinth, and other states. Imperfect restitutions. Intrigues in Peloponnesus. Alcibiades. Alliance of Athens with Argos. Renewal of war. Victory of the Lacedæmonians. Revolutions in Argos. Siege of Melos by the Athenians, and cruel treatment of the inhabitants. Athenian expedition into Sicily. Mutilation of Mercurius. Alcibiades condemned in his absence. Offers his services to Lacedæmon. Decelia in Attica garrisoned by the Lacedæmonians. Siege of Syracuse. Gylippus. Defeat of the Athenians. Deaths of Nicias and Demosthenes.

SECT. III. Alliance of Lacedæmon with Persia. Revolt of Athenian dependencies in Asia. Samos continues faithful. Intrigues of Alcibiades. Revolution in Athens, and government of the Four Hundred. Counter revolution in the Athenian armament at Samos. Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus. Alcibiades commander in chief. Theramenes. Fall of the government of the Four Hundred. Victories of Alcibiades, and return to Athens. Weakness of the Persian monarchy, and independence of the satraps. Cyrus. Lycander. Banishment of Alcibiades. Conon. Callicratidas. Battle of Arginusæ. Condemnation of the six Athenian generals. Battle of Ægospotami. Siege and surrender of Athens. Death of Alcibiades.

CHAP. VII. Of Greece, from the Termination of the Peloponnesian War, to the Peace which followed the Battle of Mantinea; and of its Colonies in Sicily, from the Destruction of the invading Athenian Army, to the Death of Timoleon. p. 86. 92.

SECT. I. Tyranny of the Thirty. Critias. Theramenes. Quarrels among the Thirty. Death of Theramenes. Thrasybulus seizes Phyle. Enters Peiræus. Expulsion of the Thirty. State of Athens. Progress of tyrannical philosophy. Democritus. Pythagoras. Sceptics. Sophists. Protagoras. Socrates. Plato.

SECT. II. Rebellion of Cyrene. Battle of Cnaxa. Return of the Ten Thousand. Xenophon. War of Lacedæmon with Persia. Dercyllidas. Character of Lacedæmonian dominion. Democracy established in Thebes and Corinth. Sedition of Cimon at Sparta. Agesilaus, king of Lacedæmon, sent into Asia. Alliance of Athens, Argos, Thebes, and Corinth, against Lacedæmon. Recall of Agesilaus, and victory at Coroneia. Lacedæmonians defeated at sea by Conon and Pharnabazus. Bloody revolution in Corinth. Union with Argos. Athenian long walls rebuilt by Conon and Pharnabazus. Iphicrates. Death of Thrasybulus. Peace of Antalcidas. Boeotian towns declared independent, and Corinth separated from Argos. Mantineians attacked by Lacedæmon. Their dispersion. Olynthian league. Attacked by Lacedæmon. Seizure of the Cadmeia. Conquest of Olynthus. Philip. Revolution in Thebes. Pelopidas. Epaminondas. Misconduct of Ephedrias. War between Athens and Lacedæmon. Campaign

in Boeotia. Naval successes of Chabrias and Timotheus. Peace made, and broken by Lacedæmon. Mnasippus attacks Corcyra. His defeat, and death. Iphicrates, Callistratus, and Chabrias. Platæa and Thebes demolished by the Thebans. Athenians make peace. Thebans continue at war. Battle of Leuctra. Jason tugs of Theßaly. General peace. Reunion of the Mantineians. Revolution in Tegea. Foundation of Megalopolis. War of Thebes with Lacedæmon. Athens joins the latter. Invasion of Laconia. Restoration of the Messenians. Lycomedes of Mantinea. Fearless Battle. Pelopidas ambassador in Persia. Party struggles in Achaia. Conduct of Epaminondas. Euphron tyrant of Sicyon. Affairs of Elbus. Murder of Lycomedes. Corinthians make a separate peace. Orchomenus destroyed by the Thebans. Alexander tugs of Theßaly. Death of Pelopidas. War between Elis and Arcadia. Epaminondas. Revolution in Arcadia. Overbearing conduct of Thebes. Epaminondas enters Peloponnesus. Battle of Mantinea. Death of Epaminondas. General cessation of hostilities. Agesilaus in Egypt. His death. Fall of Theban empire. Sedition in Argos.

SECT. III. Affairs of Sicily. Hermocrates. War with Carthage. Dionysius, tyrant of Syracuse. Dionysius the younger. Dion. Timoleon.

CONTENTS.

CHAP. VIII. Of Greece, from the Peace which followed the Battle of Mantinea, to the Destruction of Thebes by Alexander the Macedonian. p. 121. 127. 133.

SECT. I. Comparative view of the Athenian and Lacedæmonian institutions, as affecting national strength and prosperity. Athenians gradually degenerate. Change in the nature of party contests. Revival of Athenian empire. Revolt of Rhodes, Chios, Cos, and Byzantium. Revolt and recovery of Eubœa. Affairs of Macedonia. Archelaus. Amyntas and his sons. Accession of Philip. Disputes with Athens. Revival of the Olynthian League. Philip settles the affairs of Thessaly. Chares. Death of Chabrias. Exile of Timotheus. Athens makes peace with the revolted allies.

SECT. II. Council of Amphictyons. Sacred war against the Phocians. Philomelos. Onomarchus. Wars of Philip with Athens and with Phœcis. Victories of Onomarchus. His defeat and death. Lacedæmon at war with Megalopolis. Troubles of Eubœa.

Phœcion. Alliance of Olynthus with Athens. Demosthenes. Fall of Olynthus. Peace between Philip and the Athenians. Conclusion of the Sacred War.

SECT. III. Æschines accused by Demosthenes. Extensive influence of Macedonia. Disputes with Athens. Diopithes. War commenced. Administration of Demosthenes. Peace made. Affairs of Eubœa. Callias and Taurosthenes. Amphissian war. Philip, general of the Amphictyons. Antiphan. Violent conduct of Demosthenes. Amphissians subdued. Struggles in Thebes. Alliance with Athens. Battle of Chæroneia. Submission of Thebes to Philip. Peace granted to Athens. Murder of Philip.

SECT. IV. Alexander, king of Macedonia, chosen captain-general of the Greeks. His northern campaign. Revolt of Thebes. Its capture and destruction.

CHAP. IX. Of the Conquest of Alexander in Asia, and of the Affairs of Greece, from the Time when that Prince set out on his Enterprise to his Death. p. 143.

Affairs of Persia. Artaxerxes II. Artaxerxes III. (Ochus.) Reduction of Phœnicia and Egypt. Darius Codomanius. Alexander enters Asia. Battle of the Granicus. Conquest of Asia within Taurus. Memnon. Battle of Issus. Siege of Tyre. Conquest of Egypt. Foundation of Alexandria. Visit to the temple of Ammon. Battle of Gangamela. Persian intrigues in Greece. War of Lacedæmon with Macedonia. Murder of Darius. Persian empire entirely conquered. Diffi-

cult situation of Alexander. Character of his policy. Deaths of Philotas, Parmenion, and Cleitus. Invasion of India. Projects of improvement. Voyages of Nearchus. Return to Babylon. Political arrangements, and death of Alexander. Exile of Æschines. Exile of Demosthenes. State of philosophy. Antisthenes and the Cynics. Academies and Peripatetics. Aristotle.

CHAP. X. Of Greece, and of the Macedonian Empire, from the Death of Alexander, to the Deaths of Ptolemy and Seleucus, and the Invasion of Greece by the Gauls. p. 153.

Disputes about the succession to Alexander. Arrhidæus king, Perdicas protector. Distribution of provinces. Insurrection of Grecian settlers in Upper Asia. War of Antipater with Athens. (Lamian War.) Second exile and death of Demosthenes. Alliance of Antipater and Spartans with Ptolemy against Perdicas. Craterus defeated and killed by Eumenes. Perdicas attacks Egypt. His murder. Antipater protector. Rise of Antigonus. Polysperchon protector. Cassander. Troubles of Athens. Death of Phœcion. Polysperchon repulsed from Megalopolis. Olympians. Deaths of Arrhidæus and Eurydice. Victory of Cassander. Death of Olympianus. Cassander lord of Macedonia. War between Antigonus and Eumenes. Death of Eumenes. Expul-

sion of Seleucus. League of princes against Antigonus. Seleucus recovers Babylonia. Demetrius, son of Antigonus, in Athens. Naval victory of Demetrius. Antigonus and other potentates declare themselves kings. Siege of Rhodes. Battle of Ipsus. Antigonus slain, and his kingdom divided. Fortunes of Demetrius. Athens surrenders to him. Death of Cassander. Demetrius king of Macedonia. His expulsion, wanderings, and death. Pyrrhus, Lysimachus, Seleucus, successively kings of Macedonia. Deaths of Ptolemy, Lysimachus, and Seleucus. Ptolemy Cerannus king of Macedonia. Migrations of the Gauls. Invasion of Macedonia. Invasion of Greece. Antigonus Gonatas king of Macedonia. Affairs of Sicily. Agathocles tyrant of Syracuse.

CHAP. XI. Of the Rise of the Achaian League; and of the Affairs of Greece from the Invasion by the Gauls to the End of the War between the Achæians and Cleomenes, King of Lacedæmon. p. 170. 172. 176.

SECT. I. Achaian union revived. Aratus. Sicyon joined with the Achæians. Surprisa! of the Acrocorinthus. Corinth, Megara, and other states join the League. Athens under the power of Antigonus Gonatas. General policy of Aratus.

SECT. II. Pyrrhus returns from Italy. Attacks Lacedæmon. Attacks Argos. His death. State of Lacedæmon. Political reform attempted by king Agis, and opposed by Leonidas his colleague. Death of Agis. Cleomenes. Achaian war. Revolution effected by Cleomenes in Sparta.

SECT. III. Achaian League opposed by Antigonus Gonatas and by Demetrius his son. Joined by Megalopolis. Death of Demetrius. Achæians joined by Argos. Victories of Cleomenes. Alliance of the Achæians with Antigonus, protector of Macedonia. Successes of the allies. Mantinea taken by them. Megalopolis by Cleomenes. Gallant conduct of the Megalopolitans. Battle of Sellasia. Cleomenes flies to Egypt. Submission of Sparta. Death of An-

CONTENTS.

CHAP. XII. Of the first War maintained by the Ætoliens against Philip, King of Macedonia, together with the Achæians. p. 179. 186.

SECT. I. Ætoliens impatient of peace, and hostile to the Achæians: Dorimachus. Scopas. Ætolian invasion of Messenia. Imprudence of Aratus, and consequent defeat. Strange conduct of the Ætoliens. Capture of Cynæthra. Philip arrives at Corinth. Sedition in Sparta. War declared against the Ætoliens by the Achæians and their allies. Second sedition in Sparta, and alliance with the Ætoliens. Death of Olesmenes. Agesipolis and Lycurgus chosen kings. War between Rhodes and Byzantium. Troubles in Crete.

SECT. II. Ætoliens repulsed from Ægeira. Inroads of Scopas into Macedonia, and of Philip into Ætolia. Sudden arrival of Philip at Corinth, and

successes in Peloponnesus. Apelles. Sedition of Chilon in Lacedæmon. Fresh intrigues of Apelles, Leontius, and Megaleas. Philip invades Cephallenia. Invades Ætolia, and pillages Thermum. Movements in Peloponnesus. Deaths of Leontius, Apelles, and Megaleas. Weakness of the Achæian general Epistatus. Measures of Aratus upon succeeding him. Disputes in Megalopolis. Philip takes the Phthian Thebes. Skerdilidas. Wars between Rome and Carthage. Hannibal. Peace concluded in Greece. Philip allies himself with Carthage. Changes his general conduct. Fomenta the troubles of Messenia. Death of Aratus.

CHAP. XIII. Of the Wars between the Romans and Philip; * the Rise of Roman Influence in Greece; and the general Transactions of that Country, as far as the End of what was called by the Romans the first Macedonian War. p. 198. 202.

SECT. I. Alliance of the Romans with the Ætoliens, Lacedæmonians, and Attalus king of Pergamus. Desperate resolution of the Acarnaniens. Successes of Philip. Misconduct of Philip at Argos. Further progress of the war. Machanidas tyrant of Lacedæmon. Philopomen. Machanidas defeated and slain by Philopomen. General peace.

SECT. II. Cus sacked by Philip. War began against him by Attalus and the Rhodians. Troubles in Ætolia. League against Philip joined by the Athenians and by the Romans. Destruction of Abydos. Chalcis surprised by the Romans. Philip ravages Attica. Nabis tyrant of Lacedæmon. War between Nabis and the Achæians. Messene attacked by the Lacedæmonians and relieved by Philopomen. Philopomen goes into Crete. Macedonian alliance declined by the Achæians. Philip again ravages Attica. Romans demand aid of the Ætoliens. Macedonia invaded by the Romans, and by the Thracians and Dardaniens. Ætoliens invade Thessaly, but are overthrown by Philip. Mercenaries raised

in Ætolia for Ptolemy. Decrees of the Athenians against Philip. Conciliatory measures of Philip. Flamininus arrives in Greece. Forces his way into Macedonia. Enters Thessaly. Repulsed at Atrax. Ariston general of the Achæians. Achæians ally themselves with Rome. Argos recovered for Philip. Conferences between Philip and Flamininus. Argos betrayed by Philip to Nabis. Cruelties of Nabis. Flamininus gets possession of Thebes. Exhaustion of Macedonia by continued wars. Battle of Cynoscephalæ. Negotiations for peace. Beginning of ill will between the Romans and Ætoliens. Peace concluded. Disputes in Acarnania. Uncommon moderation of the people. Siege of Leucas. Submission of Acarnania to the Romans. Dardaniens, invading Macedonia, overthrown by Philip. War between Antiochus and Ptolemy. Interference of the Rhodians. Murder of Brachyllas. Arrival of the Roman Commissioners in Greece. Proclamation of liberty to Greece at the Isthmian festival.

CHAP. XIV. Of the War of Antiochus and the Ætoliens against the Romans and their Allies: and of the Affairs of Greece until the Submission of the Ætoliens to Rome. p. 218. 222. 226.

SECT. I. Antiochus rebuilds Lysimachela. Roman embassy to him. Flamininus consults his Grecian allies as to war with Nabis. Advance to Argos. Advance into Laconia. Cruelties of Nabis. Attacks on Sparta. Taking of Gythium. Nabis requests a conference. Terms of peace proposed, and rejected by Nabis. Siege of Sparta. Peace concluded. Liberation of Argos. Settlement of the affairs of Greece, and departure of Flamininus.

SECT. II. Intrigues of the Ætoliens. War between Nabis and the Achæians. Naval defeat of Philopomen. His successes by land. Flamininus at Demetria. Flight of Eurylochus. Ætoliens invite Antiochus into Greece. Demetria betrayed to them by Eurylochus. Murder of Nabis. Philopomen joins Lacedæmon to the Achæian league. Attempt of the Ætoliens on Chalcis.

SECT. III. Hannibal at the court of Antiochus. Antiochus leaves Demetria, and is appointed commander in chief by the Ætoliens. Achæians adhere

to the Romans. Antiochus gains Chalcis, and winters there. Disorders of the Boeotians. They join Antiochus. Campaign in Thessaly. Second winter at Chalcis, and marriage of Antiochus. Antiochus gains some towns in Acarnania. Philip takes part with the Romans, and conquers Athamania. Defeat of Antiochus at Thermopylæ. Submission of Phocis, Boeotia, and Eubœa to the Romans. Heraclæia taken by the Romans. Philip compelled to quit the siege of Lania. Ætoliens sue for peace. Driven to war by the harshness of the Romans. Messene besieged by the Achæians. Surrenders to Flamininus, and is reunited with the Achæians. Conquests of Philip. Siege of Naupactus. Flamininus obtains a truce. War renewed. Second truce. Romans pass into Asia. Pausistratus, the Rhodian, deceived by Polyxenidas, defeated and slain. Defeat of Antiochus by the Romans. Peace concluded. Distribution of conquered countries. Philip drives from Athamania. Ætolian war renewed. Submission of the Ætoliens.

CONTENTS.

CHAP. XV. Of Greece, from the Submission of the Ætolians to the Roman Conquest of Macedonia. p. 234. 239. 244.

SECT. I. Revolt of Lacedæmon from the Achæans. Embassy to Rome. Submission of Lacedæmon to the Achæans. Authors of the revolt put to death. Abolition of the laws of Lycurgus. Achæans decline the gifts of Eumenes. Restoration of the Lacedæmonian exiles required by the Romans. Embassy of Metellus. Embassy of Appian. Negotiations at Rome, and final settlement. Intrigue of Flaminius and Democritus. War between the Achæans and Messenians. Death of Philopœmen. Submission of Messena. Messena reunited with the Achæans.

SECT. II. Rising ill will between Philip and the Romans. Massacre of the Maronites. Demetrius sent as ambassador to Rome. His excessive favour with the Romans. Intrigue of Perseus and Demetrius against each other. Demetrius put to death on the accusation of Perseus. Death of Philip. Dardania invaded by the Bastarnæ. Popular conduct of Perseus. Perseus seeks to be reconciled with the Achæans. Callicrates. Offensive decree against the Macedonians not repealed by the Achæans. Troubles of Ætolia. Breaking out of war between Perseus and the Romans. Perseus attempts to procure the assassination of Eumenes, king of Pergamus.

SECT. III. Romans declare war. Q. Marcius

makes a truce with Perseus. Treaty. Restoration of Zeuxippeus demand. Flaminius and the Achæans. Boeotians with Perseus. Marcius takes the union of the Boeotians. Lycias refuse to Rhodes. Supported by the Romans. Marcius's embassy to Rhodes. Commencement of the successes of Perseus. Obstinacy of the Achæans, and weakness of Perseus. Haliartus taken by the Romans. Misconduct of the Roman generals. Encouragement given by the senate to traitors among the Greeks. Lycinus. Charops. Defection of Cephalus. Embassy sent to the Grecian states. Counsels of the Achæan leaders. Campaign of Perseus in Illyria, and negotiation with Gentius. Q. Marcius consul. Enters Macedonia. Declines the aid of the Achæans. Disputes among the Rhodians. Embassies to the senate and to the consul. Rhodians endeavour to mediate between the belligerents, and are roughly repulsed by the senate. Alliance of Perseus and Gentius. Illyria conquered by the Romans. Æmilius Paulus consul. Battle of Pydna. Eclipse predicted by C. Gallus. Conquest of Macedonia. Capture of Perseus. War of Antiochus Epiphanes in Egypt.

CHAP. XVI. Of Greece, from the Conquest of Macedonia to the Conquest of Achæia by the Romans. p. 253.

Violence of the Romans against the Rhodians. Submission of Epirus. Settlement of Macedonia. Violences of the Roman party in Ætolia confirmed. Achæian patriots transported to Italy. Further measures of Æmilius in Macedonia. Seventy cities ruined in Epirus. Tyranny of Charops. Mission of Gallus into Greece. Athenians plunder Oropus. Oropians apply for aid to the Achæans. Corruptions and quarrels of Menalcidas, Callicrates, and Diæus. Fresh disputes between the Achæians and Lacedæmonians. Revolt of Macedonia under Andrius. Achæians make war on Lacedæmon against the

prohibition of the Romans. Suspension of arms. Romans require that Lacedæmon, and four other cities, should be separated from the Achæian league. Ill usage of the Roman ambassadors. Unsuccessful mission of S. Julius. Conduct of Critolaus. Reconquest of Macedonia. The Roman general Metellus offers peace to the Achæians. Defeats them. Submission of northern Greece. Siege of Corinth. Violence of Diæus. Metellus superseded by Mummius. Defeat of the Achæians, and taking of Corinth. Greece reduced to a Roman province, under the name of Achæia. Return of Polybius into Greece.

CHAP. XVII. Of the State of Greece under the Roman Dominion. p. 261. 270.

SECT. I. General remarks on the effects of the conquest. War in Greece between Mithridates and the Romans. Ariston tyrant of Athens. Athens besieged and taken by Sylla. Peace concluded. Conduct of Sylla in Asia. Rhodians still comparatively free. They stand a siege against Mithridates. Roman system of provincial government. Degradation, impoverishment, and gradual depopulation of Greece.

SECT. II. Athens still preëminent as a seat of literature.

State of philosophy. Peripatetics and old Academy. Pyrrhon and Ariston. Stoics. New Academy. Arcesilas and Carneades. Cyrenaics and Epicureans. Aristippus. Epicurus. Progress of mathematics. Thales. Pythagoras. Plato and his followers. Science flourishes at Alexandria. Euclid. Archimedes of Syracuse. Eratosthenes. Apollonius. Hipparchus. Ptolemy.

Conclusion. p. 279.

Chronological Table, p. 280.

ERRATA.

- P. 5, col. 2, l. 8. *For Træsen, read Tressen.*
P. 19, col. 2, l. 14. *For Themsothets, read Thesmothets.*
P. 33, col. 2, l. 36. *For Sect. III., read Sects II.*
P. 146, col. 1, l. 11. *For on the western branch, read on the shore near the western branch.*
Ibid. l. 26. *For the deposits of the river, which have already in great measure choked it up, read the changes of the coast, and the constant gathering of shoals.*
P. 155, col. 1, l. 13. *For passed into Italy, taken refuge in a temple in Calabria, read taken refuge in Calauria, an island sacred to Neptune, near the port of Træsen.*
P. 160, col. 2, l. 51. *For smallest, read smaller.*
P. 163, col. 2, l. 40. *For Samian war, read Lamian war.*
P. 170, col. 2, l. 19. *For Mesupontum, read Metapontum.*
P. 218. In the heading of Chapter XIV., *for the Roman conquest of Macedonia, read the submission of the Ætolians to Rome.*
P. 225, col. 2, l. 11. *For undoubtedly, read undoubtedly.*
P. 236, col. 2, l. 33. *For recommended, read allured.*
P. 251, col. 1, note. *For fur Galatia, read from Galatia.*

GREECE

CHAPTER I.

Of Greece before the Trojan War.

GREECE is a country included between the thirty-sixth and forty-first degrees of northern latitude, and surrounded by seas, except upon the north, where it borders on Epirus and Macedonia. These provinces were anciently inhabited by a people of kindred origin and language, similar manners, and similar religion; but the Greeks did not consider them as forming a part of their own body, principally in consequence of their less advanced civilization,* and the incongruity of their political order, they having retained the rude monarchy of early ages, while Greece was parcelled into small republics. What is known of their history will, however, in great measure, be included in that of Greece. The most northern province of Greece was Thessaly, an extensive vale, of singular fertility, surrounded on every side by the lofty ridges of Olympus, Ossa, Pelion, Ceta, and Pindus. The other provinces of continental Greece were Acarnania and Ætolia, on the western coast; Doris, inland, and Phocis principally so, with a scanty strip of coast on the Corinthian Gulf; eastern and western Locris, the one on the Corinthian Gulf, the other on the Euripus. These are rugged territories, intersected with numerous branches from Pindus and Ceta, and their inhabitants were generally behind the rest of Greece in civilization, wealth, and power. Next came Bœotia, a rich vale, abounding in lakes and streams, stretching across from the Corinthian Gulf to the Euripus, and in other parts inclosed by mountains, by Parnassus and Helicon on the side of Phocis, Cithæron and Parnes on that of Attica. Last is Attica, a rocky province of triangular form, bounded on the north by Bœotia, on the other sides by the Ægean Sea and the Saronic Gulf, which lies between it and the peninsula of Peloponnesus. The island of Eubœa extends from near the coast of Thessaly to that of Attica, and is divided from the main land by the narrow channel called Euripus. The great mountain chain of Greece is continued through the isthmus of Corinth into Peloponnesus, (now called the Morea,) and

there appears that the mountains which bound the central province of the peninsula, hence go branches towards the north, which divide the maritime territory into the provinces of Achæa, Argolis, Messenia, and Eleia. But we shall afterwards speak of them more particularly. The first inhabitants of all these regions appear to have been a people called Pelasgians, of whose origin but little is known, though their tribes are believed to have settled extensively both in Europe and in Asia. The name Hellenes, which afterwards was adopted as the general denomination of those whom we, from the Latin, call Greeks, was originally that of a small people in the north of Thessaly, which grew early powerful, and became the origin of many leading Grecian states. Whether the original Hellenes were a Pelasgian tribe, or a tribe of a different though kindred stock, is a question admitting much discussion. The reader may find it ably treated in the Roman History of Niebuhr, who decidedly condemns the supposition that the Hellenes were Pelasgian. But of those comprised under the name of Hellenes, or Greeks, after it had become the distinguishing appellation of a great nation, at least half were Pelasgians by origin, and perhaps considerably more; nor can we affirm that Greece owed more of its manners, language*, or civilization to the Hellenic than to the Pelasgic portion of its people. Afterwards the Grecian nation became divided into two races, the Ionian and Æolian: and of the latter, a portion afterwards, under the name of the Dorians, attaining great power and importance, that name, as

* Much stress has been laid on the circumstance that Greek writers commonly speak of the Pelasgic language as barbarous. But the Greeks were certainly, whether Pelasgians or not, early removed themselves from the less improved Pelasgic tribes, supposing the basis of the language entirely Pelasgic, the admixture of Egyptian and Phœnician words to the Greek, together with the alterations made in it both by time and change of manners, may well have occasioned the Greek language to differ so much from that of the other nations, as it is derived from the old Aryan languages, and as the modern English from the Dutch. It is, however, derived from the old Aryan languages, and the Hellenes were a separate race, and it is not probable that their language was ever predominant, or that the Greek language was ever a mixture of the two. It is wholly uncertain what predominated.

GREECE.

led to them, superseded the Æolian, and being retained by the other members of the same family, the great majority of the Greeks were three, Æolians, Dorians, and Dorians.

The earliest traditions of Greece carry back the mind to a period of poverty and ignorance scarcely exceeded by the rudest savages now known. They tell of the institution of marriage, the first planting of the vine, the first sowing of corn; though, in those eastern countries, from which Greece, like the rest of the world, derived its population, all these were known long before its first inhabitants quitted their original abodes. This is not a thing to be wondered at. The earliest settlers of every country, unless sent out as a colony by public authority, or compelled to emigrate in numerous bodies by political commotions, are commonly stragglers from the mass of persons without property or regular employment, who abound in every fully-peopled district; men of restless and irregular habits, who, when placed in forest tracts, abounding with game, but requiring great labour to fit them for cultivation, and cut off from intercourse with more frequented regions, are likely to lose the civilization of their birth-place, and, neglecting all the arts of settled life, to become mere hunters. This is the case, in some degree, in the back settlements of America, though the rapid spread of civilization, and the easier intercourse with cultivated districts, have much curtailed the operation of these causes. In Greece, divided from the then inhabited world by seas and mountains, the barbarising process went so far, that husbandry seems to have been forgotten, and men were obliged, if their hunting failed, to feed on mast and berries, or other spontaneous products of the earth. In such a state, an extensive tract would support but few, while those who found themselves in want of subsistence, having no immoveable property, no laborious improvements to attach them to the spot, would readily seek a place where men were scarcer, and game more plentiful. Thus inhabitants would be thinly spread over the country with great rapidity, and, till the land was pretty generally occupied, they would scarcely feel the want of more productive employment. But, when this time came, the difficulty of subsistence must have been great. In a nation of hunters, the supply of food, instead of increasing, would decline with the increasing number of persons to be

fed. Cattle might be kept in sufficient, in the rich valleys of Bœotia and Thessaly; but that would be but a limited resource, and would be regarded as most of Greece. Each tribe, finding its own hunting-ground and pasturage insufficient, would endeavour to increase it by encroachment on its neighbours; and war would therefore be continual, occasioned, not by ambition, as elsewhere, but by need.

In this state of hopeless barbarism was Greece when visited by those Egyptian and Phœnician colonies which gave it the first rudiments of civilization. The Egyptian Cæcrops, coming to Attica, found the rude natives without union or regular government, infested, on their northern border, by the Bœotians, their only neighbours, and from the sea by the Carians, a piratical people widely established in the islands of the Ægean, and on the south-western coast of Asia Minor, whose object, probably, was the procuring of slaves, since the poverty of Attica could offer no other temptation to the plunderer. Having occupied the rock which afterwards became the Acropolis, or citadel of Athens, Cæcrops prevailed on the inhabitants of the country to submit to him as their chief. He divided the province into twelve districts, and established a principal town in each, where the affairs of the district were to be transacted; instituted marriage, and appointed laws for the administration of justice; and arranged a system of united defence against the Bœotians. The strong hold in which he had fixed his residence was peculiarly consecrated to the Egyptian goddess Neith, whose name was changed by the Greeks into Athene, and who was worshipped by the Romans under that of Minerva. Around this rock arose a city, first named, from its founder, Cæcrops, but afterwards Athenæ, from the goddess, or, as we have corrupted it, Athens.

About the same time we may probably place the founding of Sicyon and Argos, though both claimed a higher antiquity. Of the early history of Sicyon little is known, and that little is not important. Of the settlement of Argos two traditions are preserved; the one ascribing it to Inachus the son of Ocean; the other to Phoroneus son of Inachus. By those who hold the latter opinion, Inachus is mostly considered as the name not of a man but of a river. Both relations seem to mark out an unknown man from beyond the sea, who landed in the river

GREECE.

which received its name from him, or from which the other tradition supposes him to have come. The founder of Argos appears to have been a wanderer from the East, and probably from Egypt, who, by the influence of superior knowledge, having induced the rude Pelasgians to obey him, gave them some degree of regular government and a more settled mode of life. At an after-time we find the Argians governed by Gelanor, a prince apparently of Pelasgian blood, when Danaus arrived with a fresh colony from Egypt. The Argians were often distressed for want of water; he first taught them to dig wells; and, by this and similar services, he won such favour that he was encouraged to claim the kingdom. He declared himself descended from Io, an Argian princess of the line of Inachus, and one of the most singular personages in Grecian fable. It is said that Jupiter, being enamoured of her, to deceive the jealousy of Juno, transformed her into a cow; that in this form she travelled into Egypt, and there became a goddess. Herodotus, the earliest and one of the most trustworthy of Grecian historians whose works remain, explains the fable by supposing that she was enticed on ship board and carried away by some Phœnician merchants, to whom women were very profitable articles of trade. The popularity of Danaus made up for the weakness of his claim; he was chosen king, and such was his power and fame that, long after his death, the southern Greeks still went by the name of Danaans.

An adventurer from Phrygia in Asia Minor founded a dynasty which was destined to succeed that of Danaus, and to rule more widely. This adventurer was Pelops, who attained such influence, chiefly by the riches which he brought from Asia, that the southern peninsula was ever after called by his name, (Peloponnesus, the island of Pelops.) He obtained Eleia by his marriage with Hippodameia, the daughter of Oenomaus, king of Pisa in that province; and one of his daughters, being given in marriage to the king of Argos and the neighbouring city Mycenæ, was the mother of Eurystheus, the last prince of the Danaan race. He, leading an army against the Athenians because they protected the children of his enemy Hercules, left his mother's brother Atreus regent. Eurystheus fell in battle, and Atreus, being powerful and popular, was chosen to succeed him by the Myce-

neans, the more ready than he wanted an able leader to contend against the sons of Hercules. He succeeded by his son Agamemnon, whose power extended over the Peloponnese and many of the islands. The seat of his royalty was Mycenæ, in which the supremacy had been transferred from Argos by Perseus, the great grandfather of Eurystheus. But it is time to return to an earlier period, and to relate the second great Oriental colonisation of Greece.

About thirty years after the foundation of Athens, some extensive troubles took place in Palestine, which caused the emigration of numerous bodies of Phœnicians. Newton's conjecture seems highly probable, that this took place in consequence of the taking of Sidon by the Philistines, united with the Edomites, who were expelled from their homes by the conquests of David. The fugitives settled in Phrygia, in the islands of Rhodes, Crete, and Eubœa, and in several parts of Greece, under various names, as Curetes, Corybantes, Idæi Dactyli, and others; they brought with them letters, music, the art of working in metals, and a more accurate method of computing time than had hitherto been adopted; and they first taught those mystical ceremonies which formed a very remarkable part of the religion of Greece. A division of them under the name of Cadmeians occupied Boeotia, and either driving out the natives, or uniting with them, founded there the celebrated city of Thebes. Cadmus, the leader of this colony, has the fame of introducing letters into Greece; but the merit of this, and all the improvements which took place at the same period, belongs to him only in common with the other chiefs of the Curetes. One of these Phœnician settlements deserves particular attention, both from its early eminence and power, and from its offering the most ancient specimen recorded of a political system, arranged with great art and forethought, and calculated to combine the liberty of the citizens with regular government. The institutions which Minos established in Crete at a time of general anarchy and barbarism, continued to be admired by political speculators in the most polished ages of Greece, and became the model by which Lycurgus, at a subsequent period, formed the constitution of Sparta, which, with all its vices, is unrivalled as an instance of sagacity in adapting laws to certain objects.

Like most early legislators, Minos endeavoured to heighten the authority of his institutions by laying claim to divine inspiration. He called himself the son of Zeus, or Jupiter, the principal deity of the Greeks; and having retired into a cave, on coming out he declared that he had received from his father the laws which he promulgated, and which formed the basis of the Cretan commonwealth. The leading principles of his legislation were the equality of the citizens, the community of the lands, and the subjection of the daily life of individuals to minute regulation by law. The education of the children was appointed, and was principally directed to make them soldiers. They were made to sit on the ground, to wear the same coarse garment in winter and summer, to wait on the tables of the men, and frequently to exercise their courage in combats among themselves. The elder boys were divided into troops (*agelæ*); of each of which one of themselves was chosen as chief, while a superintendent was appointed from the men, to lead out the troop to the chase and to exercise, and to correct the disorderly. These troops were maintained at the public expense; and on certain days were accustomed to engage with each other in battle, to the sound of music, fighting with their fists, and even with weapons. On arriving at manhood, they were obliged to contract themselves in marriage, and at the same time they left the *agelæ* to enter into the clubs or messes of the men, where they lived in perfect equality on the produce of the land, which belonged to the state, and was cultivated for it by numerous slaves. Herein Greece saw nothing to disapprove. Ancient politicians considered slaves as absolutely necessary, and their happiness or misery as very unimportant. The object in view was to support the citizens in leisure and freedom; while the number and wretchedness of the servile class were never considered, unless so far as their discontent might endanger the tranquillity of the free. The powers of the Cretan government were concentrated in the council of elders, and in ten magistrates called *Cosmi*: and both these appointments were held for life. The assembly of the people was only allowed a silent vote on such propositions as were submitted to it by the elderhood and *Cosmi*. The military command was at first in the king, but on the abolition of royalty was entrusted to the *Cosmi*.

While Crete was flourishing under a government singularly regular, though avowedly calculated to train up the citizens in the habits of a well disciplined army, rather than in those of a peaceful commonwealth, the continent of Greece was yet in a state of great disorder. The Cadmeians and Curetes had brought to their settlements in Boeotia, Ætolia, and Eubœa, much useful knowledge, and a more settled mode of life: and nearly at the same time, corn and the art of tillage were made known to Attica by Ceres. She

...lian woman: but, from the resemblance of the religious mysteries she introduced at Eleusis to those, which were elsewhere celebrated by the Phœnicians in honour of the same goddess, under many names, as Rhea, Cybele, and others, it is probable that the benefits attributed to her were due to the Phœnicians, and that Ceres was either a priestess of the Phœnician goddess, or perhaps a name of the goddess herself. But improvement was retarded by continual rapine, war, and emigration. If a tribe was attacked by a stronger enemy, they all quitted their homes with little reluctance, to seek a new abode in the seats of any whom they in their turn might be able to master. There was no traffic, no safe intercourse by land or sea: the towns were unfortified, and no one thought of providing more than would suffice for his present wants, being uncertain when he might be pillaged or driven from his dwelling. Having nothing valuable, and expecting any where to get such necessary sustenance as might serve them from day to day, they were easily induced to change their abodes; and hence there was little increase in the greatness of cities or the wealth of their inhabitants. But the richest soils were always the most subject to these changes; for, the goodness of the land, by increasing the riches, and thereby the power, of some particular men, both caused seditions within the communities, and tempted strangers to attack them. Besides, with the growth of navigation, the people on the coast, and in the islands, both Greeks and others, betook themselves to piracy, sending out ships under the command of their most powerful men, much like the Northmen who ravaged England in the reigns of Alfred and some of his successors. This was then deemed honourable; and robbery has at some time been held in every barbarous nation; but it is a singular fact, that this feeling lasted

GREECE.

not only to the time of Homer, but in some of the less civilised parts of the Grecian continent, even to that of Thucydides. These evils were checked by the power of Minos, whose wise institutions, together with the happy situation of his island, had made him the greatest potentate of Greece. He first built a navy for the protection of commerce and the enlargement of his empire; conquered many of the Cyciades, (islands in the *Ægean*), and cleared the sea, as far as was practicable, of pirates. In the period of tranquillity thus afforded, many cities increased in wealth and power so far as to surround themselves with walls, and to feel safe in their own strength; and the towns which were subsequently founded were not, as of old, placed far away from the sea for security from the sudden incursions of pirates, but were usually fixed upon the coast for the convenience of trade, and made defensible by fortifications.

From a very early period, when the rest of Greece was in the troubled state just described, Attica alone was comparatively tranquil, a blessing due to the apparent disadvantages of its situation. It is, like most of Greece, a tract inclosed and intersected in every direction by mountain ridges; but it is one in which the productive valleys and plains bear even a smaller proportion than usual, to the rugged and sterile barriers which surround them. The soil is thin and light, highly favourable to the growth of figs and olives, but offering a very moderate return to the labour of tillage, and still less suited to the pasturage of cattle, the chief riches of that age. Hence, since no one coveted their territory, the inhabitants enjoyed it undisturbed; and the population not having been changed within the limits of tradition, the Athenians in after-times were able to boast their favourite title of *Autocthonous*, or children of the soil. The peace and security of Athens made it a refuge to wealthy and powerful men, who were driven out from other places by war or sedition; and its population was thus so far increased that it early relieved itself by sending colonies to Asia. Its prosperity was aided by an early reform in its institutions. Under the successors of Cecrops, the twelve cities into which he had assembled the Atticans, retained each its separate magistrates and *prytaneum* (town hall): and though they owned a superiority in the king of Athens, they never consulted him unless in case of danger, but were governed independently

by their several councils, and sometimes even made war on each other. The division of Attica did not cease, till Theseus coming to the throne, completely remodelled its political state.

Theseus was the son of *Ægeus* king of Athens, by *Æthra* the daughter of *Pitheus*, king of *Træzen*, a small town of *Peloponnesus*, opposite to Attica. He was bred at the court of his father-in-law, and when grown to manhood was sent by his mother to Athens. Though advised to go by sea, as shorter and safer, piracy being about that time suppressed by Minos, he chose the more hazardous journey by land. "That age," says *Plutarch*, "produced men of uncommon strength, dexterity, and swiftness, who used these natural gifts to no good purpose, but placed their enjoyment in outrage and cruelty, esteeming the praises of equity, fair dealing, and benevolence, to proceed from faintness of heart and the dread of injury, and little to become the powerful and bold." The fame of *Hercules* was principally founded on the destruction of such marauders, and Theseus aspired to a similar renown. He took his way through the isthmus of *Corinth*, a tract most favourable to plunderers, abounding with mountain fastnesses, and the only passage between *Peloponnesus* and Northern Greece. All who attacked him were slain or defeated, and he arrived at Athens, having delivered the country from some of its greatest scourges. He was there acknowledged by *Ægeus*, and welcomed by the people, prepossessed in his favour by the fame of his exploits. Some commotions were raised by the nephews of *Ægeus*, who had expected to succeed him; but these were defeated and the faction quelled.

The Athenians, in a war with Minos, king of *Crete*, had purchased peace by a yearly tribute of seven youths and seven virgins as slaves. The burden was borne with much uneasiness. The poets relate that the victims were thrown to be devoured by the *Minotaur*, a monster half bull, half man: and possibly such a report may have been current at the time among the ignorant many. The captives had hitherto been drawn by lot from the people: Theseus offered himself as one. The history of his going to *Crete* is much disguised by fable, but it would seem that Minos received him honourably, remitted the tribute, and finally gave him his daughter *Ariadne* in marriage. She returned with him, and it is fabled that he deserted her on the

GREECE.

island of Naxos. Probably she sickened in the voyage, and died on the island.

The success and patriotic boldness of his enterprise raised Theseus to the highest popularity. Sacrifices and processions were instituted to commemorate it, and the ship in which he returned was yearly sent to the sacred island of Delos, carrying a mission to perform thanksgiving to Apollo. About this time, on the death of Ægeus, Theseus succeeded unopposed; and possessing a degree of influence which enabled him to effect a great political change, he went through the several towns, and persuaded the inhabitants to give up their separate councils and magistracies, and submit to a common jurisdiction. Every man was to retain his dwelling and his property as before, but justice was to be administered and all public affairs transacted at Athens. The mass of the people came into his measures; and to subdue the reluctance of the powerful, who were loth to resign the importance accruing from the local magistracies, he gave up much of his own authority, reserving only the command of the army, and the care of watching over the execution of the laws. Opposition was silenced by his liberality, together with the fear of his power, ability, and courage; and the union of Attica was effected by him and made lasting. To bind it closer, without disturbing the religious observances of the several towns, he instituted a common festival in honour of Minerva, which was called the feast of union, and the feast of all the Athenians (*Panathenæa*.) To his wise measures Athens owes its early prosperity and civilisation, its subsequent eminence in all the arts of peace and war, and its importance in history, so utterly disproportionate to the extent and value of its territory. The quiet and good order produced by the union in Attica are proved by the fact that the Athenians were the first in Greece who left off the habitual carrying of arms, and adopted a peaceful garb.

Even in these early ages the religion of Greece, though somewhat less complex than in after-times, was an intricate tissue of fable and superstition. It seems to have been chiefly derived from Egypt, but partly also from Phœnicia, and partly from the old belief of the Pelasgians. The latter worshipped nameless gods, which makes it probable that their ancestors had quitted the regions of Asia, that formed the cradle of mankind, before the commencement of polytheism

(the worship of many gods;) though, in the barbarism into which they fell, they could not long raise their minds to the contemplation of the one supreme and invisible God; and therefore began to adore the inferior spirits, whom they supposed to be the immediate movers of nature. But when they met with strangers far their superiors in knowledge and intelligence, who professed to declare the names, order, different powers and mutual relations of the gods, the means of learning their will, and of averting their anger; they naturally received with joyful acquiescence a communication which gave them definite notions where all seemed vague, dark, and uncertain. *Such instructors they first found in the Egyptian settlers, and accordingly nearly all the names of Grecian gods were Egyptian. The Phœnicians afterwards settled more extensively; but their religion so much resembled that of Egypt, that it is difficult to discover from which nation many tenets and practices of Grecian worship were derived. In Egypt, a numerous hereditary priesthood were the sole depositaries of all religious and historical knowledge, and they chiefly studied to improve their ascendancy by practising on the ignorance and superstition of the people. For this end they veiled their doctrines and traditions under fables and allegories unintelligible to the many, and worshipped the Deity with different rites appropriate to all his different attributes, assigning him a separate name and symbol as considered under each: thus gratifying by their ritual the popular love of variety and splendour, and working powerfully on the imagination by dim glimpses of a hidden meaning in the mysterious celebrations. The multitude, as might be expected, soon came to consider these different names as belonging to so many independent deities; and the priests were not solicitous to undeceive them. Hence there arose in Egypt, and subsequently in Greece, a double religion, the one for the learned, the other for the ignorant. The latter acknowledged a plurality, and dealt in monstrous and frequently immoral fables, which have been reprobated by the wisest Greeks, as ascribing to the gods actions of which an ordinary man would be ashamed. The former was taught at the solemnities called *Orgies*, or *Mysteries*, at which those who were present were bound to secrecy as to what they saw, and were supposed

ever after to be invested with peculiar sanctity. Among the most noted of these in Greece were the orgies of Ceres at Eleusis. Their general object seems to have been to teach the unity of the highest God, and to communicate such fragments as had been retained of the primitive religion.

The spirit of mystery which prevailed in religion, extended itself also into philosophy; and the object of the earliest Grecian moralists was not so much to instruct the people, as to compose, for a narrow circle of scholars, a discipline which should raise them above the common level of mankind. Such were the instructions of Pythagoras, who imposed a long and arduous probation before a man could be admitted as his disciple; and many philosophers made a distinction between the doctrines, which they publicly taught, (*exoterica*, or the doctrines for those without,) and those reserved for a few more favoured hearers (*esoterica*, or the doctrines for those within.) This is not wonderful, considering that Greek philosophy originated from Egypt, where it was inseparably united with theology, and was, like it, the exclusive patrimony of the priesthood. Orpheus, who lived before the Trojan war, the first noted teacher of wisdom to the Greeks, preserved the union; and instituted orgies, which were at once a religious solemnity and a course of philosophical instruction. Pythagoras, in a later age, could not give his discipline the character of sacredness; but yet so closely did the purifying ceremonies enjoined by him, agree with the religious mysteries, that they are paralleled by Herodotus with the Orphic orgies, and those of Bacchus, both of which were sacred and derived from Egypt. Pythagoras, Plato, and many other eminent philosophers of Greece, travelled into Egypt, and it is probably to remnants of primitive tradition there picked up, that we owe the dim shadowings of some mysterious doctrines of Christian belief, which are occasionally found in heathen writers. The unity of the supreme Godhead, which was maintained by most of the wisest Greeks, is a truth too congenial with human reason to need any tradition to account for its existence; but there are other notions, which, far from being obvious, have been always the most difficult to be received, and these can be accounted for on no other supposition.

The popular religion of Greece in the age preceding the Trojan war, differed

little from that in after-times; except that its scattered fables had not been embodied, as was afterwards done by the early poets, Homer and Hesiod, whom Herodotus names as the fathers of Grecian mythology; and that hero-worship does not seem to have been practised. Mortals had indeed been deified, as Bacchus; but their mortality was put out of sight, and in the legends related of them, they are throughout considered as gods; whereas the heroes are, in all their actions, represented as men, till the history closes with their death, and elevation to the rank of an inferior divinity. No sign of this practice is found in Homer or Hesiod; but it afterwards became so common, that every town had its particular heroes, and new ones were continually added to the list. The greater gods took their rise chiefly from Egypt: many other more fanciful inventions were of native growth, as Muses, Graces, nymphs of mountains, woods, and waters. Greece had never an order of priesthood. There were indeed priests of particular divinities, but when not engaged in their religious duties, there was seldom any thing to separate them from the rest of the community. In early times all sacred functions belonged to the king, excepting some rites of peculiar sanctity, which had priests specially appointed to perform them; and even when royalty was generally abolished, in many states the title was continued to the person who performed those religious offices, which had belonged to the king.

Facility in crediting pretenders to a knowledge of the future, a weakness common to half civilised countries and half educated men, was very prevalent in Greece. Their predictions were of two kinds: in the one case drawn by rules from the state of the entrails in a sacrificed victim, from the flight of birds, the occurrence of thunder, and numberless accidents and natural appearances; in the other, by direct communication from deities supposed to be resident in certain spots. The first kind was so prevalent in Homer's time, that in his poem we scarcely find an action done, or plan proposed, which is not accompanied by some portent of its good or ill success. We hear little from him of local oracles, the consulting which was too troublesome and expensive to be practised except on important occasions. Many existed, though none had arrived at that commanding influence and celebrity, which was afterwards at-

tained by the oracle at Delphi, but which hardly could arise till the different states had come into more frequent mutual intercourse, and larger connexion in peace and war. The oldest oracle was at Dodona in Epirus, and was established by a woman stolen by some Phœnicians from the temple of Jupiter at Thebes, in Egypt. Other oracles arose in various places, but the greatest celebrity was gained by that of Apollo at Delphi in Phœcis. Here was a cavern, whence came exhalations producing convulsions and temporary phrensy, which were supposed to be symptoms of divine inspiration. The mode of conducting the oracle was this: the person who received the supposed inspiration was a priestess exclusively devoted to that office, and called Pythia, from Pytho, the ancient name of the place. She being placed over the cavern, the words which fell from her in her delirium were arranged and connected by the attending priests, and an answer framed from them, till a late period always in verse. The interpreters thus could modify the answer at pleasure, and in doubtful cases they generally made it ambiguous, and such as at once to gratify the questioner, if powerful and liberal, and to avoid being convicted of falsehood. Hence, when many less prudently managed lost their credit, the Delphian oracle maintained its character for superior trust-worthiness, and, as we shall find in the subsequent history, continued for ages powerfully to influence the politics of Greece.

CHAPTER II.

Of Peloponnesus, from the Trojan War to the end of the second Messenian War.

PIRACY, as we have seen, in early times was a common, and was held an honourable practice among the people inhabiting the coasts and islands of the Ægean sea. The famous voyage of the Argonauts was nothing more than a piratical expedition to the eastern shores of the Euxine, remarkable for its unusual extent and boldness, and the number of men of distinction engaged in it, in which Jason, the commander, carried away with him Medea, the daughter of the Colchian king. A similar outrage, done to Greece in the next generation, was followed by wider mischiefs. Paris, the son of Priam, king of Troy, in the course of a marauding expedition,

being hospitably entertained at Sparta, by Menelaus, the brother of Agamemnon, ended his visit, with stealing Helen, the wife of his host. The kings of Mycenæ had long been commonly the leading potentates of Greece, and Agamemnon was more powerful than his greatest predecessors. Achaia and Argolis, with Corinth, belonged to the original dominion of Mycenæ; Agamemnon inherited Eleia from Pelops; Laconia, with most of Messenia, formed the kingdom of Menelaus; and what remained of Peloponnesus was governed by petty chiefs dependent on Mycenæ. Beyond the isthmus, Agamemnon had no authority, but his power was dreaded and his influence felt; and by his ascendancy, together with resentment of the aggression, with the love of war, and the hope of booty, all Greece was united for the overthrow of Troy. (B. C. 914.)* The combined fleet was assembled at Aulis in Bœotia, where it was so long detained by contrary winds, supposed to be occasioned by the anger of Diana, that Agamemnon is said to have been compelled by his army to sacrifice his daughter Iphigenia to the goddess. This story wants the authority of Homer and Hesiod, but it is related by many very ancient writers, and is not without parallel in that age. Human sacrifices, as we know from scripture, were much used by the nations of Palestine, and hence they were carried by the Phœnicians into Greece, as into all the places where they settled; and though never there, as among the Canaanites, an ordinary rite, they were occasionally employed in great emergencies, and when the anger of some deity was believed to be unusually excited.

The people against which the voyage was directed, differed little from the Greeks in origin, habits, language, or civilisation. The extent and power of the Trojan kingdom were considerable, but not sufficiently so to keep the field against the united strength of Greece; and had the siege been prosecuted with vigour, it would probably have been short. But the resources of Greece being unequal to the maintenance of the army, it was obliged to support itself by plunder gathered from the neighbouring cities,

* The chronology of these early times is very uncertain. The dates here adopted are those of Newton, whose system, though far from being satisfactory, appears, on the whole, to tally better with the course of events than any other. We have not the means of attaining more than a very imperfect approximation to the truth. All the other systems, where they differ from Newton's, assign to each event a higher antiquity than he does.

GREECE.

and by cultivating the opposite Chersonese, or peninsula, from which it was separated by the Hellespont; and while much of its force was always thus employed, the remainder barely sufficed to keep the enemy within his walls. Thus the war was protracted through ten years, at the end of which, Troy was taken, and suffered all those miseries, and that destruction, which, to the disgrace of human nature, continues, even now, to be the usual fate of captured towns. Of the aggregate evil caused by the war, some conception may be formed from the statement, that, in different plundering expeditions, twelve towns were ruined by Achilles alone; the chiefs and soldiers mercilessly butchered, the women and children carried into bondage, and those of the women who were so unhappy as to please the eye of their conquerors, reduced to live in a miserable concubinage with the slaughterers of their kindred. This war is the subject of the noblest poem of antiquity, the *Iliad* of Homer; and the greatest moral merit of that poem is, that it does not gloss over the horrors of war, but gives such picture, as that just exhibited, broadly and plainly, without disguise or palliation. Yet this very poem stimulated Alexander to a wider career of devastation; so much less powerful is sympathy with suffering, than the desire of a spurious and malignant renown.

We have in the *Iliad*, and its sequel the *Odyssey*, an admirable picture of Grecian manners at this early period. The chief riches of the age were slaves and cattle, horses, arms, household utensils and furniture. The slaves were often taken in plundering expeditions, in which chiefs and princes thought not shame to be engaged: but however unjustly and violently obtained, their condition was better than in later times. They might be as liable to arbitrary chastisement as afterwards: but they were ordinarily treated more as members of the family, and some old and trusty servants would even be placed by their masters on a footing approaching to familiar friendship. Handicrafts and menial services could not be felt as degrading in age when princes often performed them: as we find it related that Achilles cooked the dinner for the ambassadors who were sent by Agamemnon to visit him in his tent; Ulysses carved and ornamented the bedstead for his bridal chamber; and Nausicaa, daughter to the King of Phæacia (Corcyra or Corfu),

went to her father, when sitting in the council of his chiefs, to ask that she might go down to the river with her handmaids to wash the linen of the household. Hospitality was held a sacred duty; and so strictly was it observed, that when a stranger appeared at a banquet, it was usual not to ask his name till the feast were over, lest his welcome should be injured, if he proved to be a person at deadly feud with his entertainer. Hospitality, strong family affection, and cordiality in the relations existing between master and servant, are virtues belonging to a simple state of society: but with them the early Greeks had also the vices common to half-civilised nations. They were given to piracy and robbery; and their wars were often wantonly undertaken, and always cruelly conducted, little quarter being given, and all prisoners becoming slaves. Man's life was held so cheap, that half the most famous heroes of Greece were persons guilty of murder: and though these were generally obliged to quit their country by the fear of vengeance from the kindred of the slain, they were elsewhere treated less as criminals, than as men unfortunate, as well in their banishment as in its cause.

The Grecian chiefs returning from Troy found every thing changed during their absence. Governments had then but little of established law or permanent system; and the power of princes depending entirely on their personal influence and energy, when they add their bravest adherents were absent, the aged and infant members of their family, far from exercising any authority, were unable even to protect themselves from spoliation and outrage. During the ten years war, a new generation growing to manhood, had adopted leaders of its own, and the returning chiefs found their places occupied by strangers, frequently their private property usurped, and their families destitute and exposed to indignity. Struggles ensued, in which many princes were compelled to reimburse their followers, and seek for settlements elsewhere, while others obliged their opponents to a similar migration. Ulysses, the king of the small island of Ithaca on the western coast of Greece, met with shipwrecks and various accidents on his return from Troy, which delayed his coming home for many years after that of the other chiefs. It was supposed in Ithaca that he had perished, and all the neighbouring chiefs came to

woo his wife Penelope, a paragon of beauty, virtue and discretion. Telemachus, the young son of the wanderer, and Laertes his aged father, could not resist the powerful intruders; and Penelope herself could not decidedly refuse to make her choice, though she contrived to delay it. At length Ulysses arrived, and stood unknown on the threshold of his father. He saw the suitors revelling in his halls, devouring his sheep and oxen, and wasting his substance in riot, insulting his family, and domineering over his servants and his people. In the disguise of a beggar he ministered to their amusement, endured their insolence, and partook of their churlish hospitality: but their measure was now full, and with the aid of Telemachus and two faithful servants he destroyed them. This story is the subject of the *Odyssey*: and though embellished, no doubt, by the fancy of the poet, we may be sure that it contains a groundwork of truth, and that whatever is added, tallies with the manners of the age. Agamemnon was murdered on his return by his wife Clytemnestra and cousin Ægisthus, for whom she had conceived an adulterous passion; the conspirators were strong enough to possess themselves of the government, but some of the friends of Agamemnon escaped the slaughter, carrying with them his infant son Orestes. The character of Agamemnon appears to have been popular, and the wickedness of his assassins could not but be generally detested; and the prevalence of these sentiments enabled Orestes, on arriving at manhood, to recover the throne, when he put to death both Clytemnestra and Ægisthus. It was the general belief that this tissue of horrors arose from the curse entailed by a crime of Pelops on his race, which, after occasioning deep guilt and misery in the intermediate generation, was consummated in a mother slain by her son for the murder of his father: a strong instance of a tendency universal in Greece to ascribe any remarkable crime or calamity less to the character of the immediate agents, than to the power of Destiny, urging them on actions they abhor, in vengeance for some former misdeed of themselves or their ancestors.

In the reign of Tisamenus the son of Orestes, a change took place in the ruling population through the greater part of Peloponnesus. Hercules, the most renowned of Grecian heroes, was

great grandson to Perseus king of Argos, the founder of Mycenæ. Some of his posterity were princes of Doria, a small and rugged tract in the mountains of Cæta and Parnassus; and here they never ceased to claim the royalty of Argos, from the time when it passed from the * Perseid line to that of Pelops. Twice they were repulsed from Peloponnesus; but the third attempt was more successful, when, eighty years after the Trojan war, (B. C. 824.) the Dorians invaded the peninsula under Temenus, Cresphontes, and Aristodemus, all sprung from Hercules. Tisamenus, driven from his other possessions, made a stand in Achaia; Arcadia was not attacked; but all the rest was parcelled among the invaders. Temenus had Argolis; Cresphontes Messenia; and Aristodemus dying, his twin sons Eurysthenes and Procles were made joint kings of Lacedæmon, of Sparta, or of Laconia; the first of these being the name by which the state or people is generally described, the second the name of the capital, the third of the province. Eurysthenes and Procles were each the founder of a royal house; and from their time there were constantly two kings of Lacedæmon, one from each family. Eleia was allotted to Oxylus, an Ætolian chief associated in the enterprise. The Pelopid kings had, probably, lost much power and popularity by their bloody family quarrels, and hence the conquerors had a favouring party in many places. But whatever be the plea of hereditary right by which the invasion is defended, whatever the promises held forth to allure the natives to submission, a government of conquest must ever be oppressive. The chiefs were obliged to recompense their followers, and their demands could only be satisfied by the general spoliation of the old inhabitants. Great numbers emigrated, the rest were mostly made slaves, and the Dorians remained sole masters of the soil, except in Messenia, where much was left to its rightful owners. From this revolution, commonly known as the Return of the Heracleids, or sons of Hercules, the Dorian name began to be powerful in Greece. Civilisation, which had previously made some progress in the peninsula, was thrown

* Perseid line.—The descendants of Perseus were called Perseids, those of Pelops Pelopids; and generally the members of every considerable family were denoted by an appellation formed in a similar manner from the name of some distinguished ancestor.

back by the irruption of the rude mountaineers, and the country was unceasingly torn with disputes arising from the partition of the territory won.

A common bond of union between Grecian towns, connected with each other by blood or alliance, was the institution of periodical meetings for religious observances and social festivity. These meetings were usually made attractive by splendid ceremonies, and by prizes offered to competition in athletic exercises, in poetry and music. A legend existed, that Hercules had instituted such a festival at Olympia, an Eleian town peculiarly consecrated to Jupiter; and Iphitus, king of Elis, the grandson of Oxylus, projected the making this report a means to soften the mutual enmities of the Peloponnesians, and to provide, at least, a periodical interruption of strife and bloodshed. The oracle at Delphi was now generally revered, and especially by the Dorians, whose race had come from its vicinity. Iphitus procured from the oracle a command that the Olympian festival should be restored, and a cessation of arms immediately proclaimed for all cities desirous of partaking in it; and the Peloponnesians, sending to inquire into the authenticity of the mandate, were ordered to submit to the direction of the Eleians in re-establishing the ancient customs of their fathers. Olympia was made the scene of a festival open to all Greece, which consisted in sacrifices to Jupiter and Hercules, and in contests exhibited to their honour. (B. C. 776.) Every fourth year was the period appointed for the recurrence of the celebration; and to prevent the attendance from being interrupted by war, a general armistice was ordered through Greece for some time, both before its beginning, and after its close. An olive garland was the only prize of victory in the different exercises; but this became a very envied distinction, and the interest taken in the contests, with the splendour and sanctity of the religious ceremonies, drew together an enormous concourse of spectators, and made the festival a fit occasion to communicate, readily and solemnly, whatever it concerned the Greeks in general to know. Hence, treaties were often by mutual agreement proclaimed at Olympia, and engraved on columns there erected, as a public and generally accessible record. The presidency of the festival was assured to the Eleians, with other remarkable privileges. A tradition was current

that the Heracleidae, on making Oxylus king of Elis and guardian of the temple of Olympian Jupiter, had consecrated all Elis to the god, and denounced the heaviest curses against all who should invade it, or should even suffer its invasion. Iphitus procured the acknowledgment of the tradition, and for many ages it was almost uniformly observed; and this made the Eleians singularly prosperous, and strikingly different in habits from the other Greeks. In general the smallness of the Grecian states, and their frequent mutual hostilities, made the citizens reside in fortified towns; their lands were cultivated by slaves, and on every alarm, the moveable property was brought within the walls, while the fixtures were destroyed by the invader, unless the force of the city were sufficient to repulse him. The Eleians, on the contrary, enjoyed a security which enabled them habitually to reside on their lands, and in building, planting, and every species of expensive improvement, to rest assured that they would not be robbed of the fruit of their labours; and hence they became remarkable for their opulence, for the perfection of their husbandry, the comfort and substantial character of their country-houses, and their strong attachment to a rural life, which all their institutions were directed to encourage. The advantages produced by the Olympian festival, to Elis and to Greece, excited attempts to imitate that institution, and three similar meetings were established, each to be held on one of the years intervening between two successive Olympiads. These were the Pythian, held at Delphi, the Isthmian, near Corinth, and the Nemean, in the territory of Argos; all which attained considerable celebrity, and contributed to maintain some sense of national union in Greece, interrupting annually its continual warfare by intervals of truce and friendly communication, between the most hostile states.

The government established by the Heracleidae was the same which then was universal in Greece, an irregular mixture of monarchy and oligarchy*, with a slight infusion of democracy. In a people recently emerged from barbarism, the power is always chiefly in the landholders. If the lordships be large, the proprietors are sovereign on their own estates; and though, for the military

* Oligarchy, the government of a few: democracy, that of the people.

advantages of union, they may acknowledge a king, he is little more than the head of a confederacy. But when the lordships are too small for independent defence, the proprietors are obliged to stricter union; they assemble therefore in towns, and the king is the chief magistrate as well as the military leader; the power being principally in the landholders, but exercised by them as a body over the people, and not as lords over their respective vassals. This was the first political order of Greece. The judicial power, with the general regulation of affairs, was in the council of the principal persons, under the titles of elders, chiefs, or princes: the king was military commander, president of the council, and priest. The assembly of the people had little to do with the ordinary direction of the state, being paramount indeed when called together, but only called on unusual occasions, and principally to decide the contests of the king and chiefs. The king was weak, the people scattered; the great proprietors were strong and united, and gradually monopolised the powers of the state, till the towns almost universally passed into oligarchical republics. There was little wealth but what arose from the land, and that was daily more concentrated in the ruling families by constant intermarriages, and by their support of each other's oppressions and encroachments. Manual labour being performed by slaves, in states that were not commercial, there was no means to eke out a scanty inheritance but the borrowing of money at exorbitant interest, with little prospect of repayment: the loan was readily offered by the wealthy, and in the end the land was sold to satisfy the creditor: and the small proprietors being thus destroyed, the city was divided into poor and rich, of whom the former were regarded by the latter at once with jealousy and with contempt, as persons to be kept down by every means, and proper subjects for every outrage; while they, on their part, were looking for an opportunity to enrich and avenge themselves by the spoliation of their oppressors. Such an opportunity frequently was given, when the oligarchy was divided within itself, and the weaker party made common cause with the people against its opponents; and hence a series of bloody commotions which runs through all the history of Greece. In some states the growth of commerce fostered a middle class, divided from the landed oligarchy by the different

nature and less concentration of their wealth, who had property which interested them in regular government, and intelligence and union which made them a check on the oppressions of the powerful. Where this was the case, it commonly produced a comparatively mild and regular oligarchy, and sometimes a permanent democracy; without this class, a permanent democracy rarely arose, as the lower people had not steadiness to conduct it, and the only change in such a state was from a tyrannical oligarchy to the arbitrary ascendancy of demagogues no less tyrannical.

In the age which followed the Dorian conquest of Peloponnesus, the causes described were in full operation. In most states the power of the king diminished gradually, and at length was abolished; all authority being engrossed by the wealthy landholders, who abused their ascendancy so as to incur the bitterest hatred of the poor. Hence arose perpetual contests between poor and rich, and governments constituted by the prevailing faction for the most effectual depression of the other. Besides these sources of internal dissensions, there were continual wars between city and city. In every district the smaller towns had exercised each its municipal government under the general superintendence of the king. When royalty was abolished, they would not own any supremacy in the capital; the king had their obedience, not as the head of a superior commonwealth, but as the common chief magistrate of all the cities in the province; and the claim of authority enforced by the capital was resisted with arms by the towns. Argos was the first to abolish royalty, or to reduce it to a cipher; but it was not happy in the government established in its place. The hostility between the rich and poor was there at its height, and seditions were uncommonly frequent and violent, in which the mastery was gained at different times by each; while its dominion, anciently the most extensive in Greece, was curtailed by the revolt of numerous towns, of which many succeeded in maintaining independence. Corinth, though suffering several revolutions, was commonly the quietest of the Peloponnesian republics, and that which was ruled with most of equity and moderation. Its site on the isthmus made it the great thoroughfare between Peloponnesus and Northern Greece, and gave it the commerce both of the eastern and western seas; and the flourishing of

trade produced a middle class, which in some degree protected the poor against oppression, and the rich against the consequences which might have ensued from their own excesses if unrestrained.

Besides the ordinary sources of dissension, Lacedæmon had one peculiar to itself in its divided royalty. The two kings were ever at variance, and in a contest where no political principle was at stake, the only motive to side with either was his personal influence and the hope of profiting by his favour. Hence partisans could only be secured by defending them through right and wrong: every powerful delinquent was sure to be backed by one or other of the kings; and between connivance at excesses, and the courting popularity by receding from prerogative, the regulating power of the government gave way to an anarchy, producing unmitigated oppression to the many, and to the few a tyranny unchecked by law, but rendered dangerous by the violence of rivals and the despair and hatred of the poor. Such was the state of Lacedæmon, when the death of Polydectes, the fifth from Procles, gave the crown to Lycurgus his brother, who soon after, discovering the late king's widow to be pregnant, immediately declared that he held it only as protector for the infant, if a boy, as it proved. The prudent and upright measures of Lycurgus to secure his nephew on the throne, greatly raised his character, which was already high; and though his enemies were afterwards strong enough to occasion his retirement from Sparta, he was looked on as the only person able to settle the distracted commonwealth, and at length was invited back by kings and people to legislate for the state. (B.C. 708.) Having procured the sanction of the oracle at Delphi, he returned with his plan already formed, its leading principles being adopted from Crete, where much of his exile had been passed. Some time was spent in organising a party; and then he summoned an assembly of the people, where, partly through persuasion, and partly through fear, his scheme of government was carried. The entire direction was given to a senate of thirty persons chosen for life, twenty-eight of them from those leading men whom he most trusted, with the two kings as presidents. Future senators were to be elected by the people, from such as had passed their sixtieth year. All laws originated in the senate, and the assembly of the people was confined

to the simple approval or disapproval of the decrees sent down to it, being excluded from all discussion, and even from stating the reasons of their vote. The kings had the priesthood, and the command of the army. But in after times the most important magistracy was that of the Ephori, who are said to have been either instituted or first made considerable by king Theopompus, above 100 years after Lycurgus. They were five in number, taken annually from the people, and their office was to watch over the delinquencies and ambitious projects of any, whether magistrates or private persons. They were empowered to fine, imprison, depose from office, or bring to an immediate trial any person from the king to the poorest citizen, and this acting by their own discretion, unrestrained by any precise law. In the course of time they gained a power almost despotic, and the more intolerable because, as the method of election is stated to have been bad, though we are not informed of its nature, they were often persons of little character or ability.

The most pressing evils were those arising from excessive inequality of fortunes. Lycurgus struck at the root of the mischief, by first equalising property, and then removing alike the motives and the means to accumulate. He made a law for the equal division of the lands; forbade the coming any metal more precious than iron; allowed men to borrow any utensil they wanted without consulting the owners; and adopted the Cretan institution of public messes, at which every citizen was obliged to live. His object was that all the Spartans should enjoy equality and competence, and, being free from the necessity of gainful labour, and the vices generated by the love of gain, should devote their time to improving their capacities for the public service; a noble scheme, if its practicability had not been built on gross injustice. Agriculture and handicrafts must fall to sleep, and if the Spartan people were relieved from them, it was because the people formed a scanty portion of the inhabitants, and the rest were slaves condemned to hopeless labour, and not considered as a part of the community. The gross defect of Grecian morality was the acknowledging no duties between man and man, except as linked by some special bond of blood, law, or treaty. The patriotism of each was generally confined to his particular state; but his most ex-

exclusive philanthropy only limited to the Grecian race, and held no inalienable injury to barbarians, which gratified the pride, or glutted the avarice of Greeks. It was in this spirit that many philosophers doubted the lawfulness of enslaving Greeks; but all approved of enslaving barbarians, and considered slaves as almost without rights: and it was in this spirit, too, that the Lacedæmonians, holding their bondmen under heavier oppression than was practised in any other Grecian state, conceived their boast of universal equality to be warranted by the unjust and insolent denial, that they were a portion of the people, who composed the mass of the population, and nourished the whole. The effect of the system even on the citizens was far from being entirely favourable. The mind may sometimes be degraded by a life of money-making labour, but not so certainly as by living on the compelled and unwarded toil of others: and if the love of gain was excluded, the love of tyranny was called into unprecedented activity, every citizen being empowered to command and punish all the slaves, as well those of others as his own. The brutal treatment of the ⁺Hædæi produced in them a rancorous hatred, which frequently endangered the existence of Sparta, and in their masters a jealousy that led to further oppressions, practised expressly to break their spirits, and bring them nearer to beasts: and these cruel persecutions frequently went even to the secret murder of any who were marked by superior natural gifts of body or mind.

Having banished the desire of gain, the object of the legislator was to fill the void with love of praise and emulation in patriotism and courage, and to bring the citizens into the best training for war. The education of the children and the habit of the men were equally regulated by public authority, and care was taken that all family ties should be weaker than that which bound the citizen to the commonwealth. The boys were reckoned as belonging less to their parents than to the state, and were taken from the family to be educated in bands

under appointed governors: they were bred to military exercises, and the uncomplaining endurance of hardships; practised in combats with each other; and kept on scanty fare, but encouraged to mend it by whatever they could take undiscovered from the messes of the men. By this they were formed to enterprise and circumspection, being liable, if detected, to heavy punishment for their awkwardness. In the absence of their governor they were subject to the authority of any citizen who chanced to be present, and were chastised by him for ill behaviour or disobedience. It was an usual amusement with the men to be present when the boys were at their meals, and to propose to them questions to be answered as shortly and pithily as they could: and hence the Spartans were remarkable for readiness in reply, and a brief and pointed style in speaking, which from them has been called Laconic. The maturer youths were under a discipline but slightly different; and both were obliged to pay to the men unlimited obedience and great respect, and to maintain an unexampled rigour in the decorum of outward behaviour. Emulation was promoted by every method both in men and boys, and in some instances at the cost of cherishing an evasive watchfulness over each other's failings. This system produced in the Spartans a most exact obedience to the laws, and made the love of their country in a wonderful degree a ruling principle ever present to their minds: but the constant publicity of their lives gave little scope to those domestic affections which might have tempered their hardness of heart, and taught them to feel as men for men, and not exclusively as citizens of Lacedæmon, utterly careless of the general interests of mankind. On gaining manhood they were required to marry; but it was disreputable for a young man to be seen in company with any woman, even with his wife: and as the end of marriage with Lycurgus was not domestic happiness, nor mutual affection, but to raise up soldiers for the state, he destroyed the sanctity of the marriage bed, encouraging the old to procure themselves children by inviting some younger friend to intercourse with their wives. The education of women was governed by the same principles as that of men. Their constitutions were strengthened by gymnastic exercises, that they might bear more vigorous children; they were

* *Hædæi*, the name under which the Greeks denoted all people not of Grecian blood.

* *Hædæi*, the most numerous and most important class of slaves among the Lacedæmonians. Agriculture was entirely committed to them, and those who were employed in it, paid to the owners of the land a quantity of produce, which, according to Lycurgus, was forbidden to increase. In other respects they were at the mercy of their masters.

taught to rival the men in patriotic ardour and the love of martial glory; that the hope of their applause, and the dread of their scorn, might more powerfully stimulate to daring; but Lycurgus cared little for domestic virtues, and rather discountenanced as inconvenient that purity of thought and tenderness of feeling, which are elsewhere the peculiar grace of the sex.*

Courage, hardihood, and obedience, strong love of praise, and fear of shame, directed entirely to war, made the Lacedæmonians a most formidable people. A Spartan was disgraced for ever, who gave way to fear in the most hopeless situation; and after a defeat, amidst the general mournings the kindred of those who had fallen were required to wear a face of joy, because their relations had not shared the reproach of flight. Surrounded and overmatched, they would perish rather than yield, and the surrender of a Lacedæmonian detachment to whatever odds, was a wonder to Greece. To this invincible spirit, they added a decided pre-eminence in discipline and skill. The fate of Grecian battles usually depended on the heavy-armed foot, who had each a helmet and breastplate, a large shield and long spear, and a small sword rarely used. They were formed with levelled spears in a close body, among the Lacedæmonians most commonly eight deep. The phalanx, so this order was called, while it kept its array, was irresistible, except by a similar body; but it was slow in movement and liable to be harassed securely with missiles, and disordered by unequal ground; and, once broken, it was defeated, the long spear and heavy shield being, in a mingled scuffle, more incumbrances than aids. To preserve the order in all circumstances, great readiness and regularity in evolution were required; and for this the Lacedæmonians were distinguished, as well as for a remarkably well organized system of subordinate command. All the soldiers were waited on by Helots, who acted as light-armed troops, a service so despised, that the light troops are generally omitted by Greek writers, in stating the numbers of an army. They had a few cavalry, whose principal use was to disperse the light troops of the enemy, but who never ventured to attack his phalanx; and this was a service little cultivated by the Lacedæmonians. To increase their alacrity, the camp was made to them a place of comparative

ease, the seven districts into which the city was divided, and the country round about, being assigned to each of the seven tribes, and the Helots being required to furnish each tribe with a certain number of oxen, horses, and sheep, for the use of the Spartans.

The Lacedæmonian constitution, at once the ability of Lycurgus, and his laws to the end he proposed, the presumption of entrusting the provinces of a legislator, who had fashioned the popular mind from a standard, but to check its wisdom from nature and reason. The law made the only rule of right, and to question its wisdom, the greatest of offences; and hence its faults were perpetuated to the character of the citizens, while, when it was silent, there was no general principle of morality to guide them. The excellence aimed at was very limited, and almost entirely warlike; and every institution tending to increase the military efficiency of the population was readily adopted, whatever vices of a different nature it might involve. The system succeeded; the behaviour of the citizens towards each other and towards the state was completely regulated; and the Lacedæmonians, as a people, were remarkable for the strict observance of their very limited moral code. But in their relations to all without their commonwealth, "they were neither governed by their own laws nor by the principles held sacred through the rest of Greece." In foreign command, with a few brilliant exceptions, they were harsh, unjust, and tyrannical; towards the wretched Helots uniformly cruel, and sometimes basely treacherous; while their external policy, always grasping, selfish, and ungenerous, often prodigal in the extreme, is best described in the words of Thucydides, "That most remarkably of all we know, they hold things pleasant to be honourable, and things profitable to be just." Yet however vicious and unnatural as a whole, the Spartan character stands alone in the exhibition of endurance, and universality of sacrifice and patriotism; and the degree in which these qualities were displayed by nearly every individual in that republic, may make us hope for the noblest effects of education on mankind, whenever a sagacity like that of Lycurgus in the choice of laws shall be directed to the teaching of pure and more comprehensive morality.

The increased strength and increased reputation of Lacedæmon was soon felt by the bordering states, but by none so much

as by Messenia. Inflamed by wrongs both done and suffered, in the second generation after Lycurgus, (B.C. 652) the Lacedæmonians resolved to make a sudden attack on that province without any declaration of war, and bound themselves by oath never to abandon the enterprise, and even never to return to their families till Messenia was subdued. They surprised Ampheia, a frontier town, the gates being open and unguarded as in time of peace; and that treachery might not be unaccompanied with cruelty, all found there were put to the sword. Euphaes, the Messenian king, had wisdom and courage; and, aware of the Lacedæmonian superiority in the field, he protracted the war, avoiding battles and defending the towns. In the fourth year, however, a battle was fought with great slaughter and doubtful success. But the Messenians were suffering from garrison confinement and the constant plundering of their lands. New measures were taken. The people were collected from the inland posts at Ithome, a place of great natural strength, and open to supplies by sea, the Lacedæmonians having no fleet. Meanwhile they asked advice of the Delphic oracle, which bade them sacrifice to the infernal deities, a virgin of the blood of Æpytus, son of the Heracleid Cresphontes. Impelled by patriotism or ambition, Aristodemus offered his own daughter; and when it was intended to save her by falsely denying her virginity, in his rage he slew her with his own hand. The fame of the obedience paid to the oracle so far disheartened the enemy, that the war languished for five years: in the sixth an invasion took place, and a battle, bloody and indecisive like the former. Euphaes was killed, and left no issue, and Aristodemus was elected to succeed him. The new prince was brave and able, and the Lacedæmonians, weakened by the battle, confined themselves for four years to predatory incursions. At last they again invaded Messenia, and were defeated: but in the midst of his success, Aristodemus was so possessed with remorse for his daughter's death, that he slew himself on her tomb, and deprived his country of the only leader able to defend her. Ithome was besieged. The famished inhabitants found means to pass the Lacedæmonian lines, and fled for shelter and subsistence, some to neighbouring states where they had claims of hospitality, others to their ruined homes, and about their desolated country.

Ithome was dismantled; and those who remained of the Messenians were allowed to occupy most of the lands, paying half the produce to Sparta.

The absence from home to which the Lacedæmonians had bound themselves, became, by the protraction of the war, an evil threatening the existence of the state, no children being born to supply the waste of war and natural decay. The remedy said to have been adopted was a strange one, highly characteristic of Lacedæmon, and such as no other people would have used. The young men who had come to maturity since the beginning of the war, were free from the oath, and they were sent home to cohabit promiscuously with the marriageable virgins. But even at Sparta this expedient, in some degree, ran counter to the popular feelings. When the war was ended, and the children of this irregular intercourse grown to manhood, though bred in all the discipline of Lycurgus, they found themselves generally slighted. Their spirit was high, their discontent dangerous; and it was thought prudent to offer them the means of settling out of Peloponnesus. They willingly emigrated, and under Phalanthus, one of their own number, they founded the city of Tarentum in Italy.

During forty years Messenia bore the yoke. But the oppression of the inhabitants was grievous, and embittered with every circumstance of insult, and the Grecian spirit of independence was yet strong in them; they only wanted a leader, and a leader was found in Aristomenes, a youth of the royal line. Support being promised from Argos and Arcadia, allies of his country in the former war, Aristomenes attacked a body of Lacedæmonians, and, though not completely successful, did such feats of valour that the Messenians would have chosen him king; but he declined it, and was made general-in-chief. His next adventure was an attempt to practise on the superstitious fears of the enemy. Sparta having neither walls nor watch, he easily entered it alone by night, and hung against the Brazen House, (a singularly venerated temple of Minerva,) a shield with an inscription declaring that Aristomenes from the spoils of the Spartans dedicated that shield to the goddess. Alarmed lest their protecting goddess should be won from them, the Lacedæmonians sent to consult the Delphian oracle, and were directed to take an Athenian adviser. The Athenians, though

far from wishing the subjugation of Messenia, yet feared to offend the god if they refused compliance; but in granting what was asked, they hoped to make it useless, and sent Tyrtæus, a schoolmaster, poor and lame, and supposed to be of no ability. The choice proved better than they intended, since the poetry of Tyrtæus being very popular, kept up the spirit of the people in all reverses.

The Messenian army had now been reinforced from Argos, Elis, Arcadia, and Sicyon, and Messenian refugees came in daily: the Lacedæmonians had been joined by the Corinthians alone. They met at Caprussema, where by the desperate courage of the Messenians, and the conduct and extraordinary personal exertions of their leader, the Lacedæmonians were routed with such slaughter, that they were on the point of suing for peace. Tyrtæus diverted them from this submission, and persuaded them to recruit their numbers by associating some Helots, a measure very galling to Spartan pride. Meanwhile, Aristomenes was ever harassing them with incursions. In one of these he carried off from Caryæ a number of Spartan virgins assembled to celebrate the festival of Diana. He had formed a body-guard of young and noble Messenians who always fought by his side, and to their chagrin he gave the captives. Heated with wine, the young men attempted to violate their chastity, and Aristomenes, after vainly remonstrating, killed the most refractory with his own hand, and on receiving their ransom, restored the girls uninjured to their parents. Another time, in an assault on Ægila, he is said to have been made prisoner by some Spartan women there assembled, who repelled the assault with a vigour equal to that of the men; but one of them who had previously loved him favoured his escape.

In the third year of the war, another battle took place at Megaletaphrus, the Messenians being joined by the Arcadians alone. Through the treachery of Aristocrates, prince of Orchomenus, the Arcadian leader, the Messenians were surrounded and cut to pieces, and Aristomenes, escaping with a scanty remnant, was obliged to give up the defence of the country, and collect his forces at Eira, a strong hold near the sea. Here he supplied the garrison by plundering excursions, so ably conducted as to foil every precaution of the besiegers, insomuch that they forbade all culture of the conquered territory, and even of part of

Laconia. At that time a large body of Lacedæmonians, with their kings, after an obstinate struggle, was knocked down and taken, and about fifty of his band. The prisoners were thrown as rebels into a deep cavern, and all were killed by the last except Aristomenes, who was wonderfully preserved and enabled to escape, and returning to Eira, soon gave proof to the vigour of his presence by fresh exploits equally daring and judicious. The siege was protracted till the eleventh year, when the Lacedæmonian commander, one stormy night, learning that a post in the fort had been quitted by its guard, silently occupied it with his troops. Aristomenes flew to the spot and commenced a vigorous defence, the women assisting by throwing tiles from the house tops, and many, when driven thence by the storm, even taking arms and mixing in the fight. But the superior numbers of the Lacedæmonians enabled them constantly to bring up fresh troops, while the Messenians were fighting without rest or pause, with the tempest driving in their faces. Cold, wet, sleepless, jaded, and hungry, they kept up the struggle for three nights and two days; at length, when all was vain, they formed their column, placing in the middle their women and children and most portable effects, and resolved to make their way out of the place. Aristomenes demanded a passage, which was granted by the enemy, unwilling to risk the effects of their despair. Their march was towards Arcadia, where they were most kindly received, and allotments were offered them of land. Even yet Aristomenes hoped to strike a blow for the deliverance of his country. He selected 500 Messenians, who were joined by 300 Arcadian volunteers, and resolved to attempt the surprise of Sparta, while the army was in the farthest part of Messenia, where Pylos and Methone still held out. But the enterprise was frustrated by Aristocrates, who sent word of it to Sparta. The messenger was seized on his return, and the letters found on him discovering both the present and former treachery of his master, the indignant people stoned the traitor to death, and erected a pillar to commemorate his infamy.

The Messenians, who fell under the power of Lacedæmon, were made Helots. The Pylians and Methonæans, and others on the coast, now giving up all hope of further resistance, proposed to their countrymen in Arcadia to join them in seek-

ing some fit place for a colony, and requested Aristomenes to be their leader. He sent his son. For himself, he said, he would never cease to war with Lacedæmon, and he well knew that, while he lived, some ill would ever be happening to it. After the former war, the town of Rhegium in Italy had been partly peopled by expelled Messenians. The exiles were now invited by the Rhegians to assist them against Zancle, a hostile Grecian town on the opposite coast of Sicily, and in case of victory the town was offered them as a settlement. Zancle was besieged, and the Messenians having mastered the walls, the inhabitants were at their mercy. In the common course of Grecian warfare, they would all have been either slaughtered or sold for slaves, and such was the wish of the Rhegian prince. But Aristomenes had taught his followers a nobler lesson. They refused to inflict on other Greeks what they had suffered from the Lacedæmonians, and made a convention with the Zancleans, by which each nation was to live on equal terms in the city. The name of the town was changed to Messene, which with little variation it still retains, and it has ever since been among the greatest cities in Sicily.

Aristomenes vainly sought the means of further hostilities against Sparta, but his remaining days were passed in tranquillity with Damagetus prince of Italy, in Rhodes, who had married his daughter. His actions dwell in the memories of his countrymen, and cheered them in their wanderings and sufferings: and from their legendary songs, together with those of the Lacedæmonians, and with the poems of Tyrtæus, the story of the two Messenian wars has been chiefly gathered by the learned and careful antiquary Pausanias, from whose work it is here taken. The character of Aristomenes, as thus represented, combines all the elements of goodness and greatness, in a degree almost unparalleled among Grecian heroes. Inexhaustible in resources, unconquerable in spirit, and resolutely persevering through every extremity of hopeless disaster, an ardent patriot and a formidable warrior, he yet was formed to find his happiness in peace: and after passing his youth under oppression, and his manhood in war against a cruel enemy, wherein he is said to have slain more than 300 men with his own hand, he yet retained a singular gentleness of nature, insomuch that he is related to have wept at the fate

of the traitor Aristocrates. The original injustice and subsequent tyranny of the Lacedæmonians, with the crowning outrage in the condemnation as rebels of himself and his companions, might have driven a meaner spirit to acts of like barbarity: but deep as was his hatred to Sparta, he conducted the struggle with uniform obedience to the laws of war, and sometimes, as in the case of the virgins taken at Caryæ, with more than usual generosity and strictness of morals.

CHAPTER III.

Of Athens, from the Trojan War, to the political alterations of Cleisthenes, and the first interference of Persia in the affairs of Greece; and of the general transactions of Greece, during the latter part of the same period.

ATHENS had been early civilised and flourishing beyond the rest of Greece, and particularly since Theseus had given to its institutions a regularity which seems to have kept it tranquil, even amidst the general convulsions which followed the return of the Greeks from Troy. When Tisamenus was driven into Achaia, that province was unable to support its increased population, and many of the old inhabitants being compelled to emigrate, went to Athens as a safe and eligible refuge; and the more willingly, as they, like the Athenians, were of the Ionian race. The reception of these and other refugees provoking the jealousy of the conquerors, Attica was invaded by a powerful army from Peloponnesus. The Delphian oracle had promised victory to the Dorians if they did not kill the Athenian king; on which Codrus, the king, resolved to devote himself for his people, and entering the Peloponnesian camp disguised as a peasant, provoked a quarrel in which he was killed. Alarmed at learning who had been slain, the invaders hastily retreated: but Megara, a town which had been founded by the Dorians on the Athenian territory near the isthmus, remained independent. Medon the eldest son of Codrus was lame, and his younger brother took advantage of this to dispute the succession; while a third party, adverse to both, declared that they would have no king but Jupiter. An answer was procured from Delphi in favour of Medon, and the dispute was compromised, it being determined that after Codrus none could be worthy of the title of king; that Medon should

be first magistrate, with the title of Archon; that this honour should be hereditary, but that the Archon should be accountable to the assembly of the people. These things happened B. C. 804. Attica being overpeopled through the multitude of refugees, a colony was sent to Asia Minor under Androclus and Neleus sons of Codrus. The most restless spirits emigrated, and long quiet ensued.

The coast of Asia from Cyzicus on the Propontis to the river Hermus, with the island of Lesbos, had already been colonised by Greeks. This tract was called *Æolis*, the settlers being mostly *Æolians* from Peloponnesus, driven thence at the Dorian conquest, and partly also in some preceding commotions. The emigrants from Athens occupied the coast extending southward from the Hermus, with the islands Chios and Samos. They founded twelve cities, of which the greatest were Ephesus, where Androclus resided, and Miletus, the most southern point of Ionia, the residence of Neleus. The authority of Androclus at first extended over all the cities, but the kingly power being soon abolished, each became a separate republic, though all were connected by a confederacy, with a general congress called *Panionion*, or the meeting of all the Ionians. Yet further south, some Dorian colonies were established in Caria. The island of Rhodes had long been Grecian, and settlements were soon after made on the northern shore of the *Ægean* sea, along the coasts of Macedonia and Thrace. Nor did the Greeks confine themselves to the *Ægean*. At different times, they settled most of the large and fertile island of Cyprus, at the eastern corner of the Mediterranean; founded Cyrene and other flourishing towns in Africa; occupied many places on the Euxine, more than half the coast of Italy, and of that of Sicily nearly the whole. The Greeks rarely coveted inland territories, and these were left to the natives, while the settlers established themselves along the sea, which enabled them to communicate with each other, and with the Grecian nation, of which they still esteemed themselves a part.

Twelve hereditary archons followed Medon. The last was Alcmaeon, at whose death, about 160 years after that of Codrus, Charops was made archon for ten years, and six more succeeded under the same limitation. Afterwards the duration of the office was reduced to a year,

and its duties divided among nine persons, taken, at first by suffrage, and afterwards by lot, from the *eupatridæ*, or nobles. One was chief among them, and by his name the year of his magistracy was distinguished, whence he was called archon *Eponymus*, or naming archon; but oftener simply the archon. The second had the title of King, and like the kings of old, the function of high priest. The third was called *Polemarch*, and was originally, as his name imports, the military commander. The other six were called *Thesmothetæ*, or setters forth of the laws: they presided as judges in the courts, and the six formed a tribunal which had a peculiar jurisdiction. The nine together formed the council of state. Legislation was in the people, but almost the whole administration rested on the archons.

All power being confined to the *eupatridæ*, it was to be expected that Athens should be torn by the clashing ambition of factious nobles. The strongest family was that of the *Alcmaeonidæ*, descended from the last perpetual archon, and through him from Codrus. Cylon, a man of great nobility and power, could ill brook the predominance of that house. Elated by his marriage with the daughter of Theagenes, the chief of Megara, and by victories in the chariot race at Olympia, (an honour highly valued, and conceived to carry with it something of favour from the god of the festival,) and further encouraged by a favourable answer from Delphi, he attempted to make himself tyrant of Athens; the name by which the Greeks denoted a man, who had brought under his dominion a state, of which the legal government was republican. With the aid of some troops supplied by Theagenes, Cylon and his friends seized the citadel of Athens. They were besieged by the people under Megacles, the head of the *Alcmaeonidæ*, who was chief archon; and after a time, being pressed by famine, Cylon escaped, and his deserted followers quitted their arms, and fled for safety to the altars, it being deemed impious to kill them there, or force them thence. Induced by the promise of life to leave the altars, they were notwithstanding put to death: but so deep was the impression made on the Athenians by the perfidy, and still more by the impiety of the action, that all concerned in it were banished. They returned indeed, but though many of their descendants were men of high consideration, an ever ready and effectual method

for their adversaries to embarrass them, was by requiring their expulsion as inheriting the curse of sacrilege. These and similar disorders required a remedy, and Dracon was called to legislate for Athens. The political constitution he did not alter, but he established a penal code absurdly severe; every crime, great or small, being made capital, on the ground, that every breach of a positive law was treason to the state. The necessary consequence was, that few would either prosecute or convict, and all crimes went unpunished, except the greatest.

Meanwhile Salamis, an island in the Saronic Gulf, till then subject to Athens, revolted, and allied itself with Megara. After many attempts to recover it had failed with loss, the people in their disgust, for the first time, united in opposition to the oligarchy. Assembling, they voted death to any who should propose again to lead them against Salamis. But Salamis, connected with Megara, was a troublesome neighbour, and the people were soon dissatisfied with their act, though none dared to propose its reversal. Solon, a young man of noble birth, had hitherto been remarkable only as a lover of learning and a poet. Having spread a report that he had occasional fits of phrensy, he ran out into the assembly, and mounting the herald's stone, he recited a poem fitted to rouse the people to renew the war. Some of his friends were prepared to applaud; the decree was enthusiastically reversed, and Solon, being appointed to lead another expedition against Salamis, reduced the island. The government again became settled in the hands of the party of Megacles. But Athens was subject to all the evils of oppression by the rich, and misery in the poor, which naturally spring from oligarchical government and slave-labour: and its convulsions were exasperated by the Megarians taking Nisæa, (an Attic town on the coast, which was afterwards the port of Megara,) and drawing Salamis again to revolt; and also by the enmities and religious fears remaining from the affair of Cylon. Epimenides, a Cretan philosopher, with whom Solon is said to have concerted the form of government he afterwards introduced, was invited to point out the means of restoring harmony and averting the anger of the gods; and having calmed the popular mind by religious ceremonies, he departed with great credit, leaving behind him a temporary quiet, and refusing all rewards, except a

branch of the sacred olive which grew in the Acropolis. But the people were still split into clashing parties. The democratical interest was strong in the mountains, the oligarchical in the valleys, which were mostly the property of the eupatridæ; the people of the coast favoured the mixed government. All eyes were turned to Solon, as the only man capable of settling the distracted commonwealth, and in the year B. C. 562 he was appointed archon with peculiar powers of reforming the state. He was popular among the poor, for his benevolence and equity; and the nobles, alarmed at the general discontent, were glad to see the reform in the hands of one of their own class. He executed the task with great success, both in respect of the political constitution, and of the code of civil and criminal law: the latter of which attained such fame, that the Romans formed their laws upon it; and through them it has become the basis of the laws now existing in most of Europe.

The first thing to be done was to settle the quarrels of the rich and poor. Through the difficulty of a poor freeman gaining a livelihood where labour was mostly performed by slaves, the poor were usually deep in debt; and at Athens, an insolvent debtor might be taken as a slave, and his wife and children also, if less would not satisfy the debt. This orbittant power was tyrannically used, and the removal of the evils thence arising was necessary, before order could be established. This Solon seems to have done, by lowering the interest of all debts, raising the nominal value of money, and taking from the creditor all power over the persons of the debtor and his family. The former two are violent measures: but in this case the existing evil was extreme, and probably justified the employment of such means. He then proceeded to arrange the constitution of the republic, dividing the people into four classes, according to their estates. The first contained all who received yearly from their lands five hundred medimni (each a little more than a bushel) of corn, oil, or any other produce: the second, those who received three hundred medimni. All these were exempt from infantry service, except in command, but were bound each to keep a horse and to serve in the cavalry, and were therefore styled horsemen, or knights. The third class, called Zugitæ, was of persons whose land gave two hundred medimni, but not three hundred,

and these were bound to serve in the heavy-armed foot, and to be provided with arms for that purpose. The rest were called *Thetes*, and these, if they had fit armour, might act among the heavy-armed; if not, they were reduced to the less honourable service of the light-armed. Afterwards, when Athens became a naval power, they principally manned the fleet. The *thetes* were excluded from offices of magistracy, which indeed, if admissible, they would hardly have coveted, since such offices at Athens were mostly without pay. But they were admitted as jurors in the courts, and had an equal vote with all other freemen in the election of magistrates and the passing of laws by the assembly.

The judicial power, and the ordinary administration of the government, had both been principally in the archons. Solon transferred the former to the people, establishing ten courts, in each of which, causes were decided by six hundred jurors, taken by lot from all citizens, not less than thirty years of age, who had given in their names for that purpose to the *thesmothetæ* at the beginning of the year: the decision was by the majority. To determine some cases of unusual importance, all the six thousand jurors were united in one court, which was then called the *Heliaea*. The administration he placed in a council, established by himself. Attica was anciently parcelled into divisions, which may be styled in English, wards (*phylæ*), and the wards into parishes (*demi*). From each of the four wards of which the people was composed, one hundred were yearly taken by lot to form the council. Previously to their admission, the members underwent, before the existing council, a strict inquiry into their past life, and if any thing could be proved against their character, they were rejected. The year was divided into periods, during which, the counsellors of each ward in turn, had additional powers, with the title of *Prytanes*. Afterwards, when the number of wards was increased to ten, these periods of course were ten also. At the same time the number of counsellors from each tribe was reduced to fifty. The common Attic year was a lunar year of 354 days, comprising twelve months, or periods of the moon. Every third year there was added a thirteenth month of thirty-three days, that the reckoning of time might again be brought to correspond with the solar

year, and with the order of the seasons. In the common year, each set of *Prytanes* retained the office for thirty-five days only, excepting the last four, which held it each for thirty-six: in the augmented year, the periods were of thirty-eight and thirty-nine. The *Prytanes* were a sort of managing committee, both for the council and for the assembly of the people: they directed the proceedings, summoned meetings, and dismissed them when the business was done, proposed for discussion whatever matters stood as orders of the day, and put the question when any thing was brought to the vote. One of them was entitled president (*epistates*), and he kept the public seal and the keys of the treasury and citadel: but this office lasted only one day, and was taken, during the period for which the counsellors of each ward held the office of *Prytanes*, by those counsellors in succession. In the council was transacted most of the business; and here ambassadors were first received and treaties negotiated, though the final decision of war and peace, and of all important matters, rested with the people. By Solon's constitution, nothing could be proposed in the assembly, which had not first been approved by the council; but this soon ceased to be strictly observed, though it still was most regular for decrees to be prepared by the council, and they were then brought forward with greater authority than if suggested to the assembly by an individual. Set days were appointed for the general assembly, and that the poorer citizens might be able to leave their ordinary occupations and attend it, a small pay was given from the treasury to all who came in time. When, as sometimes happened, the attendance was thin, the market was closed, and officers were sent about to mark all who were found loitering there, or in the streets, who were afterwards fined. Solon's principle in thus compelling attendance, was probably the same which dictated that singular law of his, that neutrals in civil contention should be punishable: to wit, the apprehension lest the people through indolence, carelessness, or selfish timidity, should suffer pernicious measures to be carried by the superior activity of a factious or interested minority.

The oldest and most celebrated of Athenian institutions was the court of *Areopagus*, of which the powers were increased and the constitution improved

by Solon. He composed it of all who, after being archons, had come out with honour from the scrutiny which, at Athens, all public officers underwent on quitting their offices. The Areiopagites were the only functionaries appointed for life. Their court had the sole regular cognizance of most capital offences; from it alone there was no appeal to the people, and in some cases it was even known to annul a condemnation or acquittal which the people had pronounced. It controuled all issues from the public treasury, and exercised a censorship over the citizens, watching over and punishing impiety, immorality, and even idleness. The wisdom and justice of the court, and particularly the generally high character of its members, maintained it long in great esteem, and fitted it to what seems to have been a great end of its constitution, the checking the natural levity and unsteadiness of the Athenian character. In criminal trials it prescribed to both parties the utmost plainness and simplicity of statement, and banished all attempts to work on the passions of the judges. A less praiseworthy part of the procedure was, the requiring from every accuser an oath of peculiar solemnity that the charge was true; and from every defendant a similar oath that it was false. Frivolous accusation is a grave offence, but if no charge were brought but what the accuser certainly knew to be true, few criminals would be convicted. In the popular courts, where the judges, however honest, were liable to be prejudiced and hasty, and little skilled in sifting evidence, it might be necessary to throw a heavier responsibility on the accuser; but in the Areiopagus it would seem that there could be little need of such a safeguard; and in any case the strongest oath which ought to be required of the accuser is, that he conscientiously believes the defendant guilty. An oath being also required of the accused, in cases that came to an issue there must generally have been perjury on one side or the other: but this evil was considerably mitigated by the provision that a guilty defendant, if he chose, might withdraw before the oath was administered and go into exile. The great benefits of Solon's legislation were the increased steadiness of the government and its less oligarchical character. Before, every thing depended on the archons, who were taken by lot from the small body of the eupatridæ. The general assembly was indeed supreme,

but it had no stated times of meeting and was seldom called together; and even when called, the mass of the people, ignorant and unused to public business, could only follow the beck of some powerful leader. Practically, therefore, none but the eupatridæ had any part in the conduct of affairs; while through the small number of the archons, the government was always liable to be disturbed by cabal, and was entirely dependent on the accident of their personal character. Solon, by appointing set days for the assembly, made its controul regular and permanent; by allowing to every citizen a vote in the election of magistrates, and constituting the courts of justice from the body of the people, he provided a popular check upon misgovernment, and secured to the needy the protection of the laws; by giving the chief administrative powers to a numerous council, who, like nearly all the magistrates under his system, were taken from every order of the citizens except the lowest, he transferred those powers from a small knot of wealthy men to a class whose interests practically agreed with those of the whole; at the same time that the number of the counsellors made caballing more difficult, and rendered it probable that their prevalent feelings would faithfully represent those of the persons from among whom they were taken. Still, however, the influence of the rich and noble was generally paramount at Athens, though moderated in degree and partly corrected in the manner of its exercise: and it was not till after-times that the city came into the state of a democracy, by a train of events equally singular and unforeseen.

Not long after the legislation of Solon, Athens was again distracted by contentions between the old parties of the lowlands and the coast. The first was headed by Lycurgus, the other by Megacles the chief of the Alcmaeonidæ, and while they were at the height of their dissension, Peisistratus came forward at the head of the democratical, or highland party. All three were men of high birth, without which, at this time, there was little chance of greatness at Athens. Peisistratus was an eloquent speaker and a distinguished military leader, and by his mildness of character and affability of manners had become the most popular man in Athens. One day he came in a chariot into the market place, wounded and bloody, and complained that he had been way-laid by his enemies, and with

difficulty escaped alive. In after-times the story has been commonly treated as an imposture; but as it was long believed, and no account has come down to us of its detection, and as the history is told by persons hostile to Peisistratus, it seems not less probable that the attack was real; but, true or false, the people were persuaded to vote a guard to Peisistratus, and soon after, with his guard, he seized the Acropolis. His party supported him, and of his opponents, those who would not submit to him were forced into exile; and from this time he was generally considered as tyrant of Athens.

The word tyrant, among the Greeks, admitted various shades of meaning. In its strictest and most odious sense, it denoted an usurper of arbitrary dominion in a commonwealth; and to make the character complete, it was requisite that he should be supported against the hatred of the citizens by a mercenary guard. But there were more questionable applications of the word. The personal authority of a party-leader would often reach beyond the law, and enable him, with little violation of its provisions, to influence its administration according to his will; and particularly in governments where the rule of law was seldom precise, and much was left to the discretion of judges and administrators. Such a man would generally be charged by his adversaries with tyranny, especially if the contest had been decided by arms. By the common artifice of Grecian factions, appropriating to their own party the name of the people, they would complain that the people was kept down by force; and every unlawful proceeding of their enemies in the contest would be seized on as a proof of violence and usurpation, while similar acts on their own side would be excused by the opinion prevalent in Greece that every thing was allowable against a tyrant. Peisistratus was a chief of the latter kind. He had established, by illegal violence, the predominance of his party, and while that was predominant, his personal ascendancy was complete; and accordingly his enemies called him tyrant. His friends denied the charge, for the constitution was unaltered, and so far was he from overruling the ordinary magistracies, that he himself obeyed a citation from the Areiopagus on a charge of murder. But we must remember that it was an easy virtue to let the law take its

course, when he knew that it was wholly administered by his own friends; and he would probably have been less forbearing if he could have feared an important decision against him. As it was, heat once enjoyed the reality of power, and avoided, in great measure, the odium of usurpation. Grecian party warfare was generally unscrupulous; and the violence by which his ascendancy had been gained was too common a thing much to injure his character, at least among his friends. His sway was not, however, uninterrupted. He was twice expelled, and twice returned: at last he died at an advanced age, in the administration of Athens, having exercised it with great ability, and, in all his struggles, with unusual liberality and moderation towards his opposers. He encouraged learning and the arts; he is said to have founded the first public library known to the world, and first collected and digested the poems of Homer, which had been brought by Iycurgus into Greece, from the Grecian colonies in Asia where they had long been popular.

Hippias and Hipparchus, sons of Peisistratus, inherited the influence of their father. Their government, like his, was mild and steady, and successful in peace and war. Many good laws were passed, the taxes were lightened, and the forms of the constitution were adhered to: and it was under Peisistratus and his sons that Athens first became remarkable for the splendour of its public buildings. Hippias chiefly conducted the civil administration, while Hipparchus was employed in measures for enlightening the minds and cultivating the tastes of the citizens. For this end he invited to Athens the poets Anacreon and Simonides: and that he might extend a degree of instruction to those who, in an age where books were few and expensive, had neither means nor leisure for study, he erected in the streets and highways marble columns crowned with heads of Mercury, with short moral sentences engraved on the sides. But a power above the laws is a dangerous gift, and seldom fails to nourish, even in the happiest natures, a degree of insolent disregard to the feelings of others. Half the oligarchies and tyrannies of Greece were overthrown through outrages done to individuals by the rulers in the wantonness of power. Enraged at a denial which a degrading passion had impelled him to incur, Hipparchus allowed himself

publicly to insult the sister of the refuser. Harmodius, the injured man, engaged in his quarrel his friend Aristogeiton, and they plotted the death of both the brothers, and the overthrow of the government. Hipparchus was slain at the Panathenæa, but Hippias survived, and both Harmodius and Aristogeiton perished in the tumult. From this time forward the government of Hippias became jealous and severe. He renounced all trust in popularity, and endeavoured to secure himself by the death of any whom he suspected; while he provided a refuge, in case he should be expelled, by marrying his daughter to the son of the tyrant of Lampsacus, on the Hellespont. His tyranny lasted but four years after the death of his brother.

The Alcæonidæ, ejected by Peisistratus on his second restoration, were numerous and wealthy, and unceasingly watchful for an opportunity to return. The temple of Delphi having been burnt, they had contracted to rebuild it, which they had done with a splendour far beyond their agreement. Hereby they both increased their reputation, and secured an interest with the managers of the oracle, which they were suspected to have made yet firmer by bribery. However that might be, the responses given, on whatever subject, to the Lacedæmonians, always terminated with the command to liberate Athens; till at length, though bound by friendship and alliance to the Peisistratidæ, they were induced to succour their opponents. A small force being first sent into Attica was defeated, and the leader slain. But the Alcæonid party was gaining strength; the severities of Hippias drove numbers to join it: and Cleomenes, the Spartan king, advancing with a larger army, was joined by the exiles. Hippias lost a battle, and was besieged at Athens. Here he might have held out beyond the patience of the Lacedæmonians, but for the fear of internal revolt, which induced both him and his principal partisans to concert measures for removing their children to a place of safety. These were intercepted by the besiegers, and the fathers consented to surrender Athens and quit its territory in five days. They retired to Sigeum on the Hellespont, (B. C. 510.) having held the ascendant in Athens for fifty years since Peisistratus occupied the citadel.

The death of Hipparchus had been chiefly caused by revenge for a private

wrong: but nevertheless, on the overthrow of the tyranny, the slayers were honoured as the most deserving of patriots. Their statues were conspicuously erected in the Acropolis; their descendants had various immunities and privileges, including exemption from most public burdens; a song in their praise was regularly sung at all feasts and entertainments; and in all the works of the Athenian orators, if an example of the highest patriotism, and the greatest merit towards the commonwealth be wanted, the names first mentioned, are generally those of Harmodius and Aristogeiton.

The lead was now disputed in Athens between Isagoras and Cleisthenes, son of Megacles, the head of the Alcæonidæ. Finding the interest of his opponent superior among the rich and noble, Cleisthenes betook himself to cultivate the favour of the lower people, and by this having gained the ascendant, he made some changes in the constitution tending to render it more democratical. He opened public offices to all the citizens, and it was he who increased to ten the number of the wards, and enacted that fifty persons should be taken from each to serve in the council, which was henceforth frequently distinguished as the council of five hundred, or simply the five hundred.

For the recovery of his lost superiority, Isagoras placed his hope in Lacedæmon, then by far the greatest power in Greece. Since the conquest of Messenia, it had been first in the extent and richness of its territory, as well as in the military excellence of its population. Corinth, and many cities of Arcadia, were strictly bound to it in the sort of alliance common in Greece, where the weaker confederate was wont to furnish troops to be used at the discretion of the stronger: and it had effectively the command of all Peloponnesus, except the powerful and generally hostile state of Argos. But the Lacedæmonians had views beyond the peninsula, and were ever eager to interfere as mediators in the wars and seditions of all Grecian states. They had hitherto acted in such matters with a considerable show of wisdom and moderation, and sometimes very beneficially, as in overthrowing the tyranny of Hippias. But the end pursued was always to acquire a commanding influence for Lacedæmon, under the specious pretext of protecting the liber-

ties of Greece. Above all, their favourite policy was, in every city where they had the opportunity, to establish the ascendancy of the oligarchical faction, which then depending upon them for support, would keep the city in nominal alliance, and real subserviency. With such views, they readily listened to the solicitations of Isagoras, and the more so as Cleomenes was biased in his favour by personal regards.

The sacrilegious murder of the partisans of Cylon had been the act of the Alcæonidæ, of which house were the now leading men of Athens. At the suggestion of Isagoras, Cleomenes required the expulsion of all descended from the murderers: the demand was backed by the power of Sparta, and had much support in the religious feelings common to Greece; and Cleisthenes with his principal partizans withdrew. But not content with this, and confident that no one would venture to dispute the will of the Spartan king, Cleomenes went with a small band of soldiers to Athens, commanded the banishment of 700 Athenian families, as concerned in the sacrilege, and then proceeded to abolish the council, and consign all the authority of the state to 300 of the friends of Isagoras. But Athens was not fallen so low as to endure this insolence of usurpation. The council refused to resign its authority, and the people flew to arms in its support. Cleomenes and Isagoras were besieged in the Acropolis, and on the third day it was surrendered on the terms that Cleomenes and the Lacedæmonians should be allowed to depart. Isagoras contrived to steal away among them, but his followers were cast into prison, and all condemned to death; the generally cruel spirit of Grecian party warfare being in this case embittered by great and just provocation. Cleisthenes and the exiles, immediately returning, resumed the direction of the commonwealth. A war with Lacedæmon seemed unavoidable, and they anxiously looked for any aid which might enable them to support it. The Persian empire had now extended over nearly the whole of Asia Minor; and the Athenians sent ambassadors to Sardis, the capital of one of its provinces, to propose an alliance. The satrap, or governor, asking the ambassadors who the Athenians were, and where they dwelt, when he had heard the answer, scornfully rejected the proposed alliance with so

insignificant a state, unless they would give earth and water to king Darius in token of subjection. The ambassadors complied; but on returning to Athens, their conduct was blamed, and their act disavowed.

Meanwhile Cleomenes entered Attica with a powerful army from Peloponnesus, fully bent on punishing the Athenians, and setting up Isagoras as tyrant; while the Bœotians and the people of Chalcis in Eubœa made a concerted invasion on the other side. Neglecting these, the whole force of Athens went against the more dangerous enemy: but when a battle was expected, the Corinthians withdrew their troops, refusing to co-operate in a war so unjust; and like sentiments being expressed by Demaratus, the brother king of Cleomenes, dissension ran high between the colleagues, and the army was hastily broken up. The Athenians, being now at liberty to chastise their other invaders, defeated the Bœotians, and the same day, passing into Eubœa, reduced the Chalcidians to submission, and exacted from them a tract sufficient to support a colony of 4000 Athenian families. Unable by their own strength to maintain the war, the Bœotians asked assistance from Ægina, an island in the Saronic gulf, which had early attained a wealth and consideration disproportionate to its extent, by the commercial activity and maritime skill of its inhabitants. This people had an ancient quarrel with Athens, and now, without warning, ravaged the coast. The Athenians were preparing for revenge, when their attention was diverted by news from Lacedæmon. The fraud had been discovered, by which the Alcæonidæ had procured the help of the Lacedæmonians against Hippias; and finding that the gratitude expected from the Athenians had been turned into enmity by the arbitrary violence of Cleomenes, and that Athens was rapidly growing in power and spirit, they began to wish the tyranny restored. But they had seen that, without obtaining the consent of the allies, they could not be sure of their support; a meeting therefore was called, and Hippias invited to be present; and here they laid open the arts, which had been used to persuade them to make war upon an old ally, complained of the ingratitude of Athens, and invited the assembly to concur in the restoration of the banished chief. But the Corinthians, dwelling on

the iniquity of the proposal and its inconsistency with the character assumed by the Lacedæmonians as liberators of Greece, prevailed on the assembly to reject it. Hippias returning to Sigeium went thence to Sardis, and persuaded the satrap Artaphernes to make war upon his country, that himself being restored to the sovereignty might hold it as a vassal of the Persian king. The Athenians on hearing this, sent ambassadors to Artaphernes, to dissuade him from following the suggestions of their exiles; but received for answer an imperious order to submit at their peril to Hippias; and refusing to obey, they thenceforth considered themselves as at war with Persia.

By the events which followed the expulsion of Hippias, the government of Athens had become at length substantially popular. All its former revolutions were but changes in the ruling portion of the nobility: sometimes, indeed, the weaker party called the people to its aid; but the people, though it might determine the struggle, gained little by it beyond the hope of better masters. No lasting security for good government was obtained, and any immediate improvement of administration depended on the personal character of the new rulers, and the degree in which they yet needed popular support against their beaten opponents. Such might again have been the result, if Cleisthenes had enjoyed his first victory undisputed; but by the strength of his enemies, and the determination of Cimon to set up an oligarchy with Isagoras for its chief, his cause was permanently identified both with that of democracy, and of Athenian independence. The middle and lower people, hitherto powerless through inexperience, inertness, and disunion, had numbers that might have made them superior both in votes of the assembly, and in trials of force: they wanted leaders whose personal influence could keep them united, whose political experience might direct their conduct, and who might be obliged, instead of using the people as instruments to serve a temporary purpose in raising a faction, to rest their hopes on their continued activity. Such leaders were the Alcmeonidae; and while they were bound to the commonalty by the strongest ties of common interest and danger, the other party of the nobles was broken and disgraced by its unsuccessful treason. Continually appealed to by their

present leaders, the people became versed in public affairs, and were henceforth practically, as well as legally, supreme. The result was increasing vigour and spirit in the government, and a great improvement in internal quiet and security. Though jealous and violent in troublous times, and sometimes hurried into acts, the most foolish and iniquitous; though always defective as a means of discovering truth; the popular courts were honest in intention, and did justice between the rich and the poor, with an impartiality elsewhere little known in Greece: and of the value of this distinction, some notion may be formed from the atrocious cases, occurring in all the oligarchical republics, of oppression exercised with certain impunity by powerful individuals upon the weak. The faults of the Athenian government were many and great: but of its superiority to most in Greece, and of the willing acquiescence in it of all classes, there needs no stronger proof than this, that from the time of Cleisthenes, till its constitution was nearly fallen into decay, no instance occurs of a contention by arms within its walls, excepting only those occasioned in the close of the Peloponnesian war, by the external dangers of the commonwealth, and after that war by its temporary subjection to Lacedæmon.

CHAPTER IV.

Of Greece and its Colonies, from the first Persian Conquest of Ionia to the Defeat of Xerxes' Invasion of Greece, and the Establishment of Athens as a Leading State.

For a long time, the greatest part of Asia Minor was subject to the kings of Lydia, an extensive region, on the coast of which the Ionian colonies were situated. Croesus, the last of the Lydian kings, an able and popular, but ambitious prince, had made tributary the Grecian cities of the Asiatic coast, and his power had become, to Greece itself, an object of fear, as his wealth and splendour were of wonder. His prosperity was not, however, to be lasting. In all ages, Asia has been remarkable for the sudden growth and rapid decay of mighty empires. When the Median monarchy, after overrunning most of the interior of Asia, was now giving way to the rising fortunes of the Persians*, Croesus lent his

* An account of the early monarchies of Asia,

aid to prop the falling power, and incurred the vengeance of the conquerors. Cyrus, the Persian chief and founder of the empire, having overcome the Medes, marched against Croesus, subdued his kingdom, and made him prisoner in his capital of Sardis. (B. C. 546.) He had before invited the Grecian cities to revolt, but they refused, and now, when they wished to submit to him on the same terms as formerly to Croesus, he would listen to none but the Milesians; and sent an army, under Harpagus, a Mede, to reduce the others. Harpagus first attacked Phocæa, an Ionian town, early famed for maritime enterprise and skill. When hard pressed, the Phocæans feigned to listen to proposals of surrender, and took advantage of a suspension of arms to embark their households, and quit the city. Having sought in vain for a settlement among the Grecian isles, they resolved to sail for Corsica, where they had already a colony established. But first desiring revenge on the authors of their calamity, they surprised and slaughtered the Persian garrison of Phocæa; then sailed for Corsica, having called down curses on any of their number who should stay behind, and sworn that they never would return, till a lump of iron, which they cast into the sea, should appear upon the surface. More than half, notwithstanding, returned, unable to live out of their native land. The rest arrived in Corsica, and dwelt there for five years; till, by their piracies provoking an united attack from the Carthaginians and Tuscans, though victorious, they suffered such a loss in ships and men, that they were again obliged to quit their dwellings. The larger part went to Gaul, and there founded Massilia, now Marseilles, which, with the advantage of an excellent harbour for the vessels of that age, became a rich and powerful commonwealth, and extended its dominion widely on the Gallic coast, and even to some places on that of Spain.

The Teians being next attacked, followed the example of Phocæa, and, sailing to Thrace, founded there Abdera. The other cities, finding that their walls would not enable them to hold out singly, resolved together to risk a battle. Being defeated, they submitted to the conqueror on his own terms. The islands remained free, as the Persians had no navy. Har-

pagus proceeded through Lycia into Caria, and completed the conquest of Asia Minor.

Meanwhile, Cyrus conquered Babylon, which having done, he applied himself, with assiduity equal to his military genius, to order the government of his vast empire, and unite it, as far as possible, into one. On his death, he was succeeded by his son Cambyses, who conquered Egypt, and died there, in the eighth year of his reign, while vainly attempting further acquisitions in Africa; but not before he had given proof that his natural violence of character had been fostered by despotic power into actual madness. After a short period of confusion, the throne was occupied by Darius, the son of Hystaspes, a monarch whose attention was principally turned to improve the internal administration, and increase the revenues of the empire. But though not by inclination a warrior, it was necessary for Darius to find an enemy against whom he might employ the turbulent spirit of the military portion of his subjects, thus avoiding the contempt which, in Asia, has always been the lot of unwarlike sovereigns. Under pretence of revenging an invasion made a hundred years before, he turned his arms against the barbarians of Scythia, a wide waste region, including with Tartary, most of the present empire of Russia. He crossed the Hellespont, and advanced along the western coast of the Euxine sea, receiving the submission of all the nations in his way, till he passed the Danube, and entered Scythia. The Scythians had neither towns nor cultivated fields, but lived like the modern Tartars, in moveable camps, upon the milk and flesh of their numerous herds. Having nothing, therefore, which it was necessary to defend, they retreated before him, avoiding a battle, to which it was impossible to force them, being entirely cavalry. In a wilderness, and far from all supplies, the army suffered severely from want; it was obliged to retreat, and its retreat was harassed by a superior cavalry; and it was not without great loss and hardship that it reached the Danube. But though Scythia was not subdued, the bounds of the empire were widened by the submission of Thrace and Macedonia; and the expedition seems, on the whole, to have increased the power of Darius, and his reputation with his subjects.

The usual policy of Persia towards the Grecian cities of its empire, was in each to set up one of the citizens as chief, or

and especially of the Median and Persian empires, may be found in the seventh chapter of the Outline of General History.

tyrant, whose interest was then to keep his city in obedience to the king, on whom he depended for the maintenance of his authority. Histæus, the tyrant of Miletus, was high in favour with Darius, and had obtained, as a reward for service done in the Scythian expedition, the grant of a territory on the river Strymon, in Thrace; a very eligible situation for a Grecian colony, as it abounded with ship timber, and had silver mines. Miletus, which he governed, was the richest and most populous city of Ionia; and it was represented to Darius that, by means of his new colony, so favourably situated to gain both wealth and maritime power, he might be able to revolt, and unite against Persia the whole naval force of the Asiatic Greeks. To prevent this danger, it was pretended that the king had need of his advice and assistance at Susa, his capital; and thither he went, while the government of Miletus was committed to his kinsman Aristagoras.

About this time, there was a contest of factions in the rich and populous island of Naxos, and the democratical party being victorious, many of the wealthiest men were expelled. These applied to Aristagoras for aid, which he was inclined to grant, as knowing that, if he restored them, he would be able, through them, to govern Naxos. His own force, he said, was unequal to the enterprise; but he had influence with the satrap of the province, Artaphernes, the brother of Darius, and with the power which he commanded, their restoration would be easy. The exiles consented, and Artaphernes approving the proposal, a fleet was equipped of 200 galleys, with a land force in proportion; and Megabates, a Persian of the royal blood, was joined with Aristagoras in the command. A report was spread that the fleet was intended for the Hellespont; but the commanders having quarrelled, Megabates betrayed to the Naxians its real destination, and they were found prepared for defence. After a fruitless siege of four months, the armament quitted the island, having consumed the sums allowed by Artaphernes, and much of the private fortune of Aristagoras.

Aristagoras, sure of the enmity of Megabates, and justly fearing the resentment of Artaphernes for the failure of his promises, now expected the loss of his government, as the least evil which could ensue. He had already conceived the idea of revolt, when a messenger coming from Histæus confirmed his

wavering resolution. That chief was uneasy in his detention at Susa, which he now began to see was meant to be perpetual, and he resolved on the dangerous measure of exciting a revolt among the Greeks of Asia, in the hope that he would certainly be sent to quell it, and might thus return to Miletus. Aristagoras assembled his friends, and laid before them his own sentiments, and the message of Histæus; and having obtained their approbation, he proceeded to call an assembly of the people, in which he resigned the tyranny, and proclaimed the re-establishment of democracy. The armament from Naxos was encamped at Myus, under the command mostly of the tyrants of the several cities. The commanders were suddenly arrested by a Milevian commissioner, sent for that purpose, and were given up to the people of their respective cities. Most of them were banished, but Coes, the tyrant of Mitylene, was put to death. Democracy was everywhere established, and all Ionia and Æolis engaged in the revolt. (B. C. 500).

Meanwhile, Aristagoras went to ask assistance from Greece, and first from Lacedæmon. But the cautious elderhood who directed that city refusing to engage in a war so distant and dangerous, he next applied to Athens, where he arrived at the moment when the haughty command of Artaphernes, to restore the tyranny of Hippias, had filled the citizens with anger and alarm. Miletus, and many others of the endangered cities, were colonies of Athens; and anxiety for their fate united with resentment and with the lavish promises of Aristagoras, to induce the Athenians to grant his request. Twenty ships were voted to assist the Ionians, and they arrived at Miletus with five besides, from the Eretrians of Eubœa. The combined fleet sailed to Ephesus, and the forces debarking, marched to Sardis, a distance of about sixty miles. Artaphernes was taken by surprise, and fled into the castle, and the Greeks, entering the town unopposed, fell to plunder. But a house being set on fire, the flame spread rapidly through a town mostly built of timber and reeds. The inhabitants were driven by the conflagration to assemble in the market, and in the bed of the torrent Pactolus, which ran through it, in such numbers, that they found themselves strong enough for defence; and the Greeks retiring to mount Tmolus, at night pursued their retreat towards their

ships. To avenge the insult, troops were collected from the greater part of Asia Minor, and the Persian army, following the enemy, found him under the walls of Ephesus. A battle ensued, in which the Greeks were entirely defeated, with the loss of many of the principal commanders, and the dispersion of the army. The Athenians now recalled their ships, and refused any farther part in the war.

The Ionians pursued the war by sea, and, sending thither a fleet, engaged in their alliance Byzantium, and the other towns about the Propontis; and thence going southward, the fleet was no less successful with the cities of Caria. At the same time Onesilus, king of Salamis, in Cyprus, had persuaded all that island to revolt from Persia, except the city of Amathus, which he besieged. Being informed that a Persian force was coming against him, he sent to ask assistance from the Ionians. They sent their fleet, but it did not arrive till the hostile army had been landed. Two battles followed on the same day—by land between the Cyprians and Persians, and by sea between the Ionian fleet and that of the Phœnicians, who were subject to Persia, and chiefly composed its naval power. The Ionians were victorious; but by land the Cyprians were defeated, and Onesilus slain, and the island was quite reduced to subjection. Meantime Ionia and Æolis were overrun by the superior land force of the enemy. One Persian army, after two great victories, was surprised in a defile, and destroyed by the Carians; but the other divisions were more successful, and after reducing most of Æolis, with the important town of Cuma, and taking Clazomenæ in Ionia, Artaphernes concentrated his forces, to besiege Miletus. Aristagoras, now despairing of success, and knowing himself marked for vengeance by the Persians, resolved to quit the city, and sailed to Myrcinus, the colony of Histieus. Here he was killed, in besieging a Thracian town.

Histieus had been dismissed from Susa, and sent to Sardis to assist in quelling the revolt; but finding himself suspected, he fled into Ionia, and passed to Chios. The Milesians refused to receive him, but he found friends in Lesbos and at Byzantium, from which places he exercised piracy, both against Greeks and Persians. At length, in a descent on Asia, he was taken, and being sent to Sardis, was there crucified.

Miletus was besieged by land and sea, and the Panionian assembly being con-

vened, determined to make no attempt by land, but, collecting all the ships of the confederacy, to hazard a sea-fight. The assembled fleet was of 353 triremes, long sharp-built galleys, carrying each nearly 200 men. The number of the hostile ships is stated at 600, being chiefly Phœnician, but partly also Cyprian, Cilician, and Egyptian. The Greeks appear to have been already unequalled for skill and boldness in naval action, and, with all their superior numbers, the Persian leaders feared a battle. They had with them many Grecian tyrants expelled at the beginning of the revolt, and, through them, they secretly offered to each squadron promises of impunity, if they would desert the common cause, and threats of utter destruction to their cities if they refused. The rest stood firm, but the Samian commanders, discouraged by the disorder of their own fleet, and the vast resources of the enemy, were prevailed on to comply. When the battle was beginning, they gave the signal of flight. Eleven ships out of sixty disobeyed, and stood their ground, in reward for which the names of the captains were afterwards recorded on a pillar by their commonwealth. The rest fled, and were followed by many others. The Chian squadron of 100 ships fought gallantly against an overwhelming force, but the battle was irrecoverably lost. Dionysius, the Phœcean commander, had but three ships, so small was the remnant of that state. With these he took three vessels from the enemy, and, when the fight was lost, returned no more to Phocæa, but, sailing to the coast of Phœnicia, made prize of many merchant-ships, and thence proceeded to Sicily, whence issuing, he plundered the Carthaginians and Tuscans.

The Persians now pressed the siege of Miletus, and took it by assault in the sixth year of the war. Most of the men were killed: the rest, with the women and children, were led to Susa, and presented to Darius, who settled them at Ampe, on the Tigris, near where that river falls into the Persian Gulf. The rich vale of Miletus was divided among the Persians. Æaces, the tyrant of Samos, was restored to his government; but the Samian people had not approved the treachery of their admirals, and a large proportion of them emigrated to Sicily. The islands Chios, Lesbos, and Tenedos, submitted at the approach of the Persian fleet, and at the same time the army proceeded against the Ionian towns. All the

threats of the Persian leaders were fulfilled: the handsomest boys were made eunuchs; the most beautiful girls carried as slaves to the king; the towns, with the temples, were burnt. The devastation was spread to the shores of the Hellespont, of which the Persian army ravaged the Asiatic, and the Phœnician fleet the European side. After this, the Persian government turned its attention to the internal regulation of the country, with a liberality as conspicuous as its cruelty in avenging the revolt. Advising with deputies assembled from the cities, Artaphernes made many useful regulations to prevent the petty warfare so universal among the Greeks, and to establish a course of law by which all disputes between cities were to be determined. At the same time, he appointed the tribute from each, which was not heavier than before the war; and the same assessment remained in use long after.

In the second spring after the reduction of Miletus, Artaphernes was recalled, and Mardonius succeeded him, a young man of high rank, who had lately married a daughter of Darius. He brought with him a large army and powerful fleet, avowedly to punish Athens and Eretria for the burning of Sardis. To acquire popularity among the Ionians and Æolians, and gain their willing service, he deposed all the tyrants, and established democracy in the Grecian cities: a measure very opposite to the usual policy of Persia. Having received from them a considerable reinforcement, he crossed the Hellespont. Thrace was already subject to the Persians, excepting some hordes of savage mountaineers; and Macedonia had formerly submitted to deliver earth and water, and now, when tribute was demanded, did not venture to refuse. But the fleet, in doubling the promontory of Athos, lost, by a storm, 300 ships, and above 20,000 men; and the army suffered much by a night attack from the Brygian Thracians, in which Mardonius himself was wounded. The Brygians were attacked and subdued; but the season was then so far advanced, and the fleet so shattered, that it was thought best to return, and winter in Asia.

The following year heralds were sent into Greece, to demand of every city earth and water in token of subjection. Many towns on the continent obeyed, and most of the islands. The Athenians and Lacedæmonians indignantly refused,

and disgraced their refusal with a cruel violation of the law of nations: the heralds being, at one place, thrown into a cavern, in the other into a well, and told there to take their earth and water. Among the cities which submitted were Thebes and Ægina. Ægina was an ancient enemy of Athens, and the Athenians immediately sent ministers to Sparta, to accuse the Æginetans of treason to Greece. Lacedæmon had recently been at bitter enmity with Athens, but, in the common danger, it was rejoiced to find that city disposed to unite with it in vigorous defence. Cleomenes, with his usual violence, went himself to Ægina, for the purpose of seizing the principal authors of the submission. He was opposed and prevented, but not without a remarkable acknowledgment of the authority of Lacedæmon, since it was answered that the Æginetans would have obeyed, if they had been assured that he was properly authorised by his commonwealth.

During the absence of Cleomenes, his colleague, Demaratus, having long been at variance with him, endeavoured to excite the leading men against him. There were circumstances attending the birth of Demaratus, which threw suspicion on his legitimacy, and Cleomenes encouraged and supported Leotychides, the next in succession, in claiming the crown; the question was referred to the Delphian oracle, and Cleomenes bribed the Pythia to declare his rival illegitimate. Demaratus was deposed, and soon after fled into Persia. Leotychides being appointed in his place, accompanied Cleomenes to Ægina, and that state submitting to their authority, ten of the principal men were sent to Athens as pledges of its fidelity to the common cause.

Cleomenes afterwards leading an army against the Argians, surprised and routed them with great slaughter. Many took refuge in a sacred grove surrounding a temple, which, as such groves were highly venerated, Cleomenes hesitated to profane. Enticing out about fifty successively, by the promise of ransom, he put them to the sword, and when the rest, discovering his treachery, refused to come out, he then fired the grove, and burnt them all. In the battle and massacre, so large a portion of the Argian people perished, that the slaves, overpowering the remainder, governed the city, till at length, the sons of those who had been slain growing up to manhood,

they were expelled from Argos, but maintained themselves awhile in Tiryns. Cleomenes, it was thought, might have taken Argos, but his caprice led him another way. Dismissing the rest of his army, he went with a chosen escort to sacrifice in the temple of Juno, near Mycenæ. The high priest remonstrating that such an intrusion was unlawful in a stranger, Cleomenes caused him to be scourged by the Helots, performed the sacrifice himself, and returned home. Not long after, evidence was produced of his having corrupted the Pythia, and, in his alarm, he fled into Thessaly; but, thence returning into Peloponnesus, he obtained the support of a party in Arcadia, and was there exciting war against his country, when his friends in Lacedæmon, regaining the ascendant, recalled him to the throne. He did not long enjoy it, his habitual extravagance being at length converted into positive madness. He was placed in confinement, when obtaining a sword from a Helot who guarded him, he cut himself piecemeal.

The suicide of Cleomenes was generally attributed to divine vengeance for some one of his many crimes. By most of the Greeks it was ascribed to his sacrilegious collusion with the Pythia; by the Argians to the cruel and treacherous massacre of their fugitives; but more confidently to the burning of the sacred grove, the violation of the temple of Juno, and the outrage to the priest. The Lacedæmonians imputed it to his frequent drunkenness; a vice at Sparta rarely seen and highly reprobated.

The restoration of the Æginetan hostages being agreed to by Lacedæmon, was still denied by Athens. A war ensued. The oligarchical faction was prevalent in Ægina, and Nicodromus, a leader of the opposite party, had been expelled. Nothing was more common in Greece than for the weaker in civil strife to connect themselves with the enemies of the state. According to a plan concerted with the government of Athens, Nicodromus, with his friends in the island, seized on that called the old town of Ægina. The Athenians, unequal in naval force to the Æginetans, had borrowed from Corinth twenty ships. These came a day too late; the project failed; and Nicodromus, with many of his friends, escaped to Attica, where, being settled on the promontory Sunium, they made continual predatory

war upon the Æginetans of the island. The prevailing party took a cruel revenge for the attempt which had been made, and 700 citizens at once were executed. They were afterwards defeated by the Athenians, first by sea, and then in a descent on the island.

While Greece was in the state of turbulence which has been described, Persia was again preparing for its conquest, and for the chastisement of Athens and Eretria. Mardonius was recalled, and his command given to Artaphernes, son of the former satrap, joined with Datis, a Median nobleman probably more experienced. To avoid the circuitous and dangerous route by Thrace and Macedonia, it was determined to cross the Ægean, reducing the islands on the way. Naxos, where the Persians had before been foiled, was first attacked; the inhabitants fled to the mountains, and the town, with its temples, was burnt. The other islands submitted, and gave hostages, till the fleet arriving at Carystus, in Eubœa, the Carystians refused, but were obliged to yield by the investment of their city, and the ravage of their land. The Eretrians were now assailed, who, applying to Athens for succour, the 4000 Athenians who had been settled on the territory of Chalcis, were ordered to assist them. But the Eretrians were divided and disheartened: some were for flying to the mountains, others were inclined to betray the city; and Æschines, a principal citizen, seeing no hope of defence, advised the Athenians to reserve themselves for the protection of their native country. They crossed into Attica. The Persians formed the siege. For six days Eretria held out, but on the seventh was betrayed by two of the leading citizens. The town, with its temples, was burnt, and the inhabitants made slaves. The Persians, now masters of Eubœa, crossed into Attica, and landed, at the suggestion of Hippias, on the narrow plain of Marathon. (B. C. 490.)

Athens had a commander equal to the emergency, in Miltiades the son of Cimon. His uncle, Miltiades the son of Cypselus, being invited by the natives of the Thracian Chersonese to found in it an Athenian colony, which might assist in their defence, had agreed to the proposal, and had been made tyrant of the Chersonese. On his death, as he left no children, his authority passed to his nephew Stesagoras. He also died, and in the

hope of succeeding him, Miltiades, his younger brother, went from Athens to the Chersonese. Miltiades had not, like Stesagoras, an interest established during the life of his predecessor, and the Chersonese was not by law an hereditary principality: but by a mixture of fraud and force, Miltiades secured the tyranny, and strengthened himself in it by keeping five hundred guards, and by marrying the daughter of Olorus, a Thracian prince. When Darius marched against the Scythians, Miltiades submitted to him and followed in his train, and was left with the other Grecian chiefs of the army to guard the bridge of boats by which the Persians crossed the Danube. He then proposed to break up the bridge, and suffering the king and army to perish by the Scythians, to secure Greece and deliver Ionia from the Persian yoke. His suggestion was rejected, not for its treachery, but because Persia was to each of the tyrants his surest support against the spirit of freedom in the people; but it has met with applauders among Grecian writers, generally ardent patriots, but somewhat lax moralists. Soon after Miltiades was expelled by the Scythians, but recalled on their retirement by the people: but he knew himself obnoxious to the Persians, and when on the reconquest of Ionia their fleet approached Thrace he fled to Athens. The Athenian laws were severe against tyrants, even of foreign states; and Miltiades on arriving was tried for his life; but he won the favour of the people so far, that he was not only acquitted, but appointed one of the ten generals who regularly directed the armies of the state; and so conscious were his colleagues of his superior ability, that four of them made over to him their days of chief command.

The generals being equally divided in opinion, whether to risk a battle or defend the city, the decision rested with the polemarch Callimachus. Miltiades pointed out to him that a siege by so powerful an enemy would divide and unsettle the minds of the people; that whoever had any leaning towards Hippias would be determined in his favour; that others, through despondence, would propose surrender, and make their own peace by betraying the city; but that, while all were yet united and hopeful, they might win a battle, an assurance which Miltiades was the better able to give, being acquainted with the Persian

tactics as well as the Grecian. Callimachus was persuaded, and the army marched to Marathon, where, on his own day of command, Miltiades led it into action. The Athenians were joined by the whole strength of Platæa, a little commonwealth of Bœotia, which had thrown itself on their protection against Thebes, and had ever since been their most faithful ally. The combined force may have amounted to about 14,000 heavy-armed troops, with at least an equal number of light-armed: the Persian army is stated at 100,000 men.

Of the infantry in the invading army, the Persians and Sacæ only were good in close fight, and these were inferior to the Greeks in the length of their spears, the goodness of their defensive armour, and the firmness of their array. The rest of the foot were only to be feared for their skill in using missiles, but the cavalry was numerous and excellent. The ground was admirably chosen for the Athenians. In the hills their heavy phalanx would have been unable to keep its ranks unbroken and available against the archery of Asia; in a wide plain it would have been surrounded by numbers, and harassed without the power of retaliation by the horse; but in the narrow plain of Marathon the ground favoured the movements of the phalanx, while its small extent precluded the evolutions of the hostile cavalry, and obliged all to receive the Greeks in front, instead of annoying them on the flanks or rear. Still, confined as was the space, Miltiades could only present a front equal to that of the enemy by weakening some part of his line. He weakened the centre and strengthened the wings, and then, to leave as little opportunity of action as possible to the enemy's horse and archery, he ordered the troops to advance running, and engage at once in close fight. The conflict was obstinate. The Persians and Sacæ, who were in the centre, broke the weak centre of the Athenians, and pursued it up the country; but the rest were routed by the Athenians of the wings, who being immediately recalled from pursuit, and led against the conquering Persians, defeated them, and pursued them to their ships. Seven ships were taken on the shore, and the invaders lost 6400 men, the Athenians and Platæans only 192, among whom, however, was the polemarch Callimachus, with many other eminent officers.

The Persian army on its embarkation sailed immediately towards Athens, hoping to surprise it during the absence of its defenders; but Miltiades guessing their design made a hasty march, and arrived in the city before the enemy was in sight. The invaders now returned to Asia, carrying with them their Eretrian prisoners, who were sent to Susa. Darius had borne them bitter enmity for the burning of Sardis; but when he had them at his mercy he treated them with considerable humanity. According to a favourite practice of his, he established them as a colony on an estate of his own, where they were long after distinguishable by their Grecian speech.

The Athenians on the fall of Eretria had applied to Lacedæmon for aid, which the senate promised, but alleged a superstition which prevented its being sent till after the full moon. They then dispatched 2000 men, who marched with such haste to atone for the apparent slackness of their commonwealth, that they arrived in Attica on the third day. They were nevertheless too late for the battle, but they went to Marathon to see the dead, and departed giving due praise to the Athenians, as the first to stop the victories of Persia. Herodotus remarks that "the Athenians first of the Greeks advanced running on their enemies, and first endured the sight of the Median dress and the men who wore it; for hitherto the very name of the Medes had been a terror to Greece."

Miltiades now rose to the utmost height of popularity and influence, inasmuch that when he requested a fleet of seventy ships without declaring how he meant to employ them, but merely promising that he would bring great riches to Athens, the people readily agreed. He led them to the isle of Paros, under the pretence of punishing its people for their compelled service in the Persian fleet, but really to revenge a personal injury of his own. He demanded one hundred talents as the price of his retreat, but the Parians refused, and resisted him bravely, and in an attempt to enter the town he received a wound, and was obliged to withdraw his army. On his return he was brought to trial for his life by Xanthippus, a man of high consideration, on account of the failure of his promises made to the people. His wound disabled him from defending himself, but he was brought into the assembly on a bed, while his friends defended him, principally by recalling his former

services. The memory of these, with pity for his present condition, prevailed on the people to absolve him from the capital charge; but they fined him fifty talents, about 12,000*l*. He died soon after by the mortification of his wound, but the fine was paid by Cimon his son.

The treatment of Miltiades has been with little reason alleged as a gross instance of popular ingratitude. In truth, the most blameable act of the Athenians on this occasion is one which can only be excused by the fervour of their gratitude—the entrusting an armament entirely to the pleasure of a man who, however eminent as a warrior, seems to have given little proof of probity or moderation. His attack on Paros was an atrocious abuse of public authority to the gratification of individual revenge; and it would have been most unjust that such misconduct should go unpunished; though it is to be feared that the popular resentment was excited less by the iniquity committed than by the failure of the promised riches. With respect to the fine, it seems little likely, considering the enormous wealth of Cimon, that it could materially injure either him or his father; and it was probably owing to gratitude and compassion that Miltiades escaped a heavier punishment, which his recent conduct certainly deserved.

Sect. III.—Darius's anger against Athens rose yet higher when he heard of the defeat at Marathon. He ordered to be made ready a mightier armament for the conquest of Greece, and for three years all Asia was disturbed with warlike preparation. But happily for mankind, there is generally a limit to the growth of empires formed by conquest on passing which they either fall to pieces, or at least become feeble through the want of a steady control over the distant provinces. These were to the successors of Darius a source of weakness more commonly than of strength; since, though they might swell the royal armies with lukewarm or doubtful adherents, they were ever liable to revolt; while the Persian governors were frequently encouraged, by the remoteness and magnitude of their commands, to conduct themselves as independent princes rather than as officers under a common master. The first symptom that the empire had reached its greatest height was the revolt of Egypt, which happened in the fourth year after the battle of Marathon.

and divided the attention of Darius with the purposed conquest of Greece. While preparing for both objects, he was diverted by the contending claims urged to the succession by his eldest son Artabazanes, and Xerxes the eldest born to him, after his accession, of Atossa the daughter of Cyrus. After some delay, he decided in favour of Xerxes; but he died before completing his preparations against either enemy.

Xerxes succeeding Darius, in the second year brought Egypt to submission, and then resolved on the invasion of Greece. To this he was stimulated by Mardonius, and by many Grecian refugees, particularly the Peisistratidæ. Four years passed in preparation, and in the fifth he moved towards the Hellespont, with an army gathered from all Asia, between the borders of India and the Mediterranean. A bridge was formed of ships across the Hellespont, a difficult undertaking, from the breadth of the strait and the rapidity of the current; and when this was broken by a tempest, Herodotus tells us that Xerxes, in the madness of absolute power, commanded that the workmen should be all slaughtered, and the sea scourged for disobedience to its lord. Another bridge made, the army passed over, and seven days and seven nights were occupied unceasingly in its passage. The foot is stated at 1,700,000 men, the horse at 80,000. Some time before, to avoid the dangerous navigation round the promontory of Athos, where the fleet of Mardonius had been ruined, a canal had been dug across the isthmus which joins that mountain with the mainland; a work of which the enormous labour and expense appeared so far to exceed the utility, that it was thought to have been chiefly done as a proof and memorial of Xerxes's power.

The army advanced, unresisted, through Thrace and Macedonia. Every Grecian city on its way had been commanded to prepare it a meal in the most splendid manner, and many towns were almost ruined by the expense. The fleet moved along the coast to the Thermaic bay, where it was rejoined by the land force; and while the armament paused here, the heralds returned, whom Xerxes had sent to demand earth and water from the cities of Greece. Of those who gave it, the most considerable were the Thessalians, and the Thebans, with all the Boeotians, except those of Thebes and Plataea. To Athens and Sparta no heralds were sent, because of the murder of those sent

by Darius. The atonement demanded for this crime, by the religion of the age, gave occasion to a splendid instance of patriotism. Proclamation being made in Lacedæmon, that there was need of some to die for the commonwealth, Spertias and Boulis, two noble Spartans, offered themselves as the sacrifice, and were delivered to the Persians. Offers were made to them of high preferment, if they would enter the royal service, but they refused, and being brought to the king, they declared that they came to pay the penalty of murder for the Lacedæmonians. Xerxes replied, that though the Lacedæmonians had broken the universal law of nations, by murdering heralds, he would not imitate the cruelty he abhorred, nor would he take the lives of two individuals, as a satisfaction for the national guilt. He accordingly dismissed them, and they returned home.

Alarm was great among the Grecian states which had refused submission. The Athenians consulted the oracle at Delphi, and received a most threatening answer. Sending again, to beg for one more favourable, they received an ambiguous answer; in a part of which they were told, that when all else was destroyed, the wooden wall might preserve them. Some interpreted this of the Acropolis, which had been anciently surrounded by a palisade; others, of the navy. A young man, by name Themistocles, had recently become a leader in Athens. When it was proposed to distribute to every citizen ten drachmæ (a silver coin about ten-pence) from the produce of the silver mines at Laureium, Themistocles had prevailed on the assembly to reject the proposal, and to spend the money in building ships for the war with Ægina. These were now ready, and he urged his countrymen to build more, and to rely for safety on their naval power; and the adoption of this counsel saved Greece. At a meeting of deputies from all the cities which had refused submission to the invader, a general reconciliation was effected of all quarrels, and particularly of that between Athens and Ægina. Two embassies were sent, the one to invite the concurrence of Argos, which was refused, whether from fear or from jealousy of Sparta; the other to Gelon, tyrant of Syracuse in Sicily, and then the greatest Grecian potentate.

Gelon was of a noble family in Gela, a Rhodian colony in Sicily. He had been of the guard of Hippocrates, tyrant

of Gela, who conquered many neighbouring cities; and had gained the highest rank in his service, by great proofs of warlike ability. When Hippocrates was killed in battle, Gelon was left guardian of his children. While pretending to watch over their interests, he secured the tyranny to himself. After this, in a party contest in Syracuse, the great landholders being expelled, Gelon undertook their restoration. It is probable that he had gained a character for equity and moderation, as well as for ability; since the people of Syracuse, at his approach, agreed that he should settle the differences between themselves and their opponents, and should himself become chief of Syracuse. Henceforth he neglected Gela, and applied himself entirely to increase the more powerful city; and his measures for this purpose have, to a modern eye, the appearance of almost incredible violence. He transported to Syracuse the whole population of Camarina, and more than half that of Gela; and having reduced to a surrender the Megarians of Sicily, he made citizens of Syracuse the rich and powerful men who had been the authors of the war, while the commonalty were sold for slaves, on the express condition that they were to be carried out of Sicily. Yet they had borne him no ill will, and expected from him no evil; but he seems to have been, by temper and policy, adverse to democracy; and he probably was unwilling to introduce into his city men who, adding little to its strength or riches, would yet expect equality as citizens, and who might also bring into it the seeds of dissension, through enmities before existing with their richer countrymen. Such seems the likeliest account of his motives; but the transaction was most unjust and cruel, and forms a deep stain on the memory of a chief whose administration was generally able, and, at least by policy, beneficent. Syracuse, however, prospered greatly under him, insomuch that when the ambassadors came to ask succour against Persia, he offered 200 triremes, and a land force of 20,000 heavy armed foot, and 2000 horse, besides archers, slingers, &c. He required, however, the chief command of the confederate forces, but afterwards lowered his demand, and offered to take it either by land or sea, allowing the other to the Lacedæmonians. The proposal was refused, and he did not join the league.

The Thessalians had at first been willing to join the Grecian confederacy, provided their territory were defended; and 10,000 heavy armed foot being sent into Thessaly were joined by the powerful cavalry of that province. But the Grecian commanders, thinking themselves unable to defend the passes, fell back on the southern districts, and the Thessalians not only submitted to the invader, but served him actively. The Greeks now chose for defence the narrow pass of Thermopylæ, the only tolerable outlet southward from Thessaly; and here were posted rather more than 5000 regular troops, under the Spartan king Leonidas, the brother of Cleomenes, to maintain the passage till the whole strength of the different states could be sent out; while the combined fleet of 271 triremes, besides smaller vessels, was assembled in the neighbouring road of Artemisium in Eubœa. Several attempts were made by the Persians to force the pass; but they were always repulsed with great slaughter, the narrow space not letting them profit by their numbers, and exposing them without defence or escape to the superior skill and steadiness of the Greeks, and the irresistible onset of their heavy phalanx. At length Xerxes was told of a path by which troops might be led across the mountains, and sending round a strong detachment to attack the Greeks in the rear, while his main army advanced on their front, he ensured their destruction. It was now impossible to stop the enemy, and an ordinary character would have thought it useless to sacrifice the lives of himself, and his men, where no immediate military object worth the loss could be gained. But Leonidas saw that the greatest danger to Greece was in the terror occasioned by inequality of force, which disposed each state to seek its particular safety by deserting the common cause, or at least to neglect the general defence in order to provide for that of its own territory. Nothing was so likely to obviate this as the enthusiasm which might be excited by a great example of self-devotion; and his resolution to give such an example was confirmed by an oracle declaring that either Sparta or her king must perish. Dismissing, therefore, the rest of his army to serve their country with better hope elsewhere, he retained the 300 Spartans who were with him. The Thespians, in number 700, probably the

whole force of the little commonwealth, declared themselves resolved to share his fate; and he detained the 400 Thebans against their will, as hostages for the doubtful faith of their countrymen. The army would probably be more than doubled by the light-armed slaves and Helots, who, however, were of little value as soldiers. With this scanty force the Greeks advanced to meet the enemy, and fighting like men whose only object was to sell their lives as dearly as possible, they made vast slaughter, and had the advantage till the Persian detachment came up in their rear; they then retreated to a hillock, and forming on the top, continued the struggle, when their spears were broken fighting with their swords, and, if these failed, with their hands and teeth, till the Spartans and Thespians were all slain to a man. The Thebans had been obliged to fight till their companions retreated to the hillock, but then they surrendered in a body. This is well nigh the only occasion on which the petty state of Thespiæ becomes conspicuous in history, whereas Thebes was long great and flourishing, and at one time the predominant power in Greece; but all the bloody laurels of Thebes would be well exchanged for this one act of patriotic devotedness on the part of Thespiæ.

When the Persian fleet appeared at Artemisium, many of the Greeks, alarmed at its strength, had been inclined to retreat: but the Eubœans, not without the aid of bribery, persuaded them to remain. Themistocles, the Athenian admiral, received from the Eubœans 30 talents, about 7000*l.*, with part of which he brought over to his wishes the Lacedæmonian and Corinthian commanders, keeping the larger portion to himself. Three battles were fought with no decisive result, but generally in favour of the Greeks; and the Athenians, who had at first supplied 127 ships out of 271, and afterwards added 53 more, won the highest praise in every battle. Besides, the fleet of Xerxes, which had before suffered severely off Mount Pelion in Thessaly, was here again overtaken by a storm, which destroyed many vessels. But on hearing of the defeat at Thermopylæ, the Grecian fleet was withdrawn, and the Persians took unresisted possession of Eubœa. Before leaving the island, Themistocles erected stones at all the watering-places, with inscrip-

tions reproving the Ionians for assisting the invaders of their mother country, and calling on them either to desert the armament, or if that were impossible, at least to be slack in their service. By this he hoped either to influence the conduct of the Ionians, or, failing in this, at least to make them suspected, and thus to take from the enemy the effective service of an important part of his naval force.

The Phocians were resolutely hostile to Xerxes, chiefly through hatred to the Thessalians; and now the Persian army advancing through Phocis, with the Thessalians for guides, laid waste the country with fire and sword, till it entered Bœotia, where it was received as in a friendly land. A detachment was sent against Delphi, chiefly for the great wealth contained in the temple. Alarmed at its approach, the Delphians consulted the oracle what should be done with the sacred treasure, but the answer was that they should not move it, for the god could protect his own. They then sent over their wives and children into Achaia, and themselves took shelter among the heights of Par-nassus, and in what was called the Corycian Cave. The Persians on their approach were attacked with a violent storm and with rocks rolling down on them, and when they were thrown into consternation, the Delphians sallying forth completed their defeat, and pursued them with great slaughter towards Bœotia. Many prodigies are said to have happened; a report produced, as we may suppose, partly by the imagination both of the defenders and assailants, excited by the reputed sanctity of the place, and partly by the arts of the priests employed for the encouragement of the one party and the intimidation of the other. The storm was probably natural, and the rolling down of rocks the act of the Delphians on the heights.

The councils of Lacedæmon were directed by a spirit very different from that of Leonidas. Instead of advancing to the borders of Bœotia to protect their allies, the Peloponnesians were fortifying the isthmus, in the hope that themselves might thus be preserved, though all the rest became a prey to the invader. If the Athenians had acted in a like temper of shortsighted selfishness, all Greece would have been enslaved. They had alone repelled a former invasion, but the present was too powerful;

and, unable otherwise to save the city, they would have made a separate peace. Deprived of the Athenian squadron, which was more than half the fleet, the Greeks would have been unable to keep the sea; and either the defence of the isthmus must have been given up and the troops dispersed to their respective cities, when there would have been no army to oppose the Persians in the field; or else the cities would have been successively taken by the fleet of Asia, while the best part of the population was absent. But the Athenians, when they found that, in consequence of the desertion of their allies, they could not preserve their city unless by submission, immediately resolved to abandon it. The fleet from Artemisium was assembled at Salamis to assist in their removal; their wives, children, and servants were transported to Salamis, Trœzen, and Ægina, while the able-bodied men were mostly serving in the ships; a few only were left behind, principally poor men, who were unable to support themselves in a foreign state, and some who conceived the wooden wall in the oracle to be spoken of the Acropolis. The Persians advanced on Athens, after burning Thespiæ and Platœa: they entered the city, but the few Athenians in the Acropolis made an obstinate defence, rejecting all the offers held out by the Peisistratidæ to induce their surrender. At length, with great difficulty, the citadel was taken and burnt, and the defenders slaughtered.

This news alarmed the Greeks in Salamis so much, that many of the commanders were about to make a hasty flight without awaiting the general determination; and the rest being assembled in a council of war, it was resolved to retreat to the Isthmus, and there expect the enemy. As Themistocles was returning to his ship, he was met by Mnesiphilus, an Athenian officer, who, on hearing the issue of the conference, exclaimed that Greece was lost if such a counsel were adopted; for the allies, if now allowed to retreat, could no longer be kept together, but would be scattered to their several cities. The suggestion falling in with the opinion of Themistocles, induced him to return to the Spartan Eurybiades who commanded in chief, and pressing on him with many additions the arguments of Mnesiphilus, he persuaded him to call back the council. He now urged the commanders to remain, both

on account of the advantage which the narrow Strait of Salamis gave to the Greeks, inferior as well in the speed as in the number of their ships; and also because by so doing they would preserve Megaræ, Salamis, and Ægina, with the Athenian women and children deposited in the latter places. When he found them still obstinate, he declared that the Athenians, if their feelings and interests after all they had done were so little regarded, would abandon the armament, and taking on board their families would seek a settlement elsewhere. This threat prevailed, and it was agreed to remain; but at the approach of the enemy the Peloponnesians again were eager to depart and provide for the defence of their own territories; on which Themistocles, to prevent the mischiefs he foresaw, and partly, also, with the double policy which marked his character, to secure to himself, in case of defeat, an interest with the conquerors, sent private information to the hostile commanders of the flight which was meditated by the Greeks, and advised them to guard against it by occupying both ends of the strait between Salamis and the main land.

Aristeides was an Athenian, of singular fame for integrity. He had been opposed in politics to Themistocles, through whose influence he had been condemned to the temporary banishment called ostracism, from a Greek word signifying a piece of earthenware, on which the votes were written on such occasions; an infliction imputing no crime and conveying no reproach, but merely devised as a safeguard to the democracy against excessive influence or popularity in any citizen, however acquired. The only source, from which a dangerous ascendancy could arise to Aristeides, was the unbounded reverence paid to his virtues; but this was enough to produce his ostracism, when urged on a jealous people by his able and unscrupulous opponent. He was now in Ægina, and hearing that the Persians were preparing to beset both ends of the strait of Salamis, he made his way to that island, and calling out Themistocles from the council where the debate on retreat was still pending, he told him what had taken place. Many of the commanders disbelieved his tidings, till they were confirmed by a Tenian ship, (from Tenos, an island in the Ægean) which deserted from the enemy; and since flight was impossible, all prepared for

battle. Themistocles had taught his squadron an improved system of tactics. Every trireme was armed with a strong iron beak projecting from its stem; and its most effective attack was to strike with its head on the enemy's broadside; the next to render his vessel unmanageable by dashing away some of his oars. It had been usual to grapple and endeavour to board, so that the action had been decided by the soldiers on the deck: but Themistocles taught the Athenians to depend on the management of the vessel, and therefore, to lighten it, he diminished its complement of soldiers. With the morning the Persians advanced in the confidence of superior force, and only anxious to prevent the escape of their enemies: they had considerably more than 1000 triremes, while the Greeks had but 378, of which 180 were Athenian. The whole Persian army, with Xerxes at its head, was drawn up on the Attic shore to view the engagement.

The action commenced with the arrival of an Æginetan galley chased by the Persians. The Greeks advanced to support it; but on coming front to front with the vast multitude of hostile vessels, there was a general movement of fear, and all the captains hung back except the Athenian Ameinias, the brother of Æschylus the poet, who was himself also distinguished in the battle. Ameinias dashed forward and grappled with a Phœnician vessel; the rest pressed on to aid him; and thus, according to the Athenian account, the fight was begun. The Æginetans, on the other hand, said that their ship commenced the engagement; an assertion, perhaps, not really inconsistent with the claim of the Athenians, if we suppose that, when the Æginetan galley was hard pressed, Ameinias pushing forward to its rescue enabled it to turn on its pursuers. Both stories admitted the wavering of the Greeks, and the Æginetans related a marvel as the cause of its removal; for they said that, at the doubtful moment, a female figure had appeared in the air, and a voice had been heard by all to give the word for attack, crying "How long for shame will ye back your vessels?" The onset of the Greeks was steady and orderly, in spite of their passing hesitation: whereas, in the Asiatic fleet, presumption had bred carelessness, and carelessness confusion. Notwithstanding the great disparity of force, the Greeks were completely victorious, and

the hostile armament was ruined. On this day, the Æginetans were judged to have won the first praise, the Athenians the second. (B. C. 480.)

The destruction of his fleet struck Xerxes with dismay, and produced in him an eager wish to escape in any manner from a campaign which was now becoming troublesome and dangerous. Mardonius saw that he would gladly listen to any proposal that would facilitate his return. He was aware that without a fleet the war might probably be tedious, in which case the immense bulk of the present army would be only an incumbrance, from the difficulty of subsisting it. Besides, his ambition was flattered with the idea of becoming the conqueror of Greece, while he feared that, if he now returned, he might be made answerable for the ill success of the expedition he had advised. He therefore proposed to Xerxes to return into Asia with the body of the army, leaving himself with 300,000 of the best troops, to complete the conquest of Greece. Xerxes assented, and the army having retired into Bœotia, Mardonius made his selection, and then, accompanying the king into Thessaly, there parted from him, leaving him to pursue his march towards Asia, while himself prepared to winter in Thessaly and Macedonia.

The remnant of the Persian fleet having been pursued as far as the island Andros, in the Ægean, Themistocles proposed to continue the chase, and then to sail to the Hellespont and destroy the bridge; Eurybiades opposed him, on the ground that there was danger lest the Persians, being rendered desperate, might yet be successful; and the Peloponnesians generally agreeing with Eurybiades, the proposal was rejected. On this, Themistocles persuaded the Athenians, who had been most eager for pursuit, to acquiesce; while he took advantage of the incident to secure to himself, in case of banishment, a refuge in Persia, by sending a secret messenger to Xerxes, to inform him of the plan which had been proposed, and to say that Themistocles, through friendship to him, had procured its rejection. The fleet then proceeded to levy contributions from the Grecian islands which had joined in the armament of the invader: when Themistocles abused the power resulting to him from the large squadron he commanded and from the general admira-

tion given to his ability and services, by exacting large bribes from many of the islands, as the price of his influence employed to avert from them the vengeance of the confederacy. The Persian fleet, now 300 ships strong, with the Ionians, took its station at Samos, to prevent the revolt of Ionia. The Greeks returned to Ægina, where, receiving ambassadors who solicited their assistance to liberate Ionia, they proceeded as far as Delos, and there stopt, themselves being afraid to approach nearer to Asia, as the Persians were to come nearer than Samos to Greece.

Mardonius, when he parted from Xerxes, had detached 60,000 men under Artabazus, a noble Persian, to protect the retreat. Artabazus having attended the king as far as the Hellespont, on his return undertook the reduction of Pallene, a peninsula on the Macedonian coast, which had revolted on learning the battle of Salamis and the retreat of Xerxes. Here the sea having retired and left the sands bare for a considerable space, he attempted to pass over them into the peninsula; but a large proportion of his soldiers perished by the sudden return of the waters, and he was obliged to lead the remnant into Thessaly to Mardonius.

In the spring, the first important measure of Mardonius was an attempt to detach the Athenians from the confederacy of which their vigour and public spirit had been hitherto the soul. He knew that if he could gain them, the Persians would at once recover the command of the sea: and having this, when every city was liable separately to be attacked by the fleet, it was vain to think that an army could be held together capable of opposing his own. He chose for his ambassador, Alexander, the king of Macedonia, who was previously connected by the bond of hospitality with the Athenians; and empowered him to offer them independence and the friendship of the king, with the rebuilding of their temples, the complete restoration of their territory, and the addition of any which they might wish to possess. The power of Persia, the past sufferings of Athens, the probability that it would in any future Persian invasion be again the first to suffer, its experience how little aid was to be expected from the selfish timidity of its Peloponnesian allies, were considerations which might probably incline it to the acceptance of terms so advantageous.

The Lacedæmonians took the alarm, and sent ambassadors to Athens, to remind that people that they were the principal cause of the war, to conjure them to be true to the liberty of Greece, and to offer, in consideration of the waste already made in the property of the Athenians, to maintain in Peloponnesus, while the contest should last, their wives and such of their slaves as were useless in war. The reply of the Athenians was to Alexander a firm but temperate refusal; to the Lacedæmonians, a declaration that they would pursue the war upon their own resources, without trespassing on others, together with a request that the Lacedæmonians would be ready to march into Bœotia, to save them from a second capture of their city.

On learning the rejection of his proposals, Mardonius straightway advanced on Athens. The Athenians remained in the city as long as they hoped to be joined by their allies; but when Mardonius had arrived in Bœotia and no aid was near, they passed over into Salamis, and left him the empty city, which he occupied, and then sent a messenger to Salamis, bearing the same offers which had been brought by Alexander. Ill used as they had been, the Athenians were true to Greece. The only man who ventured to advise compliance was Lycidas, a counsellor; and it is painful to relate that, as a whole people can seldom be roused to deeds of heroic and devoted patriotism, without an excitement too violent to allow them, when inflamed by a suspicion of treason, to listen to the voice of humanity, or even of justice, the enraged multitude stoned Lycidas to death, while the women crowded unbidden to his house, and inflicted a like vengeance on his wife and children. The law of nations was, however, respected on this occasion, and the messenger dismissed unhurt. Ambassadors were sent to the Lacedæmonians to complain that succours were withheld, to remind them of the offers of Mardonius, and to threaten that the Athenians, if unassisted, would provide for themselves alone. The Lacedæmonians were quietly celebrating the Hyacinthia, one of their great annual festivals; and at the same time were, with the other Peloponnesians, completing the fortification of the Isthmus. The ambassadors made their complaint to the ephori, but the answer was put off from day to

day. "I cannot tell," says Herodotus, "why, on the arrival of Alexander at Athens, they were very anxious that the Athenians should not join with the Medes, but now made no account of it; unless because the Isthmus was now fortified, and they thought they had no need of the Athenians; whereas, when Alexander came into Attica, the walls were unfinished, and they were labouring in great fear of the Persians." On the tenth day, however, it was suggested to the ephori, that all their fortifications would be a vain defence to Peloponnesus if the enemy had the fleet of Athens, to transport his army. The hint struck them, and fear effected what justice and honour ought to have done: 5000 Spartans were despatched that night, and when, on the following morning, the ambassadors came to make their last indignant remonstrance, they were told that the succours were already on their march.

Mardonius being informed by the Argians, who were secretly in his interest, that the Lacedæmonians were in motion, withdrew his army into Bœotia, for the sake of engaging near the friendly city of Thebes, and in a more level country, and therefore more favourable to his cavalry. Before leaving Athens, he burnt and demolished what remained of the city. The Athenians crossed from Salamis, and the confederate army being assembled at Eleusis, advanced to Erythræ, on the border of Bœotia, where it took up a position on the roots of mount Cithæron. The heavy-armed troops of the Grecian army amounted to 38,000, of whom the Lacedæmonians contributed 10,000. Of these 5000 were Spartans, from the city, each of whom was attended by seven light-armed Helots. In the rest of the army it is computed that to each heavy-armed soldier there was one light-armed attendant. Besides, there were 1800 light-armed Thespians, the remaining strength of that little state, all its heavy-armed troops having fallen at Thermopylæ, and those who remained, being probably the poorer citizens, who were unable to purchase the full armour, or to maintain themselves in distant warfare. With these the entire numbers were nearly 110,000. The army was led by Pausanias, the Spartan commander, who was cousin and guardian to the minor king Pleistarchus, the son of Leodæus. The Athenian force of heavy-armed was led by

Mardonius's army consisted of 300,000 Asiatics and about 50,000 Greeks.

The first attack was made by the Persian cavalry, who continually riding up in small parties, discharged their arrows and retired, annoying the Greeks without any retaliation. The Megarians being placed in the most exposed part of the line, sent to Pausanias to say that they could no longer maintain their ground, and a picked band of 300 Athenians volunteered to relieve them. They took with them some archers, a service which the Athenians cultivated with an attention and success unusual in Greece; and soon after their arrival, Masistius, the general of the Persian cavalry, his horse being wounded with an arrow, was dismounted and killed. All the horse now making a desperate charge forced back the 300, till the rest coming up to support the Athenians, they were repulsed with great slaughter. The army was encouraged by this success, but its present position was inconvenient, particularly for want of water, and it was resolved to move into the territory of Platæa. A dispute arose between the Athenians and the Tegeans, for the post of honour at the extremity of the left wing; but it was prevented from proceeding to extremity by the wise moderation of the Athenian commanders, who still maintaining their claim of right, professed themselves willing, nevertheless, to take their place wherever the Lacedæmonians might appoint. The Lacedæmonians decided in their favour, placing them at the extremity of the left wing, and the Tegeans in the right, next to themselves.

Mardonius now drew up his army according to the advice of the Thebans, opposing the Persians to the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans, the Bœotians and other Greeks in his service to the Athenians, and to the other bodies that occupied the centre, the Medes and the rest of the Asiatics. The soothsayers on each side predicted success to the party which received the attack; in compliance probably with the policy of the commanders, each of whom being posted on ground advantageous to himself, was unwilling to leave it and enter on that which had been chosen by his adversary. Ten days were spent in inaction, except that the Persian horse were harassing the Greeks, and, latterly, intercepting their convoys; but on the eleventh, Mardonius growing impatient, called a council of war, and resolved,

against the opinion of Artabazus, to attack the Greeks on the following day. The same night, Alexander the Macedonian, riding alone and secretly to the Athenian encampment, asked to speak to the commanders, and gave them notice of the resolution taken.

Pausanias being informed of this by the Athenian generals, proposed a change in the order of battle, by which the Athenians should be opposed to the Persians, of whose mode of fighting they alone had experience, while in their place the Lacedæmonians should act against the Boeotians and other Grecian auxiliaries. The Athenians readily consented, and the troops began to move while the morn was breaking; but Mardonius made a counter-movement of his Greek and Persian troops, and the Lacedæmonians desisted from their purpose when they saw that it was known. Mardonius sent a herald to reproach them with their fear, and then commenced the action with his horse, who harassed the Greeks severely, and filled up the spring from which their water had been supplied. The Greeks now suffered both from the attacks of the cavalry, and from the want of water and food, their convoys being cut off: and it was resolved to proceed at night to a position nearer Platæa, where water abounded, and the ground was less favourable to horse. Accordingly in the night the army was moved, but the Greeks of the centre had been so disheartened by the attacks of the cavalry, that instead of taking up the appointed position, they fled to the city of Platæa. There remained on the one wing the Lacedæmonians (10,000 heavy-armed), and the Tegeans (1500); on the other the Athenians (8000), with the Platæans (600), who always accompanied them, and who had carried their zeal so far that, though an inland people, they helped to man the Athenian ships at Artemisium. Including the light-armed, those who stood their ground were, of the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans 53,000, of the Athenians and Platæans about 17,200. The march of the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans was delayed by the obstinacy of Ananpharetus, a Spartan officer, who viewing the intended movement as a flight, long refused to join in it. The day was dawning, and the Lacedæmonians, through fear of the horse, proceeded over the roofs of Cithæron. The Athenians, who had waited for the move-

ment of their allies, went by the plain. Mardonius, on seeing the Greeks, as it seemed, retreating, was filled with exultation, and immediately led the Persians after them, while the other Asiatics followed tumultuously, thinking the day won. The Lacedæmonians, on the approach of the cavalry, sent to the Athenians for assistance, begging that if they were unable to come, they would at least send the archers; but the Athenians, when preparing to comply with the summons, were prevented by the attack of the Greeks in the Persian service.

The battle was now joined on both sides. The Persians fought with great bravery; but neither bravery nor vast superiority in numbers could compensate their inferiority in arms and discipline, and they were at length defeated with great slaughter, Mardonius being killed. The other Asiatics fled immediately, when they saw the Persians broken. Of the Grecian auxiliaries, opposed to the Athenians, many were slack in their exertions as not being hearty in the cause; but the Boeotians, who formed the strongest body, were zealous for the success of Mardonius, and they fought long and hard before they were defeated. The Boeotians fled towards Thebes, the Asiatics to their entrenched camp, their flight being in some degree protected by the Asiatic and Boeotian cavalry. On hearing that their friends were victorious, the Greeks of the centre returned in haste and disorder to the field, and the Megarians and Phliasians going by the plain were charged and broken with considerable loss by some Theban horse.

The fugitives who escaped into the camp were in time to close the gates and man the walls against the Lacedæmonians and Tegeans; and the assailants being unskilled in the attack of fortifications, they made a successful defence till the arrival of the Athenians, who went about the work more skilfully, and soon gained entrance. The passions of the Greeks were inflamed to the utmost by long distress and danger, and no mercy was shown. Of the 300,000 men who were left with Mardonius, 20,000 had been led from the field by Artabazus when it first became evident that the Persians were losing the battle; but of the others not 3000 are said to have survived the battle and the subsequent massacre. The mind revolts from such creeping destruction.

even amidst its exultation on viewing the deliverance of a great people from unprincipled aggression. It were indeed to be wished that an outraged nation would remember mercy in the moment of vengeance; and refrain from needlessly visiting on the miserable tools of despotism the crimes of their employers. But though such magnanimous humanity may be sometimes taught by reason and religion to an individual, it can never be expected from a body of men, and least of all from men flushed with victory, and burning with all the fierce passions necessarily engendered in a bloody struggle for life or death, however just and holy the motive of the fray. Few victories are free from the stain of unnecessary bloodshed, even when won by mere professional soldiers, unprovoked by personal wrongs, and careless of the quarrel in which it pleases their rulers to employ them. The Athenians were men whose houses had been burnt, and whose families had suffered all the evils of a sudden emigration, while any who remained behind were undistinguishingly slaughtered. The other Greeks, if they had not endured it, had lived in fear of the like treatment at the hands of enemies whose warfare was habitually merciless. Assuredly, therefore, it is not a subject of wonder, or of harsh and unmitigated reproach, if the cruelties of the Persian soldiery were retaliated in kind.

Artabazus arrived in safety at Byzantium* on the Bosphorus, whence he passed into Asia; but not without many of his followers being cut off by the Thracians, and many dropping on the way through fatigue and hunger. Meanwhile the army of the Grecian confederacy marched against Thebes, and compelled that city to purchase its safety by delivering up the principal authors of its defection from the common cause, who were sent to Corinth by Pausanias, and there put to death.

Another battle was fought in Asia on the same day with that of Platæa. The Samians, without the knowledge of their tyrant or the Persians, had sent messengers to invite the Grecian fleet at Delos to pass over to Ionia, assuring the commanders of their superiority to the Persian force in those seas, and of the disposition of the Ionians to revolt. The Greeks complied; and on their approach the Persian leaders, feeling themselves too weak for a sea-fight, sent away

* Byzantium, the modern Constantinople.

the Phœnician ships, and bringing the others to the promontory of Mycale, near Miletus, where the land army was encamped, drew them upon the beach, an easy thing with the light vessels used in ancient war, and surrounded them with a rampart. The chief commander of the Greeks was Leotychides, a Spartan of one of the royal houses. On arriving, he repeated, with a similar double purpose, the stratagem of Themistocles at Artemisium. Sailing along the shore he made proclamation by a herald to the Ionians, bidding them remember that the Greeks were fighting for their liberty. The Persians were already jealous of the Samians, because they had ransomed and sent home some Athenian prisoners; and their suspicions being strengthened and made more general by the proclamation, they disarmed the Samians, and sent the Milesians to guard the passes, under pretence of profiting by their knowledge of the country, but really to remove them from the camp. The Athenians advancing along the beach commenced the action, followed by the Corinthians, Troezenians, and Sicyonians. After some hard fighting they drove the enemy to his entrenchments, and then forced the inclosure, on which the mass of the army fled, the Persians only still resisting. It was not till now that the Lacedæmonians came up, having been impeded by steep and broken ground. On seeing the Greeks prevailing, the Samians, though unarmed, did what they could in their favour, and the other Ionians followed their example, and sided with the Greeks. The Milesians, who had been sent to guard the passes by the Persians, turned against them and slaughtered the fugitives. All Ionia now revolted. The fleet proceeded to Samos, where a consultation was held on the fate of that country. It could not protect itself unassisted, and its defence was a burden the Greeks were loth to support. The Peloponnesians proposed to remove the inhabitants, and settle them on the lands of those states that had joined the common enemy: but the Athenians were averse to the desolation of Ionia, and jealous of the interference of others with their colonies; and when they urged the reception of the Ionians into the confederacy, the Peloponnesians gave way, and the Samians, Chians, and other islanders who had joined the fleet, were admitted.

The fleet now sailed to the Hellespont to destroy the bridge, but found it

broken; on which Leotycheides with the Peloponnesians returned home, while the Athenians remained and formed the siege of Sestos on the Hellespont, where the Persians from all the other towns of the Chersonese had collected. The siege was continued till the Persians were reduced to the extremity of famine, and then they escaped by night out of the place, but many were slain or taken in the pursuit. The Athenians having cleared the Chersonese of the invaders, returned home.

Immediately after the battle of Plataea, the Athenian people had begun to bring back their families and to rebuild their city and ramparts. But the jealousy excited in the Peloponnesians by the power and spirit which Athens had displayed, was far stronger than their gratitude for what it had done and suffered in the common cause. An embassy arrived from Peloponnesus to urge the Athenians not to go on with the fortifications, but rather, as far as in them lay, to demolish the walls of all other cities out of Peloponnesus, that the enemy, if he again returned, might have no strong place to fix his head quarters in, as recently in Thebes. If the demand had been complied with, Athens would have become entirely subject to Lacedæmon. At the same time it was dangerous to refuse, since, from the past conduct of Lacedæmon, there was little ground to expect that gratitude would prevent it from any action prompted by jealousy or ambition; while it was vain to hope that the military force of Athens, always inferior to that of Lacedæmon, and now further weakened by the number of citizens absent with the fleet, would be able to maintain itself without the aid of walls against the united strength of Peloponnesus. In this difficulty Themistocles advised them immediately to send away the Lacedæmonian ambassadors, to raise up the walls with the utmost possible celerity, men, women, and children all joining in the work; and chusing himself and some others as ambassadors to Lacedæmon, to send him thither at once, but to detain his colleagues till the walls had attained a sufficient height for defence. He was accordingly sent to Lacedæmon, where he put off his audience from day to day, excusing himself by saying that he waited for his colleagues; who were daily expected, and wondered that they were not come. But when reports arrived that the walls

were gaining height, he bade the magistrates not trust to rumour, but send some competent persons to examine. They sent accordingly, and at the same time Themistocles secretly directed the Athenians to detain the Lacedæmonian commissioners, but with the least possible show of compulsion, till himself and his colleagues should return. The latter were now arrived, and brought news that the walls had gained the height required; and Themistocles declared to the Lacedæmonians that Athens was already sufficiently fortified, and that henceforth if the Lacedæmonians and their allies had anything to propose, they must do it as to persons able to judge both of the common interest and their own; that when it seemed best to abandon the city, the Athenians had determined and done it for themselves, and that in the deliberations of the confederacy they had appeared in judgment inferior to none; that they thought it best for themselves and for all, that their city should be fortified, since there could be no equality nor freedom of debate on the concerns of the alliance, without such an approach to equality in defensive means as might ensure to each a certain degree of independence and security. The Lacedæmonians were secretly mortified at their failure, and probably not the less so from the consciousness that the attempt had been an unhandsome one; but their discontent did not break out openly, and the ambassadors on each part went home unquestioned.

The following year Pausanias being appointed to command the confederate fleet, reduced most of Cyprus, and then proceeding to the Bosphorus besieged and took Byzantium from the Persians. But his mind was drunk with glory and power, and he now aspired to hold under Persia the dominion of Greece. He favoured the escape of the prisoners taken in Byzantium, and with them he sent a letter to Xerxes, in which he asked his daughter in marriage, and promised to effect the subjugation of Greece. On receiving a favourable answer his pride swelled yet higher, and led him to conduct not more profligately arrogant than absurdly impolitic. He assumed the Median dress and mode of life, and took a body-guard of Medes and Egyptians; and he daily treated the allies with extravagant haughtiness and severity, in so much that the Ionians already pre-

ferring as leaders the Athenians, their kinsmen and most active liberators, now urged them to take the command, and, if necessary, to resist Pausanias. At this crisis Pausanias was called home under a charge of treason, and forthwith the whole fleet, excepting the Peloponnesians, took the Athenians for leaders. Dorcis was sent out to replace Pausanias, but the allies refusing him obedience, he withdrew with his squadron from the fleet: and the Lacedæmonians acquiesced the more readily in the change, from weariness of the war, from fear lest their officers should, like Pausanias, be corrupted into disobedience to the laws, and from holding the Athenians equal to the command and now friendly to themselves. This beginning of Athenian ascendancy took place in the year B. C. 477. (Clinton's Fast. Hellen.)

Pausanias, on his return, being acquitted of the charge, but not reinstated in his command, went out again without public authority, pretending a wish to be present on the scene of action, but really purposing to carry on his practices with Persia. But fresh information arriving against him, the ephori again recalled him, and he obeyed, trusting for security to money and friends. There were strong grounds of suspicion, but not proof enough to procure the condemnation of a man of high rank and pure Spartan blood, says the historian; implying, apparently, that against a meaner man slighter proofs might have sufficed. Complete evidence was at length supplied. A slave entrusted by Pausanias with a letter to Persia, was alarmed by observing that no former messenger had ever returned. He opened the letter, and found that it directed his death; and he immediately carried it to the ephori, who not yet being fully satisfied with the proof, contrived with him a plan through which they overheard an avowal of the treason from the mouth of Pausanias himself. They now proceeded to arrest Pausanias, but he being forewarned, took refuge in a building belonging to the temple of Minerva, called the Brazen House. The sanctity of the place forbade them to force him out or kill him there, but they walled him in and let perish by hunger. They were not, however, thought to have preserved selves by the evasion from the guilt of sacrifice.

Lacedæmonians sent ambassa-

dors to Athens to declare that they had found evidence implicating Themistocles in the treason of Pausanias. It seems very unlikely that he should really have concurred in it, but not improbable, considering his intriguing character, that he may, to serve some purpose of his own, have tampered with Pausanias in a manner that might countenance the suspicion. He was now banished by ostracism and living at Argos, and hither Athenian and Lacedæmonian commissioners went together to arrest him. He fled at their approach, and went to Corecra; and thence he was conveyed to the opposite continent by the Corcyreans, who showed him kindness, but feared to protect him. Whithersoever he went, he was followed by those who were sent to apprehend him, till he was obliged to commit himself to the generosity of a personal enemy, Admetus, the king of the Molossians. Admetus being absent, Themistocles addressed himself to his wife, and was instructed by her to take her child in his arms and seat himself on the hearth, as the most prevailing manner of supplication. On the return of Admetus, he declared who he was, and prayed that if, in the assembly of the Athenians, he had spoken anything against the interest of Admetus, it might not be visited upon him in his banishment: "For he was now an easy prey to any one much weaker than Admetus; but a generous spirit would only avenge itself on its equals, and in equal contest." The Molossian prince was moved, and received him to hospitality; and when he was demanded by the messengers of Athens and Lacedæmon, he would not give him up, though he did not venture to retain him. Themistocles wished to go to Asia, and he was sent by Admetus to the Macedonian port of Pydna, where he embarked in a trading vessel bound to Ionia. He was driven by cross winds to the island of Naxos, where an Athenian armament was besieging the city. (B. C. 466. See the next chapter). In this emergency he made himself known to the master of the ship, and threatened that, if taken, he would declare to the Athenians that the master had knowingly carried him for the sake of gain. The only means of safety, he said, was, that none should quit the vessel; and if in this the master would comply with him, he should be largely rewarded. Accordingly, the vessel was kept in the offing for a day and a night, and then, as soon as the weather al-

lowed, it proceeded to Ephesus. On arriving in Asia, Themistocles wrote to the king Artaxerxes, the son and successor of Xerxes, beginning his letter thus:—"I, Themistocles, come to thee, who have done thy house most ill of all the Greeks, while I was of necessity repelling the invasion of thy father; but yet more good, when I was in safety and his return was endangered." He mentioned the warning he gave before the battle of Salamis of the intended flight of the Greeks, and the breaking of the bridge, which at the time he professed to have prevented: declared that he was able to do great service to the king, and was now expelled for friendship to him; and said, that at the year's end he would in person explain the purpose of his coming. The king bade him do so, and after a year spent in learning the Persian language and manners, he went to Susa, and was there received into the highest favour, as well on account of his reputation and the ability which appeared in his discourse, as for the promises he made of reducing Greece under the Persian yoke. The revenues of three cities were assigned for his support, and he lived in great splendour till he fell sick and died, according to some; according to others, he poisoned himself when Artaxerxes was preparing an invasion of Greece, whether from conscious inability to fulfil his promises, or from unwillingness to assist in enslaving the country he had preserved. It is said that he directed his bones to be carried to Attica, and secretly buried, since the laws forbade the interment there of one banished for treason. He left an unequalled reputation for readiness, decision, and rectitude of judgment, fertility of resource and acuteness in conjecture, for foresight of the good and evil results of every measure, and for eloquence in enforcing his conclusions. Had he joined to these high powers of mind a clear integrity and singleness of purpose, his fame would have been purer, and his latter days perhaps more happy. It is true his double policy served him well in securing so splendid an asylum in Asia, but a more straightforward line of conduct might have prevented his exile. In all his exertions for the good of his country he endeavoured at the same time to promote his private profit, and to keep up an interest with the public enemy, by which he might be able, if it should be

convenient, to separate his fortunes from those of Athens. Such a man, whatever be his services, can never be trusted: and however innocent he may have been of the treason of Pausanias, it was the natural consequence of his habitual doubledealing that the charge should readily be believed.

During part of the war just described, a struggle no less critical had taken place among the Grecian settlements in Sicily. The Phœnician colony of Carthage, in Africa, remarkable no less than its mother country for maritime and commercial enterprise, was beginning to attain a degree of military power to which Phœnicia had never aspired. It possessed a part of the northern coast of Sicily, and the opportunity was inviting to subdue the whole, while all assistance from Greece was precluded by the Persian invasion. A pretext was furnished by a quarrel with Theron, tyrant of Acragas, or Agrigentum, a colony from Gela, and, after Syracuse, the most powerful state in Sicily: and an enormous armament was sent off, strengthened, according to the usual practice of Carthage, with mercenaries from many barbarous nations, the fleet being by treaty joined with that of the Tuscans. Gelon, however, marched with the force of Syracuse to the assistance of Theron, leaving the command of his fleet to his brother Hieron: and Hieron defeated the Carthaginian and Tuscan fleet, while, about the same time, the Carthaginian land force was completely broken at Himera by the united armies of Syracuse and Acragas. It is said, by some authors, that Gelon's victory took place on the same day with the battle of Salamis. No further conquest was attempted in Sicily by Carthage for many years after; but we are not sufficiently acquainted with the history of that city to determine the cause of its inaction. Shortly after his victory Gelon died. His ability and popularity are shown by the fact, that 130 years after, when a vote was passed to remove all statues of kings and tyrants, Gelon's alone was excepted. He was succeeded by Hieron, also a prince of considerable ability, and remarkable for the encouragement of letters. In the following reign of his brother Thrasybulus, who is accused of cruelty and arbitrary conduct, a civil war took place, which ended with the establishment of democracy in Syracuse.

CHAPTER V.

Of Greece, from the establishment of Athens as a leading state, to the beginning of the Peloponnesian War.

THE Athenians, being acknowledged as leaders by the Greeks of Asia and the islands, proceeded regularly to organise the confederacy. Aristides was, by common consent, appointed to make the assessment determining how much each city was to contribute in ships or money to the support of the war. This he executed with the greatest impartiality, and in such a manner, that the justice of the proportions appears to have been questioned by none. The whole annual amount of the tribute was 460 talents, about 104,200*l*. Athenian officers were appointed to receive it, under the title of of Hellenotamizæ, stewards or treasurers of the Greeks. The common treasury was established in the sacred island of Delos, and here the assembly of delegates was held which directed the operations of the league. The whole arrangement was marked by an equity and moderation uncommon in Greece, and very opposite to the after conduct of Athens: and this may probably be ascribed partly to the circumstance that the power of Athens was yet incompletely established, and depended much on the good will of its allies, and partly also to the wisdom and virtue of some of the present leaders there, especially Aristides.

The war was successfully carried on under Cimon, the son of Miltiades, against those places in Europe which still held for the Persian King. But the allies grew weary of it, and many agreed to pay a sum of money in lieu of the ships which they were bound to furnish. By this Athens was at once obliged to build and employ more ships, and supplied with the means, while the navy of the allies proportionally declined. The Athenians feeling their strength became haughtier in their conduct, and more harsh in enforcing the same services which grew to be less punctually rendered. Hence rose wars with the defaulters; in which Athens uniformly prevailing, the fleet of the conquered city was taken from it and a heavier tribute levied: and since every such contest brought fresh power and wealth to the predominant state, and diminished the resources which could be at the com-

mand of any combination among its dependents, Athens, from the leader, became the mistress of her allies. The first state so subjected was the island Naxos, which revolted and was conquered in the twelfth year of the Athenian command. In the following campaign the forces of the Athenian league under Cimon won two great victories on the same day from the Persians, by sea and then by land, at the mouth of the river Eurymedon, in Pamphylia. Some time after the Athenians had a quarrel with the islanders of Thasos about some mines on the opposite coast of Thrace, and about the revenues of the ports in the same region; when the Thasians, after a defeat at sea, and a siege of three years, submitted to give up their ships of war, to demolish their walls, and to pay a heavy tribute, resigning the disputed revenues. (B. C. 463.)

The Lacedæmonians being appealed to by the Thasians, were secretly preparing to invade Attica in their behalf, when they were prevented by an earthquake, in which great part of Sparta was overthrown, and 20,000 persons perished. The Helots, who were nearly all of Grecian blood, and chiefly descended from the conquered Messenians, took the opportunity to revolt, and were joined by some of the Pericæi, or people of the towns, who, though personally free, were politically enslaved, being excluded from all share in the government, obliged to unlimited obedience to Lacedæmon, and liable to insolent and arbitrary indignity both from the officers of the state and from individual Spartans. An attempt to surprise the city was foiled by the ready prudence of the King Archidamus, and the revolted occupied Ithome, the strong hold of their ancestors in the first Messenian war. They were here besieged by the Lacedæmonians, who called in aid from their allies, and particularly from the Athenians, on account of their superior skill in sieges. But the Athenians were proud of the rising greatness of their country, and little disposed to acknowledge the pre-eminence still assumed by Lacedæmon. Disagreement took place, and the Lacedæmonians became suspicious, considering the bold, restless, and somewhat capricious character of their allies; that the Athenians might possibly be induced in the course of the siege to turn against them. They therefore dismissed them, saying that as the siege was converted into a blockade they had no further need of them;

but they still retained their other allies. The Athenians perceived the cause, and were deeply offended, inasmuch that they immediately renounced the alliance, and contracted one with the hostile state of Argos. Ithome was surrendered in the tenth year of the war, under the condition, that the besieged should ~~for~~ ever quit Peloponnesus, and that any who re-entered it should be a slave to the finder. The Athenians received them, and established them at Naupactus on the Corinthian gulf, which had been lately taken from the Locrians.

A quarrel taking place between Megara and Corinth, the former revolted from the Lacedæmonian confederacy and allied itself with Athens, giving it the command, not only of the city, but of its two ports, Nisæa, on the Saronic, and Pegæ, on the Corinthian gulf. (B.C.458.) The Athenians now built between Megara and Nisæa what the Greeks called long walls, that is, fortified lines securing the communication between a city and its port; a valuable defence to a state allied with Athens against Peloponnesus, since no danger could be feared from a land blockade as long as succours could be thrown in unopposed from the powerful navy of its ally. A war ensued against the Peloponnesians, in which Athens gained many successes both by land and sea; its most active enemies being by land the Corinthians, by sea the Æginetans. In one instance its power and energy were most eminently shown, when a large part of its forces being employed in Ægina, and another in Egypt, in an expedition which will afterwards be mentioned, the Corinthians with their allies marched against Megara, thinking that the Athenians could give it no assistance without abandoning the enterprise of Ægina. The Athenians, without recalling a man, sent against them Myronides, an able commander, with those who remained at home, being chiefly old men and boys; and with these they won a decisive victory. About the same time they began their long walls. Their port of Peiræus, with the two smaller, Phalerum and Munychia, had been fortified at the suggestion of Themistocles, with even greater care than the city itself, and he advised them, if they should ever be unable to maintain both, to abandon the city, and establishing themselves in the Peiræus to hold out with their ships and their ramparts against all as-

sailants. The city and the port were now connected by fortifications, in such sort that as long as they could command the sea and defend the walls, the most superior land force could endanger neither.

The Phocians having invaded Doris, the original country of the Lacedæmonians, the strong mutual regard which generally subsisted in Greece between a mother country and her colonies, impelled the Lacedæmonians to send an army against them. Having effected its object, the return of the army was opposed by the Athenians, who, holding Megara and Pegæ, commanded the passes of the isthmus; and it was led into Bœotia to wait the discovery of some safe way to return, and also the result of some overtures from Athenian malcontents, made desperate by the building of the long walls. In every Grecian state, the cavalry being composed of the richest men, and the heavy armed foot of citizens mostly in easy circumstances; while the fleets, where they existed, were principally manned by the poor, who were elsewhere condemned to insignificance among the despised crowd of light-armed; the possession of a navy was necessarily favourable to the importance of the common people. Hence maritime power was always the wish of the democratical party; whereas those who favoured oligarchy preferred depending on the land force, of which the more substantial citizens were the strength. The safety and the present greatness of Athens had been won by the patriotic exertions of all its people, both poor and rich, and chiefly in that mode of warfare wherein all were called into important and decisive action. Accordingly, from the Persian war the government of Athens began to be practically democratical: the supremacy of the general assembly, always acknowledged, now came habitually into play; that body gradually engrossed all the powers of government; and rank and wealth lost all political power; save what they must always exert by influencing the conduct of individuals. The importance of the richer classes was, however, maintained by whatever made the safety of Athens depend on the army it could keep in the field; and hence they would dislike a measure which ensured, without the protection of an army, a safe communication with all its possessions. Besides,

in every democracy the oligarchical malcontents looked for aid to Lacedæmon, as did henceforward the popular party in oligarchical states to Athens : and here was a fresh motive to attempt a revolution before the completion of the works, which would so much diminish the power of Lacedæmon to help them. A rising against the democracy seems to have been contemplated, but it came to nothing. The Athenians marched out to Tanagra in Bœotia, and were there defeated, some Thessalian horse who were with them deserting in the action. The present policy of Lacedæmon was to raise up Thebes as a check on Athens, and the army on retiring left Bœotia subject to that city. Only sixty-two days afterwards the Athenians under Myronides defeated the Bœotians at Cœnophyta. Tanagra was taken ; in all the towns the democratical party, ever hostile to Lacedæmon, was called into activity, and all Bœotia, except Thebes, came into alliance with Athens. Myronides next advancing into Phocis, where the democratical party, otherwise the stronger, had been kept under by Thebes and Lacedæmon, restored ascendancy to the friends of Athens, and then proceeded to enforce the submission of the eastern or Opuntian Locrians, who were generally attached to Lacedæmon. About the same time Ægina submitted to give up its fleet, demolish its walls, and pay a tribute ; and Athens ceased to suffer from an island which, from its situation, its maritime strength, and its ever active hostility, was called the eyesore of Peiræus. The war continued about four years longer, generally in favour of Athens. It was then interrupted by a five years' truce with the Peloponnesians. (B. C. 450.)

The empire of Athens had now attained its greatest magnitude. It extended over most of the islands of the Ægean, including Eubœa ; over the Grecian towns of Thrace and Macedonia, and those of Asia. The terms of subjection were various : some were deprived of ships and fortifications, obliged to pay a heavy tribute, and liable to what further exactions it might please the Athenians to make ; others, whose obedience hitherto had given no pretence to oppress them, or whose power made it a dangerous attempt, retained their navy, and were only bound to a lighter tribute and to service in war. The common treasury had,

however, been removed from Delos to Athens ; the assessment was much raised ; the affairs of the league were entirely directed by the Athenian assembly, and any disputes which might arise among its members were determined in the Athenian courts ; the meeting of deputies from the different cities, which had been held at Delos, was indeed continued at Athens, but it no longer had any effective power, its boldest exertion being humble suggestion or remonstrance to the Athenians. Besides, the power of Athens was extensive on the continent of Greece. It directed Megaris, Bœotia, Phocis, and the Opuntian Locris ; from Pegæ and Naupactus it commanded the Corinthian gulf ; in Peloponnesus, Trœzen was subject to it ; its influence was predominant in Achaia, and Argos was connected with it by necessary interest and common hostility to Lacedæmon.

While Athens was rising to its present greatness, changes not less important took place in its internal government. Where slave-labour prevails, there can be little employment for the poorer freemen ; and hence in Greece that class was usually degraded and miserable. The great destruction of property in the Persian war would increase the number of poor in Athens ; their bravery and services would much enhance their claim to consideration. But whence were they to be maintained ? This question was answered by successful and lucrative war, and the rapid growth of empire. These gave the citizens both employment and maintenance ; in the intervals of service they lived at leisure on the fruits of pay and plunder, and occasional donations from the state and from wealthy individuals ; and having little private business they were the more ready to attend the assembly when any interesting question was to be debated. The poorer citizens were superior in number to all, and to most of the middle class in leisure and frequency of attendance ; and hence rose two effects apparently inconsistent ; the regular increase of power in the lower orders, with the almost uniform success of every measure tending to gratify them ; and the great influence accruing to wealthy individuals, if they laid out their riches with politic liberality on feasts, theatrical representations, and other methods of contributing to the amusement and comforts of those who were unable to command the means of pleasure.

After the fall of Themistocles, Cimon was long the first man in Athens, by his abilities, integrity, and popular manners; and by the splendidly liberal use of his great wealth. He threw down the fences of his gardens and orchards near Athens, and permitted all to partake of their produce; spread a table daily for the poorer citizens, particularly those of his own ward; and was always ready to give or lend money to the indigent. His magnificence was also displayed in public works. He adorned the city with splendid porticoes; groves, and gardens, in which it was the delight of the Athenians to assemble and pass their time in conversation. Most of this was done at his private expense: but other important works were executed under his direction, from the riches which his victories had brought into the treasury. In particular, the defences of the Acropolis were completed in this manner.

In his political bias, Cimon was aristocratical, and desirous of friendship with Lacedæmon; and it was chiefly owing to him that so long a time elapsed before a breach with that power. There was, however, a strong opposing party whose influence rose with the rising dislike of Lacedæmon; and when the Athenians were provoked to renounce its alliance, Cimon was banished by ostracism, and the opposition came into power. Ephialtes was the ostensible leader, but Pericles the son of Xanthippus was rapidly gaining the chief influence; a young man of noble birth and great abilities, with some military distinction, but principally noted as an accomplished statesman and speaker. His high natural gifts had been improved to the utmost by education and by converse with philosophers and men of letters: his mind was penetrating and comprehensive, his oratory most forcible, with a polish and elegance before unknown. The new government was strengthened by the gaining of Megara, and the ensuing victories; but the people missed the bounty of Cimon; it was necessary to gratify them, and the means of the present leaders were inadequate. The expedient adopted was to apply to this purpose a part of the public revenues; and at the same time it was deemed essential to that speedy and brilliant success in the war without which the administration could not stand, to conduct the operations on a great and expensive scale. But all issues from the

treasury were controlled by the council of Areiopagus; which being mostly aristocratical and friendly to Cimon, was thought not likely to sanction the expenditure demanded by the views of the new rulers. Ephialtes proposed to curtail the powers of that body, giving to the assembly the cognizance of the most important causes reserved by Solon to the Areiopagus, and the power of directing issues from the treasury without control. The motion was supported by Pericles, who, after it was carried, obtained a law giving* pay for attendance in the assembly and in the courts. The religious festivals were increased in number and magnificence, and thus, on days of business the many were fed by their pay, on holidays feasted by the victims of the sacrifices.

Since the Persian war; Athens had become the seat of philosophy and art, which had long flourished in the earlier quiet, riches, and civilization of Ionia, but had hitherto been little cultivated in Greece. Their growth had been liberally encouraged under the administrations of Themistocles and Cimon, and that of Pericles went yet further in the same career. The city was adorned with master-pieces of sculpture, painting, and architecture. The religious festivals were accompanied with contests in poetry and music. Tragedy, from a rude ode in honour of Bacchus, had been raised by Thespis, Phrynichus, and others, to a delineation of human action and suffering; had been clothed by Æschylus with the utmost loftiness of thought and expression, and set forth with all the aids of scenic effect; and was still most successfully pursued by Sophocles, Euripides, and others not meanly gifted, though inferior to these. Comedies were exhibited, disgraced indeed with licentious ribaldry and gross personal abuse, but rife with wit and humour, lively painting of character, and keen political satire. Many distinguished philosophers were resident in Athens, and the citizens flocked to hear them discourse in porticoes and other places of public resort. With such amusements, the people must needs have been unusually pure of taste and active in mind; but their time was given to little but amusement, and hence they were, like other idlers, light-minded and capricious. Secure of subsistence

* This is the statement of Aristotle; according to some others, there was a small pay given before which Pericles increased.

and pleasure at the public expense, the many wanted the discipline of necessity, which habituating men to strict attention in their particular pursuits, enables them, when called on, to display the like on questions of national utility. They were not drawn from private business by the interest of important state proceedings, but, having no business, they found amusement in lively debate, and pride in the exercise of their franchise. Accordingly they thought more of criticising the speakers, than weighing the measures; they were greedy of flattery, readily led away with brilliant promises, careless and hasty in decision, because, though singularly quick of apprehension, they were impatient of continuous thought. Had Athens commanded no resources but its own, it would have been impossible to support in idleness so large a portion of the people; but the subject states were liable to unlimited extortion. Any proposed exaction, however oppressive, was eagerly caught at by the swarm of idlers who looked for maintenance and pleasure to the lavish expenditure of the state; and their number and frequent attendance in the assembly, would generally ensure the success of any measure which united them in its favour. Hence arose a crew of profligate demagogues, who attained a paramount influence by being ready to propose, at any cost of justice, humanity, and ultimate advantage, whatever promised to the multitude an immediate gain; and who frequently turned their ascendancy to profit, by taking presents from the allies as the price of forbearance and protection. The populace drew both gain and pleasure from the submission of the allies; the pride of each was flattered, in proportion to his personal insignificance, by the homage paid him as a citizen of the sovereign republic; their hopes of individual enjoyment were all bound up in the continuance and extension of the empire; and the passions thence resulting were studiously exasperated by unprincipled orators:—what wonder then that we shall hereafter find their sway as jealous as oppressive, and, in case of revolt, their vengeance as cruel as their rule had been unjust?

Shortly after the rise of Pericles and his friends, a fleet had been sent to conquer Cyprus; but Egypt had lately revolted from Artaxerxes under Inaros, a chief of the bordering Libyans, and he made splendid offers to engage the

assistance of Athens. The fleet was ordered from Cyprus to his aid, and backed by Grecian valour and discipline, he soon became master of the country, obliging the Persians to shut themselves up in the White Castle of Memphis, the chief city of Egypt, the other two divisions of the city being taken by Inaros. The Persian king, despairing of success by force, made large offers of money to the Lacedæmonians, to induce them to invade Attica; but they, though not on friendly terms with Athens, refused to be the tool of the common enemy against it. At length, Megabazus, a Persian of the highest rank, being sent with a powerful army, defeated the Egyptians and drove the Athenians out of Memphis. They were now besieged in their turn for eighteen months in an island of the Nile, which was finally taken, and the defenders were mostly slaughtered. Inaros was taken and crucified; and all Egypt submitted, except a large tract of inaccessible marshes. The war had lasted for six years, and was finished three years before the conclusion of the five years' truce with Lacedæmon.

About the same time the two great parties in Athens were reconciled, and Cimon was recalled at the motion of Pericles, having completed only five years of his term of banishment, which he spent on his inherited lordship in the Chersonese. His restoration probably facilitated the conclusion of the truce with Lacedæmon, and till his death Athens was undisturbed by internal contest. In the interval of peace a third long wall was added, passing between the former two to the middle harbour, Munychia, so that if either of the outer walls were forced, the city would still have secure communication with one of its ports. The cavalry had long fallen into insignificance, being probably depressed by Cleisthenes for its attachment either to the Peisistratides, or generally to oligarchy. The democracy seemed now too strong to fear it, and a good cavalry would be very useful in any invasion of the Peloponnesians, to check and limit the ravage of the fields. A body of 300 horse was therefore established, and the Athenian cavalry gained credit as among the best in Greece.

The cessation of hostilities filled Athens with a multitude unaccustomed to peaceful industry, and to diminish the inconvenience and provide for a

number of the citizens, a colony of 1000 families was sent out to the Thracian Chersonesa. Soon after, to give profitable employment to the many who must otherwise have been supported in idleness, and to divert the popular thirst of conquest from disturbing Greece, the design was resumed of adding Cyprus to the Athenian confederacy. Cimon was sent out thither with 200 triremes; but he died on the island, and this, with the want of provisions, made it necessary to return. Before returning, however, the Greeks won a double victory over the Persians by land and sea.

The superintendence of the temple at Delphi had long been in the common government of the Phocian towns, but the Delphians now claimed it exclusively, and the Lacedæmonians supported them with an army which put them into possession of the temple. This arbitrary act could not but offend the Athenians, and the more, as Phocis was among their allies; and after the retreat of the Lacedæmonians, they forcibly restored the temple to the Phocians. Here the matter rested; but some time after, the Bœotian exiles, expelled when the country came under the influence of Athens, having seized on Orchomenus, Chæroneia, and some other places in Bœotia, the Athenians sent an army to dislodge them. Chæroneia was taken, and the defenders condemned to slavery; but a large force of exiles, Bœotians and others, had been collected at Orchomenus; the Locrians had joined it, who by timely submission had prevented any expulsion of their people; and the returning army was defeated near Coroneia, almost every surviving Athenian being made prisoner. The Athenians were now unable to command Bœotia, and the rather as they expected enmity from Lacedæmon, the five years' truce being near its close; there was scarcely a family not deeply interested in the recovery of the prisoners; and a peace was hastily made, in which their restoration was the only set-off required against the surrender of all claims upon Bœotia.

The treaty was soon proved necessary by the revolt of Eubœa, the most important dependency of Athens. Pericles led thither an army; but he had scarcely landed when it was told him that the Megarians, renewing their connexion with Corinth, had risen on the Athenian garrison. Returning, he defeated the Megarians and their allies; but subsequently Attica was invaded by the Pe-

loponnesians, under the Lacedæmon, Pleistoanax, the son of Isonias. Defeat might be fatal, and any considerable delay in the reduction of Eubœa might endanger the other dependencies. In this dilemma Pericles is said to have procured the retreat of the invaders, by bribing the chief adviser of Pleistoanax. The army was withdrawn without apparent cause, and Pleistoanax, on his return, being accused of corruption, was fined so heavily that he was obliged to quit the country. Pericles, in the account of the expenses of his command, stated ten talents as employed for a necessary purpose: and it is mentioned as a proof of singular confidence which the people placed in Pericles, that they let that article pass unquestioned. The Peloponnesians being gone, Pericles again, passed into Eubœa, and quickly reduced it. The Histiazans were expelled, and their territory apportioned among Athenian families; the rest were admitted to a capitulation, by which they preserved their estates and their municipal governments. The Athenians, weary of a war which had been mostly disastrous, and feeling themselves unable to maintain their empire in its present extent, now concluded with the Peloponnesians a truce for thirty years, by which, besides Bœotia and Megara, which were already lost, they gave up Nisæa, Pegæ, and Trœzen, with the influence which they had hitherto exercised in Achaia. (B. C. 445.) *

The death of Cimon had ended the union of parties in Athens. His brother-in-law, Thucydides, the son of Melesias, was a man of high birth and character and considerable talents; and to him the aristocratical party wished to trust the helm of the state. But Pericles, who had submitted to be second to the age and tried ability of Cimon, would not give place to any other: and it is probable that the demands of the aristocratical party rose higher on the loss of a chief whose liberal and popular character, while it increased their strength, had moderated their pretensions. A war of oratory ensued. The unfortunate expedition into Bœotia seems to have been conducted by the friends of Thucydides, and by its failure and the disasters following, the people were led to throw themselves entirely upon Pericles. He justified their confidence by his ability and success in extricating the commonwealth from its

perils; Thucydides was banished by ostracism, and the lead of Pericles was henceforth little disputed.

In the sixth year of the thirty years' truce, a war took place between Samos and Miletus, both allies of Athens. The Milesians, being worsted, appealed to Athens, and their complaint was supported by some of the Samians, discontented with the government of their country which was then oligarchical. The Samians in power being required to send deputies to answer the charges, refused compliance, probably apprehending that their plea would be unfavourably heard by a people always hostile to oligarchy; but the Athenians sent a fleet which enforced submission, and established a democracy, taking, as hostages from the oligarchical Samians, 50 men and 50 boys, who were placed under a guard in the island of Lemnos. Some, however, of the party of the Few had fled to the continent, and thence corresponded with their friends in the island: and these, with the aid of Pisuthnes, Satrap of Sardis, having collected 700 auxiliary soldiers, crossed by night into Samos, and, being joined by their friends on the spot, surprised and overpowered the new government. They then went to Lemnos, and retook their hostages, with the Athenian guard, which they gave over to Pisuthnes. They now prepared an expedition against Miletus; at the same time Byzantium revolted in concert with them.

Immediately on the arrival of the news, Pericles was sent out with nine others in command of a fleet, which defeated a Samian force superior in numbers. Reinforcements arrived from Athens, Chios, and Lesbos, and the city was blockaded by land and sea, till Pericles going with a considerable squadron to look out for a Phœnician fleet that was expected to succour the besieged, the Samians by a sudden attack took several ships from the Athenians, and commanded the sea for fourteen days, after which, through the return of Pericles and the arrival of fresh reinforcements to the besiegers, they were again shut up within their walls. In the ninth month of the siege they surrendered: their navy was given up, their walls demolished, they were obliged to give hostages for their fidelity, and to pay a sum of money, by instalments, for the expenses of the war. The Byzantines submitted, not awaiting the approach of the fleet, and they were

admitted to their former terms of subjection.

The Samians in the beginning of their revolt had applied to Lacedæmon for assistance, and an assembly of deputies from the allies had been held to consider the request. It would not seem that any very effectual aid could be expected, since the Peloponnesians were totally unable to cope with the Athenians at sea, and the only chance of their preserving Samos was the diversion which might possibly be made by invading Attica. The request was, however, rejected, principally by means of the Corinthians, yet weak from the last war, and well aware that in any contest with Athens, they, from their nearness, were likely to be principal sufferers; and they are afterwards represented as taking credit with the Athenians for having asserted the right of every leading city to control and punish its allies.

Three years after the reduction of Samos the seeds were sown of a war the most general, lasting, and pernicious with which Greece had been torn. The island of Corcyra, on the coast of Epirus, was a colony of Corinth; a settlement formed by public authority, to extend the connexions of that city, or to relieve it of its overflowing population; and supported in its original weakness by the power, and partially, at least, equipped from the resources of the state.*—As such, it was obliged to give, and entitled to demand, assistance in time of need; and it was bound by sacred usage to pay to the mother city a reverential observance, shown, among other instances, in giving to its citizens precedence in the religious festivals. But Corcyra growing to surpass Corinth in commercial wealth and naval and military power, withheld the customary homage, and thereby incurred the enmity of its metropolis (mother city). Before the breach the Corcyreans had founded Epidamnus, on the Illyrian coast; by a common practice inviting Phalius, a Corinthian, to be the leader of the colony, that so, as they thought, the gods of their fathers might favour the enterprise, and protect the settlement. Some Corinthians and other Dorians joined the expedition. Epi-

* Provisions and arms were supplied from the public stores in the Erytanæum. In the same building, a sacred lamp was kept perpetually burning, from which the colonists lighted a lamp, to burn in like manner in their Prytanæum; and this, if accidentally extinguished, could be relighted only at the sacred lamp of the mother city.

damnus grew and prospered, till it was brought low by sedition and war with the neighbouring Illyrians. The oligarchical party, who were expelled, united with the barbarians, and those in the city being hard pressed sent to ask aid from Corcyra. They seem, however, to have felt that their state had no claim of merit with the mother country: they preferred their suit in the habit of suppliants, and it was, notwithstanding, rejected. *

The Epidamnians now consulting the oracle at Delphi, were authorised to acknowledge Corinth as their metropolis, and to transfer to it their homage and obedience. The Corinthians accepted the offer, both in hate to the Corcyreans, and as thinking that they had no less right in the colony, since the nominal founder and some of the original settlers had been Corinthian. They proclaimed that any citizen who wished it should go as a colonist to Epidamnus, and sent, besides, an auxiliary force. Offended at this, the Corcyreans took the part of the Epidamnian refugees, who had also requested their interference, and sent a fleet to require the recal of the exiles, which, when this was refused, joined with them and with the Illyrians in besieging the town.

The Corinthians prepared to raise the siege; and being far weaker at sea than their opponents, they procured assistance from many of their allies. Alarmed at the combination against them, the Corcyreans invited the mediation of Lacedæmon and Sicyon, and prevailed so far that ministers from those states accompanied an embassy which they sent to Corinth, to propose that the dispute should be submitted to the arbitration of any Peloponnesian states on which both could agree, or to the decision of the oracle at Delphi. The Corinthians refused, and the armament sailed. The Corcyreans completely defeated it, and slaughtered all the prisoners, except the Corinthians, whom they kept in bonds. On the same day Epidamnus surrendered. The Corcyreans now commanded the sea, and long annoyed their enemies without retaliation.

It had been the settled and hitherto successful policy of the Corcyreans to engage in no alliance. Islanders and strong at sea, they needed not protection, and they would not hazard being entangled in the quarrels of others. But the Corinthians were making the greatest exertions to repair

their defeat, and it was apprehended that they might have the aid of the Peloponnesian confederacy, of which Corinth was a very important member. It seemed therefore necessary to the Corcyreans to obtain a powerful ally; and, their kindred states of Peloponnesus being in the hostile interest, they sent ambassadors to Athens, as the only power from which they could hope effectual succour. The Corinthians also sent an embassy to dissuade the Athenians from supporting their enemies, and the assembly being met, each stated and supported their claims in a set speech. Athens had but a temporary peace with the Peloponnesians, and their disposition was known to be unfriendly: and Corcyra being the second maritime power in Greece, it was important to secure it to the Athenian confederacy, and to prevent its falling under the Peloponnesian. The treaty allowed the admission into either league of any Grecian state not yet a member of either; but it was nearly certain that any act done in defence of Corcyra would be considered as a hostile measure by the Peloponnesians. On the first day of assembly nothing was decided: but on the second day it was agreed, apparently with the wish of Pericles, to contract an alliance solely defensive with Corcyra.

The Corinthians and their allies put to sea with 150 ships, of which 90 were Corinthian; and the Corcyreans met them with 110. Besides, there were ten Athenian triremes, which had orders not to fight unless a descent were attempted on Corcyra or its dependencies: and accordingly they kept aloof, except by sometimes threatening where the Corcyreans were hard pressed. The battle began with much courage, but little skill: the vessels, as of old, insufficiently equipped, the decks crowded with soldiers, and the action, to the Athenians trained in the discipline of Themistocles, resembling less a sea-fight than one by land. The Corcyreans were defeated, and driven to the shore; and, in the pursuit, hostilities passed between the Corinthians and Athenians. The Corinthians then set themselves to collect the wrecks, and make prisoners of the men who were found on them; most of whom they slew, and among them, ignorantly, some of their own friends, whose vessels had been destroyed by the Corcyreans. In the evening, they again advanced; and

fearing a landing, the Corcyraeans led out their shattered fleet, with the Athenian ships, which would now have given more decided aid: but the Corinthians were deterred from joining battle by the approach of a squadron which proved to be of twenty Attic triremes. The next day, the Corcyraeans, with the thirty Athenian ships, offered battle. Unwilling now to fight, and unable to maintain themselves in their station, the Corinthians resolved to try the disposition of the Athenians; and sent to them, in a boat without a herald, messengers who accused them of breaking the truce by obstructing the movements of the Corinthians, and bid them treat themselves as enemies if they intended to commence a war. The Corcyraeans within hearing called out to kill the messengers, which, considering them as enemies without a herald, would have been within the Grecian laws of war: but the Athenian leaders answered that they were not breaking the truce, but protecting their allies; and that the Corinthians might go whithersoever they would, if it were not against any place belonging to Corcyra. Hereupon the Corinthians went home, as did also the Athenian squadron to Athens.

Potidæa, a town on the Isthmus connecting the Peninsula of Pallene with the confines of Thrace and Macedonia, though a tributary ally of Athens, was a colony of Corinth, and still so far connected with its mother city as to receive thence annually magistrates. It was now urged to revolt by the Corinthians, and by Perdiccas king of Macedonia, who was also endeavouring to stir up a revolt among the other subjects of Athens in his neighbourhood, the Chalcidians and Bottiæans. The Athenians being informed of this, sent a requisition to the Potidæans, to give hostages of fidelity, to demolish their walls on the side towards Pallene, to send away the Corinthian magistrates, and thenceforward to receive none. The Potidæans sent to solicit a reversal of the order, and, at the same time, in conjunction with the Corinthians, secretly negotiated for the support of Lacedæmon. The Athenians refused to relax, and the Spartan administration promising to invade Attica in case the Athenians should endeavour by arms to enforce their demands, the Potidæans engaged in a league with the Chalcidians and Bottiæans, and all revolted together. The Chalcidian Peninsula being open to the

fleet of Athens, Perdiccas proposed to the inhabitants to destroy their towns and abandon their lands; to make Olynthus their one strong-hold; and during the war to remove to a territory, which he would assign for their support, all their people beyond what the defence of the city might require. This measure was adopted, and the greatness of the sacrifice shows that the Athenian sway had been most galling.

The Athenians sent 30 ships to Thrace, and 40 more with 2000 Athenian heavy-armed, when they learnt that the Corinthian Aristæus, with 1600 heavy armed, was on his way to Potidæa. They first attacked Perdiccas, but having soon concluded a treaty with him, they went against the revolted allies. These they found before Olynthus, commanded by Aristæus, and with 200 horse from Perdiccas, who had turned against the Athenians as soon as the pressure of their arms was removed. The Athenians were victorious, their enemies mostly flying to Olynthus, but Aristæus, who had broken and pursued too far the wing opposed to him, taking refuge in Potidæa. They sat down before Potidæa, and being reinforced by 1600 heavy-armed, they were enabled to complete the blockade. Aristæus, having settled matters within, escaped out of the city, and taking the command of the Chalcidians, gave the besiegers some annoyance, and at the same time pressed the Peloponnesians for aid.

The Corinthians now called more loudly for war, and were supported by others, particularly the Æginetans, who secretly, since they dared not openly, complained of their subjection. The Lacedæmonians being met in assembly to hear any charge which might be made against the Athenians, the Megarians, among others, alleged that they were unjustly excluded from the Attic market and the subject ports. Last of all, the Corinthians blamed the general tardiness of Lacedæmon; set forth the dangers arising to Grecian liberty from the insatiable ambition and restless enterprise of Athens; complained of their own particular grievances, and called for assistance to their friends shut up in Potidæa. It happened that Athenian ambassadors were then in Sparta; and they, hearing their city thus accused, demanded a hearing. They would not, they said, answer particularly to charges made before those in whom no right resided to judge between

them and their allies; but they wished to admonish the hearers against lightly determining so great a matter, and to show their city not unworthy of its empire. They spoke of the merits of Athens in both Persian invasions, and the voluntary submission of the allies; and said that, as their sway was honourably won, so in the present temper of Lacedæmon it could not safely be relinquished. They endeavoured to palliate the harshness of their rule; deprecated all breach of the existing truce, and offered to submit all disputes to arbitration, according to the treaty.

The foreign ministers being dismissed, Archidamus, the aged king, a wise and moderate man, addressed the assembly. He justified the habitual caution of Lacedæmon, and set forth the dangers and certain evils of war with a state so far superior in wealth and in naval skill and power. In land force, he said, it was true the Peloponnesians had the advantage; but they could only ravage Attica, while the Athenians would be constantly supplied with all they needed from possessions far beyond the reach of their enemies. Finally, since the Athenians were willing to submit to a judicial decision, the appeal to arms would be unjust. The question was put, and the assembly decided that the treaty was broken, and that the allies should be called to deliberate whether war were to be commenced. This took place in the fourteenth year of the thirty years truce, and the forty-ninth after the battle of Salamis. It was followed by a meeting of the allies, which resolved on immediate war. It is the opinion of the discerning Thucydides, that the Lacedæmonians were less determined to hostility by the complaints of their allies than by their own jealousy of the power of Athens.

Unprepared for action, the Lacedæmonians wished to delay the beginning of the war: they also wished to throw on the Athenians the refusal of peace, and, if possible, to throw dissension among them. With these views they sent an embassy to Athens on a subject totally unconnected with the present quarrels, but likely to engage on their side the superstition of Greece. Fit atonement, they said, had not been made for the sacrilege of the Alcæmonidæ in the sedition of Cylon; and since the curse of sacrilege was held to cleave to all descendants of the guilty, they required that the wrath of the gods

be averted from Greece by the total expulsion of the polluted race. Of these was Pericles, through his mother; and though they could not hope to obtain his banishment, they yet expected, by informing the people, to embarrass his administration. It would have been vain to allege the antiquity of the crime, or the innocence of those on whom it was now to be visited; for in the popular faith of Greece, blind fear was predominant over reason and justice: but the demand was easily repelled by recrimination. The Lacedæmonians had two more recent sacrileges unatoned, the starving of Pausanias in the Brazen House, and the execution of some Helots forced from the temple of Neptune on Mount Tænarus, to which last the great earthquake at Sparta was popularly ascribed. They were therefore required first to expel the accursed families from among themselves.

A second embassy came with a different commission. It required that the siege of Potidæa should be raised, and Ægina made free; but chiefly that the decree against Megara should be reversed. The first demands were little pressed, and decidedly rejected; to the third, and principal, the Athenians replied by alleging misconduct on the part of the Megarians, who had cultivated the sacred land on the borders which ought to be inviolate, and received the fugitive slaves of the Athenians. A third embassy, neglecting the former requisitions, demanded, as the one condition of peace, the independence of all Grecian subjects of Athens. The assembly being divided in opinion how to answer, Pericles addressed them. He exhorted them resolutely to withstand the imperious demands of the ambassadors, since one concession to fear would embolden the Peloponnesians to dictate new submissions without limit; and he showed that the war was more to be dreaded by Lacedæmon than by Athens. Inferior in shipping, and still more in seamanship, the Peloponnesians never could cope with them at sea; they might ravage their lands, but the Athenians could retaliate, and the ravage of all Attica would be a smaller calamity than that of a part of Peloponnesus. "If we were islanders, who," he asked, "would be so proof against attack? Let us then be islanders in our policy, giving up our lands and houses, and only solicitous to defend the city and

command the sea: and let us not squander the lives of men, on whose exertions our empire depends, in a doubtful attempt to preserve for a time a territory of which the loss is little important, and to repel an invasion which, if repelled, will soon be repeated with no less a force. I have many other grounds to hope success, if you be but willing not to seek fresh conquests during the war. To the embassy let us answer, That we will admit the Megarians to our markets and ports, if the Lacedæmonians will abrogate, as far as respects ourselves and our allies, the law excluding strangers from their city; for neither of these points is provided for in the treaty: That our subject cities shall be independent, if they were independent at the making of the treaty; and if at any time the Lacedæmonians shall permit their allies to settle their respective governments in their own fashion, and not in that most agreeable to Lacedæmon: That we are willing, according to the treaty, to submit our disputes to a fair arbitration: and that we will not commence a war, but we will resist, if others commence it." The foresight of Pericles is worthy of remark, since we shall find that Athens was with difficulty prevented from triumphing by gross errors of conduct, and particularly by that rashness and wild thirst of conquest which he deprecated. The answer was framed according to his suggestion: That the Athenians would do nothing on command; but that they were willing to abide by a judicial decision according to the treaty.

CHAPTER VI.

Of the Peloponnesian War.

SECT. I.—Thebes had ever been accustomed, as the leading city of Bœotia, to claim political and military command over all the rest. The Platæans had refused submission, and stood upon their independence as a separate state; and, at an early period, finding themselves unable to resist the overwhelming power of the Thebans, they had sued to Lacedæmon for aid. It did not then agree with the views of the Lacedæmonians to engage in the concerns of a region so distant as Bœotia, and they therefore advised the suppliants to make their request to the Athenians, who were a powerful people and near at hand. The Platæans did so, and met with prompt and effectual aid from Athens:

in return for which they gave their heartiest service in all the wars and dangers of their protectors. The Thebans were now sure of war with Athens; they had often been annoyed by the hostility of the Platæans, and always had ill brooked their assertion of independence; and, hoping to secure the town before the general struggle broke out, they listened to some Platæan malcontents, who offered to introduce their troops into the city. Three hundred were sent, who entered by night the more easily, as no watch was set; for it was considered a time of peace. Their introducers wished them to proceed to the massacre of their chief enemies; but they preferred to gain the city peaceably if possible, and taking ground in the market place, they made proclamation that those should join with them, who wished to be leagued with all the Bœotians according to the custom of their fathers. Dismayed at the sudden attack, the Platæans listened to their proposals, till they discovered the small number of the invaders; but, finding this, they assailed them while perplexed by the darkness in their ignorance of the streets. The Thebans were defeated, and most of the survivors obliged to surrender at discretion. A Theban army following to support the detachment received, while on the march, the news of its destruction; and when the leaders were determining to seize on any Platæans found without the walls, as pledges for the captured Thebans, a Platæan herald arrived to rebuke their treacherous aggression, and to declare that, if they did any injury, the prisoners should instantly be put to death. The Thebans retired; but the Platæans, in the violence of their resentment, proved false to the promise, which, if not expressed, was implied in their threat, and all the prisoners were executed, in number one hundred and eighty.

A messenger had been sent to Athens with the news of the surprise, and the Bœotians in Attica were arrested: a second to tell of the capture of the Thebans; and directions were returned to keep the prisoners safe till the Athenians should determine of their treatment. Unfortunately, they were already dead. An Athenian army now conducted to Platæa a convoy of provisions, and having left a detachment to assist in the defence, brought away with it the women and children, and men unfit for war.

The Lacedæmonians were

themselves to the utmost in preparation. Ambassadors were sent to Persia, chiefly in hope of pecuniary aid. A fixed money contribution was appointed to be paid by each of the allies, and it was proposed that five hundred triremes should be raised for the maritime states, besides those expected from the Italian and Sicilian Greeks, who mostly favoured their cause. The league included all the Peloponnesians, except the Argians and Achæians, who were neutral; and nearly all the states of northern Greece, except the Thessalians and Acarnanians. These sided with Athens, the former coldly, but the latter more heartily; and by their friendship, with that of Corcyra and Zacynthus, and with the town of Naupactus held by the Messenians, who owed their very existence to Athenian protection, the Athenians were enabled to carry on the war in the western seas. Corcyra, Chios, and Lesbos, furnished ships to Athens, and were treated as independent: the remaining islands of the Ægean, except Melos and Thera, with all the Greeks of Asia, and all in Thrace but those who had recently revolted, were tributary subjects, deprived of ships of war, and liable to unlimited control.

In spite of a more cultivated humanity of manners, and a religion so pointedly opposed to violence and bloodshed, that by some it has been construed to forbid even necessary defence, nearly every war has been popular in the outset, even in the states of civilized and Christian Europe. The Greeks were ardent lovers of military fame, and little imbued with universal justice and philanthropy. The utmost extent of their political morality went no further than patriotism and fidelity to contracts; few even of deep thinkers held it a duty to respect the happiness of mankind, or felt the wickedness of unnecessary war. It is not then wonderful that the call to arms should have been generally welcome, when, in fourteen years, the youth had grown up inexperienced in the sufferings of war, but proud of the glory of their fathers, and eager to emulate their deeds. All Greece was in anxiety; oracles and predictions without number were circulated; and every uncommon natural phenomenon was made a presage of the event. The general wish was favourable to the Lacedæmonians, who professed to uphold the liberty of Greece. The subjects of Athens were eager to be liberated, and those who were yet free were fearful of being subjected; and thus, as

she rose to empire through the tyranny of Pausanias, she seemed likely to fall from it through her own.

The Peloponnesians advanced under king Archidamus, but, before they entered Attica, a Spartan minister was sent to try whether the Athenians would yet recede in their pretensions. The messenger was not admitted to a hearing, but was sent away with the declaration that, if the Lacedæmonians wished to make any proposal, they must first withdraw their army. Having received this answer, Archidamus crossed the Attic border.

Pericles was one of the ten generals of Athens. His office enabled him to call at his discretion extraordinary assemblies of the people; and this, with the power of guiding their proceedings by his eloquence and popularity, gave him, in effect, the supreme direction of the state. In an assembly held while the Peloponnesians were gathering, he endeavoured to prepare the people for the war. Apprehending that Archidamus might spare his lands, either for private friendship which existed between them, or by command of the Lacedæmonians, to make him suspected in Athens; he declared that if his estates met with any distinguishing forbearance he would resign them to the public. He exhorted his hearers to secure their moveable property in the city, and avoiding a battle, to look to the maintenance of their naval strength and foreign command, the chief sources of their greatness. He then stated the amount of their means. Besides other revenues, the yearly tribute from the allies was now six hundred talents, about one hundred and fifty thousand pounds. The treasury contained six thousand talents in coined money, and there was uncoined gold and silver in sacred vessels, offerings, Persian spoils, &c. to a vast amount. The native heavy-armed troops were twenty-nine thousand men. The cavalry, with the horse bowmen, were twelve hundred; the foot bowmen, sixteen hundred. Besides there would be numerous light armed, chiefly slaves. The triremes fit for service were three hundred. It is not stated what additional force was supplied by the allies.

The Athenians brought into the city their families and furniture, and sent their cattle to Eubœa and the other neighbouring islands; reluctantly, for they were beyond all other Greeks attached to a country life. The ravages of

the Persians had been repaired, the houses rebuilt, and many with expensive improvements, all which would now again be ruined. They regretted the temples, and the old religious observances of the several towns, inherited from times before the union effected by Theseus. The actual distress was great. Many fell from competence to poverty by the cessation of income from their estates. The city was filled with a multitude far greater than the houses could contain: some found shelter in the temples, some in towers of the walls; the rest were huddled in open spaces of the city and the Peiræus, and on the ground between the long walls. Nevertheless, they applied themselves vigorously to warlike preparations, and a fleet of one hundred ships was made ready to act against Peloponnesus.

The advance of Archidamus was retarded by the hope that the Athenians, while their property was yet undamaged, might offer concessions to preserve it. No offer coming, he proceeded to Eleusis, and sitting down there, wasted the rich Thriasian plain; then to Acharnæ, the largest parish of Attica, and within six miles of Athens. The Acharnians were a numerous and powerful body, and furnished along three thousand heavy armed; and he thought that they might prevail with the people to risk a battle, or if not, when they had lost their property, they would be less warm in defending that of others, and he might pursue his operations more securely. Athens was all confusion. The Thriasian plain had been ravaged by Pleistoanax; but never before, since the Persian war, had an enemy come in sight of Athens. Some cried out for battle, particularly the Acharnians; others opposed a measure so perilous; but all agreed in censuring Pericles as the cause of their evils. Pericles stood firm, and would not call an assembly, since it would probably have voted to risk an immediate engagement; but he sent out parties of cavalry to cut off stragglers, and to prevent the extension of ravage to any distance from the camp; and in an action with the Boeotian horse, the Athenians had the advantage. Having wasted the Acharnian vale, and vainly sought a battle, the invaders carried devastation to Oropus, at the eastern extremity of Attica, and thence passing into Boeotia, returned home.

Meanwhile, the one hundred Athenian ships, with fifty Coreycæan, and a

few from other allies, sailed round Peloponnesus, and wasted much of its western coast. Passing on, they took Astacus, in Acarnania, expelled its tyrant, and establishing democracy, admitted it to alliance; and without hostility brought over to their interest the large island of Cephalonia.

The Athenians voted to set aside one thousand talents as a reserve for extremity, and denounced death to whoever should propose to touch it unless the city should be attacked by sea; an event implying the prior ruin of the Athenian navy, and the only thing, as it was thought, which could destroy the commonwealth. One hundred triremes were set aside for the same emergency. The Æginetans were known to have been active in kindling the war, and their inveterate hostility was peculiarly dangerous from the situation of their island. By a harsh measure, but one which seems, according to Grecian maxims, not to have exceeded what the provocation might justify, the whole free population was expelled, and a colony of Athenians occupied the lands and houses. Thus the island was garrisoned without expense, and the city relieved of part of the multitude which crowded it. Most of the Æginetans were established by the Lacedæmonians at Thyrea, on the confines of Argolis and Laconia. The Athenians had successfully negotiated with Sitalces, the powerful king of Thrace, who became their ally, and effected peace and alliance between them and Perdiccas.

Winter setting in, all Greece was quiet, except the western coast, where a Corinthian squadron restored the tyrant of Astacus. At Athens, the funeral of those who had fallen in battle was, according to custom, publicly solemnized, and Pericles being appointed to pronounce their funeral oration, delivered a speech which has been reported by Thucydides. As this and some other speeches of Pericles are the earliest extant specimens of Grecian eloquence, so they may justly take their rank among its greatest masterpieces.

In the first campaign, the ravage of Attica had been retaliated with not less effect, and with far smaller expense and trouble. But in the following year, just as the Peloponnesians had commenced a second invasion, Athens was visited with a scourge more terrible than they. A pestilential fever, originating in Ethiopia, had been felt in Egypt and many

parts of Asia, when it fell on Athens with fury before unknown. It began with heats in the head; and inflammation in the eyes; the tongue and throat were bloody, the breath fetid; then came sneezing, then laborious coughing; then excessive evacuations in all ways, followed by violent hiccups and spasms. The skin was reddish and full of ulcers, but not outwardly hot; though the internal fever was such that the patient could not bear the lightest covering, and many threw themselves into the wells for relief. Thirst was unquenchable, and sleep there was none, yet the sufferers were less weakened than might have been expected. The fever lasted from seven to nine days; but many who survived it perished by the ulceration of the bowels, and the flux which followed. The disease passed from the head through the whole body, and finally fixed in the extremities, which many lost. Some were totally deprived of memory, and recovered, not knowing their nearest friends; nor even themselves. Birds and beasts of prey would not touch the corpses, or, tasting them, they perished.

No remedy was found for the disease. Its virulence was increased by the uniform despondency of the sufferers; and they died neglected, or if any ministered to them, he caught the infection. Those only who had passed through the malady, could attend with safety on the sick, since they were not again liable to it in a fatal degree. The evil was increased by the crowded state of the city. Dying men lay heaped in stifling huts, or in the streets, and about the fountains, whither they thronged to drink. The temples were filled with corpses, and means were wanting for the burial of the dead.

The worst effects of the calamity were unbounded licentiousness and desperate thoughtlessness. Men said in their hearts "Let us eat, drink, and revel, for to-morrow we die: why spare health or fortune, which we shall not live to enjoy?" Rich houses were made desolate, and poor men, suddenly enriched, abused their wealth in riot and debauchery. Men's affections were blunted, and their natures brutalized, by tumultuous revelry, when all were perishing around them, and when the riches they squandered were derived from the recent death of those who had been most dear to them. No fear of God, or the laws, deterred from crimes that promised the means of immediate pleasure. Untaught by their

religion to look to the Divinity for aught but worldly blessings, they saw no distinction between the righteous and the wicked, when the pestilence was fatal to both; and the laws were impotent, since no one expected that he would live to suffer their sentence.

At this time of misery, Pericles adhered to the policy he had chosen. He would not hazard a battle, but suffered the Peloponnesians to ravage Attica, while their own country was wasted yet more extensively than before by the Athenian fleet. But the spirit of the Athenians was broken: they made proposals of peace, which were haughtily refused; and the shame of failure concurred with previous suffering to raise their anger against Pericles, as the author of their misery. Pericles called an assembly to encourage them, and justify himself. He re-stated the reasons for war, which had before determined them, and which now had lost no force; reminded them that he had warned them of all their present sufferings, except the pestilence, which no human wisdom could foresee; repeated that, if they now gave way, they must be subject to Lacedæmon, and on harder terms than if they had yielded at first; and showed that, with firmness, they might still prevail. His arguments persuaded them to maintain the war, but their anger for their individual losses did not subside till they had fined him heavily; yet so convinced was the capricious multitude of his superior merit, that they soon re-elected him general, and put everything under his direction.

In the autumn, there fell into the hands of the Athenians some Peloponnesian ambassadors sent to Persia. Among them was Aristæus, who had chiefly managed the revolt of Potidæa; and the fear of further damage from him was a leading motive in the cruelty which followed. The ambassadors were put to death unheard, under the plea of retaliation for the atrocious conduct of the Lacedæmonians, who, since the war began, had massacred the crew of every merchant ship they met with, whether of the Athenians or their allies, or even of neutrals. In the ensuing winter, Potidæa surrendered, on the terms that the garrison and people should be dismissed in freedom. The territory was occupied by a colony of Athenians.

Pericles died soon after through the pestilence; and after his death, Thucydides observed, his foresight was made

manifest. "For he said that the Athenians would prevail in the war, if they attended to their navy, made no new conquests, and incurred no needless dangers: but they did just the contrary, and besides committed many other faults, both among themselves and against their allies, at the persuasion of ambitious and interested men. And the reason of the difference was, that he being powerful by ability, reputation, and pre-eminent integrity, was not obliged to humour the people, but able to direct them; whereas those who followed being more on a level with each other, and each aspiring to be first, courted favour by advising not what was best, but what was most agreeable. Yet the Athenians, after squandering unprofitably the best of their strength, and provoking new and powerful enemies, were with difficulty overcome when weakened by internal strife; so more than verified was the assertion of Pericles that, with prudence, they were a match for the Peloponnesians."

In two invasions of Attica, the Peloponnesians, with great expense, had caused much individual suffering; but had failed to provoke a battle, and had little weakened the adverse state. The next summer they entered not Attica, but laid siege to Plataea. The Plataeans remonstrated, urging the merit of their commonwealth in the Persian war, and the perpetual protection assured to them by Pausanias, in the name of Greece. Archidamus, who commanded the Peloponnesians, offered neutrality; and when they said they could not trust the Thebans for observance of the terms, his answer was, "Entrust to us your lands and houses, show us the boundaries of the lands, and number the fruit trees; and sojourn where you please till the war is over, when all shall be restored; till then, we will cultivate the land, and provide for your subsistence." The Plataeans consented, provided the Athenians were willing; but deputies being sent to Athens, brought a requisition to abide by the terms of their alliance, and a promise of aid. They, therefore, declared themselves unable to comply with the demands of the Lacedæmonians; and Archidamus, solemnly protesting that the breach of faith was on the side of Plataea, commenced the siege. The mode of attack was rude and unskilful, the garrison active and vigilant; and the besiegers were obliged to resort to blockade. All useless mouths having been sent to Athens, there were in the

place but four hundred Plataeans, eighty Athenians, and one hundred and ten women, to make bread.

Meanwhile, an Athenian army had been beaten by the Chalcidians of Thrace, and an attempt had been made against the power of Athens in Western Greece. The Ambraciots, a Corinthian colony to the north of Acarnania, with the Leucadians and Anactorians, one thousand Peloponnesians, and some of the neighbouring barbarians, invaded Acarnania; but the barbarians, rashly separating themselves, were defeated, and the expedition failed. Of one hundred ships equipped last year by the Peloponnesians, forty-seven being sent from Corinth to co-operate with the forces in Acarnania, were intercepted by Phormion, who was stationed with twenty Athenian ships at Naupactus. Confident in his own ability, and the skill of his crews, he met them, and confounded them with his manœuvres, sunk their admiral, and routed them, taking twelve ships. The Peloponnesians sent out seventy-seven ships to retrieve their defeat, yet, with these, they feared to meet the small squadron of Phormion in the open sea. At length, they entrapped him in the entrance of the bay, where there was not room for his superior manœuvring. Nine Athenian ships were taken or forced aground, some of which were recovered by the Messenians on the shore, dashing into the water, and fighting from the decks: eleven fled towards Naupactus, pursued by the Peloponnesian advanced squadron of twenty ships. The hindmost of these eleven was nearly overtaken by a Leucadian trireme, when it turned round a large vessel at the entrance of the port, struck its pursuer on the side, and sunk it. The Peloponnesians stopped in confusion and alarm, and the eleven Athenian ships, advancing in order, had an easy victory. The Athenians took six ships, and recovered all which had been taken from them, save one.

A project was suggested to the Lacedæmonian commanders, by which they might partly cover their disgrace. Being told by the Megarians that the Athenian government, secure in naval superiority, left Peiræus little guarded, they determined to surprise it. A body of seamen crossing the isthmus, launched forty triremes laid up in Nisæa, and stood towards Attica; but a contrary wind arising, they feared they might be too late for surprise, and, instead of sailing for Peiræus, they landed on Salamis, and

ravaged it. The time thus wasted saved Peiræus. The alarm in Athens was excessive, at sight of the beacon fires, which announced the presence of an enemy. All hurried in arms to the port, the ships were launched and manned, and stood for Salamis; but the Peloponnesians, not awaiting them, returned to Nisæa with much booty, some prisoners, and three empty triremes, not without fear that their leaky vessels might founder on the way. Henceforward, the Athenians kept better guard in their harbour. The Peloponnesian fleet having dispersed, the winter was spent by Phormion in strengthening the Athenian interest in Acarnania, by confirming the power of the friendly party in the towns, and banishing the most obnoxious men.

Perdiccas of Macedonia had again changed sides, and Sitalces attacked him, at once to fulfil his engagements with Athens, and to punish a breach of faith to himself. The Thracians were a barbarous, but bold and hardy race; and however inferior in discipline and skill, their numerical superiority was such that the Macedonians could not keep the field. Sitalces overran and wasted Macedonia and Chalcidice; but his army suffered through hunger and wintry weather, and he retired without making any permanent conquest.

The next summer Attica was again invaded by the Peloponnesians; and soon after all Lesbos but Methymne revolted from Athens. The island was divided into six republics, of which Mitylene and Methymne were far the most powerful. Methymne was zealous for democracy and Athens; but in Mitylene the oligarchical party was strong; and this, with the hope of undisputed rule in the island, and the fear that they might be like others deprived of their fleet and reduced to subjection, disposed the Mitylenæans to revolt. They increased their navy, strengthened their defences, and laid in stores for a siege: they had already influence in the smaller states, and they now improved it to a strict union. But before their preparations were completed, the Athenians being informed by the Methymnæans, and some of the democratical Mitylenæans, commanded them to desist: and their refusal brought an Athenian squadron of 40 triremes. The Mitylenæans endeavoured to gain time by negotiation, but the only terms of pardon now were the surrender of their navy, and the de-

molition of their walls. All Lesbos declared for Mitylene, except the Methymnæans, who joined the Athenians with their whole force. After an indecisive engagement in the field, the Mitylenæans retired within their walls, and the siege was formed.

Ambassadors from Mitylene, arriving at Sparta, were sent to sound the allies at the Olympian meeting. At a conference held after the solemnities, it was resolved to aid them by again invading Attica: and the fleet which lay in the Corinthian gulf was carried across the isthmus, to co-operate with the land force. Dispersed in the Grecian seas as was the navy of the Athenians, it was thought they could not meet the attack but by withdrawing the squadron from Lesbos; but they launched 100 triremes which lay ready in Peiræus, displayed their force before the astonished enemies, who ventured not to quit their ports, and made descents where they would on Peloponnesus. The Peloponnesians were busy with their harvest, and weary with fruitless inroads; and intelligence coming that an Attic squadron was ravaging Laconia, the invasion was given up, and the Lacedæmonians went home.

The armament in Lesbos being so inadequate to its purpose that the Mitylenæans kept the field, Paches was sent with 1000 heavy-armed to take the command, and his arrival again confined them to their walls. The Athenian treasury was exhausted with the war, and a contribution was now first collected from the citizens, apparently as a free gift. At the same time ships were sent to levy money from the allies.

In the following summer, the fifth of the war, the Peloponnesians ravaged Attica more destructively than in any invasion but the second, and sent Alcidas with 42 ships to Mitylene. In the winter, Salthus, a Lacedæmonian, had brought assurance of such an aid; but as the year advanced, even he began to despair of it. He thought that by giving the armour of the phalanx to the lower people, who, as in most oligarchical states, were only allowed to act as light-armed, the Mitylenæans, instead of starving in their walls, might keep the field. The thing was done—but the people, no longer awed by the monopoly of arms and discipline in the privileged class, claimed a part in the government, demanded a public and equal distribution of food, and threatened, if refused, to make their own terms with the besiegers.

The leaders being alarmed capitulated for all on these harsh terms:—That the Mitylenæans should surrender themselves to the pleasure of the Athenian people—that the Athenian army should immediately be admitted into the city—and that none should be put into bonds, enslaved, or killed, till the will of the people was known.

When Alcidas heard that Mitylene was taken, some advised him to attempt its recovery, by surprising the Athenians while ignorant of his arrival; others to seize some city in Ionia, and issuing thence to win that country from Athens. But Alcidas was only anxious for a safe return. Instead of going on to Lesbos, he coasted in the opposite direction, taking many merchant vessels, which fearlessly approached, the crews supposing that any ships of war in those seas must be Athenian. All the prisoners he massacred, according to the savage practice of the Lacedæmonians from the beginning of the war, till, at the remonstrance of some Samians, he changed his conduct. But as soon as he found that the Athenians in Lesbos had heard of him, he sailed directly for Peloponnesus. The alarm of his presence had been great in Ionia, as the towns were kept unfortified lest they should assert independence. Paches pursued, but could not overtake him, and returned to Mitylene, whence he sent to Athens the chief promoters of the revolt.

The Athenians were highly enraged against the Mitylenæans, both because they had revolted, being exempt from the galling yoke imposed on most of the allies, and because they had first brought a Peloponnesian fleet on the coast of Asia. In their first fury they voted death to all the grown up citizens, and slavery to the women and children. On the morrow, the people seeming dissatisfied with their vote, at the instance of some friends to the intended victims, a second assembly was called. The chief supporter of the vote was Cleon, a profligate demagogue, with little ability in the conduct of affairs, a coarse but ready speaker, and skilful in flattering the worst passions of the populace. He dwelt on the mischiefs of lightly changing purpose, and the necessity of a terrible example to check the spirit of revolt already prevalent in the subjects of Athens; and laboured to inflame the people by setting forth the privileges which the Lesbians had enjoyed. His opponents argued that no severity of punishment could prevent revolt when

inclination and opportunity concurred; that revolters shut out from pardon would be the more obstinate; that it was unjust to visit the fault of the ruling few on the people, who, when arms were given them, had compelled submission; and that such an act would destroy the good will of the commonalty, in every state the main prop of the Athenian interest. The friends of mercy prevailed, and a trireme being sent with a countermand, arrived just as Paches had read the first order and was about to execute it. The men whom Paches had sent were put to death, in number near 1000. The walls of Mitylene were razed, the ships of war given up; and the lands of all the Lesbians except the Methymnæans, being divided into lots, were assigned to Athenians, but were occupied by the Lesbians, paying each a yearly quit-rent to the lot holders.

In the preceding year provisions had begun to fail the Platæans; and seeing that Athens would not venture an attack on the besieging army backed by all Bœotia, they planned an escape. Full half were discouraged, but by the rest the plan was gallantly executed as it had been ably conceived, and passing the lines by night with the loss but of one man, they came safe to Athens. In spite of the relief thus given, the remaining garrison were now brought so low by famine that they could not defend the walls. The Lacedæmonian general had been ordered to win the place by capitulation, if possible, that so Platæa might be retained, though all conquests made by force should, at the peace, be mutually restored. He therefore sent a herald to propose to the Platæans, that they should surrender their city and submit to the justice of Lacedæmon, so that the guilty should be punished on trial, but none otherwise. The Platæans consented, and commissioners were sent from Lacedæmon to try them; who without stating any accusation, asked each whether in the war he had done any good to the Lacedæmonians or their allies. The Platæans requested to answer more at length: they stated the ancient merits of their city, the ties of necessity and gratitude which bound it to Athens, the treacherous attack of the Thebans which forced it into war. The Thebans replied, asserting that the Platæans had wrongfully deserted Bœotia for Athens; they justified their late interference as a friendly act invited by the best of the

Plataeans; and complained of the fruitless massacre of their prisoners. As if to make it evident that the fate of the Plataeans had been predetermined, the judges, without weighing the arguments, merely repeated their question. None could say yes, and all were led to death. Thus perished Plataeans and 26 Athenians, by an act which, though less extensively bloody than others in this same war, can scarcely be paralleled in any history for deliberate baseness and impudent mockery of justice. The women were made slaves, and the town demolished by the Thebans.

Meanwhile attention was called by the troubles of Corcyra. Many noble Corcyraeans, prisoners in Corinth, had been won by kind treatment, and set free under a secret engagement to reconcile their country with the Corinthians. Through their intrigues the assembly voted that the Corcyraeans, retaining the alliance with Athens, would yet remain at peace with the Peloponnesians. They went on to prosecute Peithias, the head of the democratical party, as enslaving Corcyra to the Athenians; but he being acquitted, and retaliating on his accusers with an improbable charge of sacrilege, the five richest were condemned to a ruinous fine; and hearing that the influence of Peithias withheld all mitigation, and that he was persuading the people to an alliance, offensive as well as defensive, with Athens, the party suddenly collected, and entering the council-hall with daggers, killed Peithias, and about sixty of his friends. Then assembling the people, they declared that what had been done was the only method of preserving freedom to Corcyra, and, under the terror of the recent massacre, obtained a vote of neutrality in the war. Ambassadors being sent to make their apology in Athens, were there arrested as rebels.

To confirm their insecure ascendancy, the oligarchical Corcyraeans attacked their opponents. Both offered freedom to any slaves who would join them, but most took part with the people, who, strong in numbers and position, and in zeal so vehement that the very women were active in the fray, on the third day prevailed so far, that their opponents could only cover their retreat by firing the quarter of the town where they dwelt. The next day the nobles were saved from massacre by the coming of Nicostratus, the Athenian commander in Naupactus, who mediated an agree-

ment, on the terms that ten only, who were named, should be brought to trial, and the rest should live as citizens under a democracy. Even the ten, excepted were suffered to escape, and all speedily quieted without further bloodshed, when, as Nicostratus was departing, the popular leaders requested him to leave, for greater security, five of his twelve triremes, taking instead as many Corcyraean. He consented, and they named their enemies to go in the vessels; but these refused, fearing, in spite of the assurances of Nicostratus, that they would be sent to Athens. Their obstinate mistrust raised suspicion in the people, who rose and searched their houses for arms; and, alarmed at this, four hundred of the nobles took sanctuary in the temple of Juno.

Four or five days after came a Peloponnesian fleet of fifty-three ships, under Alcidas. The Corcyraeans put forth sixty triremes, two of which deserted, and in some the crew went to blows among themselves. The Peloponnesians seeing their confusion, sent twenty ships against the Corcyraeans, and opposed with all the rest the Attic twelve. Nicostratus nevertheless had sunk one ship, and was acting with advantage against the rest, when the other twenty came to aid them; and he then retreated in order, covering the flight of the Corcyraeans, who had lost thirteen triremes. The Corcyraean people, now in fear lest the enemy should attack the city, endeavoured to accommodate matters with their party opponents, and prevailed on some to serve in the fleet; but Alcidas wasted his time in indecisive measures, till finding that an Athenian fleet of sixty ships was approaching, he hastily departed.

The democratical Corcyraeans now prepared a horrid revenge for their terrors. The ships were ordered to sail round from one harbour to the other, and in the voyage all who were in them, of the oligarchical party, were thrown overboard; and at the same time a massacre was commenced in the city. The case of the suppliants of Juno gave more difficulty; teachers and cruelty cost but little, but to violate a temple was a serious thing. About fifty were persuaded to come out and stand a trial. All these were condemned to death, and their fate completed the despair of those who had remained. Some stabbed themselves, some hung themselves on the trees; others mutually killed each

other; all perished in the temple. Unlike Nicostratus, Eurymedon, the new Athenian admiral, kept a quiet spectator in the harbour, while the Corcyraeans, for seven days, were hunting out and murdering all whom they held their enemies. Under colour of treason to the democracy, many were slain by their private enemies, and many debtors wiped out their score with the blood of their creditors. In the words of Thucydides, whatever is wont to happen in such cases took place, and yet more. About five hundred of the persecuted party escaped to the continent, and after the departure of Eurymedon, seizing the forts there belonging to Corcyra, kept up a predatory war so successfully as to cause a famine in the city. Afterwards, with a few auxiliaries, they passed into the island, burning their vessels that their only hope might be in victory. They fortified themselves on Mount Istone, and thence commanded the country.

The pestilence in Athens, after raging two years unabated, had slackened for a while; but this winter it renewed its fury, and continued it for another year. In its whole course it cost Athens no less than 4400 heavy-armed soldiers, and 300 horsemen, and of the remaining multitude a number not to be reckoned.

In the next summer the Peloponnesians, preparing to invade Attica, were deferred by earthquakes, an ill omen according to the superstition of the age. Various actions took place with no decisive result. In the west Demosthenes, the son of Alcisthenes, commanding thirty Athenian ships, was joined by the Acarnanians and other allies, and marched against Leucas. He ravaged the territory unopposed, and the Acarnanians wished him to wall in the town, thinking that when that was done they could reduce it by blockade, and be delivered from a neighbour always hostile. The Messenians of Naupactus urged him to attack their constant enemies the Ætolians, whose reduction would make easy the extension of Athenian influence through all western Greece. Demosthenes was led to adopt the suggestion of the Messenians both by the favour due to their zealous service, and by the hope that the conquest of Ætolia would open a way into Phocis, by which the force of the western allies might be brought against Bœotia. The Acarnanians left the army in disgust, but with the rest he pursued his project.

The Ætolians were a rude but nume-

rous and warlike tribe, dispersed in un-walled villages, and too poor to use the arms or cultivate the discipline of the phalanx, but formidable in their own rugged country from their skill in handling the dart, and activity in skirmishing. Some of the Ozolian Locrians, neighbours of the Ætolians, and trained in a like mode of fighting, being allied with Athens, were appointed to meet the army of Demosthenes; but they did not arrive in time, and by their failure, and the defection of the Acarnanians, whose light-armed troops were numerous and excellent, his men were few, and almost entirely heavy-armed. He advanced, meeting nothing that could stop his march; but the Ætolians had assembled on the heights, and gave great annoyance, running down and throwing their darts, retiring when the enemy advanced, pursuing when he retired, and having in both, with their light armour, certain advantage. The few Athenian bowmen kept them off awhile, till, weary with long exertion, their arrows nearly spent, and their commander slain, they took to flight. The heavy-armed, left a prey to enemies whom they could not reach, were broken, and fled. Incumbered with their armour, and pursued by active men, numbers were killed. Their guide fell early. Many strayed into impassable ravines, and a large body entering a wood, the Ætolians fired it, and all were destroyed. Of 300 Athenians, heavy-armed, 120 were slain, the prime of all the Athenian youth who fell in the war. Of the allies a large proportion perished. The fleet sailed home, but Demosthenes remained at Naupactus, fearing to meet the people.

The Lacædæmonians were now persuaded by the Ætolians to attempt the conquest of Naupactus, and 3000 heavy-armed of the allies were sent against it, under Eurylochus, a Spartan. The Ozolian Locrians were easily brought to submission, and through them the army passed into the territory of Naupactus. The town was in danger, being large, and the defenders few; but Demosthenes had gone to the Acarnanians, and though ill received at first on account of Leucas, had prevailed on them to send 1000 heavy-armed, whose entrance saved the place. Eurylochus retiring was invited by the Ambraciots to assist them in conquering the Amphilocheian Argos, as the first step towards the reduction of Acarnania: and till the time came, he quartered his army in Ætolia.

Late in autumn 3000 heavy armed Ambraciots entering the Argian territory seized the hill fort of Olpæ. The Acarnanians, feeling that their own citizens wanted large political and military experience, offered Demosthenes the chief command, in spite of their late defeat, and their vengeance with him. Eurymedon having joined the Ambraciots, the combined army was decidedly superior; but an ambush ably planned by Demosthenes gave him the victory. Two of the three Spartan generals being slain, Menedæus the third, unprovided for a siege, and without a way of escape, proposed on the next day to treat; but all he could obtain was, that the Peloponnesians might depart with speed and secretly leaving the others to their fate. By this Demosthenes and the Acarnanians hoped to have the Ambraciots at their mercy, and to make the Peloponnesians odious for selfishness and treachery. The Peloponnesians went out in small parties as for herbs and firewood; but when they were at a distance the others followed in alarm. Both were at first pursued by the Acarnanians, some of whom when the generals interfered, were on the point of killing them, thinking the public betrayed. When the matter was explained, they let pass the Peloponnesians, but killed the Ambraciots. About 200 were slain, the rest escaped. The Ambracian people learning that their troops held Olpæ, had followed with their whole remaining strength. Demosthenes surprised their camp at day break, and but a few returned to Ambracia.

Could Demosthenes have led the allies at once against Ambracia, it must have failed: but they well knew that were there no western city connected with the Peloponnesians, their friendship would cease to be necessary to Athens, and they would be oppressed. Demosthenes now returned with confidence to Athens. After his departure the Acarnanians made peace and alliance with Ambracia for a hundred years, on the terms that neither the Ambraciots should be required to act offensively against the Peloponnesians, nor the Acarnanians against the Athenians; the Ambraciots should give up whatever they had taken from the Amphilocheians, and should not assist the Anactorians, who were hostile to Acarnania. This moderation established to the Acarnanians for a long time a degree of quiet, unusual in Greece, and contri-

buted to the character of benevolence and uprightness which long distinguished them.

The greatest cities of Sicily were Dorian, and allied with Lacedæmon. In the fifth year of this war, the Ionian states, attacked by Syracuse and the Dorian league, had besought aid of Athens. The request was recommended by kindred and old alliance, and by the wish to employ the Sicilian Dorians at home, that they might not send supplies to Peloponnesus. Twenty ships were dispatched, which at first commanded the sea; but the Athenians hearing that Syracuse was raising a navy, sent forty more in the seventh spring. Eurymedon and Sophocles, the commanders, were directed on the way to succour Coreyra against the exiles, to whose aid a Peloponnesian fleet was known to be going; and Demosthenes, embarking without any regular command, was authorized by the people to employ the fleet as he might think best, as it coasted Peloponnesus.

Demosthenes required the generals to land at Pylos* in Messenia; but hearing that the Peloponnesian fleet was at Coreyra, they refused. A storm forced them into that port, and Demosthenes bid them fortify the place, for this was the end of his commission. The harbour was excellent, though like all the neighbouring country it had been deserted since its conquest by Lacedæmon; and Demosthenes wished to garrison it with Messenians from Naupactus, who would zealously maintain it as by right their own, and whose Doric speech gave great advantage for incursions into Laconia. The generals ridiculed the project, and he appealed to the soldiers; but vainly, till foul weather continuing, for amusement they took to building the fort. They had no tools, but they picked up stones and laid them together, using clay for mortar, which, for want of better means, they carried on their backs, stooping forward, and clasping their hands behind them. Much of the fort was strong by nature, and in six days they rudely walled the rest. The generals now proceeding left five triremes with Demosthenes.

The news was heard at first with scorn in Lacedæmon; but the army, which had invaded Attica, hastened

* Pylos. The modern Navarino, a scene of action equally remarkable in ancient and in very recent history.

home in alarm, having been but fifteen days in the enemy's country. On its return a force was sent against Pylos, the fleet was called from Coreyra, and Demosthenes was blockaded by land and sea, having just time to send to Eurymedon. The fort was attacked on both sides, but towards the land the ground was strong, and, on the side towards the sea, by skilfully using the difficulties of the shore, he was enabled with his handful of men to prevent a landing. On the third day the Athenian fleet came in sight. The harbour was shut in by the woody island Sphacteria, which left a narrow entrance on each side. In this the Lacedæmonians had placed a body of troops, proposing to block up both the inlets, and post troops in every spot where the Athenians could land. Afterwards they resolved to engage in the harbour, favoured by the narrow space and the surrounding army. But on the fourth day, while they were getting out their ships, the Athenians entering at both the mouths, attacked those under way, took five, and chased the rest to the shore. The Lacedæmonians dashed into the water, and, after hard fighting, the Athenians drew off with only the five first taken. Eurymedon now became master of the sea; and occupying the strait, kept strict watch on those in the island, being four hundred and twenty Lacedæmonians with their attendant Helots.

Alarm rose high in Lacedæmon; for an extraordinary valour was there attached to every citizen of pure Spartan blood, and among the destined prisoners were men from most of the chief families. Rescue seeming impossible, it was determined to treat for peace: and a truce was made on these terms; that the Lacedæmonians should give in pledge to the Athenians the ships which had fought in the late action, and all ships of war lying in any Laconian port; that a stated measure of food should be sent in daily for each man on the island; that Lacedæmonian ambassadors should be sent to Athens, and on their return the truce should end and the ships be restored; and that if any article were broken, the treaty should be void. The ambassadors went, expecting that the Athenians, who had asked peace, and been refused, would gladly embrace it when offered. But the Athenians were

by no means disposed to moderation

than their enemies had been before. The all-powerful Cleon persuaded them to require Nisæa, Pegæ, Trœzen, Achaia; and the negotiation was broken off.

On the return of the ambassadors the Lacedæmonians re-demanded their ships. The Athenians withheld them, alleging some small breaches of the truce, which might, perhaps, on the strict letter of the convention, bear out the denial, but which could not justify it to an honourable mind, considering how much had been trusted to their good faith. Hostilities were renewed. The blockade was tedious and expensive; it lasted into autumn, and the people began to fear its failure, and repent the rejection of peace. Cleon's credit was in danger. At first he imputed falsehood to the messengers; but when appointed himself to go to Pylos and examine, he changed his tone, and attacked the board of generals, saying, that if they were men, they would quickly capture those in the island, and that if he held their office he would do so.

The leading person of the board of generals was Nicias, the son of Niceratus, a man of birth and fortune, in whom a generous temper, popular manners, and considerable political and military talent, were marred by unreasonable diffidence and excessive dread of responsibility. He professed himself willing to resign the business to Cleon; who accepted it, thinking the offer a feint, but, when he found it sincere, endeavoured to retract. The light-minded multitude were amused with his embarrassment, and thought the jest too good to be lost, though the public service should suffer. The more he declined it, the more they pressed it on him; and when, seeing no escape, he began to boast that in twenty days he would bring the prisoners, they laughed at his presumption, but encouraged him to go on. The wiser were comforted by the hope they would either gain the object desired, or failing of that, would be rid of Cleon. But Cleon had heard that Demosthenes was preparing an attack, and prudently left to him the conduct of it, though he was ready to appropriate to himself the credit of success. He landed on the island with Demosthenes, who by the skilful use of his numerous light-armed troops, soon reduced the Lacedæmonians to distress. Surrounded by enemies, who fled at their approach, but turned on them when they desisted from pursuit; plied with mis-

siles from the right when they charged upon the left, and from the left as soon as they fronted the other way; worn out with labour, stunned with noise, and half suffocated with dust, after many had fallen, the remnant made their way to a fort at the extremity of the island. Their rear and flanks were here protected, so that they could better withstand the enemy in front. But a body of archers and dartmen being silently led to occupy a height which commanded their rear, they were again surrounded, and exposed to sure destruction. Demosthenes and Cleon now stopped the attack, and summoned them to surrender. They asked leave to communicate with their countrymen on shore, and several messages passed, by the last of which they were permitted to consult for themselves, only doing nothing disgraceful. On this warrant they surrendered; and they were brought to Athens within twenty days, as Cleon had promised. This result surprized the Greeks, who had thought that nothing could bring Lacedæmonians to surrender. A vote was passed by the Athenian people that the prisoners should be kept in bonds till peace were made, and if Attica were again invaded, should be put to death. In number they were two hundred and ninety-two, of whom one hundred and twenty were Spartans. The original number of heavy-armed on the island had been four hundred and twenty, but the rest had fallen in the engagement. A Messenian garrison was placed in Pylos, which much annoyed the Lacedæmonians, unused to the incursions of an enemy. The Helots, who were mostly Messenian by blood, deserted in great numbers; and their late masters, suffering by their active enmity, and yet more by the loss of their services, fearing the increase of these evils, and looking forward to the revival of the Messenians as an independent and inveterately hostile power, were earnest for peace. Their overtures, however, were repulsed by the Athenians, too much elated to grant any moderate terms.

The same summer Nicias, with a powerful fleet and army, gained some successes against the Corinthians, but effected nothing decisive. Eurymedon and Sophocles making Coreyra in their way from Pylos to Sicily, reduced the exiles on Istone to surrender themselves to the discretion of the Athenian people. Till they could be sent to Athens, they

were placed on an island, under condition that, if any attempted to escape, the capitulation should be forfeit for all. The democratical leaders, fearing that their lives might be spared by the Athenians, now devised a plot of horrible treachery and cruelty. Persons were suborned to persuade the exiles that the Athenian generals would deliver them to the Corycæan people, and to offer them a vessel for their escape. Some attempted flight, and were taken in the ship; the terms were now broken, and all were given up to the people. The prisoners were placed in a large building; and they were led out thence in bonds by twentics, between two lines of citizens in arms, who struck and stabbed them, each selecting his particular enemies, while men with whips drove on any who hesitated to proceed. Sixty had been thus killed, when the rest found what was passing. Calling then aloud to the Athenians to put them to death if such were their will, they declared they would neither go out nor suffer any to come in. The people, not attempting to force a free passage through the doors, untiled the roof and showered missiles on them. Defence was hopeless, and they resolved to end their suffering. Some stabbed themselves with the arrows which had been shot at them, others strangled themselves, but in a day and night all perished. The corpses heaped on waggons were borne from the city and cast out unburied, in defiance of Grecian religion, which attached to the rite of burial an extraordinary sanctity and importance. Eurymedon having witnessed the completion of the tragedy, and sailed on to Sicily.

Next year the Athenians under Nicias conquered Cythera, an island on the Laconian coast, and allowing the inhabitants to retain their possessions under a tribute of four talents, made the island a post for the annoyance of the Lacedæmonians. In their return they took and burnt Thyrea, and of the unhappy Æginetans there established, all who survived were carried to Athens, and were there put to death. Thus was finished the long enmity of Athens and Ægina.

About the same time, by the exertions of Hermocrates, a distinguished Syracusan, the Sicilians were brought to agree among themselves, and the Athenian fleet sailed away. Elated by present success to think even things within their power, the people would not believe but that their generals might

have conquered Sicily, and that they had been prevented by bribery. In this persuasion they fined Eurymedon, and banished two others.

Though Megara was democratically governed, old hatred of Athens had bound it to the Lacedæmonians; who fearing to lose it, let the Megarians chuse their constitution, while a Peloponnesian garrison held their port of Nisæa. The Athenians were wont twice a year to ravage the lands; and the city was continually harassed by its oligarchical exiles holding Pegæ, the other port. Distress exciting discontent in the people, the friends of the exiles were emboldened to propose their real; and the popular chiefs, foreseeing ruin to themselves should their enemies be restored and backed by Lacedæmon, treated secretly with the Athenian generals Hippocrates and Demosthenes. To cut off from Megara the Peloponnesians in Nisæa, the long walls were first betrayed to the Athenians. Measures were next taken for admitting them into the city, but these being frustrated, the Athenian generals blockaded Nisæa, which was soon obliged to capitulate.

The spirit of Lacedæmon was broken by continued ill-success; but one man still kept heart and hope, and now obtained an opportunity of partially retrieving her affairs. This was Brasidas, the only Spartan who had given proof of talent in the war. He was young, and youth in his country was a bar to eminence; but though never placed in the highest command, he had shown in subordinate posts such daring activity, that the Chalcidians, on requesting a force from Lacedæmon to complete the revolt of the Thracian subjects of Athens, asked Brasidas for the leader. Their suit was granted, but the Lacedæmonians, however desirous to find work for Athens at a distance, feared to lessen the force at home, where the Helots were more than ever objects of jealousy since Pylos was held by Messenians. The detestable precaution taken seems incredible, but is yet true. Such Helots as thought they had done most service in war were invited to stand a scrutiny of their conduct, and freedom was promised to the most deserving. Two thousand being chosen were crowned with garlands as freemen, and solemnly marched round the temples. Soon after, all disappeared, and no one knew how each was murdered. Being all of those who seemed most able to

head an insurrection, the government was willing to send seven hundred Lacedæmonians with Brasidas.

This leader was at Corinth preparing for his march, when he heard the danger of Megara. He summoned the neighbouring allies, and being joined by the Bœotians, his army outnumbered that of Athens. Both armies offered battle, but neither would make the attack; and the Athenians retreating to Nisæa, Brasidas was admitted into Megara. Having there confirmed the Lacedæmonian interest, he dismissed the allies and returned to Corinth. The most active favourers of Athens in Megara immediately fled, but the rest thought that they might safely make terms with the oligarchical party. The exiles were restored under an oath of universal amnesty. They took the oath; but their chiefs being placed in the magistracies, arrested one hundred of their principal enemies, accused them before the people, and by terror compelling the assembly to condemn them, executed them all. After this foul perjury and murder, Megara was long governed by a very few.

The successes of Athens had encouraged the democratical Bœotians to plan a revolution. It was agreed that Demosthenes, with the western allies, should land in the west of Bœotia, while, on the same day, Hippocrates, with the force of Athens, fortified Delium in the east. But the day was mistaken, and Demosthenes, arriving on the coast, found that the intended diversion had not been made, and that the Bœotian government, informed of his purpose, had brought all its forces to oppose him, and taken such measures that his friends in the town dared not stir. He accordingly retired; and after his departure, when Hippocrates came to Delium, the whole strength of Bœotia was at liberty to act against him. The armies were nearly equal, and the fight was long and bloody; but in the end the Bœotians prevailed. The defeated army fled to Delium, and, leaving there a garrison, went home by sea. Soon after Delium was taken by the Bœotians.

Meanwhile Brasidas with 1700 heavy-armed troops had pursued his march to Thrace. The country was friendly as far as the border of Thessaly. Most of the Thessalian towns were nominally democratical, and the many were every where devoted to Athens; but in most places the interest of a few powerful

men directed affairs. Having procured some distinguished Thessalians to accompany him, he proceeded; and partly preventing opposition by the influence of his guides, and by his own conciliatory conduct, and partly avoiding it by the rapidity of his march, he passed through into Macedonia. Being joined by the Chalcidians he went to Acanthus. Some leading men favoured his purpose, and as the many, though attached to Athens, had fears for their harvest, it was agreed that Brasidas should be admitted to address the assembly. He was eloquent in speech, and liberal in his policy, uncommon gifts in a Spartan; he promised independence, and impartial justice to men of all parties; and his arguments being seconded by his army at the gates, Acanthus joined the Lacedæmonian alliance.

Amphipolis, on an island in the Strymon, was the most valuable of Athenian possessions in Thrace, by its rich plain and noble river, forests of ship-timber, and mines of silver and gold. It was settled by Athens, during the administration of Pericles, after two former colonies had been cut off by the Thracians. Brasidas having intelligence with some in the city, surprised the bridge and entered the island. Few of the Amphipolitans were Athenians by origin; most were Chalcidians or connected with Perdiccas: and when Brasidas proclaimed that both Amphipolitans and Athenians might take their choice, whether to remain enjoying equal rights, or to depart with their effects; his unusual moderation, with the wishes of many and the fears of all, disposed the people to accept the terms and receive his army. Thucydides the son of Olorus, the historian, being stationed at Thasos, had brought up his squadron as soon as he heard that Amphipolis was attacked. Too late to save it, he secured Eion, at the mouth of the Strymon, which was next attempted. The Athenians, vexed that a way was found to possessions which they had thought protected by their navy, vented their rage on Thucydides for that loss which not all his activity could prevent. He was banished for twenty years, during which, by intercourse with the Peloponnesians, he extended his knowledge of Greece and completed his fitness to write its history.

Many other cities joined with Brasidas. He professed to fight for Grecian freedom, and his mild and liberal conduct supported the claim. The

general was taken as a sample of his countrymen, and an opinion rose of Lacedæmonian equity and moderation, from which men were afterwards bitterly undeceived. He projected creating a fleet at Amphipolis, and asked a reinforcement to his army from Lacedæmon. But this was withheld, for his superiority of talent excited jealousy in the government, unaccustomed to recognize individual pre-eminence in persons not of royal race.

The Athenians now repented their rejection of peace, and the Lacedæmonians, harassed from Pylos and Cythera, and eager to recover their prisoners, still were anxious to treat. As a step to peace, a truce was concluded for a year, each party keeping what it held, but the use of ships of war being for the time forbidden to the Peloponnesians. Scione, in the peninsula of Pallene, had revolted to Brasidas; but the Athenian commissioners, who announced to him the truce, declared that people excluded, the vote of alliance with Lacedæmon not having passed till after the articles were signed. Brasidas insisted that their revolt had taken place before, and refused to give them up. The Athenian people were highly enraged at finding even those almost in the situation of islanders revolt in reliance on the land force of Lacedæmon; and they voted, at the instigation of Cleon, that Scione should be taken and its people put to death. Mende too revolted, and Brasidas received it, denying that the treaty forbade him to accept an alliance spontaneously offered. The Athenians thought differently, and supported their claim by a powerful armament under Nicias and Nicostratus.

Having provided for the defence of his new allies, Brasidas accompanied Perdiccas against the province of Lynceus. A large body of Illyrians, hired by Perdiccas, turned their arms against him; and the Macedonians retreated in sudden panic, leaving their allies in the utmost danger. Brasidas saved his army by an able retreat; but the soldiers, in their anger, committed violences which exasperated Perdiccas, already offended with the Spartan leader for his wish to return to Mende before Lynceus was subdued. From this time Perdiccas sought to join with Athens, which he soon did, and by his influence in Thesaly, passage was denied to a reinforcement sent to Brasidas.

Before the return of Brasidas, Mende was lost. The leading men had caused the revolt, but the people favoured Athens. When the Lacedæmonian governor called out the Mendæans to battle, one of them declared that he would not go out, and that there was no reason for war. The governor, assuming the arbitrary authority which Lacedæmonians on foreign command were wont to exert, seized the speaker, and was dragging him from the assembly; when the democratical party flew to arms, routed the Peloponnesians and their adherents, and admitted the Athenians. The Athenian generals directed the restoration of democracy, and declared that they would not inquire into the past, but would leave the Mendæans to their own measures with respect to the authors of the revolt. They next laid siege to Scione.

The Thespians having suffered greatly at Delium, the Thebans, who had long wished, by razing their walls, to compel their unqualified subserviency, now enforced that humiliating measure. The pretence was imputed attachment to Athens; the occasion, the weakness of the Thespians, crippled in supporting against Athens the allies who oppressed them. Such are the justice and decency of the strong.

Cleon's success at Pylos had raised his credit higher than ever. Aristophanes shook it for a moment, when, according to the practice of the Athenian stage, where living men were satirized by name, and the politics of the day continually introduced, he brought out a comedy entirely levelled at the vices of Cleon, and the levity and folly of the people, his dupes*. The satire succeeded; Cleon was ridiculed and reviled, and being prosecuted for embezzling the public money, he was heavily fined. But he soon recovered his ascendancy; and having deluded himself into the belief that he could command armies without the assistance of Demosthenes, in the tenth year of the war, when the truce expired, he persuaded the Athenians to send him as general into Thrace. Through his rashness, ignorance, and cowardice, his army was routed under Amphipolis; but both he and Brasidas were killed—a double advantage to Athens, which might nearly compensate for the loss of the battle.

* This comedy is still in existence. Its title is *The Knights*. It is one of the plays of Aristophanes recently translated by Mr. Mitchell.

The death of Cleon leaving Nicias without a rival in power, peace was soon made. Platæa was left to Thebes, Nisæa to Athens; all other conquests were mutually given up. Amphipolis, as an Athenian colony, was to be restored unconditionally; the other Thracian towns were only to pay the tribute assessed by Aristides. Scione was left at the mercy of Athens. All prisoners were to be mutually restored, and any dispute arising between the contracting parties was to be settled judicially. Should any alteration in the treaty seem desirable, it might be made by consent of Athens and Lacedæmon. The Boeotians, Corinthians, Eleians, and Megarians, protested against the terms; but the majority of the allies consenting, the Lacedæmonians ratified them in the name of the whole confederacy. (B. C. 421.)

SECT. II.—In Greece a war was thought to be justified, if it promised advantage, and if no express treaty forbade it. Peace was seldom made except for a term of years, and the expiration of the period was sufficient reason for hostility. The peace just made was for fifty years, and a pressing motive of Lacedæmon to conclude it was the approaching close of a thirty years' truce with Argos, which that state had refused to renew. In power the second among the Peloponnesian states, Argos still looked back with pride to its ancient pre-eminence, and cherished the hope of disputing with Sparta the command of Peloponnesus. Its comparative wealth and population were now unusually high, for during ten years of surrounding warfare it had thriven in peace; and the Lacedæmonians, fearing to stand alone against Argos, united either with Athens, or with their own offended allies, hastily formed a defensive alliance with Athens. Lacedæmon was to be first in the restitutions stipulated in the peace; but the only article yet executed was the liberation of Athenian prisoners. The Athenians, however, on making the alliance, set free the prisoners taken at Pylos. One article of the alliance is worthy of notice; that the Athenians should assist with all their strength in quelling any insurrection of the Helots. A like stipulation never was made by any other Grecian state; but it was fit that the greatest guilt of Lacedæmon should be the source of its peculiar and ever present terror.

This alliance completing the estrange-

ment of Corinth from Lacedæmon, some leading men proposed to the Argians to league for the defence of Peloponnesus against the ambition of the new confederates. The government of Argos being democratical, all proposals of treaty were regularly made to the popular assembly; but in the present case, lest any who might endeavour to connect their cities with Argos should be endangered by the publicity of the attempt if it failed, the Argian people empowered twelve commissioners to conclude alliance with any Grecian state but Lacedæmon or Athens. From either of these the assembly alone could receive proposals. The alliance of Argos was soon embraced by Mantinea, Elis, and Corinth. The Megarians and Bœotians stood aloof. Dissatisfied with Lacedæmon, and inveterately hostile to Athens, their oligarchical governments were yet unwilling to connect themselves with a powerful democracy like Argos.

As soon as the peace was made, the Lacedæmonians had ordered their general Clearidas to restore Amphipolis, and required the other Thracian towns to submit to Athens on the terms prescribed. They all refused, and Clearidas saying that he could not compel them, was directed to bring away all the Peloponnesian troops. On the return of the army, the Helots who had fought in it were rewarded with freedom. About the same time a violent precaution was taken against the restored prisoners from Pylos, who found themselves held cheap on account of their surrender, an act before unknown in Lacedæmon, but which, to save them from certain destruction, the government had authorized. Disturbance was feared from their discontent, and the more as some were in high employment; wherefore they were voted incapable of office, and, what seems more strange, incapable of buying and selling. Some time after, the disqualification was removed. In the course of the summer Scione was taken by the Athenians, and, according to the cruel decree proposed by Cleon, the men were slaughtered, and the women and children made slaves. The land was given to the remnant of the Plataeans.

The Athenians had begun to mistrust the Lacedæmonians, who, instead of restoring Amphipolis, had left it in the hands of the armed citizens; and who, when required, always promised, but

had hitherto delayed, to join in compelling their allies to perform their part in the treaty. The Lacedæmonians said that they had done what lay in them, and would use their endeavours to induce the others to concur; in return they claimed the restoration of Pylos, or, at least, that it should be garrisoned with Athenians, and not with their implacable foes the Messenians and Helots. After much dispute, the last proposal was granted. The Lacedæmonians then requested the Bœotians to give up to them the Athenian prisoners who were in Bœotia, and the border fortress of Panactum, which, according to treaty, was to be restored to Athens. In return for Panactum and the prisoners, they hoped to recover Pylos: but to obtain them they were obliged to form a separate alliance with the Bœotians, though it was stipulated in their alliance with Athens, that neither party should make war or treaty without the consent of the other. This measure, therefore, did not conciliate the Athenians, but rather gave them fresh offence; especially when it was found that the Bœotians, instead of restoring Panactum, had demolished it. The Argians supposing Bœotia leagued with Athens and Lacedæmon, at first had wished to treat with Lacedæmon; but when they found that those two states were more at variance than before, they broke off the treaty, and sent ambassadors to Athens. Ambassadors were also sent by Lacedæmon to defend her conduct, and demand the restoration of Pylos. This occasion introduces to us one of the most remarkable characters of Greece.

Alcibiades, the son of Cleinias, a youth of the highest birth in Athens, became early master of a vast inheritance. His talents were brilliant, his ambition unbounded; his wealth and high political connexions surrounded him with flatterers, by whom his confident temper was so far inflamed, that he meditated speaking in the assembly before his twentieth year. From this he was diverted by Socrates, the first and greatest Grecian teacher of moral wisdom to mankind. He saw the powers of Alcibiades and the danger of their perversion; he desired to curb his wild passions, and direct his love of praise to worthy objects. The young man had an inquiring mind, which led him to value the instructions of Socrates, and a disposition generous enough to venerate his character; and an intimate

friendship took place between them, which was confirmed by Socrates saving his pupil in a battle in Thrace, a service repaid by Alcibiades in the rout of Delium. But the influence of Socrates could not permanently overcome the temptations which beset his young disciple. His love of pleasure was excessive; and his uncommon beauty of person made him the object of adulterous passion to many women of rank in Athens. He was courted by numbers who hoped to profit by his wealth, and by his means of arising to power. Greedy of pre-eminence in every thing, he gloried in a lavish magnificence before unknown in Athens, and offensive to many, as outraging the due equality of citizens in a democracy. And in his political career we shall find him no less unable to separate true glory from mere distinction; admirable indeed for ingenuity and boldness, but the slave of an ambition utterly estranged from public spirit, and as selfish in its ends as unscrupulous in its means.

The family of Alcibiades had anciently been hereditary public guests of Lacedæmon; by which connexion they were bound to entertain and do good offices to all its envoys; and in return, if ever they went thither, were honourably received at the public expense. Such public guests considered the state to which they were attached as a second country, took care of its interests, and laboured to preserve it in amity with their own; and the favour they there enjoyed, being sometimes useful to their country, contributed to their influence at home. Indignant at the attempt to restore the Peisistratidæ, an ancestor of Alcibiades had renounced the friendship of Lacedæmon, with all the ceremonies prescribed by Grecian religion for the dissolution of a bond so sacred as was that of hospitality, whether public or private. Alcibiades, wishing to renew the connection, had shewn kindness to the Spartan prisoners; but the Lacedæmonians, who liked neither his youth nor his habits, preferred to communicate with Nicias on the subject of peace; whence Alcibiades became hostile both to Nicias and Lacedæmon.

The ambassadors of Argos and Lacedæmon, met at Athens. The latter having told the council that they came with full powers to conclude on all disputed points, Alcibiades persuaded them that it would be for their advantage to profess their powers limited, and promised, if they did so, to support them.

Accordingly, in the assembly, they declared themselves restricted; whereupon their treacherous adviser attacked them more violently than before, taxed them with double dealing, and proposed an immediate junction with Argos. The offended people would have voted it, but the assembly was adjourned on account of an earthquake. Next day, their anger having cooled, they listened to Nicias, and contented themselves with sending to require that the Lacedæmonians should restore Amphipolis, and renounce the alliance of Bœotia, unless Bœotia would join the common league. The demand was rejected by Lacedæmon, and they concluded an alliance with Argos. In this Corinth did not concur, inclining rather to rejoin Lacedæmon.

Epidaurus, besieged by the Argians, was reinforced from Laconia by sea. The Argians complained to Athens, that, by allowing this, it had broken the treaty, which provided that neither state should suffer enemies of the other to pass through its dominions. This strange remonstrance, acknowledging that the sea was the dominion of Athens, would seem to have been prompted by the influence of Alcibiades; who proposed and obtained the compliance of Athens with the no less strange demand, that, in reparation to Argos, and punishment for the imputed aggression of Lacedæmon, the Messenians and Helots should be re-established in Pylos, and thus Laconia should be exposed to plunder, though still nominally allied with Athens.

In the next summer, the fourteenth from the beginning of the war, the Lacedæmonians made an effort to succour their distressed allies of Epidaurus, and to recover their influence in Peloponnesus. They marched out with all their force under king Agis, the son of Archidæmus, and were joined by their remaining allies, including the Corinthians. Agis manœuvred so successfully that the Argian army was surrounded, and exposed at great disadvantage to the attack of a superior force. Two Argians saw the danger, Thrasylus, one of the five generals of Argos, and Alciphron, a public guest of Lacedæmon. They went privately to Agis, and pledging themselves to reconcile their state with Lacedæmon, prevailed on him to grant a four months truce, on his own authority. The army of Agis heard with astonishment the order to retreat; but so far were the Argian

people from rightly valuing their escape, that they ignorantly thought they had lost an opportunity of destroying the Lacedæmonians, and their anger ran so high that Thrasylus saved his life by flying to an altar.

The Athenian force was not yet come; and when it came the Argian leaders were unwilling to break the truce. Alcibiades, however, arriving as an ambassador, persuaded the people that the truce was void, being made without authority; and the allied army being put in motion reduced Orchomenus in Arcadia, and advanced on Tegea, an ancient, faithful, and most valuable ally of Lacedæmon. The Lacedæmonians from the first had disapproved the retreat of Agis, but hearing that the truce was renounced, and Orchomenus taken, they called him to account, with a violence unusual in them. They were on the point of heavily fining him, and demolishing his house; but he prevailed on them to try him further, and was suffered to resume the command, but under a restriction before unknown, ten counsellors being appointed, without whose concurrence he might not lead the army beyond the borders.

Tegea was secured by a hasty march of the Lacedæmonians, and being joined by the Arcadian allies, they entered the territory of Mantinea. After some manoeuvring, the Lacedæmonians, when they least expected it, found themselves suddenly in front of the enemy, who were advancing in good order. Their alarm was considerable, but their excellent training enabled them rapidly to form for battle; and the day was won by their superior discipline and steadiness, notwithstanding some considerable errors of their commanders. This battle restored the credit of Lacedæmon, and gave to the oligarchical Argians the hope of concluding a peace, and then an alliance, and finally by that means overthrowing the democracy. In spite of the great influence of Alcibiades, who was then present in Argos, the people consented first to peace, and then to alliance with Lacedæmon,—an example which the Mantineans were compelled to follow; and at the close of the year, by the aid of a force from Lacedæmon, oligarchy was established in Argos.

This did not last long. The Many taking heart, attacked and overcame the ruling party. The Lacedæmonians prepared to march against them; but

delays took place, during which the Argians renewed their alliance with Athens, and began to build long walls to their port. The unfinished walls were demolished by the Lacedæmonians, but little further was gained. By the arbitrary interference of Lacedæmon, the Argian people had been driven to throw themselves so entirely on Athens, that when Alcibiades came next year, with twenty ships, he was supported in arresting, and imprisoning in different islands, three hundred persons suspected of wishing well to Lacedæmon.

Melos, an island on the coast of Peloponnesus, was independent of Athens; which could not endure that, when all the other islands were its subjects, one of the weakest should withhold obedience. "Tell us not," said its ambassadors, "that, though colonists of the Lacedæmonians, you have not joined them in their wars against us; tell us not that you have done us no wrong, but examine our respective forces, knowing that equals only dispute about justice; but the mighty do their pleasure, and the weak must submit." Such in all ages has been the principle acted on by powerful oppressors, though never, at least in modern times, so explicitly avowed, as both here and in some other speeches occurring in Thucydides, which, if not always correct reports of what was actually said, are yet specimens of the language which the public ear could endure. The Melians refusing submission were besieged; no effort was made for them by Lacedæmon; they were reduced to surrender at discretion, and, for defending their independence against an unprovoked and most unjust attack, all the men were butchered, and the women and children sold as slaves.

Next spring, the Athenians, hoping to effect the conquest of Sicily, which was again torn by petty wars, prepared a fleet to aid the Egestans against Selinus, which was backed by Syracuse. Alcibiades, Nicias, and Lamachus, were chosen to command. Nicias attempted to dissuade the people from wasting their resources in distant warfare, and multiplying their enemies; Alcibiades replied, enhancing the value of the conquest; and the assembly approving it, voted one hundred triremes, and five thousand heavy-armed troops, with archers and slingers in due proportion, and whatever further the generals might think expedient. The citizens eagerly enlisted, from the love of enterprise, from curiosity, from the hope of enriching

themselves by successful war, and increasing the public treasure, which furnished subsistence to the poor, and amusement to all.

It was an ancient and venerated custom in Athens to place at the entrance of temples and houses a block of square stone crowned with a head of Mercury. Most of these one night had the faces mutilated. This incident, apparently so trifling, dismayed all Athens. It was thought ominous of ill to the intended expedition; it was thought to prove a design to overthrow the democracy; though how it could contribute to such an end is inconceivable. All efforts failed to discover the perpetrators; but it was found that Alcibiades had before, in a drunken frolic, been concerned in some similar irregularities, and his many enemies laboured to fix the charge on him. His guilt is most improbable, for the business was evidently concerted, and very injurious to the favourite project of ambition in which he was now embarked; but his ostentatious extravagance had raised a suspicion that he looked far above democratical equality; he had shown that he little regarded things esteemed most sacred; and many were easily persuaded that his overweening disposition had led him to insult the religion of his country, and to plot against its liberty.

Alcibiades demanded an immediate trial. It would be unjust, he said, to receive accusations against him when absent, and imprudent to keep a man in high command, with such charges hanging over him. But his accusers dreaded his popularity in the army, and feared to alienate the Argian and Mantinean auxiliaries procured by him. When he was gone they might work on the passions of the people, aggravating every unfavourable circumstance, while the accused was not present to contradict them. They procured a vote that Alcibiades should proceed on the expedition. The preparations were completed, and the fleet set sail under the anxious gaze of all Athens, assembled to witness the departure of the most splendid armament ever sent by a Grecian state on distant service.

The Ionian interest in Sicily had been quite overborne, and none were ready to join with Athens, except the Eggestans, who were on the brink of ruin, and the remnant of the Leontines expelled from their city by Syracuse, and now occupying two fortresses in their ancient ter-

ritory. The generals differed how to proceed. Nicias proposed to relieve Eggesta, and then return home, unless the Eggestans should fulfil their promise to furnish pay for the fleet, or some readier means should occur than now appeared of restoring the Leontines. Alcibiades was for negotiating with all the cities but Syracuse and Selinus, beginning with Messene, as the most convenient harbour and station whence their army might commence its operations, and when they knew what cities would be with them, then attacking Syracuse. Lamachus, who appears to have been a mere soldier, full of spirit and enterprise, but little versed in intricate political speculations, wished to fall on Syracuse, while unprepared; but being overruled, he concurred with Alcibiades, and Nicias was obliged to yield. Alcibiades persuaded the Messenians, not indeed to join in the war, but to furnish a market to his army. He obtained the alliance of Naxos and Catana, and sent ten triremes to the port of Syracuse, to proclaim that the Athenians were come to restore the Leontines, their kinsmen and allies, and that any Leontines would be received in the armament as friends.

Meanwhile, as often happens when the popular mind is possessed with unreasonable error, the Athenian people had overleaped all bounds of justice, humanity, and common sense. From the affair of the Mercuries, a plot was inferred for the establishment of oligarchy or tyranny, and the irritation was cherished by continual discourses of what Athens had suffered through the Peisistratidæ. On the slightest suspicion—on the most discreditable evidence—men, the most respected, were imprisoned; alarm increased with the number of accusations, and each found easier credit than the last. At length Andocides, one of the imprisoned, seeing no other hope of escape, and hoping by the sacrifice of a few to save the rest, and to tranquillize the city, confessed the crime, and accused some others—whether truly or falsely, is not known. The people received the information with joy, and setting free the informer and those whom he had cleared, tried and executed the others. The proof was very inadequate, and the condemnation most unjust; but the panic was in great measure abated. Though Alcibiades was not included in the information, the people, in their present temper, were easily stirred to inquire into his former impieties. He was

proved to have profaned the mysteries of Ceres, by celebrating them in mockery in a private house; and this was easily connected by the malice of his enemies, and the excited suspicions of the people, with a charge of conspiring against the democracy. The accident of a small body of Lacedæmonians approaching the Isthmus, raised suspicion so high that the people passed a night under arms. In Argos, also, the Many became jealous of the friends of Alcibiades; and though Alcibiades himself had placed in custody the oligarchical Argian chiefs, these unhappy men were given up by Athens, to be put to death by the Argian people, as if conspirators with Alcibiades. The death of Alcibiades was resolved, but it was thought unsafe to arrest him in the army. He was simply summoned home; but suspecting his danger, he fled to Peloponnesus, and was capitally condemned in his absence.

The plans of Alcibiades were given up, no man remaining capable of executing them; nor was any decided course of action substituted. The armament went to Egesta, and, returning thence, lay at Catana; while the Syracusans, who had lately been in dismay, grew so confident, that they obliged their leaders to conduct them to that city. Of this the Athenian generals took advantage, and sailing by night for Syracuse, took up a strong position under the walls. The Syracusans hastened home, and lost a battle; but the Athenians returned on the morrow to Catana, without pursuing their success. The Syracusans, alarmed at their defeat, were now willing to be directed by Hermocrates, their ablest commander. They made him the first of their generals, and reduced the number from fifteen to three; they passed the winter in disciplining their forces, strengthening their city, and confirming their allies; and sent to ask the aid of Corinth, their mother city, and of Lacedæmon.

The prayer of Syracuse was supported in Lacedæmon by Corinthian ministers, as well as by Alcibiades, who had gone thither with the unworthy purpose of taking revenge upon his country by foreign arms. He declared that the Athenians hoped to conquer, not only Sicily, but Grecian Italy, and Carthage; to obtain from Italy ship-timber in abundance, and from Spain numbers of excellent mercenary soldiers; and then, with resources thus increased, making war on

Peloponnesus, to become lords of all the Grecian race. He therefore advised the Lacedæmonians, both to send a Spartan general, with troops, into Sicily, and to make a diversion at home; and for the latter purpose, he recommended garrisoning Decelia, in Attica. The assembly approved his plans; Gylippus, a Spartan of royal blood, was appointed to command in Sicily, and directed to consult with the Corinthians and Syracusans how best to carry thither troops; but these were to be gathered as they might from the allies, Lacedæmon furnishing none.

In the spring the Athenians, after some unimportant movements, formed the siege of Syracuse. Their operations were ably conducted; they were superior in every skirmish, and the circumvallation (walling round) was rapidly and but completed. Hermocrates seems to have acted judiciously; but the Syracusans, undisciplined, and frequently insubordinate, could not resist the skill and experience of their enemies. The friendship of Athens was generally courted; supplies came in both from Sicily and Italy; the Syracusans themselves began to talk of capitulation, and even sent proposals to Nicias, who was now alone in command, since Lamachus had fallen in a skirmish. Suspicion arose of the treachery of parties, the common dread of Grecian cities when besieged; and the people vented their discontent in cashiering their generals.

Gylippus, arriving in Sicily with seven hundred heavy-armed infantry, by his own activity and the reputation of Lacedæmon increased his numbers to above three thousand in all. He passed the Athenian lines unopposed, and joined the Syracusans; and to the astonishment of the besiegers, who were busied in a different part of the works, the combined forces appeared as offering battle. Gylippus halted while retreat was in his power, and sent a herald to the Athenians, to say, that if they would quit Sicily in five days he would make a truce for the purpose. The messenger was received with scorn, and went away unanswered. Gylippus observed that the Syracusans could not keep their order on difficult ground; but Nicias, not attempting to profit by this, let them retire at leisure. The next day Nicias continued inactive, while Gylippus took the fort where the Athenian magazines were chiefly deposited, and which commanded

the heights of Epipolæ, on the inland side of the town.

The Athenians, though still superior in the field, had lost all hope of taking the city, and were daily suffering by the swampy nature of their ground. Gylippus carried out a wall from Epipolæ, so as to intersect the lines of the besiegers and secure a communication with the country beyond. Twelve ships arrived from Corinth and its allies, and the Syracusans, strengthened both by land and sea, prepared to act offensively. Ministers were sent to Corinth and Lacedæmon: Gylippus went round the Sicilian cities to gather reinforcements, rouse the lukewarm, and win the neutral or adverse.

Nicias communicated to Athens his danger. His men were wasting by sickness, desertion, and the sword; his ships perishing for want of repairs, since all were continually needed to keep open the sea, by which alone he could get supplies. He declared it necessary to recall the army, or else to double its force; requested that he might be superseded, as disqualified by ill-health for command; and that former honourable services might excuse his present ill-success. The people would neither give up their plans of conquest nor accept the resignation of their general; and Demosthenes and Eurymedon were appointed to lead a powerful reinforcement.

The Lacedæmonians, attributing their previous ill-success to their own injustice in supporting the aggression of Thebes on Platæa, and in refusing the arbitration proposed by Athens, now considered that the Athenians had placed themselves in the wrong, by refusing in their turn a judicial settlement of the differences which had arisen since the truce. They therefore renewed the war in the nineteenth spring from its beginning. (B. C. 413.) trusting now that the gods would be on their side. They entered Attica and fortified Deceleia, a town not fifteen miles from Athens, and commanding its richest lands. The works proceeded without an attempt at opposition; yet the Athenians persisted in their plans of distant conquest, and Demosthenes sailed for Sicily, with most of their disposable force.

Meantime Gylippus and Hermocrates prevailed on the Syracusans, disregarding the skill and fame of their opponents, to make an effort for maritime superiority. A combined attack was planned by land and sea. By sea the Syracusans were defeated, though superior in the

number of ships; but while the Athenians were watching the battle, their forts on the headland closing in the harbour were attacked and taken, with most of their provisions and stores. Triremes were stationed under protection of the forts, and no Athenian convoy could now come in without fighting. But however successful in straitening the enemy, the Syracusan generals were anxious to strike a decisive blow before the reinforcement arrived. The port giving little scope for the manœuvring of the Athenians, enabled the Syracusans to meet them bow to bow, instead of suffering their transverse stroke. Gylippus strengthened the bows of his ships to give them the advantage in the shock. He gained first a slight advantage, next a victory, but before he could further pursue it, the force under Demosthenes arrived.

The natural indecision of Nicias, increased by ill-health and dislike of his command, had been a principal cause of failure. Demosthenes, desirous to avoid a similar error, resolved to act while his force was unimpaired; to make some attempt which might determine the probability of success; and either to pursue the war with vigour or abandon it without delay. He attacked the heights of Epipolæ, the possession of which would give the means of renewing the blockade; but failing, he proposed to withdraw while retreat was open. The safety of the army was more important than any conquest it could now achieve, and it was better to hazard the popular displeasure than to waste the best strength of the state when most wanted at home. But Nicias would not risk an unauthorised return, and he had secret grounds of hope arising from communication with Syracusan malcontents. The opportunity was lost, matters daily grew worse, sea-fights took place to the advantage of the Syracusans, in the last of which their naval superiority was completely established. To remain was now impossible, and the Athenians began their retreat, leaving their wounded to the mercy of the enemy. They were yet strong in regular foot, and able to overbear all direct opposition, but the march was long, and the enemy far superior in horse and light troops. Fatigue and want, and constant harassing, thinned their ranks and broke their spirit, and the mass of the army was either killed or reduced to surrender individually or in bodies.

Nicias had shown throughout the retreat a fortitude and energy strongly contrasted with the feebleness of his preceding conduct. Both he and Demosthenes were taken by the Syracusans, and both put to death by order of the people. The humbler captives were imprisoned in the stone quarries, where numbers miserably perished through want and hardships of every kind. The deliverance of Syracuse must be gratifying to all who rejoice in the failure of unprincipled ambition; but our sympathy with that people cannot but receive a check when we view the deliberate cruelty with which they abused their triumph.

The Athenians were long before they would believe the complete destruction of an armament containing all the flower of their citizens and the greatest part of their navy. When convinced, they vented their anger on the orators who had advised the expedition, as if themselves, who so readily voted it, were not equally to blame. Their situation seemed almost desperate. There was little money in the treasury, and few ships in the harbour; their enemies were superior by land and sea, and would probably be joined by the navy of the Sicilians, and further strengthened by extensive revolt among the allies of Athens. The remedial measures of the Athenians were, however, energetic and judicious. The spirit of the people still was high, and they were schooled by misfortune into compliance with their wiser counsellors. They set themselves vigorously to the building of ships and the raising of money; retrenched the expenses of feasts and shows, and took measures to secure the obedience of the allies, particularly of Eubœa, the most important. It was, nevertheless, the opinion prevalent in Greece, that the Athenian power could not outlast another summer. The allies of Lacedæmon were confidently looking to relief from a long and difficult war, and those of Athens mostly to deliverance from a hard subjection; while Lacedæmon itself, which had lately been warring against an enemy decidedly superior, now enjoyed the prospect of undisputed ascendancy in Greece.

SECT. III. The Persian kings, instead of aspiring as formerly to the conquest of Greece, now lived in fear and jealousy of the single state of Athens; so far superior are courage and intelligence to mere extent of territory and amount of subject

population. Many allies of Athens were contending which should first be enabled by Lacedæmon to revolt; and with their ministers came ambassadors from two great Persian officers, the powerful satraps of Lydia and of the Hellespont, each of whom solicited alliance, and urged the Lacedæmonians to make his government the scene of their earliest operations. It was determined to assist the intended revolt of Chios and Erythræ, according to the wish of the Lydian satrap Tissaphernes. The Chians had sixty ships of war, and forty were voted to support them; but while the sailing of the squadron was delayed by the wonted tardiness of Lacedæmon, the Athenians, suspecting its destination, sent to charge the Chians with their purpose. The design was that of the oligarchical party, and had not been communicated to the assembly nor to any favourer of democracy; the leaders, taken unprepared, denied the wish to revolt, and the requisition of seven ships to join the Athenian fleet was obeyed.

Summer came, and a Peloponnesian squadron sailed for Chios, but it was attacked, chased to the shore, and there blockaded by the Athenians. So much were the Lacedæmonians discouraged, that they actually meditated giving up the splendid prospects opening in Asia. Alcibiades, however, prevailed on them to send five ships to Chios, and to allow him to accompany them; and arriving before the news of the Athenian success, he persuaded the Chians to join the Peloponnesian league. The example soon was followed by Erythræ, Clazomenæ, and Miletus. An alliance was formed with Tissaphernes, on terms little honourable to Lacedæmon; for it was stated that all should belong to the king which had been possessed by his predecessors; which, strictly interpreted, would include all the Grecian cities of Asia, with the islands.

On hearing the revolt of their most powerful ally, the Athenians brought into use the thousand talents set aside in the beginning of the war as a reserve for extremity. Through the vigour of their own, and the feebleness of the Lacedæmonian administration, they were soon again advancing to maritime superiority. The Samian commonalty rose upon the nobles, who were probably arranging a plan of revolt; and banishing four hundred they reduced the rest to complete depression. The Athenians, now sure of the fidelity of Samos, voted

its independence, it having since the former rebellion been held under strict control. Lesbos revolted, but was soon reduced; Clazomenæ returned to obedience, and the Athenians, now masters of the sea laid siege to Chios, and reduced it in the course of the winter to great distress.

Alcibiades, far from wishing Lacedæmon completely triumphant, had principally sought to gain an influence over Tissaphernes, by which he might detach him from the Peloponnesians when he should see cause. About this time the adverse party, gaining the lead in Lacedæmon, refused to ratify the treaty made with Tissaphernes. Suspecting the insincerity of Alcibiades, and fearing his genius, they sent private orders to assassinate him, which he prevented by quitting the army. He now successfully laboured to put the satrap at variance with Lacedæmon, and dispose him to connection with Athens; and he secretly negotiated with some of the Athenian leaders at Samos, where the army had its head-quarters, for his own recall. The exertions of Athens had of late been prodigious, but in its exhausted state, they could not long hold out against an enemy supplied by the wealth of Persia; yet if those supplies could be transferred to Athens, it might still be victorious. Alcibiades well knew that if he should be restored there could be little esteem for his character, and that, when the immediate need of him was past, he might fall by the first breath of suspicion: he saw that his surest support would be a party who owed their superiority entirely to him, and he knew that the fate of the commonwealth was so completely in his hands, that he could attach to his services what condition he would. The price he set on them was the establishment of oligarchy. On this condition, coupled with the return of Alcibiades, it was declared in the army that the king would furnish money for the war; and such was the general sense of the public danger, that a majority decided to accept the terms.

Delegates were sent to Athens to propose the change; and the people, though unwillingly, were yet induced by their desperate situation to acquiesce. Peisander, the chief of the deputation, was sent with ten others to treat with Tissaphernes, and empowered to conclude whatever should seem best. Having organised a faction Peisander sailed, but his mission was frustrated by unexpect-

ed difficulties. The Satrap was unwilling quite to break with Lacedæmon; and Alcibiades fearing that his influence might appear to fail, desired to make the Athenians the refusers, by asking extravagant concessions to Persia. The negotiation was broken off, and Tissaphernes concluded a treaty with the Lacedæmonian admiral on terms more moderate than before. Oligarchies were set up by Athenian commissioners in several subject towns, and most of these in consequence revolted to Lacedæmon.

Peisander, returning to Athens, found the revolution much advanced. Many of its chief opposers had been murdered, no one dared to ask by whom; the popular party were dismayed and disunited, and mutually suspicious through repeated desertions. All opposition being silenced by the fear of assassination, the oligarchical leaders swayed the assembly to their will. But though certain to carry at the moment whatever it pleased them to propose, they felt that some degree of moderation was necessary to secure the continued obedience of the people, and particularly the acquiescence of the armament in Samos, which they could less intimidate or coerce. The scheme adopted was, that the sovereignty should be placed in an assembly of five thousand citizens, chosen for their property and bodily ability: but while this body was nominally supreme, the whole direction of the state was effectively vested in a council of four hundred, and it was only when summoned by them that the larger assembly was to meet. The people ratified the new constitution, and the existing authorities gave way to it without a struggle. The change was brought to pass with singular ability, and with a quietness and freedom from extensive bloodshed almost unparalleled among Grecian revolutions; but though not accompanied with battle or massacre, it was deeply stained with the baser practice of secret assassination. In the measures which led to it the chief actor was Peisander: but the contriving and directing mind was that of Antiphon, a man of the highest character both for capacity and virtue; who, both by his advice and by his talent for composition, had assisted many who had occasion to appear in the courts and in the assemblies; but had kept himself as far as possible aloof from both, through fear of the jealousy which often attended the reputation of ability, especially when the fortune,

habits, and temper of the possessor appeared to connect him with the favourers of aristocracy.

Peisander had left the oligarchical interest predominant among the Athenians at Samos, and approaching to superiority among the Samians. But the Athenian generals with most of the soldiers favoured democracy, and had only renounced it as the price of Persian aid, which seemed not likely to be given. The oligarchical Samians meditating an attack upon the Many, the latter craved the support of the generals, and of Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, two distinguished Athenians of the popular party. These canvassed the soldiers with so much effect, that nearly all declared for democracy, and agreed in the resolution not to suffer the Samian people to be oppressed. The attack was made, but the Samian Many being supported by the Athenians easily prevailed. The victory was used with uncommon moderation. About thirty of the conspirators were killed in the tumult, but not a man was put to death by way of punishment; only three were banished, and the rest were pardoned and admitted to live in perfect equality under the democracy.

A ship was sent to Athens with these tidings, which it was supposed would be well received there, for the Athenian revolution was yet unknown at Samos. On arriving, some of the crew were thrown into prison; while the commander escaping to Samos reported the change, and passionately exaggerated the violences of the new rulers. In the debates ensuing in the army, Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus took the lead. An oath was imposed on all that they would be faithful to democracy, zealous in the war, and perseveringly hostile to the Four Hundred. The Samians also took the oath, and were admitted to the Athenian councils, as men embarked in the same cause. The soldiers now assumed to their assemblies the authority of the general assembly of the people, considering the commonwealth as overthrown in the city, and only existing in the camp. Their first act of power was to supersede all suspected officers, appointing Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus to the chief command. Alike at war with the Peloponnesians and the Athenians of the city, they encouraged themselves with the considerations that they were the strength of the commonwealth, and the new rulers comparatively weak; that having the fleet, the subject states were theirs, with

the revenues thence arising; that Samos was no contemptible home; and that far from looking to Athens for subsistence, they had both larger resources than those in the city, and the command of the sea, which placed at their mercy the supplies of their opponents. They trusted to the goodness of their cause, which was the vindication of their ancient constitution; they hoped for Persian aid in bringing the war to a happy issue; and in the worst event, with the force which they possessed they could gain both lands and cities to inhabit.

The Peloponnesians, being disunited and ill commanded, did not move against the Athenians till their differences were settled. On approaching Samos they found all quiet and orderly, and withdrew, avoiding offered battle. It was necessary to find some means of supporting the expenses of the fleet, which were scantily supplied by Tissaphernes, always sparing of his treasure, and now uncertain which party to support. They listened therefore to Pharnabazus, the satrap of the Hellespont, who offered to maintain them if they would come to his province. But as they would not move with their whole force at the hazard of fighting the Athenians, a small squadron only arrived in the Hellespont, avoiding observation by a circuitous route. Meantime an assembly being held of the Athenians in Samos, Thrasybulus obtained the recall of Alcibiades, and went himself to invite him to the island. Alcibiades arriving, harangued the assembled army, lamenting his exile, and magnifying the benefit to be expected from his return; which he represented as certainly bringing with it the support of Tissaphernes. He was immediately chosen commander-in-chief. Hope and confidence rose so high that the soldiery were eager to sail to the Peiræus, and put down the Four Hundred. Alcibiades checked the rash design. The nearer enemy, he said, must not be left at liberty to seize unopposed on the richest possessions of the state; and it was necessary for himself, since he was chosen general, to communicate personally with the satrap on the necessary arrangements of the war. The assembly being dissolved he went immediately to Tissaphernes, anxious at once to impress upon the Athenians his close connexion with the satrap, and to confirm his influence over the latter by displaying his power among the Athenians; and thus he obtained from both what his views

required, by alarming alternately the Athenians with Tissaphernes, and Tissaphernes with the Athenians.

Ambassadors from the Four Hundred arriving at Samos, the popular fury rose so high that the multitude were again on the point of voting to go straight to Athens. The influence of Alcibiades again prevented a measure which would have been certain ruin to both parties, but which only he was capable of hindering. He framed a moderate answer to the ambassadors, encouraging those in the city to hold out against the common enemy; for while, he said, the city was safe, there was hope of accommodating the dissensions of the citizens; but were either party cut off, whether those in Athens or in Samos, there would soon be no commonwealth with which the enemy could treat.

Already divisions had arisen among the rulers at Athens. Peisander and the thorough-going oligarchists were bent on confining all real power to the Four Hundred; and rather than compromise with their countrymen at Samos, or admit into the government any leaven of democracy, they were ready to lay their country at the feet of Lacedæmon. They would make peace if possible as an independent state; but peace must be made on any terms: and they would rather, if it were necessary, govern Athens like so many other oligarchies as the lieutenants of Lacedæmon, than permit the return of their feared and hated opponents, and sink into private citizens under a government to which they could not but be objects of suspicion. But there was also a party headed by Theramenes, which upheld the authority of the Five Thousand, and opposed undue submission to Lacedæmon. This consisted of those whose real for oligarchy was less than their desire of union and national independence; of the friends to a mixed government; and of the democratical party, who, not as yet daring to avow themselves, threw their weight into the scale of those whose principles were least opposite to their own. The answer of Alcibiades breathed a spirit of compromise and mutual accommodation, which gave new hope to the moderate party; while Peisander's party, fearing more and more, pressed on the negotiation with Lacedæmon, and instructed their commissioners to lower their demands, and conclude the peace in haste on any tolerable terms. At the same time they built a fort which commanded

the entrance of the Peiræus. Its purpose, they said, was the defence of the harbour in case of attack by the fleet from Samos; but their adversaries maintained that its real object was to enable them to admit the fleet of the Peloponnesians. The approach of the latter so near as Ægina strengthened the suspicion, and the people rose in tumult to destroy the fort. Theramenes went as one of the generals apparently to suppress the tumult; but as soon as he had ascertained that he would be supported he assumed the direction of the insurgents. The cry was to uphold against the Four Hundred the government of the Five Thousand; and thus the punishment of treason, which would have been incurred by appealing in terms to the entire people, was avoided by calling on a body acknowledged as sovereign by the existing constitution.

Next day the armed people held an assembly, and marched into the city. The Four Hundred sent a committee to confer with them. They said that the Five Thousand, who had not yet been nominated, should be immediately declared; that the Four Hundred now in office should resign their authority in due time; that the Five Thousand should settle the manner of appointing their successors; and that on a stated day the people should meet to consider the means of a permanent reconciliation. On the appointed day the people were assembling, when news came that a Peloponnesian fleet was at Salamis. All ran to the harbour, and, without waiting for orders, each did what seemed to him to be required. Ships were launched and manned, and all prepared for defence; but the enemy passed by towards Eubœa. Fresh alarm arose; for the people being deprived of the produce of Attica by the garrison of Deceleia, the loss of Eubœa would leave them scarcely the means of subsistence. A squadron was sent to the protection of the island, but it was surprised and defeated; and Eubœa, which had before been inclined to revolt, immediately declared itself.

If the Peloponnesians had now sailed to Peiræus, they might have entered unopposed, and the city could only have been saved by the return of the fleet from Samos, whereby its foreign dominion must have been lost. But the opportunity being neglected, the Athenians had time to settle their internal government, and arrange their measures of defence. It was decreed that the council

of four hundred should be immediately dissolved, and the supreme authority vested in five thousand, who should be taken from those citizens now in Athens, who were enrolled for service among the heavy-armed troops. Thucydides declares that the constitution was established on a better footing than at any time within his memory, with a moderate and beneficial distribution of powers between the Many and the Few. Immediately on the change, most of the oligarchical leaders fled to Decelæia. A vote was passed for the recall of Alcibiades, and information of the late transactions was sent to the armament at Samos, with an exhortation vigorously to continue the war.

The Lacedæmonians had now begun a course of operations in concert with Pharnabazus, who furnished their force with a liberality, and supported them with a decision, which present a strong contrast to the cunning, timid, and avaricious conduct of Tissaphernes. But the Athenians, under the able conduct of Alcibiades, vigorously seconded by Thrasylbulus and Thrasyllus, were entering on a course of victories,* which continued till they had completely destroyed the hostile fleet, recovered much of their lost dominion, and without intrigue or solicitation, by the mere force of their successes, induced Pharnabazus to make peace, and stopped those inexhaustible supplies on which the enemy had depended. Having done all this, in the twenty-fourth year of the war, and the sixth from his banishment, Alcibiades determined to revisit his country; and as winter was approaching, he proposed to gratify the greater part of his forces with the opportunity of seeing their friends, and attending to their domestic concerns. He returned, and was received with the greatest favour, being immediately appointed commander-in-chief with greater powers than had ever been intrusted to any such officer. He had soon an opportunity both of gratifying the people, and increasing his reputation in Greece. Since the garrisoning of Decelæia, the Athenians had never ventured to conduct by land the customary procession to Eleusis in honour of Ceres. Alcibiades, with the forces from Asia, added to

the former strength of the city, now undertook to protect them in the full performance of every rite; and the train went and returned escorted by the army, without an attempt at disturbance.

No nation is recorded to have long preserved an efficient control over large and distant provinces, unless by a decided superiority in character, institutions, and civilization. Such, at least in a political and military view, was the case with the Romans; and such is yet more strikingly the case with the English government in India: for as the extent of the empire is here yet more disproportionate to the foreign controlling force; so the disadvantage is balanced by a more universal superiority, not more in the arts of peace and war, than in the tone of public morals; and, in spite of many errors and many crimes, in the general honesty of intention toward the governed, which, to the Romans, as to former Indian governments, was a principle unknown. In the numerous empires which have risen and fallen in Asia, the ruling race has seldom been of a character to attach its subjects by beneficence, or to awe them by pre-eminent courage and skill. They have generally been created by an able leader rising in a warlike tribe. They have rapidly increased; for among nations that saw in the sovereignty not a trust for the good of the people, but a prize for the boldest ruffian or the craftiest betrayer, there could be neither public spirit nor determined attachment to ancient institutions, to stand up against the thirst of conquest and plunder, in a successful army, under a popular commander. But as empire was acquired by force, so by force only it could be preserved. When the first career of victory was over, and the influence of personal character by the founder of a dynasty was gone, his feeble successors gradually lost all hold on the obedience of their officers; while the soldiery in the provinces became devoted to their immediate commander, and careless of the distant head of the empire. Accordingly, in the Persian monarchy, since the time of Xerxes, the provincial governors had gradually assumed a considerable degree of independence. They paid tribute indeed to the king, and owned a nominal allegiance; but they made separate treaties with foreign states, as we have seen in the cases of Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes; sometimes they made war on each other, each professing to remain

* In one of these battles the Spartan commander, Mindarus, was slain, and nearly every ship of his squadron taken. The dispatch, in which these tidings were announced to the Lacedæmonian government, has been preserved entire by Xenophon. It runs thus: "The luck is gone; Mindarus is dead; the men hunger; we know not what to do."

in obedience to the sovereign ; and occasionally, when visited with the royal displeasure, a refractory satrap would retain his government by arms.

Darius, the present king, appears to have felt that his empire was weakened by its unwieldy extent, and to have contemplated detaching from it the provinces bordering on the Grecian seas, to form a separate kingdom for Cyrus, his younger son, a youth of spirit and ability. The prince was sent into those provinces as his father's lieutenant, and both Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes were subjected to his command. Lysander, who had recently been appointed the Spartan admiral, on hearing that Cyrus was arrived in Sardis, where his court was to be held, immediately hastened thither. Unlike his countrymen in general, Lysander was a supple courtier and a dexterous politician. The prince's favour had already been won by an embassy from Lacedæmon, and it was raised to the highest pitch by the insinuating manners of the Spartan commander. He now joined unreservedly in the war, and supplied full pay to all the sailors of the Peloponnesian fleet.

This turn of things lowered the credit of Alcibiades, whose restoration had chiefly been procured by the promise of Persian assistance. His fleet was still the stronger, but with his limited resources and the inexhaustible supplies at the command of Lysander, it could not long continue so without decisive action. Accordingly, he led his fleet to a station in view of the enemy. But during a short absence of the general, by the folly of one of his lieutenants, a battle was provoked against orders, and lost. The defeat in itself was little important, but the news set all Athens in a flame. The enemies of Alcibiades took advantage of the popular rage—he was accused of haughtiness, negligence, and indifference to the welfare of the people ; and the only man who seemed capable of extricating the commonwealth from its dangers was dismissed from his command, without inquiry or defence. The popular fury once excited, spent itself in vague charges of disaffection, and many who had supported the Four Hundred were variously punished with death, confiscation of goods, or disfranchisement. Alcibiades did not venture to return to give an account, according to custom, of his conduct in office, but retired to a lordship he possessed in the Thracian Chersonese.

The history of Alcibiades is a striking instance how little true merit can be measured by temporary popularity. When he had wilfully inflicted on his country deeper wounds than had been given by the ablest servants of its enemy, he was recalled, received with unexampled joy and favour, and appointed to a station of unusual power and splendour. When by able and faithful service he had nearly retrieved the injuries he had done, he was for a trifling error, and that not his own, ignominiously displaced and driven into banishment. Yet let not his life afford a lesson of encouragement to unprincipled politicians. Though popular opinion in a free state be often ill-judging in a moment of excitement, it commonly settles into justice as the passion cools and the ferment subsides. Pericles was fined and Cimon banished ; but both these great men ended their days the most beloved and trusted favourites of the people. The present charges against Alcibiades were trivial and unjust ; but his previous character gave them weight, and deprived him of the confidence to challenge inquiry, and trust to the calmer judgment of his countrymen. It is frequently a part of the punishment of guilt to be shut out from the opportunity of atonement. The glory of saving his country was too great for the man who had so profligately brought it near destruction ; but in the circumstances his condemnation was unjust as well as ruinous ; and it should seem as if the injustice and folly of the Athenians had been made at once the instrument to punish the treasons of Alcibiades, and the cause of not unmerited ruin to themselves.

In place of Alcibiades, ten generals were appointed, of whom the first was Conon, a man of great ability. Lysander was soon after superseded by Callicratidas, according to the custom of Lacedæmon, which suffered no man to be admiral for more than a year. The new commander was a man of decision, plain good sense, and honesty, and a rigid disciple of Lycurgus. He first collected reinforcements, which made his fleet decidedly superior. But finding that the friends of Lysander were caballing against him, and exciting discontent at so frequent changes of command, he called together the Lacedæmonians of the armament and spoke thus. " I could be well content to stay at home, and if Lysander or any other pretends to be a better seaman, he may

be so for me. Being, however, appointed admiral, I must do my best in that capacity. Will you support me, or shall I sail home, to tell how things stand here?" The cabal was silenced. Callicratidas then went to the court of Cyrus to ask a supply; but he was not a courtier, and it did not occur to him to smooth his way by compliments, or to guard against any ill offices which might have been done him by Lysander. He was coldly received, and put off from day to day; till, disgusted at his treatment and at all he saw, he departed, exclaiming that the Greeks were most wretched who would so truckle to barbarians for money, and that if he returned he would do his utmost to end the necessity of doing so, by reconciling Athens and Lacedæmon. He obtained a loan from the Milesians and Chians, and sailing to Lesbos, took Methymne by assault. All goods were given up to pillage, but the slaves were collected and sold. Callicratidas was urged by the allies to sell the Methymnean citizens also, but he declared that, under his command, no Greek should be made a slave. We have here a noble example of the power with which, in moral questions, a sincere, upright, and benevolent nature, can enlighten the judgment and clear it from the prejudices of an illiberal education. Callicratidas was a plain straightforward man, of moderate capacity, and not likely to seek for maxims of policy more refined than those of his country; he was a zealous and even bigoted adherent of the institutions in which he had been born and bred, which, beyond all others, produced in men contempt of human suffering, and indifference to the welfare of all communities but their own. Yet his heart was right, and he was led by native integrity to avow and act on a principle of generous humanity, which, though fitted to benefit all Greece by diminishing the miseries of war, was never proclaimed before or after by the most enlightened and liberal of Grecian statesmen.

Callicratidas obtained an opportunity of attacking Conon with superior force, defeated him, and having taken thirty triremes, besieged the rest in Mitylene. The Athenians, on hearing Conon's danger, manned a powerful fleet, on which all embarked who were bound to naval service, and many even of the cavalry, who were generally exempt. This was not enough, and the deficiency was made up with slaves, who were rewarded with

their freedom. Eight of the ten generals were on board. The hostile armaments engaged near Arginusæ, a knot of small islands between Lesbos and the mainland. The Athenians were so far superior in force that Callicratidas was advised to decline an action: he answered that his death would be a small loss to Sparta, but that flight would be disgraceful. The reply was spirited, but singularly injudicious, since he hazarded not his life alone but the fleet which he commanded, and perhaps the issue of the war. Yet the superstitious rigour of his obedience to the precepts of Lycurgus, sets in a stronger light the virtue which could lead a mind so little distinguishing to depart from the habits of his country where they were ungenerous and inhuman. The battle was long, but it ended in the complete defeat of the Peloponnesians. Callicratidas perished and seventy ships were taken.

The generals proceeded to the relief of Conon, leaving a squadron under Theramenes and Thrasybulus, who were then, captains of triremes, to collect the dead and save the men who were floating on the wrecks. This was prevented by a storm, and the crews of twelve Athenian ships, that had been wrecked in the battle, perished. Six of the generals returned to Athens, leaving the other two with Conon at Samos. On arriving, they were imprisoned by the council of five hundred, and being brought before the general assembly, they found themselves accused by Theramenes, of having neglected those wrecked in the battle. Their death was evidently predetermined by a powerful faction, for they were not allowed to conduct their defence in the usual form, but each was permitted only to make a short speech. They had left the care of the wrecked, they said, to Theramenes and Thrasybulus, men confessedly sufficient for the charge. If the duty had been neglected, those who now accused them were to blame; but the fact was that the weather had made it impossible, and this they brought many witnesses to prove. It was plain that if the question were now put, the generals would be acquitted; but the accusers having on their side the presidents and the majority of the council, the former declared that there was not light to judge of the show of hands: the decision was referred to the next assembly, and it was resolved that the council should determine the manner of judgment. Meantime persons were procured to

show themselves in deep mourning, as for relations lost after the battle; and a man was suborned to state to the assembly that he had saved himself on a flour barrel, and had been conjured, by his drowning comrades to tell the Athenians how the generals had abandoned those who had deserved so well of their country. The council resolved that the people should decide by ballot, whether or not the generals were criminal in suffering those to perish who had conquered in the battle. This mode of proceeding was as illegal as unfair; and on this ground it was opposed by Eurypolemus, who threatened to impeach Callixenus, the author of the resolution. But the multitude cried out, that it was intolerable if the people were not allowed to do its pleasure; and one of Theramenes's faction was emboldened to declare, that whoever should presume to check the assembly, he would move that his fate should be decided by the same ballot with that of the generals. Eurypolemus was obliged to retract his threat; but the prytanes refused to put the question on the illegal decree. Callixenus accused them of contumacy, and the multitude indignantly called for those who resisted the orders of the people. One yet stood firm, and this was Socrates the philosopher, who persisted that he would not act otherwise than according to law: the other prytanes consented to propose the resolution of the council. Eurypolemus, compelled to withdraw his opposition to the decree, as one which could not regularly be even taken into consideration, still resisted it as unjust and inexpedient, and proposed to try the generals separately, according to established law. The question was put, and the motion of Eurypolemus declared to be carried; but the show of hands being repeated at the demand of one of the faction, was now declared to be for that of Callixenus. The people proceeded to ballot, according to the decree; the eight generals were condemned by one vote, and the six present executed. Such was the gratitude and justice of Athens to those who had won for it the greatest victory obtained in the war.

The measure of this people's iniquity now was full, and the victory of Arginuse, which ought to have saved the commonwealth, proved the prelude to its ruin. The government did not recover its steadiness after the late violent overbearing of law and justice. The people, repenting their fury, bound five of the instigators to answer for their conduct.

These escaped before trial, and Callixenus, who was one of them, made his peace in an after revolution; but he lived, hated and avoided, and perished by hunger in a time of scarcity. The banished were recalled, the disfranchised restored to their political rights, and oaths of concord taken by the people; but nothing could bring back union or energy. Yet a powerful fleet was intrusted to Conon, and five others; while Lysander again commanded for Lacedæmon, and by his able, active, and conciliatory conduct, retrieved her affairs.

At length the hostile fleets were watching each other,—the Peloponnesians in the harbour of Lampsacus, on the Asiatic side of the Hellespont, a defensible station, with a market close at hand; the Athenians, on the open beach of Egospotami, precisely opposite, the nearest market being that of Sestos, two miles off. It is pleasing to find in a character, which we have frequently had reason strongly to condemn, one instance of distinguished patriotism at a time when he had recently been ill treated by his country. Alcibiades was living at his castle in the Chersonese, and saw the disadvantageous position of his countrymen. He went to the generals, and suggested the expediency of removing their forces to Sestos, where they would, equally with the enemy, have the advantage of a town and harbour, and would be able to choose when to fight. The admonition was treated by some of the generals with unmannerly disdain, but its wisdom was soon made manifest. For four days the Athenians had offered battle daily, which Lysander declined; and afterwards the sailors had wandered to Sestos, and about the country, to seek provisions. Every day's inaction on the part of Lysander increased their confidence, and consequent disorder. But on the fifth day Lysander, waiting till the Athenians were dispersed according to their custom, suddenly pushed his fleet across the bay, and surprised their ships before the seamen could be collected. Nine vessels, all belonging to the division of Conon, had their complete crews aboard, and these escaped; but all the rest were taken, in number one hundred and seventy. Conon sent one ship to Athens, to carry the news of the defeat; and thinking that the war was now desperate carried the rest to Salamis in Cyprus.

The greater part of the Athenians, with five of the generals, were made

prisoners, and Lysander assembled the allies to deliberate what was to be done with them. The Athenians were accused of many flagrant violations of the laws of war. Among other charges it was said that they had determined, should they win the battle, to cut off the right hands of all their prisoners; and Philocles, one of the generals, was particularly accused of having thrown down a precipice the ~~entire~~ crews of two captured triremes. It was voted that all the Athenian prisoners should be put to death, excepting Adeimantus, one of the generals, who it was said had opposed the inhuman decree respecting the prisoners. Lysander, asking Philocles what he deserved, who had been first to violate the laws of Grecian warfare, began the execution by killing him with his own hand; and all the Athenian citizens were put to death, to the number of three thousand. The retaliation of cruelty for cruelty is a measure of very pernicious example, and to be justified, if ever, only by the most pressing necessity of self-defence. That plea would in the present case be absurd. The intention imputed to the Athenians, with their former conduct on many occasions, was a fit object of abhorrence, not of imitation; but to justify their massacre on the ground that they had set the first example of lawless cruelty to Greece, required surely more than ordinary effrontery in the officer of a power, which in the beginning of this very war, while yet unprovoked by any barbarities of the enemy, had continued for many years habitual military execution, not on enemies taken in arms, but on peaceful merchants and unoffending neutrals.

The navy of Athens being totally destroyed, Lysander could take possession, unopposed, of its dependencies. From each he allowed the Athenian garrisons to depart to Athens, but thither only. He knew that against the uncommon strength of that city famine only could avail, and therefore the more numerous the persons in it, the surer and speedier would be its reduction. He soon blockaded Athens with his fleet, while by land it was besieged by both the kings of Lacedæmon, with the whole strength of the Peloponnesian allies.

The news of the defeat at Ægospotami carried dismay to Athens. The people remembered the fate of the miserable Scironians, the Æginetans, and

many others; but, above all, of the Melians, the colonists of Lacedæmon, whom they had slaughtered without a shadow of just provocation in the mere wantonness of power. Expecting such mercy as they had shown, they prepared to endure to the utmost, blocked up all the ports but one, and made all ready for defence. No assault was made, but famine soon began to be felt, and many died of hunger before capitulation was proposed. To the necessary evils of defeat and blockade, there were added those of internal dissension. The government had been long unhinged by factious struggles, which were now embittered by the irritation of suffering, and the sullenness of pride contending with despair. Long resistance was impossible; concession only could save the city, and it was doubtful whether the most abject concessions would be accepted—yet, the Athenians, doggedly refusing to acknowledge what they inwardly felt to be true, passed votes of punishment on any who should propose such sacrifices. The popular favourite of the day was Cleophon, a warm opposer of all concession; and his power being commensurate to the violence of the passions by which he was supported, he was enabled to surpass all former demagogues in insolence and arbitrary conduct; till, in a subsequent fluctuation of the popular mind, he was accused, and put to death. At length ambassadors were sent with the offer, that the Athenians would be subordinate allies of Lacedæmon, retaining the Peiræus, and all the fortifications. On the border of Laconia the ambassadors were met by a message from the Ephori, informing them that the terms they brought were known at Lacedæmon, and that, if they wished for peace, they must come better instructed. This repulse raised the consternation to the highest pitch, the Many now expecting nothing less than to be sold into slavery. The ferment was increased by the not unreasonable suspicion that the oligarchical party would willingly make terms for their own exclusive advantage. It was understood that a principal demand of Lacedæmon would be, the demolishing ten furlongs of the long walls. This was a tender point with the Athenians, and a vote was passed forbidding even the proposal of such a concession. In this state of hopeless and aimless agitation, Theramenes de-

clared that, if he were sent to Lysander, he would ascertain whether the purpose of the Lacedæmonians, in requiring the demolition of the walls, was to make slaves of the people, or merely to insure their political subjection as a subordinate state. Being sent to Lysander, he abode with him more than three months, awaiting the time when the increasing pressure of famine might have so far broken the spirit of the Athenians, as to induce them to entrust the business unreservedly to him. At length returning, he said, that Lysander had hitherto detained him, and now referred him to Lacedæmon; and the assembly was persuaded to send him with nine others to Lacedæmon, fully empowered to act according to their discretion.

The Lacedæmonians, hearing that the ambassadors now came with unrestricted powers, held a congress of the allies, to determine the fate of Athens. The Corinthian and Theban deputies vehemently urged its total destruction; but the Lacedæmonians adopted a wiser as well as more generous policy. Peace was made on the conditions that the long walls and the walls of the Peiræus should be demolished; all ships of war, but twelve, given up; the exiles restored; and that the Athenians should follow, by land and sea, wherever the Lacedæmonians might lead. Thus depressed and oligarchically governed, Athens, it was thought, might be a valuable dependency of Lacedæmon, and perhaps an useful counterpoise to the ambition of Thebes or Argos. The terms were unwillingly but unavoidably accepted by the Athenians; Lysander entered the harbour; the exiles returned, and the demolition of the walls was begun to the sound of festive music: for that day, says the Athenian historian, Xenophon, was thought the beginning of freedom to Greece. We shall find that the general opinion was erroneous, and that the weaker states gained little by the change of masters. The war had lasted nearly twenty-seven years. (From B. C. 431 to B. C. 403.)

Alcibiades was not among the exiles restored. He remained on his Thracian lordship, an object of jealousy both to Lacedæmon and to the new government of Athens. To escape the persecution of Lacedæmon, he went into Asia. When residing there, his house was attacked by a tumultuous assemblage of people, at whose instigation is

uncertain. The house was set on fire. Alcibiades sallied with his servants, and none dared to meet him hand to hand; but he was overwhelmed from a distance with darts and arrows, and thus slain, before he had reached his fortieth year.

CHAPTER VII.

Of Greece, from the termination of the Peloponnesian War, to the peace which followed the battle of Mantinea: and of its Colonies in Sicily, from the destruction of the invading Athenian army, to the death of Timoleon.

SECT. I.—Before the Peloponnesian army quitted Athens, the chief power was vested in thirty persons nominally elected by the people, though at this moment there could be little freedom of choice. The pretended object of their appointment was to reform the laws and remodel the government on its ancient principles: but the new constitution being still kept back, while they disposed of the existing magistracies according to their pleasure, it grew manifest that they aimed at perpetuating their own dominion. At first their acts were popular, and continued so while confined to the prosecution of those who had been malicious informers under the democracy. For their further projects foreign support was needed: communicating, therefore, with Lysander, they obtained through him a Lacedæmonian guard. The pretext for sending it was to protect them in clearing the city of disreputable persons, and in settling the state; but when strengthened by it, the thirty proceeded without scruple to the arrest of every citizen of credit who seemed likely to oppose their usurpations.

The most eminent of the Thirty were Critias and Theramenes. Critias had great abilities, high rank, and ample fortune, with a haughty and violent temper, embittered by a banishment inflicted on him by the people. He now proposed to secure to the Thirty, and to himself as their chief, the despotic rule of Athens under Lacedæmonian protection. By extensive executions he thought at once to gratify his revenge, and remove all suspected opponents; and diminishing the number of citizens signified little, for all necessary labours might be done by slaves, and foreign attack was prevented by the power of Lacedæmon.

daemon. The views of Theramenes were very different. That bold and dexterous intriguer, though selfish, trimming, and unscrupulous, was not tyrannical like Critias. He was naturally mild and moderate, a lover of popularity, and averse from needless bloodshed; though in the prosecution of the generals, after the battle of Arginusæ, he had shown that no crime would stop him in the pursuit of his ends. He had successively assisted in raising and overthrowing every party which had lately risen in Athens; and from his frequent change of sides he was popularly known by a name denoting a sort of shoe, that might be drawn on either foot indifferently. The most remarkable features of his character were the acuteness with which he judged when the predominant faction was about to fall, and the decision with which he changed his side, before to common eyes the change seemed prudent. The measures which alarmed him as impolitic had commonly disgusted him by their violence, and enabled him to justify on public grounds his abandonment of the falling party; and this, with his boldness in taking his part while it seemed yet hazardous, had preserved to him in all his turnings some degree of popular esteem.

He now vainly remonstrated with his colleagues. Without a party, he said, no oligarchy could stand; and by these proceedings all parties were offended and alarmed. But Critias, having secured most of the Thirty in his interest, was eager to rid himself of his only rival in ability and influence; of a man whose views were inconsistent with his own, and who, finding himself powerless among the Thirty, would probably be ready, able, and bold to work their overthrow. The danger most feared was a rallying of the people round Theramenes, such as had already taken place against the Four Hundred. To obviate this, a catalogue was formed of three thousand citizens, to whom only the sovereign power in assembly, with exclusive eligibility to magistracies, was given. All other citizens were to be under the absolute dominion, not of the Three Thousand only, but of the Thirty. A review of arms was ordered, of the Three Thousand in the market-place, of the other citizens in smaller divisions in different places of the city. The Thirty then sending their own confidential adherents, supported by the Lacedæmonian troops, disarmed in

detail all the citizens except those of the Three Thousand; and the arms being carried to the temple of Minerva, in the Acropolis, were placed in the keeping of the Lacedæmonian garrison.

Having thus prevented all effectual opposition, the Thirty did their pleasure. Many were put to death through personal enmity, and many for their wealth; and it was actually voted that each of the Thirty should select one man, according to his pleasure, from the foreign sojourners in Athens; and that all, so chosen, should be put to death, and their property carried into the treasury. With the produce of confiscation they furnished pay for the Lacedæmonian troops, and rewards for the most forward of their own adherents; but as means were wanting to attach by favours a number sufficient to support them against the just hatred of the rest, they adopted the abominable expedient of compelling men to execute their most tyrannical orders, that, being involved in the same guilt, and liable to the same resentment, they might support the present government as their only chance of protection. Among those on whom this policy was practised, Socrates is a solitary instance of determined resistance. He was commanded with four others to apprehend and bring to Athens Leon of Salamis, a man whose life had been blameless, but whose wealth was a tempting prey. This order Socrates disobeyed as illegal; the other four performed it, and Leon was executed. The life of the philosopher was saved by his poverty, and by the speedy downfall of the tyrants whom he had offended. We have already seen the conduct of Socrates at the impeachment of the six generals; and it is remarkable that the only occasions, on which his name appears in the political history of Athens, should both be instances of bold resistance to the injustice of powers which none other dared withstand; both proofs that his actions were governed by the favourite principle of his ethics, that no outward violence could make the virtuous man either criminal or unhappy.

Thus far the council had been readily subservient to the Thirty, but the next attempt was harder. Theramenes had grown more decided in opposition to his colleagues as their tyranny grew more violent: his destruction was resolved on, but the council was not yet prepared to concur in it. Persuasion was used with some of the members, menace with

others. Matters were arranged with those whom the tyrants most trusted—the council was summoned—young men with hidden daggers surrounded the hall—the Thirty attended, and Theramenes among them, when Critias rose and accused him of treason against the existing government. Theramenes defended himself with readiness, eloquence, and skill, and so showed the expediency of the measures he had recommended, and the iniquity and danger of those pursued by Critias, that he disposed a majority of the council in his favour. But Critias knew that now either he or Theramenes must fall, and after short conference with the Thirty, he went out and directed his armed attendants to show themselves. Then returning, he addressed the council thus:—"I hold it my duty as president of the Thirty to prevent my associates in the government from being misled. These men before you, say, that they will not endure the acquittal of one who is known to be undermining the oligarchy. In the new constitution it is enacted, that the Three Thousand of the catalogue shall be liable to death only by the judgment of the council; but all others by that of the Thirty. I then, with your unanimous approval, strike out this man from the catalogue, and we, the Thirty, condemn him to death." Theramenes sprang to the altar, and thence appealed to the sacredness of the place, as well as to the protection of the laws, reminding the councillors that if they did not protect him their names might be erased from the catalogue with as little ceremony as his own. He was, however, dragged from the altar to prison, and compelled to drink the fatal cup of hemlock, the common punishment for state criminals at Athens. His courage did not fail. He calmly drank the poison, and, dashing the remainder on the floor, as was the custom of revellers, "Be this," he said, "for Critias!"

The Thirty now tyrannised without restraint. Lands and country-houses were seized for themselves and their adherents, and the owners executed. All citizens not of the catalogue were commanded to quit Athens, and most took refuge in Peiræus; but as many continued to be taken thence and executed, they fled, chiefly to Megara and Thebes. Thrasybulus, who was then residing in Bœotia, was encouraged by the multitude of exiles to strike a blow against the despots. It was mid-winter, about

six months after their establishment, when, with seventy companions, he occupied Phylæ, a border-fortress of Attica. The Thirty led their forces against the place, and assaulted it without success; and when they thought of blockading it, a heavy fall of snow obliged them to retreat. To prevent, however, the plundering of their lands, they sent the greater part of the Lacedæmonian auxiliaries with a body of their own horse to a station near the place; but Thrasybulus having now collected seven hundred heavy-armed soldiers, surprised their camp, and defeated them.

The tyrants now resolved to secure a refuge in Eleusis, in case they should be driven from Athens. The cavalry, being composed of the wealthiest families, was generally favourable to oligarchy, and the Thirty had laboured to attach it to them by favours, and considered it as the trustiest part of their force. They went with it to Eleusis, and arresting all the townsmen who were suspected of disaffection, brought them to Athens. The citizens of the catalogue, both horse and foot, were assembled to pass sentence on the prisoners, and the Lacedæmonian troops were present in arms to discourage opposition. Critias then addressed the assembly thus:—"The government which we are establishing is formed for you no less than for ourselves. It is fit that as you share its advantages you should also share its dangers. You must, therefore, condemn the arrested Eleusinians, that your fears and hopes may be the same with ours." The votes were secretly given, not openly as was usual in Athenian criminal proceedings, and three hundred prisoners were condemned at once.

Not long after, Thrasybulus, with about one thousand heavy-armed troops, entered Peiræus unopposed, by night. In the morning the Thirty attacked them with very superior numbers, but were, nevertheless, defeated, and Critias slain. A truce was obtained according to custom, by the defeated, for the burial of the dead, and while it continued many from both sides assembled in conversation. The party of Thrasybulus professed all willingness to be reconciled to the Three Thousand, and imputed the evils suffered to the Thirty only, "who, for their private interests, had destroyed as many Athenians in eight months, as the Peloponnesians in ten years, and had forced on this most hateful and

unholy civil war." It was manifest that the Athenians from the city were impressed by what they heard, and their leaders anxiously hurried them away. Next day the Thirty met to deliberate what was to be done, while the Three Thousand were in altercation in various parts of the town. Those who had been forward in the late violence urged resistance to the utmost; while others, who thought they had not sinned beyond forgiveness, wished for accommodation. In the end the tyrants were deposed, and a committee of ten appointed to negotiate peace with the party in Peiræus. Two of the Thirty were placed in the committee, the rest retired to Eleusis. But the Ten, instead of treating with Thrasybulus, endeavoured to secure to themselves the power from which the Thirty had fallen. Many of the Three Thousand were on their side, and nearly all the cavalry, and they looked for aid to Lacedæmon. Meantime the late exiles becoming superior, as well in number as in zeal and union, commanded the country, and prepared to blockade the city.

Lysander now being appointed to command for Lacedæmon in Attica, made ready to besiege Peiræus. No prudence or bravery in Thrasybulus and his followers could withstand the power of Lacedæmon; but the state of parties in that city gave them hope. Many, among whom was Pausanias, one of the kings, were jealous of Lysander, and, above all, of the commanding influence which he seemed likely to gain in Attica. The assembly was persuaded to decree that the business of Athens required the presence of a complete Lacedæmonian army; and such an army being sent thither under Pausanias, the appointment of Lysander sunk into a subordinate command. One smart but indecisive skirmish took place, but the real purpose of the Spartan king was to settle matters by negotiation, not by battle. A treaty was arranged, by which all Athenians, the Thirty excepted, and some few others of the most guilty, were restored to their rights, under an oath of universal amnesty. Eleusis was given as a residence to the excepted, and to all who might fear to live in Athens. Pausanias then led away the Peloponnesians; and Thrasybulus, with his followers, marched in procession into the city, and offered a thanksgiving sacrifice to Minerva. A general assembly then was held, in which, by the advice of Thrasybulus, the old

constitution was entirely re-established. The people soon, after, being alarmed with the news that those in Eleusis were hiring mercenary troops, marched out against them with their whole force. The leaders in Eleusis were murdered in a conference; a great crime, but the only one which disgraced the restoration of liberty to Athens. Peace and amnesty were offered and accepted; the refugees returned; the people kept their oaths, and the government was carried on with concord. Thus the Athenian commonwealth was completely restored; and Attica reunited.

The vices have already been remarked which were produced in the Athenian people, by so large a portion of them living as pensioners on the state. This evil was necessarily increased by the recent series of revolutions, which had completely interrupted the course of peaceful labour, made many poor who had formerly been rich, and many idle who had been industrious. At the same time the poorer citizens had been increased in number by the admission of slaves and foreigners, in reward for services against the Lacedæmonians, and against the Thirty. The number of pensioners being, therefore, increased, while the foreign sources of revenue were cut off, the extortions, which had formerly been practised on the subject-states, were now directed against wealthy men at home. It is probable, however, that the total amount of wealth thus levied was not immoderate; for, with the foreign command, the expenses of fleets and armies had passed away, and it was far less easy to bear hard on those who were present and possessed of extensive influence, than to plunder the defenceless tributaries. But cases occurred of great individual hardship; and there is reason to fear that the public indigence sometimes appeared in a shape peculiarly odious, and that the judges might be biassed against a state defendant, by the magnitude of the confiscation. Other evils arose: so many violent revolutions had necessarily created numerous personal enmities, and confirmed a tendency, always too strong in the Athenians, to suspect in the most trivial occurrences a plot against the government. But none of these evils can fairly be traced to the conduct of Thrasybulus and his followers, which was singularly prudent and moderate. They were the natural result of the previous history of Athens, of the wars it had waged, the dominion it had

bold, and the revolutions it had undergone; and, though in some degree they may justly be regarded as a testimony against its unbalanced democracy, it is probable that no other government known to Greece would have stood so fearful a trial without yet greater mischiefs.

About three years after the restoration of democracy, Athens was disgraced by the condemnation of the most excellent man she ever produced, the philosopher Socrates. But before relating his death, we will look to the state of moral science before his time, and the revolution he worked in it. The early Grecian philosophers fall into two great classes, the physical speculators, and the ethical and theological. Of the former the most eminent was Democritus, the author of the atomic philosophy; which considers the world to be made up of atoms, or indivisible particles of matter similar to each other, and all natural appearances to be results of their different positions and motions. In explaining sensible phenomena, Democritus shewed perhaps more knowledge and acuteness than any other Greek: but not content with this, he pushed his atoms into subjects where they had no place; represented thought and sensation as modifications of matter and motion; declared that there was no God nor spiritual being; and that the order and harmony of the world were produced by blind chance, amidst the infinite combinations of moving atoms. He had many followers, as well in his atheism and materialism, as in his physical principles. For a specimen of the ethical and theological philosophers we may take Pythagoras, a Samian, but the founder of a sect very prevalent in Grecian Italy. His morality and religion were purer than those current in Greece. He had travelled into Egypt, and brought apparently from thence some remnants of primitive tradition; but he had also brought a fondness for the arts of Egyptian priestcraft. He aimed at enlightening, not the many, but a privileged few; who, by superior intelligence, becoming rulers in their several cities, were to govern them with humanity and justice. Accordingly admission into his sect was made difficult, and his doctrines were veiled with a mystical language, calculated to foster a blind reverence in the disciples towards their master, and, in the vulgar, towards the disciples. Some practical conclusions were published to all; but the principles were accessible

only to the most instructed. Here, then, we have two principal classes of philosophers,—those busied in physical speculations, which were often tainted with atheism and materialism; and those who chiefly studied morals and theology, in many instances not unsuccessfully, but always studiously veiling their researches from the many. After these arose the sceptics (doubters) and sophists—the last, a name not marking any particular doctrines, but describing a class of men whose profession was to cultivate the talents of youth. It will readily be supposed that with common minds the object of such cultivation was not the highest absolute moral and intellectual excellence, but the best training for the pursuit of wealth and power. In Grecian communities eloquence was the talent most available to the aspiring; and, accordingly, it was what the sophists chiefly undertook to teach. They professed to possess and impart the power of recommending successfully any side of any question: from habitual indifference to truth in discourse, the passage to mental doubt was easy; and most of the sophists became sceptics in philosophy. Of this Protagoras was an example, perhaps the most eminent among them, who held that knowledge was no more than sense or opinion; that to every man what he felt or believed was true; and what he disbelieved, false; that there was no absolute truth, but the same thing might be true to one man, and false to another. Scepticism naturally leads to looseness of morals; for no man who doubts the existence of certain principles, will sacrifice his present inclinations to the supposition of their truth. Accordingly, the practical precepts of most of the sophists were highly favourable to the corrupt propensities of their pupils. As opinion was the measure of truth, so inclination was the measure of good; and that man was the happiest, who had power and will to gratify his desires without restraint or regard of others. Justice was sometimes a name for the interest of the strongest, sometimes a mere creature of law without foundation in nature; a scarecrow set up by the weak to deter the strong from taking those advantages to which they were naturally entitled.

Socrates attended but little, except in early years, to physical science; but he turned all the powers of his mind against the atheists and materialists, the sceptics, and those who set up pleasure as the only good. Against the first

he maintained most ably the being of a God, the incorporeal nature and immortality of the soul. In his disputes with the sophists and sceptics, he availed himself of a readiness and dexterity in argument superior to their own; and drawing them by an artful series of questions into inconsistencies and absurdities, at once exposed their arrogance and the falsehood of their views. He delighted in humbling insolent pretenders to superior knowledge, and he confessed and dwelt on the imperfections of the human understanding, as an instrument for the investigation of truth: yet he did not, like most of the sophists, make that imperfection a reason for denying existence to the truth which he was unable completely to fathom; but rather a motive to greater humility and candour in the search, and to a modest reliance on divine assistance, to guide man's judgment on points important to his welfare, where his own unassisted faculties were inadequate to the task. He stated and enforced a system of morality and religion, purer and loftier than that of the Pythagoreans; but, unlike them, he was accessible to all, always clear in his statements as far as possible, and ready to explain whatever was not understood. Hence, he was said to have brought down philosophy from the clouds, and made her converse with men: Ever earnest in recommending temperance, benevolence, piety, justice, and showing that man's happiness and dignity are determined by his mind, and not his fortunes, by virtue and wisdom, not by rank and wealth, his own life was the best example of his precepts. We have seen his unbending uprightness when forced into public office, and his private conduct was no less exemplary. Barefooted and poorly clad, he associated with the rich and gay as with the needy, in the same spirit of cheerful good-will: his advice and instructions were given to all without fee or reward, for his spirit was rigidly independent, and, if he possessed little, he wanted less.

This excellent man was impeached before the popular court of reviling the gods which Athens acknowledged, of preaching other gods, and of corrupting the youth. The latter charge was principally supported by the conduct of Alcibiades and Critias, both of whom had been his pupils. He triumphantly repelled the accusations; but his accusers were powerful, his judges prejudiced, and his

danger was increased by the manner of his defence. It was usual for accused persons to supplicate favour with tears, and endeavour to move pity, by exhibiting their children. By this the pride of the judges was gratified, when they saw sometimes the most considerable persons obliged to descend to supplication. But Socrates considered this as equally unworthy of himself, and disrespectful to the tribunal, which ought to be directed by justice, not by favour; and the judges were offended at his denying them the accustomed homage. He was condemned to death. He again addressed the court, declaring his innocence, and observing that the charges against him, even if proved, did not amount to a capital crime. "But," he said, in conclusion, "it is time to depart; I to die, you to live; but which for the greatest good, God only knows." The condemnation took place on the eve of the day when the sacred ship of Theseus * was sent with offerings of thanksgiving to Apollo at Delos. All executions were forbidden till its return, and thus the death of Socrates was respite for thirty days, during which his friends had free access to him in prison. Means were concerted for his escape; the jailor was bribed, a vessel prepared, a retreat in Thessaly provided: But Socrates had always taught the duty of obedience to the laws, and he would not set an example of breaking them. He waited the return of the ship, spent his last morning in calmly reasoning with his friends on the immortality of the soul, and the happiness derived from virtue, took the fatal cup of hemlock, and died.

The philosophy of Socrates was wholly promulgated in conversation, not in writing; but his doctrines and character have been handed down to us by two of his most gifted pupils. Plato, the greater of them by far, possessed a mind almost unrivalled for its completeness at all points; and uniting the greatest acuteness, vigour, and comprehension of understanding, with a most glowing and poetical imagination, and matchless dignity, power, and beauty of style. But his genius was too original and peculiar to fit him for the mere reporter of another's opinions, and much of what he has written under the name of Socrates, must be considered as his own. The bias of his mind was to abstract speculation; to the discovery of the principles

of morality, rather than the application of its precepts to particular cases. In his fondness for lofty contemplations, he sometimes slides into mysticism and obscurity,—a tendency which is not observable in the discourses of Socrates, as delivered by his other celebrated disciple, Xenophon. The acuteness of Plato's Socrates in confounding the arrogant falsehood of the sophists, and his skill and patience in developing the reasoning powers of his younger associates, are probably faithful copies from the great original: but his deep and subtle speculations on the nature of moral beauty and goodness, however admirable in themselves, appear to be characteristic of the writer, rather than his master; whose turn of thought seems more truly expressed by the sobriety of mind and practical good sense which are every where visible in the Socrates of Xenophon.

SECT. II.—About the end of the Peloponnesian war, the death of Darius had left the throne of Persia to his son Artaxerxes. Mutual jealousy and quarrels ensued between the new king and Cyrus, which ended in the latter leading an army to dethrone his brother about four years after his accession. The principal trust of Cyrus was in a body of above 10,000 Grecian mercenaries, who did their part so well, that in a great battle at Cunaxa, near Babylon, they defeated all opposed to them. But Cyrus, being roused to fury at the sight of his brother, made a violent charge on the body in which he was posted, wounded Artaxerxes with his own hand, and was himself killed in the encounter. All the Asiatic followers of Cyrus now submitted to the king. The Grecian leaders were invited to a conference, and treacherously murdered; and the army was left without commanders in the heart of Asia, separated from Greece by vast tracts of hostile territory, and obliged to begin its march through extensive plains, in the face of innumerable light cavalry. An assembly was held to choose new leaders, and among those who came forward was Xenophon, a young Athenian, who has just been mentioned as the biographer of Socrates. Xenophon was elected one of the generals, and was in a great measure by his superior ability that the army overcame all the obstacles which beset it. He has given an account of the expedition, equally interesting as a narrative, and admirable as a specimen of composition. He has also written the most authentic

history of the times now in question. Few persons have been equally remarkable for the union of literary and warlike ability; but though the course of his life was free from blame in the eye of his contemporaries, it is much to be regretted by better taught moralists, that the friend and biographer of Socrates should have gathered his laurels in so vile a trade as that of a mere hireling military adventurer.

A war broke out between Lacedæmon and Persia. The Lacedæmonian army in Ionia was at first ill commanded, and proved alike oppressive to its allies, and inefficient against its enemies. But Dercyllidas, succeeding to the command, exercised it with great ability. He restored good order to the army, and prosperity to the country, and conciliated the affections of all who were under his administration. He was no less bold and skilful in military enterprise than judicious in civil regulation; and he obtained peace from Pharnabazus and Tissaphernes, on the terms that all Grecian cities should be independent. The complete ratification, however, of the treaty depended on the king and the Lacedæmonian government.

Since the end of the Peloponnesian war, Lacedæmon had been little less than all-powerful in Greece. The change was in some respects a happy one, but not upon the whole. The smaller states were indeed released from the grinding tributes, which had been wrung from them to support the navy of Athens, and to feed and amuse its idle and luxurious people. But the democratical governments were generally changed into oligarchies of the narrowest kind, dependent for existence, not on the willing acquiescence of the people, but on Lacedæmon; and we have already seen, in the conduct of the Athenian Thirty, the abuses to which such a power was liable. Many states were made the residence of Spartan governors, who were generally oppressive and arbitrary. Bred up in contempt for all mankind, except their own fellow-citizens, they considered as rebellion all opposition to the will of a Spartan officer. Their tempers were harsh, their manners rude. Their notions of law were entirely derived from the institutions of Lacedæmon; and as popular complaint was never there allowed against the measures of persons in authority, they would put down all remonstrances, however moderate and lawful, by the most violent means.

Athenian officers were commonly men of milder temper and more polished manners, and more accustomed to respect the feelings of the persons under their command. A proverb was current in Greece, that the Athenians were better as individuals, the Lacedæmonians as a government; and it illustrates the conduct of the two states towards their subjects. The Athenian government was an expensive, the Lacedæmonian, a frugal one; and therefore the former oppressed its subjects with extortions, from which those of the latter were exempt. In case of revolt, the passionate revenge of the Athenian people was frequently more bloody than the unfeeling, but deliberate policy of its rival. The occasional sufferings of the allies of Athens were, therefore, greater; but they had more freedom of speech and of remonstrance, were less exposed to daily vexatious interference with their domestic government, and less given up, individually and collectively, to the self-willed tyranny of officers in command; and the authority of the Athenian governors, such as it was, was commonly exercised with more forbearance.

It was usual, as we have seen, in the different provinces of Greece, for the leading city to claim an authority, which the smaller towns were unwilling to allow. This pretension was usually discouraged by the imperial states, which wished to depress the larger cities, and to bring the smaller into dependence on themselves. To make the Bœotian towns independent of Thebes had always been a favourite object with Athens; a line of conduct which had ensured to that state the determined enmity of Thebes. While Athens was powerful, the Lacedæmonians were glad to maintain the claim of Thebes to the dominion of Bœotia, and thus to favour a valuable ally, and to keep in friendly hands a power which would otherwise have fallen to Athens. But when Athens was depressed, the case was altered, and Lacedæmon began to favour the independence of the towns. The Thebans were offended, and the enemies of Lacedæmon in that state gained strength; and as these were always the party friendly to democracy, the Theban oligarchy was changed into a popular government. Democracy also gained ascendancy in Corinth—so that the two principal allies of Lacedæmon were alienated. These changes appear to have taken place very soon after the Peloponnesian war: how-

ever no actual quarrel ensued; but during the Asiatic command of Demosthenes, the Lacedæmonians put down by arms the pretensions of this to command over the neighbouring towns.

King Agis died, (B. C. 398,) and was succeeded by his brother Agesilaus, whose first year was signalized by the discovery of a plot to effect a change of government. Lycurgus had introduced a distinction of rank among his people, except such as arose from age or merit; but in the course of ages all the powers of government had been ingrossed by certain families peculiarly distinguished as Spartans. The origin and nature of this distinction are not ascertained: but the most probable opinion seems to be that of a very acute and searching historian (Niebuhr), that the Spartans were those legitimately descended from the original citizens; whereas, the common Lacedæmonians had insensibly grown up, till they formed the most numerous portion of the people, from marriages contracted by Spartans with aliens, and from the association of strangers and vassals as members of the community, but upon an inferior footing. At the battle of Platæa, the Spartans were five thousand, each of whom was attended by seven Helots; while the other Lacedæmonians, who were also five thousand, had each only one attendant. But the Spartans, never admitting new associates, had lessened in number, till they formed, even in Sparta itself, only a small part of the population. Their pride and privileges had increased as their number lessened: the ephori, the senate, and all the higher officers, civil and military, were taken from their body, and they were now scarcely ever sent on foreign service, except in some command. These privileges were haughtily exercised, and naturally gave great offence to the excluded classes; and Cinadon, a young man in spirit and abilities inferior to few among the Spartans themselves, conceived the project of exciting a revolt against their sway. To engage others in his views, he was wont to bid them count the Spartans in the full market-place. There might be, besides the king, the ephori, and the senate, about forty. "These," he would say, "are your enemies—but all the rest your friends. Again, in each town and village of Laconia, you will find one enemy and many allies; the first, the Spartan magistrate; the second, the unprivileged Laconians. All the Helots,"

he proceeded, "all the newly admitted citizens, the lower people in the capital, and the inhabitants of the other towns, universally are of our party; for, whenever any mention is made of the Spartans, all these are unable to conceal that they would gladly eat them raw." When such were the feelings, on which it rested, the revolution planned by Cinadon would probably have been a bloody one; and thus it is that excessive misgovernment begets a bitterness of feeling in the people, which vents itself at the moment of liberation in cruelty and outrage. Such acts may justly raise abhorrence for the perpetrators, and compassion for the individual victims: but to be influenced by them, so as to think the more favourably of the old government, is a great, though common error; for the violence of the people's resentment is generally a testimony that their oppressions have been intolerable. In the present case the conspiracy was discovered in time; Cinadon was executed with tortures; and the Spartans retained their exclusive privileges.

Soon after this the news arrived that the Persian court refused to ratify the treaty of Dercyllidas, and the united force of the empire would be turned against the Asiatic cities, which were under the protection of Lacedæmon. Agesilaus was sent to command in Asia. He had much of the moderation and wisdom of his father, Archidamus, with far greater activity, enterprise, and military talents. By prudence and liberality he conciliated the cities, and having found them torn with factions, he restored quiet and union; while, by his warlike ability, he not only repelled the apprehended attack, but found himself in a condition to look for further successes. His project was not to conquer, and annex to Lacedæmon any provinces of the Persian empire, but to favour their erection into independent kingdoms, which would form a barrier to the Grecian states against the dangerous neighbourhood of Persia. The success of the scheme would probably have been beneficial to Lacedæmon, to Greece, and to the revolting provinces; which would have been better and more vigorously governed as separate kingdoms than as portions of the vast Persian empire. The design was favoured by the increasing division of that monarchy. Many of the satraps had been implicated in the rebellion of Cyrus, and most of those who remained faithful were inclined to

hold their governments as a matter of right, and to renounce their allegiance, if deposed or treated unworthily; while the return of the ten thousand had shown how small a body of Greeks could brave the power of Persia, even in the heart of its dominions. But before his design could be executed, Agesilaus was recalled by troubles in Greece.

We have seen the rise of enmity to Lacedæmon in some of the most powerful Grecian states. The manifestation of that spirit appears to have been hastened by Persian gold in Argos, Thebes, and Corinth; but in Thebes the feeling was strongest, and it was between Thebes and Lacedæmon that war first rose. The Thebans alone could not hope to stand against the enemy they had provoked; but they knew that the Athenians bore impatiently their present depression; and that the same pretence of zeal for Grecian liberty, which had served the Lacedæmonians so well against Athens, might now be no less available to those who withstood the dominion of Lacedæmon. The Thebans asked and obtained the alliance of Athens. Iysander was sent with an army into Bœotia; he professed to vindicate the independence of the towns, and the gates of Orchomenus were opened to receive him: but, soon afterwards, he was killed in battle, and, by the feeble conduct of king Pausanias, who replaced him, the army was obliged to quit Bœotia, without further action, under a dishonourable truce.

Athens led Argos into alliance with Thebes, and Argos Corinth, now democratically governed, and closely connected with Argos. The league was joined by most of the northern states. Instead of allowing the supremacy of any commonwealth, it was agreed that a congress of deputies from each should meet at Corinth, to direct the conduct of the confederacy. The Lacedæmonians now resolved to recall Agesilaus; and, in the mean time, the allies sent an army avowedly against Laconia. "The Lacedæmonian state," said the Corinthian deputy, "resembles a river; which, near its source, is easily forded, but the farther it flows, the more it is swollen with tributary streams. Thus, the Lacedæmonians march from home with their own troops only; but, as they proceed, their army grows formidable with reinforcements from the cities. I hold it, therefore, best to attack them as near as

possible to Lacedæmon." The confederates were met near Corinth by the Lacedæmonians and their allies. Though greatly superior in number, they were disunited and ill-commanded, as often happens in such bodies; the Boeotian generals, in particular, showing a strong inclination to throw upon their associates all the peril of the day. By these errors, and their own superior discipline, the Lacedæmonians were victorious.

Agésilas was enjoying, in Asia, honours and power such as had never fallen to the lot of any Greek. His popularity was universal; his hopes of success and glory brilliant; and nothing could be more mortifying than the summons to quit his present splendid situation, and to live at home under the harsh control of the ephori. When about to depart, he assembled the allies, stated the necessities of his country, and assured his audience that he would never forget them, but would return as soon as possible to do his utmost for their welfare. The assembly burst into tears, and unanimously voted powerful succours to accompany Agésilas; who divided all his care between measures for the security of the Asiatic Greeks, and the providing a numerous and well-appointed army to lead into Greece. He crossed the Hellespont, and marching through northern Greece, he entered Boëtia, and met the forces of the hostile league near Coroneia. The numbers were nearly equal; but the Asiatic troops, who formed a large part of the army under Agésilas, were reckoned very inferior to the European. Their behaviour, however, did great credit to Agésilas, who had trained them, and his victory was complete. Little further was attempted before the army went into winter quarters. (B. C. 394.)

It has been mentioned that Conon, after the battle of Ægospotami, fled to Salamis in Cyprus. The Cyprian cities were, for the most part, governed by their several princes or tyrants, under the paramount sovereignty of Persia; but as that feeble government did little to protect its distant dependencies, or to restrain their mutual dissensions, the defence of these cities chiefly rested on the vigour of their several administrations, and the connexions which they formed either with independent powers or with the satraps of the continent. In this view, no alliance could be more desirable than that of the first maritime power of the age; and accordingly Euagoras, the present ruler of Salamis, an able, just,

and popular prince, had successfully cultivated the Athenians, inasmuch that he was, an honorary distinction, made a citizen of Athens. Conon was honourably received by Euagoras, and soon became his most confidential minister. The eight triremes which he brought with him were a valuable addition to the naval strength of Salamis; and he had military and political ability, and experience in communication with Persian officers, all which made him highly useful to Euagoras. Conon negotiated with Pharnabazus, and won his friendship for the prince of Salamis; who, being countenanced by the satrap, added several towns of the island to his dominion, without offending the court. But when Agésilas was warring in Asia, Conon suggested to Pharnabazus to make a diversion by sea. A Phœnician fleet was at the satrap's orders; it might be joined by that of Euagoras: the Athenian interest was yet considerable in the cities of Asia and the islands, and the personal credit of Conon was high, especially among the seamen. Pharnabazus adopted the suggestion, equipped a powerful fleet, and commanded it in person, leaving, probably, the effective direction to the more skilful Conon. The result was complete defeat to the Lacedæmonians; of which the news was brought to Agésilas shortly before his victory at Coroneia.

The command of the isthmus was an important object both to the Lacedæmonians and their enemies, and, in contending for it, the Corinthian territory necessarily became the habitual seat of war. The Corinthians, of course, were the principal sufferers among the allies; the war became unpopular, and the oligarchical party seemed likely to regain the ascendant. To prevent this, the democratical leaders planned the massacre of their opponents, and the Athenian, Boeotian, and Argian administrations are accused of having been privy to the plot. The time chosen was a religious festival, when, all the people being assembled, the business might be more readily and completely performed; but the part of the whole design most shocking to the Greeks was the profaning with a series of murders a season at which not even the execution of convicted criminals was held allowable. Many were slain before they knew their danger, some while engaged in conversation, some at the theatre, some even sitting as judges. Those who fled to the altars were murdered there with-

and scruple: "so that some pious men," says Xenophon, "even of those who were not stricken, died of horror at seeing such impiety." Those who fell were mostly elders of the principal families, the youth of which had been assembled in another place by Pasimelus, one of their number, who suspected the plot. On hearing the outcry, Pasimelus and his companions immediately seized the Acrocorinthus, or citadel of Corinth; but they were induced to leave it by the fall of a capital from a pillar, which, to their superstitious minds, seemed an omen of ill. They had fled beyond the border, when they were induced to return by the persuasions of their friends, the lamentations of their mothers, and the assurances given on oath by some of the rulers, that they should suffer no harm.

The democratical leaders had adopted a measure unprecedented in Greece: they had united their city with Argos, removed the boundary stones, abolished the Corinthian assemblies, and declared by law solemnly enacted, that the two peoples should henceforth be all Argians. The returned fugitives could not endure the change: they found the power of their opponents completely established by union with the democratical people of Argos, while themselves, who had formerly been important in Corinth, were now of little consideration in the united commonwealths. They had, indeed, the rights of Argian citizens, which they did not desire; but any change was usually unpopular which, increasing the number of citizens in a state, diminished each man's share of the sovereignty; and here, not only was the number of citizens more than doubled, but the name of their country was abolished, and the seat of government removed. On a smaller scale, the same feelings were at work which made the union with England at first unpopular in Scotland; and their violence was exasperated by resentment at the bloody means used to effect the change. The minds of many were thus inflamed, till they thought that life was not worth having on such terms. In the words of Xenophon, "They resolved to make their country Corinth, as it had been from the first; to establish it in independence and good government; to purify it from murderers; and thus to become its saviours, or, if they should fail, at least to meet the most glorious death in pursuit of the greatest blessings." Pasimelus and another nego-

tiated with Praxitas, the Lacedæmonian commander in Sicily, and promised to introduce his troops within the long walls between Corinth and its port, Lechaum. The scheme prospered, and the army of Praxitas being admitted, and joined by the Corinthians hostile to the government, defeated the Corinthian and Argian forces which attacked it. Lechaum was next taken, and a breach was made in the long walls, so as to leave an open passage for Lacedæmonian troops along the isthmus.

During the winter, Pharnabazus had diligently augmented his fleet; and embarking in the spring, with Conon as his vice-admiral, he sailed among the islands of the Ægean. Following Conon's advice, he did not attempt their subjection to Persia, but contented himself with expelling the Lacedæmonian governors, and making them independent. On these terms, all readily received him. The following year he sailed again, and landing in Lacomia, ravaged the country, then overran Cythera, and placed there a garrison under an Athenian officer. He next sailed to the Corinthian isthmus, where the congress of the league was assembled, and exhorting the leaders there to carry on the war with vigour, left a sum of money for its support. The satrap was provoked to these exertions by ravages which his territory had sustained from the arms of Lacedæmon; but the expense pressing heavily on his treasury, he gladly adopted the proposal of Conon to relieve him from the burden, and at the same time to strike the most effective blow against his enemy. The Athenian commonwealth, Conon said, would be willing to undertake the support of the war; but, for this, it must be enabled to maintain its navy by the tributes from the islands. If Pharnabazus would allow his fleet to be used in enforcing those tributes, and would assist in rebuilding the long walls and the walls of Peiræus, he might trust the rest to Athens. The satrap consented; he placed his fleet at Conon's disposal, and assisted liberally with money and workmen in rebuilding the walls. The neighbouring democratical states co-operated zealously, particularly the Boeotians, so lately the remorseless enemies of Athens. Thus Conon, after thirteen years' absence, returned to Athens with the present of a fleet and fortifications; with the means, in short, of re-establishing for his country little less than its former importance.

The Spartan government, though victorious by land, carried on the war with little vigour, being cramped by the loss of its foreign revenues, and by the necessity of watching the disaffected Laconians. The war was waged, not by battles, but by incursions and sudden expeditions, and it was with a view to these that Iphicrates, an Athenian officer, raised and disciplined a body of troops, of a kind before unknown in Grecian warfare. Light troops, in Grecian armies, and especially in Peloponnesian, were little valued, and commonly made up of untrained slaves; though it had appeared in the Ætolian expedition of Demosthenes, and on many other occasions, how fatal the want of them might be to the cumbrous, though irresistible phalanx. Athens had good bowmen, and had often profited by them; and Iphicrates raised a body of light troops, regularly armed and disciplined, and trained to act in the Thracian manner, with target and dart, instead of shield and spear, whence they were called *Peltastæ*, or targeteers. To the undisciplined skirmishers of the Peloponnesians, the targeteers were more to be dreaded than the phalanx; for they were equally formidable to them in attack, and far more so in pursuit; and even against the phalanx itself they might be employed with advantage, for, though quite unable to support its charge, they were trained to harass it in flank and rear,—to retreat, when pursued, and instantly to rally, and again attack the pursuers as they retreated. Thus Iphicrates defeated several bodies of heavy-armed foot, belonging to the allies of Lacedæmon, and, at length, a considerable detachment of the Lacedæmonians themselves. The last blow, being received from a kind of troops which they affected to despise, contributed more than any other reverse to humble the pride and damp the hopes of Lacedæmon.

The war went on in Greece with great distress to all the parties, and with no important result; but Thrasybulus, being sent with an Athenian fleet to the coast of Asia, gained some considerable advantages. A revolution had taken place in Rhodes, in favour of democracy; but the refugees, being succoured by a Lacedæmonian fleet under Teleutias the brother of Agesilaus, disputed with their adversaries the command of the island. Thrasybulus on his arrival

secured the superiority of the Rhodians in the city, after which he sailed for the Hellespont. He succeeded in restoring democracy and alliance with Athens in the important city of Byzantium, in Mitylene, and the greater part of Lesbos, and in most of the cities on the Asiatic coast, which yet favoured Lacedæmon. The Byzantine people, in their joy at the re-establishment of democracy, made no objection to the restoration of the toll which Athens had formerly imposed on all vessels passing the Bosphorus, on which Byzantium stood. Thrasybulus then proceeded to the collection of tribute from the towns; in the course of which the people of Aspendus were so exasperated by some irregularity of his soldiers, that they attacked his camp by night, and he was killed in his tent. Thus fell a man of tried honesty and patriotism, who had shown uncommon ability in very trying situations, and had been the chief instrument of restoring freedom and happiness to his country. The only cloud that rests upon his memory is an appearance of his having concurred with Theramenes in the accusation of the six generals, if not actively, at least by withholding the testimony which might have saved them: but the evidence we have is not sufficient, to warrant us in decidedly fixing so dark a stain on a character otherwise so pure.

It was in the eighth year of this war, and the nineteenth after the taking of Athens (B. C. 387), that Lacedæmon obtained the intervention of Persia in its behalf, and thereby a peace highly favourable to itself. Antalcidas, who was chosen to command in Asia, and to negotiate with Persia, had before been sent to Tiribazus, the present satrap of Lydia, and had gained his favour; insomuch that he arrested Conon, who had come to him as ambassador from Athens, and it is uncertain whether Conon ever escaped from the confinement into which he had so faithfully been thrown. Antalcidas was successful in war against the Athenians, and recovered the command of the sea; but he still adhered to his purpose of making peace. The first proposal came in the form of a requisition from Tiribazus, for a congress of ministers from all the states which were willing to receive the terms of peace that the king should dictate. The congress met, and Tiribazus showed the order from the king, which ran thus: "Artaxerxes, the king, holds it just, that all the cities of Asia should be his,

and the islands of Clazomenæ* and Cyprus: that all other Grecian cities, small and great, should be independent, except the islands Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, which may be subject to Athens, as of old. Whoever shall not receive these terms, against such I will join in war with those who accept them, by land and sea, with ships and money."

The belligerents consented to the terms proposed. The Thebans, however, required that the oath of their ministers should be taken as the representatives of Bœotia. Agesilaus declared that he would not accept their oath, unless made in strict conformity to the king's order, which required the independence of every city, small and great. The Theban ministers said that they had not authority to make any such concession. Agesilaus bid them go and ask their employers, warning them that if they did not comply, they would be excluded from the peace. They went; but Agesilaus, in his enmity to the Thebans, who had on a former occasion personally insulted him, persuaded the ephori to resort at once, to coercion. Preparations were hastily made, but before the army marched, the Theban ministers returning announced the acquiescence of their city: the oath of Thebes was taken for itself alone, and the Bœotian towns became independent.

The Corinthians and Argians were still for preserving their union; which could not be done, so powerful was the adverse party in Corinth, without keeping Argian troops there. This Agesilaus held a breach of the treaty, and he threatened immediate hostility, unless the troops were withdrawn. The demand was reluctantly complied with, and on the departure of the Argians the opposite party became superior: the exiles returned; the principal promoters of the late revolution emigrated, particularly those concerned in the massacre; and Corinth and Argos became, as formerly, distinct republics. Their separation, and the independence of the Bœotian towns, which broke the power of Thebes, were the objects most to be

†

* Thus the passage stands in Xenophon, but its correctness has been disputed, on the ground that Clazomenæ was a city on the continent of Asia. It seems, however, that although the city was originally built there, the inhabitants afterwards moved over to the island, from fear of the Persians. At a later period than that now treated of, Alexander the Macedonian united the island to the mainland by a mole, which was still visible when Chandler visited the place. See *Schneider's note on Xenophon, Hellen. V. i. 31.*

desired by Lacedæmon. Accordingly, the influence of Lacedæmon was more effectually established by the peace of Antalcidas, than by that which ended the Peloponnesian war; though in the latter it had been completely triumphant, and in the former had suffered not less of evil than it had inflicted. In both, however, that state incurred slight discredit by giving up the Greeks of Asia to the Persian dominion.

The Lacedæmonians did not delay to abuse their power. Some of their allies, it was said, had wished success to their enemies, and these must be chastised. They first required the demolition of the walls of Mantinea, declaring that they could not trust the fidelity of that people. "For we know," they said, "that when we were at war with Argos, the Mantineians sent corn thither; that they have sometimes pretended a truce, to excuse them from joining the army; that when they have joined it, they have served grudgingly; that they repine at our successes, and rejoice at our defeats." The Lacedæmonians appear to have trusted little to the justice of these pretences, for they added that the thirty years' truce was just expiring. We have seen that the Greeks acknowledged no duties to those who were without the pale of existing covenants; and, accordingly, the expiration of a truce between Argos and Lacedæmon, in the Peloponnesian war, had been held to justify the renewal of hostilities without fresh provocation, after thirty years of peace. But even this would not have prepared us for the present conduct of Lacedæmon, in threatening war to Mantinea after a similar period, not of suspended hostility, as in the case of Argos, but, of actual friendship and alliance. It is true, the Lacedæmonians complained that the Mantineians had failed in their duty as allies; but had the vague pretences alleged been sufficient to justify hostility, they would have justified it, independently of the expiration of the truce.

It is probable that one motive of the Lacedæmonians, in thus oppressing Mantinea, was their dislike of her democratical government, which they had unwillingly permitted, while they feared to drive her from their own alliance into that of their enemies. Agesilaus, disapproving the expedition, excused himself from leading, by alleging some obligation of his father to the Mantineians. Agesipolis, the other king,

sat down before the city: he flooded it by damming the river which ran through it, and the fortifications being built with unburnt bricks soon began to give way. The Mantineians now capitulated, and the only terms allowed them were, that they should abandon their city, and settle themselves in villages. The popular leaders, fearing the vengeance of their opponents, obtained from Agesipolis a safe conduct to depart. The street was lined with Lacedæmonian troops, while sixty of the most obnoxious passed out; "and though hating them," says Xenophon, "they were kept from harming them more easily than the best of the Mantineians," meaning the oligarchical leaders; "a great instance of subordination." This passage exemplifies the bitterness of Grecian party and national enmity, while its language shows the oligarchical bias of the historian. He proceeds: "After this the Mantineians were distributed into four villages, as they had anciently lived. At first they disliked it, as they had new houses to build; but the men of property soon became pleased with the change, as they lived near their estates, and directed the government aristocratically without being thwarted by troublesome demagogues. The Lacedæmonians sent an officer to each village, and the people served in their armies much more readily than under the democracy." That is, Lacedæmon governed by means of the nobility, who, depending on its support, were zealous in its service; while the disunited and enfeebled people, as has happened in all ages, submitted, without remonstrance, to waste their blood in quarrels wherein they had no interest.

Three years followed of unusual tranquillity; and when it was interrupted, the alarm came from a new quarter. Olynthus, the most powerful among the Chalcidian cities of Thrace, had adopted the unusual policy of associating, in all the civil and political rights of its people, the citizens of some small neighbouring towns. This was very adverse to the common temper of the Greeks, who generally guarded their separate governments with so much jealousy as not even to suffer intermarriage. The system prospered, and some of the larger towns joined the association. Among these was Pella; the largest town of Macedonia. The rising power had attracted the attention of Athens and Thebes as a valuable ally;

and overtures of friendship had already taken place between those states and Olynthus.

The Olynthians had invited the neighbouring towns of Apollonia and Acanthus to join their confederacy, and had added a threat of war in case of refusal. The rulers of those states sent ambassadors to Lacedæmon, who represented this Olynthian system of association as an ill boding novelty. They declared that negotiation was already commenced with Athens and Thebes, and advised the Lacedæmonians to take care lest they should no longer find that part of Greece easy to manage. "You are very anxious," the ambassadors continued, "to prevent the union of Bœotia: how, then, can you suffer to rise a greater power than Bœotia, and that not by land only, but also by sea." They went on to state the great resources now possessed by the Olynthians, and the far greater which they expected to attain; and finished by saying, that many of the towns were yet unwilling associates, and the confederacy might now be easily dissolved; but if the union were once confirmed by intermarriages and intermixture of possessions, it would be very difficult to break it. Their arguments prevailed. Eudamidas was sent with two thousand Laconians, while his brother Phœbidas remained to collect the troops which were to follow. Though Eudamidas could not face the enemy in the field, his small force and the fame of Lacedæmon preserved several towns which were on the point of joining Olynthus; and the important city of Potidæa, the key of the peninsula of Pallene, opened its gates to him, though it was already a member of the Olynthian league.

Phœbidas arrived at Thebes on his way to join his brother. Parties there were so nearly balanced, that Ismenias and Leontiades, contending chiefs, were together in the office of polemarch, the chief magistracy. Ismenias, a warm opposer of Lacedæmon, avoided Phœbidas; but Leontiades courted him. The party of Ismenias prevailed so far as to carry a vote, which forbade that any Theban should join the army under Phœbidas; on which Leontiades offered to introduce a Lacedæmonian garrison into the citadel, whereby his party would be enabled to overbear their opponents, and Phœbidas might carry with him a powerful Theban force into Thrace.

Phœbidas caught at the treacherous proposal; the troops were introduced, and Leontiades going to the council, declared that the Lacedæmonians were in possession of the citadel, but that there was no need for alarm, for they disavowed all hostility. Being authorized, however, as polemarch, to apprehend all persons suspected of treason, he commanded the guards to seize Ismenias. Many of the friends of Leontiades were present, and forewarned: the opposite party were completely surprised. Some fled immediately, some went home to prepare for departure; but, as soon as it was known that Ismenias was lodged in the Cadmeia (the citadel of Thebes) four hundred persons fled to Athens. A new polemarch was chosen from the party of Leontiades, and he himself then hastened to Lacedæmon. (H. C. 382.)

On most occasions, the conduct of Agesilaus had been just and liberal beyond the wont of Lacedæmon; but we have once already seen him hurried into precipitate violence by his hatred of the then ruling Thebans; and the same feeling now induced him to exert his influence in favour of the perfidious measure which had effected their downfall. The way had been smoothed by him, when Leontiades addressed the Lacedæmonian assembly. He enlarged on the enmity which the democratical Thebans had often shewn to Lacedæmon, and especially in their recent alliance with Olynthus; and mentioned the constant anxiety of Lacedæmon to prevent the subjection of Bœotia to Thebes. "Of this," he said, "there is now no danger; you need not fear the Thebans; for, if you but provide for our security as we shall for your interests, a simple order will ensure obedience to all your wishes." The assembly resolved to keep the citadel, and to bring to trial not Phœbidas but Ismenias. Three judges were sent from Lacedæmon, and one from each of the allies, and the late chief magistrate of an independent state was brought to answer before a foreign tribunal for his conduct in that magistracy. Ismenias was accused of seeking foreign connexions; of pledging himself in hospitality to the Persian king for the injury of Greece; of having partaken of the money sent from the king; and of having been a principal author of the late troubles. The chief part of the charges, it is to be observed, referred not to any separate machina-

tions of Ismenias, but to the public conduct of the party to which he belonged; and that not at any recent period, but during the troubles which had been concluded by a peace solemnly made and sworn by Lacedæmon with that very party as the government of Thebes. Such, however, as the charges were, Ismenias refuted them; but being, nevertheless, unable, says Xenophon, to persuade his judges that he had not entertained great and evil projects, he was condemned and executed. His fate, it is plain, had been determined before the trial began. This mockery of justice, more loathsome than the most baffled murder, is an abomination peculiar in Greece to Lacedæmon, and of which we have already seen an instance in the judicial massacre of the unfortunate Plateans.

Teleutias, the brother of Agesilaus, an able and highly popular commander, was now sent with a powerful army against Olynthus. But that state, by the liberality of its policy, and the benefits resulting to those who united themselves with it on the terms it offered, had acquired, without war or violence, a power which made it no easy conquest. After some trifling successes, the army of Teleutias was completely defeated and the leader slain. A fresh army was sent under king Agesipolis, a young man of promise, who carried on the war with advantage till he died by sudden illness. The Olynthians, however, had probably depended on the support of Thebes and Athens, of which the former, instead of aiding them, was now at the command of their opponents. The Lacedæmonians prevailed against them; they were blockaded and pressed by famine; and they submitted to become dependent allies of Lacedæmon, and to follow in arms whithersoever the Lacedæmonians should lead. Thus fell a power which appears, as far as very imperfect knowledge can enable us to judge, to have been more likely than any that had yet arisen to promote the peace and general liberty of Greece.

Meanwhile, Agesilaus was employed near home. After establishing democracy, the people of Phlius had continued allies of Lacedæmon; which had, with unusual moderation, refrained from interfering to change the government, and only exerted its authority to secure fair treatment for the depressed party. At length it was provoked to arms by the continued injustice of the Phliasian

government towards those who were held more particularly the friends of Lacedæmon. Agesilaus besieged the city, and, after a most resolute defence, reduced it to extremity; and his moderation was shown in the terms which he granted, by which the settlement of its affairs was referred to one hundred Phliasian commissioners, chosen fifty from each party.

The Lacedæmonians were now at their highest pitch of power; Bœotia was completely theirs, Corinth firm in their friendship, Argos brought low, and Athens without allies; when a change, the beginning of a train of misfortunes, which broke their power for ever, was brought about by means apparently so trifling, that Xenophon, an exile under the patronage of Lacedæmon, and particularly of Agesilaus, can only account for it by ascribing it to the divine anger at the iniquity of his patrons, who had seized the citadel of Thebes. This perfidy and violence indeed well deserved punishment, for it was a flagrant breach of that treaty, establishing the independence of all Grecian towns, to which they had solemnly sworn, and of which they had so rigorously enforced the strict construction on all others. In the winter of the year (B. C. 379), seven Theban exiles, resident in Athens, conspired with the secretary of the polemarchs Archias and Philippos, to overthrow the government of Thebes. They went secretly thither, and being introduced by the treacherous secretary to the presence of his masters, assassinated first the polemarchs, and afterwards Leontiades. Some of them then went to the state prison, and, obtaining admission by pretending an order from the polemarch, released the prisoners, and procured them arms from a neighbouring temple. Then, fully trusting in the general hatred to the existing government, they proclaimed that the tyrants were no more, and invited the citizens to assemble in arms. When day broke, and what had passed was certainly known, the citizens joined them horse and foot.

In the course of the day the refugees arrived from Athens, and a body of Athenians. It was resolved to assail the Cadmeia; but the Lacedæmonian garrison, being weak, surrendered the fortress on condition that they might depart with their arms. The Thebans gladly consented, and the Lacedæmonians were allowed to depart; but all

who were seen among them of the oligarchical Thebans were seized and put to death, excepting some who were saved by the humanity of the Athenian auxiliaries. Not content with taking vengeance on the guilty, the popular fury extended itself to the massacre of the innocent, and the children of those who had been executed suffered death. These crimes were probably not designed by the leaders, but produced by the violent passions commonly arising in Grecian seditions, and provoked in the present case by more than ordinary guilt. But this shocking cruelty, and the treachery and assassination with which the enterprise was begun, form dark blots on a revolution otherwise to be admired for the justice of its cause, the boldness of its conception, and the prudence as well as the daring vigour which marked both the plan and the execution.

The Lacedæmonians put to death the late governor of the Cadmeia, who had thus easily surrendered a possession so important, and so disreputably acquired; and they sent an army against Thebes. Agesilaus had probably repented of countenancing the treachery of Phœbidas; but it is plain that he was now unwilling to be connected with the prosecution of a business, which had begun in iniquity, had fallen into increased discredit through the tyrannical conduct of the Theban rulers established by Lacedæmon, and had ended with complete ill success. He excused himself from the command, on account of his age, which had reached the term after which, by the laws of Sparta, no man was obliged to go on foreign service; and the army was led by his colleague, Cleombrotus, the brother of Agesipolis. The object, however, of the expedition appears to have been rather to protect the Lacedæmonian party in the Bœotian towns, than to recover dominion in Thebes. The army carefully avoided all injury to the Theban territory, so that men doubted whether it was to be war or peace; and finally it withdrew, leaving Sphodrias to command in Thespiæ, with a third part of its force. The display of the Lacedæmonian power so near them had produced in the Athenian people a terror, which showed itself in unjust severities towards those who had advised assisting in the deliverance of Thebes.

The Thebans, if left to struggle alone with Lacedæmon, could scarcely hope for any peace, but such as would leave

their independence very precarious, and probably bring ruin to the authors of the late revolution. But they had now as leaders men of superior talent, of whom Pelopidas and Epaminondas were the chief. Pelopidas, active, prompt, and daring, with great dexterity and ready invention, had been an exile, and one of the seven conspirators who began the revolution. Epaminondas, his most intimate friend, was a man of consummate ability, but of retired and studious habits and limited fortune: he had hitherto taken little part in public affairs, and had remained undisturbed in Thebes under the usurping government; and even from this time he appears for a considerable interval to have assisted the administration chiefly with his advice. The views of these men were directed to the recovery of Theban supremacy in Bœotia; and accordingly Pelopidas and two of his associates were made chief magistrates, with the title, not of polemarch, or military commander, but of Bœotarch, or commander of the Bœotians. As this made peace more distant, it was necessary to provide the better for war; and Athens was again engaged on the Theban side, through an intrigue of Pelopidas, who found means to induce the Lacedæmonian general, Sphodrias, to commit an aggression, so absurd in its conduct, as well as unjust and impolitic in its professed design, that it was universally ascribed to bribery. He entered Attica by night, ostensibly to surprise Peiræus. At Thria, day broke on him, and he returned; but, instead of attempting to disguise the hostile intention, he plundered houses and drove off cattle. The Athenian government complained to Lacedæmon, and Sphodrias was brought to trial. But Cleonymus, his son, was the intimate friend of Archidamus, the son of Agesilaus, who fully shared in his distress; and Agesilaus suffered his public integrity to be so far overborne by his private affections, that he used his influence in procuring the acquittal of Sphodrias. The consequence was the violent resentment of the Athenians, who immediately joined heart and hand with Thebes.

Agesilaus now took the command. In two successive years he entered Bœotia, with a force superior to the united strength of Thebes and Athens, and Thebes was greatly distressed by the ravaging of its territory. An army was kept continually at Thebes, to

support the Lacedæmonian party in the Bœotian towns; all of which were now governed by narrow oligarchies, that could not maintain themselves unassisted; while the favourers of democracy, including apparently in many towns a full half of the citizens, took refuge in Thebes. Thus completely changed was the state of parties in Bœotia, since the series of actions which closed with the Peloponnesian war; when Thebes was oligarchically governed, when Athens was the enemy and Lacedæmon the protectress of its supremacy, and when it was the democratical party which supported the separate independence of the towns. One incident is worth recording in the second campaign of Agesilaus. In Thespiæ it would appear that the emigration had been less than in many places, and that though no acknowledged enemy of Lacedæmon could remain there, there was a party ranged against those who claimed to be pre-eminently its friends. The latter modestly requested that Agesilaus would allow them to put their less zealous fellow-citizens to death; but he refused, and mediated between the factions so successfully, that he effected at least a temporary reconciliation, and, binding them to each other by oaths of concord, left Thespiæ in peace.

Next year, Agesilaus being disabled by sickness, the young king Cleombrotus led the army; but the intended invasion was foiled, the mountain passes being occupied by the Athenians and Thebans. Disgusted at the protraction of the war, the allies of Lacedæmon proposed equipping a fleet. By this the supplies of foreign corn, which chiefly supported Athens, might be cut off; and the army might be transported at pleasure into Bœotia, without depending on the freedom of the passes. In pursuance of the first object, a fleet was posted to intercept the Athenian corn ships; but this was met and defeated near the isle of Naxos by the Athenian Chabrias, the completest officer of the age. Another fleet was prepared to transport an army across the Corinthian gulf into Bœotia; but, at the request of the Thebans, Timotheus, the son of Conon, coasted Peloponnesus, and the intended expedition was prevented, the Peloponnesians being detained to protect their homes against the threatened attack. The Thebans thus had leisure to proceed against the Bœotian towns, and aided by the popular party in each, they

established every where democratical government, and Theban supremacy. Timotheus proceeded to Corcyra, and with the aid of a friendly party brought it to submission. He permitted none of the usual severities towards the conquered party: no selling into slavery—no banishment; he made no change in the constitution of the state; but exerted all his eloquence and prudence in composing differences and reconciling quarrels; and his reward was a general good will, in that part of Greece, to himself and his country. After this he defeated a Lacedæmonian fleet sent against him, and gained the command of the sea. Nevertheless, the Thebans invading Phocis, a Lacedæmonian army crossed the gulf, and defended that country.

The Lacedæmonians were now losing ground, when an overture of peace was made from Athens. The enmity of Thebes and Athens was old, their friendship recent; and though the Athenians had helped in securing Thebes from subjugation, they were far from wishing success to its rising ambition. They were also not unreasonably dissatisfied with a war in which the exertions and sacrifices had been chiefly theirs, and the profit that of Thebes. They were burdened with taxes, infested with Æginetan cruisers, and harassed with watchfulness; while the Thebans, whether unable or unwilling, contributed nothing to the support of that fleet, which had saved them from invasion,—perhaps from ruin—and enabled them to gain the mastery of Bœotia. Influenced by these considerations, they offered peace to Lacedæmon: it was accepted, and Timotheus was ordered home with his victorious fleet.

Timotheus, in returning, landed some Zacynthian exiles on their island, of which the Zacynthian rulers complained to Lacedæmon, as a gross injury. The Athenians evidently were unconscious of having done any thing to provoke a renewal of war, for they had laid up their fleet, and dismissed the crews, when it was voted by the Lacedæmonians that the Athenians had acted wrongfully, and redress should be sought by arms. At best this resolution was unjustifiably intemperate; but the time and circumstances lay open to a worse suspicion. The pressure was removed from Lacedæmon; the fleet, which had commanded its coasts, was broken up, and probably could not be quickly reassembled on the scene of action. The

trifling business of Zacynthus furnished a pretence for annulling a treaty, of which the benefit had already been received; and the laying up of the ships, while it proved the confidence of good faith on the part of the Athenian administration, gave to the Lacedæmonians a fair chance of reducing Corcyra, before it could be succoured.

The Lacedæmonians sent Mnasippus against Corcyra, with a powerful armament, much of which was composed of mercenaries. The island had been little troubled with internal dissensions since those seditions which had given it so bad a notoriety in the Peloponnesian war; and being commonly protected from hostile ravage by its situation and naval power, it was now remarkable for its high cultivation, and the splendour of its country houses. All this became the prey of the invader, and so rich was the plunder that even the common soldiers learned to be nice, and refused to drink any but the choicest wines. The Corcyreans were blockaded and pressed by hunger, before their complaint reached Athens, and when it was resolved to assist them, there were neither ships nor seamen ready. An Athenian general, however, and a small body of troops, were sent over land to assist in the defence; and Iphicrates being appointed to collect and command a fleet, hastened the levy by all the means in his power. As soon as it was completed he set out, and making his progress principally by rowing, with little use of sail, he won great credit by the manner in which he contrived at once to perform the voyage in not more than the ordinary time, and to exercise his newly-gathered seamen, so that they might, immediately on their arrival, be fit to do battle with the practised crews of the Peloponnesians. On reaching Cephallenia, he found that Corcyra was already safe. The sufferings of the besieged had become so severe, that when Mnasippus had proclaimed that any persons coming as deserters from the town should be sold for slaves, they still deserted. He scourged them and sent them back; and admission being denied to such as were bondmen, many died of hunger under the walls. Encouraged by the distress of his enemies, the Spartan commander, thinking victory certain, had resolved to make it cheap. For this, he dismissed some of his mercenaries, and withheld from others their pay, when due. The army naturally became dis-

contented and disorderly, and an opportunity was soon given to the besieged, which was ably improved, and led to the defeat and death of Mnasippus. The besieging army, discouraged by this discomfiture, and fearful of the speedy arrival of Iphicrates, was hastily re-embarked, leaving behind it much of its spoil, and many wounded soldiers.

Iphicrates, now master of the sea, proposed to ravage the Laconian coast, and to reduce those western cities, which still were hostile to Athens; but for this a fresh supply of money was needed. When first appointed he had requested to have as colleagues Callistratus, the most popular speaker, and Chabrias, the best general of the time, both hitherto his opponents. His reasons may not improbably be conjectured. He was going on a difficult and important service, and as the expense of the fleet would be heavy, and the treasury was low, it was likely that the people would be severe in exacting the greatest results from so costly an exertion. The presence of intelligent and unfriendly witnesses would be the severest trial of his conduct, but their approval would be its most triumphant vindication; and he probably relied upon his own ability and energy to merit their good report, and upon their candour not to withhold it, if deserved. He might hope to conciliate his associates, by the trust he had placed in their honour, and by his behaviour to them, while serving with him. Approving his conduct, they would be jointly responsible for its success; and thus he would be supported by the eloquence of Callistratus, and the high fame of Chabrias. In every respect the plan succeeded. Callistratus became his friend, and when money was wanted, offered to be messenger to the people, and either to procure a supply, or set on foot a negotiation for peace. Iphicrates approved, and Callistratus went to Athens.

The Athenians had been alarmed by the growing ambition of Thebes, and offended by the attack on their ancient friends the Phocians; and they were now more deeply disgusted by a recent act of tyranny. The Platæans and Thespians had shown unwillingness to admit the dominion of Thebes in the full extent to which it was claimed; and for this their towns were demolished and their whole people expelled. They fled to Athens, and were there received with ready sympathy. It was not forgotten that their cities had been true to

Greece when all the rest of Bœotia had strengthened the hands of the Persians; nor that the Platæans had been long the most devoted allies of Athens, and at one time almost a part of its people. These recollections heightened the pity which was naturally felt for the homeless fugitives; while indignation rose higher at the thought that the Thebans themselves, when lately victims of oppression, had mainly owed to Athens their deliverance, and their elevation to the power which they now abused in contempt of Athens, and to the injury of its friends. Any further support of Theban ambition appeared both discreditable and perilous; and on the arrival of Callistratus, in spite of just resentment against Lacedæmon and the prospect of brilliant success, it was resolved to make peace. The Thebans were first invited to concur, and then an embassy was sent to Sparta.

The Lacedæmonians were too severely pressed by Iphicrates not to wish for peace on any moderate terms; they, therefore, gladly called an assembly, and summoned the deputies of their allies to hear the proposals. One Athenian ambassador spoke to this effect:—"You always declare, O Lacedæmonians, that the cities shall be independent; and yet yourselves are the greatest hinderers of independence. For you bind your allies to follow whithersoever you shall lead, and you engage in wars without consulting them; so that your confederates, who are said to be independent, are often compelled to war against their best friends. Again, you do a thing most inconsistent with independence, establishing in different cities arbitrary ruling bodies of thirty or of ten; and your care is, not that these shall govern righteously, but that they shall always have a force at hand to keep down the citizens by violence; so that you seem to delight in tyrannies rather than free governments. When the king commanded that the cities should be independent," (such was the common language in speaking of the peace of Antalcidas,) "you declared that the Thebans would violate the order, if they did not suffer every city to govern itself by what laws it would: yet when you seized the Cadmeia, you suffered not the Thebans themselves to be self-governed. But no friendship can exist with those, who expect fair dealing from others, while themselves are catching at every unfair advantage." Callistratus followed in a

more conciliatory tone. The Lacedæmonians agreed to peace on the terms proposed; their governors were to be withdrawn from the cities, and every city to be independent; armies were to be disbanded, fleets laid up; if any city violated the treaty, it should be lawful for every other at its pleasure to assist the injured, but none should be compelled to join in hostility.

The terms of the treaty were in perfect unison with the wishes of Athens, but adverse to those both of Thebes and Lacedæmon, neither of which was willing to give up its dominion. But the Lacedæmonians trusted to ancient habits of authority and obedience to retain their allies without the forbidden coercion; whereas the Thebans would inevitably lose the command of Bœotia, which was recently gained, and could only be supported by force. The latter, therefore, complying, would be enfeebled, and might fall whenever Lacedæmon should find a pretext for hostility, or feel herself strong enough to act without one: refusing, they would be abandoned by Athens, without whose support, it was believed, they could not stand even now; and then the Lacedæmonians, having crushed their rivals by means of an illusory resignation of dominion, might resume their empire, and re-establish it on a firmer basis. The same considerations which prompted the apparent moderation of Lacedæmon were to the Thebans reasons for embarrassment and alarm. To reject a treaty so equitable in its provisions would be matter of offence and suspicion to Greece, and they would have no allies, while Lacedæmon would be backed by its Peloponnesian confederates. Acquiescence would have been wise and patriotic, could they have trusted Lacedæmon; but believing they well might, that its real intention was to exact a permanent and substantial, in return for a temporary and nominal sacrifice, the command of the force of Bœotia seemed necessary not only to greatness, but to independence and security. The Theban leaders were able and daring; they boldly stood the hazard; and grounds were found to vindicate them from the charge of ambitiously and obstinately rejecting a safe and honourable peace.

The Athenians and their allies by their respective ministers had severally sworn the observance of the treaty: the Lacedæmonian representatives took the oath for themselves and their allies.

The Theban ministers had sworn on the part of Thebes, but they now required that the Bœotian name should be substituted. The demand was inconsistent with the spirit of the treaty, yet not more so than the privilege just assumed by Lacedæmon. It was refused, and the Thebans renounced the treaty. The Athenians scrupulously did their part, withdrawing their garrisons and recalling their victorious fleet: the Lacedæmonians withdrew their governors and garrisons, but instead of recalling their army from Phocis, they ordered Cleombrotus to lead it against the Thebans, unless they allowed the Bœotian cities to be independent. Here then was an open violation of the treaty, according to which the army ought to have been dissolved, and a fresh one gathered, if necessary, from those cities only which voluntarily joined in the war. This incident went far to justify the conduct of the Thebans; for it showed that the specious moderation of Lacedæmon had been only a decoy; and that now, as after the peace of Antalcidas, that power would strictly enforce on all others their engagements, but would observe its own no further than suited its convenience.

Cleombrotus entered Bœotia. The Theban leaders, knowing that decisive action only would secure the fidelity of the towns, though inferior in force, advanced to meet him. Under the present generals their military system had been much improved; their heavy-armed foot and their cavalry had always been among the best in Greece; but now the foot were scarcely inferior to the Lacedæmonians themselves, while the horse were very far superior, the Lacedæmonian cavalry being of little reputation. But their greatest advantage was the genius of Epaminondas their commander, and the skill and daring activity of his associate Pelopidas. To increase their confidence the generals used every resource of Grecian superstition. An oracle was circulated, importing that Lacedæmon was to be worsted near the tomb of the virgins, who were said to have slain themselves after being violated by some Lacedæmonians. This tomb was near to Leuctra, where the battle took place; and before engaging, it was dressed and ornamented by the Thebans. News was brought from the city that all the temples had opened spontaneously, and that the sacred arms had vanished from the shrine of the Theban hero Hercules, which plainly

showed that he was going to the war. These marvels were not lost upon the many, though there wanted not those who doubted their genuineness: and they effectually braced up the spirit of the soldiery to encounter the old fame and often tried prowess of their adversaries.

The original and masterly plan of action devised by Epaminondas on this occasion was long remembered as an important improvement in the Grecian science of war; and the historian might be allowed to dwell on it with unmixed satisfaction, had it never been employed except for the only lawful purpose of hostilities—self-defence. The entire fronts of contending armies had commonly been brought into action at once, and the contest decided in every part of the line by superior numbers or valour. The Thebans had sometimes charged in column, when unable otherwise to break the opposing phalanx: but it was reserved for Epaminondas to choose from the first one point on which to make the decisive attack; and while he withheld the weaker parts of his line from immediately closing, to unite in the attacking column such a body, that though weaker in numbers on the whole, he might be greatly stronger on the decisive point. The battle was begun on both sides by the horse, and that of the Lacedæmonians was quickly driven back on the infantry. Their phalanx was formed twelve deep; and Epaminondas directed his Theban column fifty deep against the right wing, where stood the king with most of the Spartans, considering that, if this were routed, the rest would be an easy conquest. The chosen band around Cleombrotus awhile maintained the unequal struggle; but the pressure was too great; the king was slain, with many of the noblest Spartans; the wing gave way, the rest of the line speedily followed; and the Lacedæmonians with astonishment saw themselves overcome in a pitched battle by inferior numbers, a thing unknown for ages. (B. C. 371.)

When the news of the defeat at Leuctra was brought to Sparta, the people were celebrating one of their chief religious festivals. The ephori did not allow a moment's interruption of the solemnity; they only sent to the kindred of the slain information of their fate, and commanded the women to abstain from clamour and tears. Such power was yet in the institutions of Lycurgus, that the interdiction was universally obeyed; all

bore their losses in silence; and on the following day the friends of the dead went about with cheerful countenances, while those of the survivors kept their houses, or, if obliged to show themselves, appeared with every mark of sorrow and shame. Prompt action, however, was necessary to prevent a greater calamity, the loss of the defeated army, which was now besieged in its camp. To bring it off, the whole remaining strength of the commonwealth was ordered to march; and Agesilaus being still disabled, his son Archidamus was appointed to the command. But relief had come to the blockaded Lacedæmonians from an unexpected quarter.

Jason, of Phæræ in Thessaly, a man of uncommon powers both of body and mind, an able general and a skilful politician, had not only become the lord of his own city, but had brought most of Thessaly into subordinate alliance. At the head of the opposing cities was Pharsalus, which after violent struggles of faction had been tranquillised by an extraordinary agreement. Polydamas was a Pharsalian eminent by birth and riches, and by splendid hospitality, for which the Thessalians were noted; but most of all by spotless integrity, in which all parties placed such confidence, that they at length agreed for their mutual security to entrust him with the command of their citadel, and the exclusive management of their public revenues. He had been raised to this station without intrigue or violence by the free choice of his fellow-citizens; but the discretionary nature of his authority, and the absence of all provisions for examination and control, while they would have given to a dishonest man unbounded means of abuse, appeared to open a wide field to calumny against the most upright, and to withhold the means of vindication. Nevertheless, Polydamas executed his difficult office without incurring a breath of suspicion, and apparently to the satisfaction of all. He could not, however, equally succeed in opposing the power of Jason, which became daily more an overmatch for the Pharsalians and their allies. But Jason, though extravagantly ambitious, was politic and liberal: he respected the character of Polydamas, and wished his friendship; and he was wise enough to prefer the voluntary adherence of Pharsalus to its compelled subjection. He invited Polydamas to a conference, and urging the value of his own alliance

and the danger of his enmity, prevailed on him to advise the Pharsalians to compliance. The states of Thessaly had always acknowledged some common bonds of union, and had occasionally appointed a captain-general of the whole nation with the title of *Tagus*. This office was the object of Jason's ambition, and with the support of the states connected with Pharsalus, he readily obtained it. He had now at his command eight thousand horse, twenty thousand heavy-armed foot, and targeteers innumerable. He had extensive coasts, large revenues, and forests of excellent ship-timber, and he looked to dominion by sea as well as by land. With these resources he aspired to the supremacy of Greece, and further than that, to the conquest of Persia. Wild as these projects seem, he had means and abilities which might probably have realised them could his life have been sufficiently prolonged; but they were too vast for the ordinary duration of a single human life, and Jason was cut off in his prime, when hardly entered on his career.

At the battle of Leuctra, Jason was already *Tagus*; he was allied with Thebes, and the Thebans invited him to come and aid in the overthrow of Lacedæmon. He came; but, considering that the ruin of its enemy would make Thebes mightier than suited his designs, he bent his mind to save the remnant of the beaten army. He counselled peace, and obtained a truce, under favour of which the Lacedæmonians decamped by night. Arriving in Megaris, they met the army under Archidamus, and all now dispersed to their homes.

Jason, returning into Thessaly, levied from all his cities oxen, sheep, goats, and swine, to sacrifice at the approaching Pythian festival. Though the rate of the impost was very moderate, it brought together a thousand oxen, and of the smaller cattle more than ten thousand. He also commanded the Thessalians to assemble in arms at the time of the solemnity, with the purpose, as was universally believed, of assuming the presidency to himself. But before the period came, he was assassinated by seven young men, who approached him, under pretence of having a difference to settle, while he was sitting after a review of the Phærean cavalry to listen to such as needed his advice, authority, or assistance.

The issue of the great contest still

was doubtful. The success of Thebes had been glorious, but the Peloponnesians were bound by it more firmly to Lacedæmon, whose power secured to them collectively a pre-eminence which would be lost by the ascendancy of a state beyond the peninsula. The Athenians, jealous alike of both the rivals, wished to balance them; and their aim was, before either people had the game in its own hands, to make peace on the principle of independence to the cities, which seemed to give the best chance of lasting quiet, and least to favour the ambition of the dreaded powers. Accordingly they invited to Athens a congress of all who wished for peace on the terms established by the treaty of Antalcidas. The congress met, attended by ministers from nearly every state of Greece; the Athenians proposed, and the meeting approved an oath to this effect: "I will abide by the terms of peace which the king sent, and by the decrees of the Athenians and their allies; and if any state having sworn this oath shall be attacked, I will succour it with all my strength." The oath was taken by all, except the Eleians, who objected to the independence of some subjects of their own.

The Mantineian people, now considering Lacedæmon as barred from interfering, decreed that they would re-assemble in one city, which should forthwith be fortified. This was offensive to Lacedæmon; but to hinder it forcibly, would be so gross a breach of the recent treaty that all Greece could not fail to resent it. Agesilaus had great personal and family interest in Mantinea, and he was sent to negotiate; but the leaders, fearing his popularity, refused to call an assembly, and he went away in anger, yet holding the appeal to arms impossible under the treaty.

The success of the popular party in Mantinea animated their friends in Tegea, and they conceived the project of uniting Arcadia under a general assembly from all the states, to whose decisions each particular city should be subject. The plan was likely to be widely beneficial; but it was dangerous to the aristocratical rulers of Tegea, whose power could hardly stand when entirely divorced from all connexion with Lacedæmon, and joined in a league, of which the Mantineian democracy would be a leading member. By their influence the measure was thrown out in the assembly; and the proposers

attempted to carry it by arms. But the sway of the present governors had been liberal and equitable; their adherents were not less numerous than their opponents, and they prevailed in the battle. Stasippus, their chief, a man of unusual humanity, forbade pursuit. The fugitives collected at the gate towards Mantinea, and entering into conference with the victors, prolonged it till the arrival of the Mantineian forces, which they had sent for before the contest began. They then opened the gate, and attacked their imprudently merciful conquerors. Stasippus and some of his friends escaped by the opposite gate, and, being closely pursued, took refuge in a temple; but their enemies, uncovering the roof, and pelting them with the tiles, compelled them to surrender. They were tried by a court of democratical Tegeans and Mantineians, and were condemned, and executed by the enemies whom they had spared. About 800 Tegeans then fled to Lacedæmon.

The Mantineians now had clearly put themselves in the wrong; and the Lacedæmonians sent an army under Agesilaus to punish them, and to restore, if possible, the Tegean exiles. Meantime, the project of union had become extensively popular in Arcadia, and it had been agreed, almost universally, that a new city should be founded, with the name of Megalopolis, (Great City,) to be the common capital and place of assembly of the Arcadian people. The force of nearly every state was collected to oppose Agesilaus; but the Arcadians did not hazard a battle; and the campaign was closed without any important result, except that the spirit of the Lacedæmonian people was somewhat raised by the display of its superiority in the field.

The victory at Leuctra had been very gratifying to the pride of the Bœotians; and the consequence was a willing submission throughout the province to the supremacy of Thebes, a general attachment to the successful leaders, and a warm concurrence in their projects of ambition. Those able statesmen had so skilfully improved their rising influence and reputation, that they had found the means of inducing the Phocians also to submit to their dominion, without the use of any violence contrary to the treaty. By the war of Lacedæmon and Arcadia, they had a pretext for hostility against the former, and an opportunity

of procuring powerful allies within the peninsula; so that no opportunity, as it seemed, could be fitter to strike a blow for empire. It is true that, in strict justice, they had no sufficient ground for hostility, since the Mantineians and not the Lacedæmonians had been the aggressors; but, in the general imperfection of information, the violence of party spirit, and the prevailing laxity of political principle, it was not difficult to make out a case against Lacedæmon which would satisfy great part of Greece; and accordingly they were reinforced from many neighbouring states. In the middle of winter their army, marching under the command of Epaminondas, passed through the Corinthian territory into Peloponnesus. The Corinthians had professed and kept a strict neutrality; yet, because they would not take arms against Lacedæmon, their ancient ally, to support the violence of Mantinea against Tegea, their lands were ravaged, their cattle driven off, and their houses burnt. The Bœotian army joined the Arcadians, Argians, and Eleians near Mantinea; the Lacedæmonians had quitted Arcadia; and Epaminondas was advised by his Peloponnesian allies to lead his army into Laconia. In spite of opposition, he passed the rugged frontier mountains, and advanced along the left bank of the Eurotas, plundering and burning. He found the bridge which led to Sparta too strongly guarded for him to attempt the passage; but he proceeded farther down the river, and crossing it at Amyclæ, bent his march towards the unwallèd capital.

The confederate force was far greater than any that Lacedæmon could assemble, had all her subjects been zealous in her cause. But the greater part of the Laconians regarded as friends the enemies of the Spartans; many had already joined the invaders, and in the rest no confidence could be placed. The Spartans only could be safely trusted, and their small number seemed lost in the extent of the city. It was resolved to offer freedom to any Helots who would assist in the defence. More than 6000 were enrolled, and then the administration became fearful of the strength it had created. Succours, however, arriving from some of the allies, they now thought they could command the fidelity of the new levy. Agesilaus showed his ability in an imposing disposition for defence; and by this, to-

gether with the fame of Lacedæmon, the enemy was deterred from an attack, which might, not improbably, have succeeded. Epaminondas again proceeded down the river, pillaging and burning every unfortified town, and laid siege to Gythium, the port of Lacedæmon. But, though he kept strict discipline among his Bœotians, he could not equally manage his Peloponnesian allies. They were tired of winter warfare, laden with booty, and tempted by the nearness of their homes; and their dropping off diminished his army till he thought it prudent to quit Laconia.

The ferment was great in Athens on hearing the imminent peril of Lacedæmon, less from friendship to that power than from apprehension of Thebes. The council summoned an assembly. It was addressed by ambassadors then present, from Lacedæmon and its allies, who magnified the danger of Theban ambition, and the benefits of friendship between Lacedæmon and Athens. A murmur arose, that the Lacedæmonians talked of friendship when they were in distress, but that when they were prosperous, their conduct had ever been overbearing. "Yet," it was said, "at the end of the Peloponnesian war, when the Thebans urged our utter ruin, they prevented it." "Besides, we are bound by oath to aid the Lacedæmonians, who are not attacked for any injustice, but for the just succour given to the Tegeans when attacked by the Mantineians contrary to the oaths." This argument worked on most, though some were blinded by party violence so far as to justify the Mantineians. But when the Corinthian ambassador called on them to avenge the unprovoked ravage of his country, to which not even malice could impute any breach of the treaty, the cry that he had spoken well was general; and the result was a vote that the whole strength of the commonwealth should march under Iphicrates to the relief of Lacedæmon. The army marched; but Iphicrates, apparently, was not zealous in the cause; for he incurred great blame by a dilatory conduct very unlike his usual activity. He did not reach Arcadia till the Thebans were quitting Laconia, and he let them return home unopposed.

The invasion was over, but it had broken the power of Lacedæmon. A large part of the unprivileged Laconians remained in revolt, and nearly all the Helots. The able Theban leaders took

the opportunity, while they were masters of the field, to establish a permanent check on the rival state. They invited all the scattered relics of the Messenians to return and repossess the country of their fathers, to which, in all their wanderings and sufferings, they had ever looked with love and fond regret. Epaminondas was patron of the new city of Messene, built at the foot of Mount Ithome, on which the citadel was placed. The work was completed without interruption; and thus the Thebans, in restoring the inheritance of a brave and injured people, deprived Lacedæmon of half its territory, and established on its frontier an inveterate adversary that formed a rallying point for its disaffected subjects. Few statesmen have ever been able so well to combine in one measure the furtherance of ambitious projects and the gratification of a benevolent disposition.

Next year, the Thebans, invading Peloponnesus, were obliged to return home before they had done any thing considerable, by the hostility of the Thessalians under the Tagus Alexander of Phœæ. Meantime, a schism was rising in their confederacy. They had got, like the Athenians and Lacedæmonians, any superiority in ancient fame, in political institutions, or in the character of their people, which could make their allies consider obedience as their due. They had only numbers, courage, and discipline, with an extraordinary man at their head; in the former respects the Arcadians were little inferior, and they had now a chief of no common ability. Lycomedes of Mantinea, was noble and wealthy, an active promoter of the Arcadian union, and distinguished both in council and in arms. He advised his countrymen no longer to make themselves the blind instruments of Theban ambition. "As soldiers," he said, "you are notoriously among the best in Greece. Without you, the Lacedæmonians never invaded Attica, nor will the Thebans now invade Laconia. If you are wise, you will insist on equality with Thebes. You have formerly raised the Lacedæmonians, you are now raising the Thebans; and shortly you will find the Thebans but other Lacedæmonians." The Arcadian people submitted themselves entirely to the direction of Lycomedes, and under him they were active and successful, inasmuch that they began to be held the best soldiers of the time. But their

strength and success were far from being grateful to the Thebans, when coupled with their rising spirit of independence.

The distress of Lacedæmon had now been considerably alleviated by the growing disunion of its enemies, and by cordial support from Athens, principally directed by the skill of Chabrias. Additional assistance was derived from an emissary of Persia, who had been sent, to mediate a peace on the condition that Messenia should return to subjection; and who, when this stipulation was rejected by the Thebans, had employed a large sum of money in raising mercenaries for Lacedæmon. Soon after, the Argians, Arcadians, and Messenians, were defeated by Archidamus, the son of Agesilaus, without the loss of a single Lacedæmonian, a circumstance from which this action became celebrated under the title of the Tearless Battle. At the same time the Thebans were pressed by the war with Thessaly; they, therefore, began to wish for peace, and they turned their eyes to Persian support as the likeliest means of enabling them to make it on their own terms. Pelopidas was sent to Susa, accompanied by ministers from Argos, Elis, and Arcadia: his manners were pleasing, his conduct dexterous, and he won the king to the side of Thebes. A Persian of rank accompanied him to Greece with a written mandate, requiring that Messene should be independent; that the Athenians should lay up their fleet; that war should be made upon them if they refused; and declaring that, if any city refused to join in such war, the king would direct his first hostility against it. The Thebans now assumed to be the arbiters of Greece, and their summons for a congress to meet at Thebes was generally obeyed. But when, on the Persian rescript being read, the Thebans demanded that those who wished to be friends of the king and of themselves, should immediately swear to the terms proposed, the deputies from the cities generally answered that they were sent not to swear to any propositions, but to hear and report them to their constituents. The Arcadians were more decided in their opposition. Pelopidas had spoken of them contemptuously in Persia, and the court had consequently slighted their ambassador; who returned from his mission in high wrath, and reported to the assembly that the king had bakers, cooks, cup-bearers, and door-

keepers in plenty, but men to fight with the Greeks he had searched for and could not find. The address of their envoy was well suited to bias them against any settlement of Grecian affairs to be made under the authority of Persia: and it probably contributed much to the same effect, that the delegates sent to the general congress were mostly taken from the party opposed to Theban ascendancy. Lycomedes was one of these, and he not only declined the oath, but said that the congress ought to have been held on the seat of war, and not in Thebes. The Thebans angrily exclaimed that he was acting as an incendiary in the league: whereupon he declared that he would sit no longer, and went home, accompanied by all the other Arcadian deputies. The meeting broke up. The Thebans sent to every city separately requisitions to accept the terms, expecting that none would venture to incur the united enmity of Thebes and Persia: but Corinth first refusing, and adding that it wanted no interchange of oaths with the king, most others followed the example; "and thus," says Xenophon, "this attempt of Pelopidas and the Thebans to acquire the empire of Greece came to its end."

The Achæians were fortunate in their ancient institutions, and free from the seductions of empire; and hence their character for probity stood high, and they had been less vexed than most of their neighbours with bloody dissension. They had parties, and we have seen in Athens that the same ground-work of law would uphold a very different fabric of government, as principles were applied by the Many or the Few; but we have also seen that the existence of acknowledged principles was a common safeguard to all, since it narrowed the field of oppression when parties were unequal, and of contest when they were balanced. The Achæian constitution seems to have kept its form, though administered by the nobles or the people, as Lacedæmon or Athens preponderated. Since the Peloponnesian war the rulers had been aristocratical; but now the democratical party looked for support to the imperial democracy of Thebes. Epaminondas led an army into the province. The men of rank threw themselves on his liberality, and he did not disappoint them; for while he transferred the administration to their opponents, and took pledges of fidelity to Thebes, he neither changed the constitution, nor suffered the banishment of any

individual. But his moderation offended the high democratical party throughout the league; the Arcadians complained that he had settled Achaia according to the interest of Lacedæmon, and the complaint found support in Thebes. The Theban people decreed that regulators should be sent to the Achaian cities; and these, concurring with the multitude, expelled the nobles, and established unqualified democracy. It soon appeared that the wise liberality of Epaminondas had been best for Thebes, for Arcadia, and for the Achaian Many themselves; for the exiles making common cause, and attacking each city separately, recovered all; and, instead of remaining neutral, as before, they became bitter enemies to the Theban league, and most troublesome neighbours to Arcadia.

The city of Sicyon had commonly been in alliance with the Achaians, and under similar laws. The predominance of Lacedæmon had preserved its government in the hands of the rich and noble; and they had kept it faithful to their patroness, till very recently, when it had yielded to the growing strength of the Theban league. This change took all power from Euphron, who had previously managed the affairs of the commonwealth; but he wished, as he had been first of the citizens under Lacedæmon, to become so now under her enemies. For this purpose he persuaded the Argians and Arcadians that, if authority rested in the wealthy, they would take the first opportunity of renewing the alliance with Lacedæmon: whereas, if democracy were established, the city would adhere to its present connexion. The Argians and Arcadians entered into his views, and sent soldiers to support him: he assembled the people in the presence of these auxiliaries, and obtained a vote to establish democracy. He was chosen general with four others; his son was placed in command of the mercenaries; and, henceforward, he advanced with rapid strides on the highway of tyranny. He lavished on his mercenaries the public treasure and that of the temples, besides the private property of many persons, whom he drove into banishment as friends of Lacedæmon. When he thought himself strong enough, he turned against his fellows in office, assassinated some, and drove out others, till he ruled without a rival. In all these violences the allies were induced to acquiesce, partly by money, and partly by the ready service of his troops.

Æneas of Stymphalus, on being elected general of the Arcadians, resolved to put down this oppressor. He marched to Sicyon with his army, and entering the acropolis he called together the principal men, and sent for those who had been driven into exile without a legal sentence. Euphron fled to the harbour, which he found the means of delivering to the Lacedæmonians; and by this he obtained a favourable hearing, though probably no real belief, for the assertion that, in spite of appearances, he had ever meant fairly towards them. Meantime strife had risen in the city between the nobles and the commonalty; and Euphron, having hired a band of mercenaries in Athens, offered his services to the latter, and found acceptance. He mastered all the city except the acropolis, where Æneas had placed a Theban governor and garrison. He then went to Thebes with large sums of money, in the hope of persuading that government to expel the nobles from Sicyon, to withdraw the garrison, and to leave the city in his hands. The recalled exiles also went to Thebes to urge a counter petition: but they saw their enemy received in a manner which made them think that his suit would be granted, and some of them, driven wild by the fear of renewed oppression, fell upon him publicly and slew him. The assassins were carried before the council to be judged; but they were acquitted on the ground that tyrants and traitors were already condemned by the universal judgment of mankind, and that, Euphron being both, his slayers were entitled to honour, not to punishment.

Since the last settlement of Phlius by Agesilaus, that little state had been the active, faithful, and dauntless ally of Lacedæmon, throughout its greatest distress, and had done service out of all proportion to its population and strength. Its situation on the Argian border, and in the line of march from the isthmus to Laconia, gave it great facility of annoying the enemy, but peculiarly exposed it to suffer by his hostility. During the second invasion of Peloponnesus by Thebes, the exiles, who had been driven into banishment after the siege of Phlius by Agesilaus, having intelligence in that city, surprised the acropolis, while the Eleian and Arcadian forces, by concert with them, assailed the walls. Both were beaten off by the prompt and energetic resistance of the besieged, and the Phliasians continued the steady

friends of Lacedæmon, though surrounded with watchful enemies far more powerful than themselves. Their power was not sufficient to make their history important in the general outline of Grecian politics, but their loyalty to their engagements, and singular spirit, activity, and prudence in defence, form the subject of a very interesting narrative in Xenophon, of which the English reader will find the substance in Mr. Mitford's *History of Greece* (c. xxviii. s. 1).

Oropus, an Attic port on the border of Bœotia, being seized by some Athenian exiles, the whole force of Attica was marched against it; but no assistance came from any of the allies, and the Athenians were unable to reduce it. They became, in consequence, discontented with their allies, and the knowledge of this gave to Lycomedes the hope of advancing his favourite project of emancipating Arcadia from Theban influence. He obtained a decree from the Ten Thousand, the name by which the general assembly of Arcadia was designated, authorising him to negotiate an alliance with Athens, whither accordingly he went. The proposal was exclaimed against by many as contrary to the treaty with Lacedæmon: but, when it was represented that any thing which loosened the connexion of Thebes with Arcadia would be beneficial no less to Lacedæmon than to Athens, the alliance was accepted. Lycomedes, in returning, unfortunately, landed at a port which was full of Arcadian exiles, and by them he was murdered.

The Corinthians, cut off from Lacedæmon, had become accustomed to rely in great measure on Athenian auxiliaries for their defence. A suspicion arose that the Athenians cherished designs against the independence of Corinth, and the government dismissed the Athenian troops, saying that it had no further need of them. Without them, however, it was unable to withstand its powerful enemies, and persons were sent to sound the Theban government, and to learn whether an application for peace would be successful. Being encouraged to expect it, the Corinthians asked that they might first communicate with their allies, so that those who desired peace might be parties; and this being granted, they sent ambassadors to Lacedæmon. They represented the difficulties of their situation; expressed their willingness to persevere in the war, if the Lacedæmo-

nians could point out any hope of safety, and if not, their wish that the Lacedæmonians would join with them in making peace: but if this might not be, they requested the Lacedæmonians to allow of their making a separate peace; "for if we are saved," they said, "we may serve you hereafter; which if we be now ruined, we never can." The conduct of the Lacedæmonians, in this instance was generous; they encouraged the Corinthians to make peace, and released from their engagements any others of their allies who might wish to be relieved from war. For themselves, they said, they never would submit to lose Messenia, which they had received from their fathers. The Corinthians sent an embassy to ask for peace; the Thebans proposed alliance, but this the Corinthians refused. The Thebans then, admiring their resolution not to take part, though pressed with danger, against their friends and benefactors, granted them peace with neutrality. The same terms were also given to the Phliansians.

In Orchomenus, the second city of Bœotia, the oligarchical party was the strongest, and it bore the sway of Thebes with great reluctance. An oligarchical party was still numerous in Thebes itself, but the chiefs were in exile; and these plotted with their friends in the different cities, and particularly in Orchomenus, to effect a revolution which might restore them. The conspirators mostly served in the cavalry, and a general review of the cavalry of Bœotia was the occasion chosen for the execution of the plot. The secret had been betrayed to the Bœotarchs; the conspirators of the smaller towns were pardoned, but all the soldiers of the Orchomenian cavalry were brought in chains before the assembled Theban people. From the earliest period an inveterate hatred is said to have subsisted between Thebes and Orchomenus; and never was a feud more bloodily terminated. Not only were the cavalry put to death, who had in some sense provoked vengeance, but it was decreed that Orchomenus should be levelled, and the whole people sold into slavery. The decree was of course resisted. The Thebans marched in arms to Orchomenus, and having taken it, slaughtered all the men, and sold the women and children.

After this an army was sent into Thessaly. The Tagus Alexander, already mentioned as a troublesome enemy to

Thebes, was an able man, but a rapacious, oppressive, and faithless ruler. His tyranny provoked resistance, and the Thebans had already sent Pelopidas with an army to support the revolting cities. That expedition had ended unprosperously; but fresh oppressions raising fresh revolts, the Thessalian friends of Thebes again requested a supporting army, and Pelopidas for the leader. Both suits were granted. Pelopidas fell in the first battle; but, nevertheless, the presence of a Boeotian force relieved the opposers of the Tagus, and the end was an accommodation between Alexander and the Thessalian cities, and his alliance with Thebes.

Elis was oligarchically governed, but its democratical opposition was patronised by the Arcadians. Hence arose war between the two states; and Elis returned to the Lacedæmonian alliance. The people of Pisa, near Olympia, had ever claimed the right of presiding at the Olympian festival, and the Arcadians now backed them. The Arcadians seized Olympia, and the Pisans commenced the solemnity under their protection; but it was interrupted by the Eleian forces, and at the time when all war was usually suspended, the sacred ground itself became a field of battle. The Eleians were generally despised as soldiers, but this day, through zeal to vindicate their sacred character, and anger at what they deemed a shocking profanation, they proved themselves equal to the bravest of Greece. The day was theirs, but they could not retake the temple.

The employment of mercenary soldiers—vagabonds without a country of their own, who hired themselves out to states with which they had no other connexion, for the detestable work of war—was already common in Greece. We have now the first example of an approach to the modern use of standing armies embodied from the people. The Arcadian Eparites were a select militia of citizens from every state of the Union, who were to be always ready for service. They had contributed much to the successes of Arcadia, but their establishment involved a danger which soon became manifest. The present chiefs considered that, by making sure of the Eparites, they might controul all opposers. For this purpose, the Eparites must be kept embodied, and in pay, which seemed also necessary to the preservation of their conquests, and the

protection of their new allies. Their own resources were insufficient; but the Olympian treasury was in their hands, and they resolved to brave the abhorrence of Greece by using it. The source of the pay, now regularly issued to the Eparites, could not be concealed. The Mantineians condemned it by a vote of their assembly, and sent a sum of money to the general government as their share of the pay now wanted for the Eparites. Their leading men were cited before the Ten Thousand, to answer a charge of treason to the Union; and not appearing, they were condemned. A body of Eparites was sent to apprehend them, but the Mantineians shut their gates, and refused to give them up. Meantime shame and horror at the sacrilege prevailed in the general assembly of Arcadia, insomuch that a vote was passed forbidding further trespass on the sacred treasury.

The situation of the rulers was critical. They had blackened their character; they had lost the majority in the assembly; they had lost beyond recovery the command of the Eparites; for those who could not serve without pay, daily left that body, and were succeeded by men of competent fortune, who enlisted for the purpose of weaning it from its present attachments. Grown desperate, they sent to Thebes, and assuring that government that Arcadia was on the point of joining Lacedæmon, urged the march of a Theban army into Peloponnesus. The application was favourably received. Meantime, their opponents becoming decidedly superior in the assembly, ambassadors were sent to remonstrate at Thebes against the intended march of Theban forces into Arcadia, uncalled for by its government. It was next resolved that the temple at Olympia neither belonged to Arcadia, nor ought to be coveted by it, but that it would be both just and pious to restore it to Elis. On such grounds the Eleians gladly treated for peace, and deputies from all the Arcadian towns assembling in Tegea, received the ministers of Elis. A Theban officer also came to the congress, attended by three hundred Boeotian heavy armed foot.

The Arcadians now abandoned themselves to festivity, all but the principals in the sacrilege, who knew themselves not only excluded from power by the present change, but liable to the severest punishment. They communicated with the Theban, and found him ready to

support them. Some of the Eparites were still their own, and, backed by these and by the Bœotians, they shut the town-gates, and sent parties to seize the leading men of every Arcadian city. The persons arrested were far more than the prison could contain; but many escaped, and among these the greater part of the Mantineian leaders, whom it had been most wished to secure. Mantinea was only twelve miles off. A herald was sent thence to Tegea, to demand the liberty of the arrested Mantineians; to remonstrate against the execution or imprisonment of any Arcadian, without due trial; and to offer security, that any Mantineian, who might be accused of treason, should appear to answer. The Theban, perplexed and disconcerted, released his prisoners, and apologized for what he had done, misled, as he pretended, by false intelligence of a plot for betraying Tegea to the Lacedæmonians. He was suffered to depart; but ministers were sent to Thebes to accuse him. They were roughly repulsed, and Epaminondas, who was then commander-in-chief, told them that the officer had done much better when he seized the men, than when he released them; "For," said he, "when we are engaged in war on your account, your making peace, without consulting us, is a manifest treason. Be sure, then," he added, "that we will march into Arcadia, and there, with our friends, we will continue the war."

The interference of Thebes in the government of Arcadia had been insolently arbitrary, and the pretence to justify the threat of war was evidently futile. Had Arcadia made peace singly with Lacedæmon, there might have been reason for complaint; but the war with Elis was a separate matter, involving no Theban interests, and in which Thebes had taken no part. The act may have been prompted either by the wish to support at all hazards an administration which could only stand by keeping the country dependent on Thebes, or else by suspicion that the change had originated in Lacedæmonian intrigue, and would end in alliance with Lacedæmon. If by the latter, it made necessary the very measure which it was intended to prevent. In effecting the recent change, the entire oligarchical party had concurred with the greater part of the democratical—with nearly all, indeed, who were not implicated in the sacrilege. The oligarchical party would naturally lean towards Lacedæmon; the democratical

would prefer the friendship of Thebes, while it could be retained with independence. That hope being withdrawn, both parties concurred in the measures to be taken. They conferred with the Eleians and Achæians, and sent for Athenian succours, according to the treaty made by Lycomedes. Ambassadors were sent to Lacedæmon, and an alliance made on terms that marked the humbled state of that commonwealth; for it was agreed that the chief command should rest with the city in whose territory at any time the army might be.

Epaminondas advanced into Peloponnesus, and was joined by his allies there, namely, the Argians and Messenians, and four towns of the Arcadians. The rest of the Arcadians were assembled at Mantinea, with their Athenian, Achæian, and Eleian allies, and a part of the Lacedæmonians, the rest of whom remained with Agesilaus, at Sparta. The Theban general seeing no opportunity of advantageous action, remained quietly in Tegea, till he heard that his opponents had pressed Agesilaus to join them, and that the remaining Lacedæmonians were actually on their march. He then suddenly marched for Sparta, and had well nigh taken it empty; but Agesilaus was informed of his movement just in time to hasten back, and arrive before him. Though his numbers were very scanty, the able disposition of Agesilaus secured the town against a sudden assault; and a strong Theban detachment having seized a commanding height, Archidamus advanced over very difficult ground, with less than one hundred men, and—such was the power of desperation—drove them from it. Expecting that the forces collected in Arcadia would come to the aid of Lacedæmon, Epaminondas would not await them, but returned to Tegea, and sent forward his Theban and Thessalian horse, to plunder the Mantineian territory. It was harvest time, and the Mantineians believing that the enemy was gone, their servants and cattle were all in the fields. A body of Athenian cavalry was just arrived; they had travelled far, and men and horses were without refreshment; nevertheless, they did not refuse their assistance, though greatly outnumbered, and that by the Theban and Thessalian cavalry, esteemed the best in Greece. An obstinate conflict ensued, in which the Athenians had the advantage, and the Mantineians got in their property without loss.

Decisive action now was necessary to Epaminondas, for the period of his command was drawing to its close. He had hitherto met with little but failure in an enterprise, by the undertaking of which he had united all the most powerful states of Greece against his country. If he withdrew without a victory, the allies whom he came to aid would be besieged by the enemy, and his own reputation probably ruined: "so that it seemed to him," says Xenophon, "impossible not to fight, considering that if he were successful it would cancel all complaints, and that his end would be glorious if he fell in, the attempt to give to his country the dominion of Peloponnesus." In spite of the checks which had been received, his genius had kept up union and mutual confidence in all the various tribes that composed his host. His force exceeded that of his adversaries, and the more as they did not venture again to leave Laconia unprotected. His evolutions led them to believe that he would not fight before the morrow; and then he wheeled his army upon them, while their minds were no longer strung, nor their battalions arrayed for immediate action. In the battle which followed, instead of engaging like former commanders along the whole extent of the ranks, he exhibited a most perfect and refined application of the principles which had won him the victory at Leuctra. He formed his line obliquely, strengthening to the utmost the point which was nearest to the enemy; while he placed his weaker divisions in the parts which sloped off backwards; so that they might come up in time to complete the victory when the hostile line had been broken through by their fellows, but not soon enough to enter at the first into a doubtful contest, and perhaps by their defeat to dishearten the rest. The event did not belie his expectation: but just at the critical moment of the fight, he fell. He lived to know that his army was victorious, then fainted, on the extraction of the weapon, and died, as it is said, with an expression of joy that he had not lived to taste of defeat. No one attempted to improve the victory; the heavy armed infantry stood upon the spot, the cavalry quitted pursuit, and rejoined the phalanx; and the light armed troops and targeteers, crossing the field as conquerors without looking for support, were charged and cut to pieces by the Athenian horse. The whole result of the day was com-

pletely indecisive. Such was the celebrated battle of Mantinea. (B. C. 362.)

Epaminondas has been ranked by many as the first and purest of Grecian worthies. There is much in his character to support the praise; but it must be taken with considerable abatement. He was a man of the most commanding genius; a devoted Theban patriot; and, as far as we can judge, singularly free from mere personal ambition, and its attendant vices of envy and ill will. His steady friendship with Pelopidas is alike honourable to both. But we cannot award him the rarer praise of love of peace, of extended regard to the welfare of Greece, of scrupulous political morality, or even of sound views of his country's true interests. Under his direction the administration of Thebes was insatiably ambitious and overbearing. In some particular acts of tyranny, such as the expulsion of the Plataeans and Thespians, and the massacre of the Orchomenians, it may be doubted whether Epaminondas was to blame; and the rather, as we have seen in the settlement of Achaia an instance where his own measures were liberal and moderate, while his influence could not support them. But the bent of his policy was to make Thebes, at whatever cost of blood or suffering, the mistress of Greece; and the last aggression on Arcadia, which was undoubtedly his measure, and might vie with the worst deeds of Sparta herself, shows that he was little scrupulous in the choice of means for effecting his purpose. The manner of his death has been the theme of general applause. Yet he was cut off in the perpetration of a great crime, by measures which, no doubt, displayed much talent, but were the certain cause of misery to unoffending thousands; and those last words, which have been so famous, seem, if indeed they have been truly reported, to have proceeded less from an enlightened love of his country, than from a personal and patriotic vanity, altogether heedless of the cost mankind might have to pay for its gratification.

With the life of Epaminondas the energy ceased which had maintained union and activity in the Theban confederacy; and with it ended also the fear which had united so many states in opposition. A general accommodation soon ensued, in which the allies of Lacedæmon consented to the demand, that the Messenians should remain in-

dependent; and Lacedæmon, which alone refused, remained nominally at war with all the states allies of Thebes. The weariness of all parties, however, produced a practical cessation of hostilities, during which the attention of Agesilaus was invited to Egypt. That country had revolted from Persia, and taken to itself a king, to whose assistance Agesilaus, at the age of eighty years, led an army. He hoped, according to his friend and historian, to punish the Persian monarch for the support he had given to the enemies of Lacedæmon, and once more to free the Greeks of Asia from his yoke. Another motive which would probably weigh both with him and with the Lacedæmonian government, was the hope of acquiring wealth to support a war for the recovery of Messenia. Civil troubles arose in Egypt, and it was in them, not in war against Persia, that the Grecian army was principally employed. The king, to whose support Agesilaus had originally come, was deserted by his subjects; and the succession to his throne was disputed. Agesilaus established on the throne the candidate whom he supported, and, sailing for Greece, died on the voyage. He left a high reputation as an able, though not a fortunate statesman, and one of the few who, in promoting the aggrandisement of their communities, did not lose sight of the common welfare of Greece. This part of his character was strongly shown, when the means of taking Corinth by assault being offered to him by some Corinthian refugees, he refused, observing that it might be fit to chastise Grecian cities, but not to destroy them. But his affections were violent, whether in friendship or animosity; and he sometimes suffered them to overbear his better judgment, and even his integrity, as in the two most culpable actions of his life, his supporting the seizure of the Cadmeia, and excusing the aggression of Sphodrias. His character is strongly contrasted, both in its worse and better features, with that of his great opponent Epaminondas, whose noblest quality was his magnanimous superiority to personal interests and passions, whose greatest fault, the disposition to pursue the aggrandisement of his own commonwealth, careless of any injury which might follow to others.

The old Grecian system of confederacy was now entirely broken up. Lacedæmon was fallen, and the ascendancy of Thebes did not survive its author. One

might expect that the following period would be comparatively peaceful and happy, since the smaller states were no longer obliged to serve the ambition of the greater. Far from it: with the habits of the Greeks, lasting quiet was impossible, and a general war was only exchanged for a complication of petty quarrels, many of which, while the confederate system was in vigour, would probably have been referred to the judgment of the superintending state. Revolutions were more frequent, governments more jealous. The protecting power, by assuring stability to the subordinate administrations, had enabled them to relax the suspicious vigilance of fear; and the authority of its officers had often been employed to compose dissensions and moderate revenge. But now the only security of the ruling party was the complete depression of their adversaries, and this they sought by more unsparing massacre and banishment. Cruelly provoked retaliation; every feud still increased in bitterness; and it was observed that there were now more exiles from single cities than formerly from all Peloponnesus.

Argos has lately been little mentioned; and its inactivity is accounted for by the weakness resulting from a sedition and train of executions almost unparalleled. Some leading men, finding that their popularity had been overthrown by calumnies, and that their situation was growing dangerous, plotted the overthrow of the democracy: the design was discovered, and some of the culprits arrested and put to the torture. The chiefs of the conspiracy destroyed themselves; but one of the tortured having accused thirty other persons, all these were put to death without examination. It was now acknowledged that a plot had existed, and it was thought that the guilty were far more numerous than those who had suffered; fresh accusations were brought, and, in the present temper of the people, accusation was equivalent to conviction. The popular alarm and suspicion rose to absolute frenzy, and increased with every new charge, till above 1200 of the principal citizens were executed, and the people still called for more. The accusers now became alarmed; they knew not how to feed the fury they had raised, nor how to quiet it; their hesitation seemed suspicious, and they themselves were put to death. After this, says the author from whom we

have the relation, the multitude became calm ; but he makes no attempt to account for the restoration of tranquillity. In reflecting upon such revolting passages of Grecian story, we may well condemn the excesses incident to the immediate government of a multitude. But our censure of the individuals composing it should be mitigated by the consideration that, even when possessed of specious accomplishments, they were unenlightened by a sound education, and unaided by a rational system of jurisprudence. With the habits of mind produced by the one, and the regularity of proceeding secured by the other, the horrid excesses we have been surveying could never have taken place : the want of these prime blessings must be called in to explain them.

SECT. III.—For a short time after the overthrow of the Athenians in Sicily, Hermocrates kept the lead in Syracuse. At his proposal, ships were sent to assist the Lacedæmonians against Athens ; he was himself the commander of the squadron and his men were remarkable for courage and discipline, and especially for good conduct in quarters. Meantime, his opponents prevailed in Syracuse ; he was displaced and banished ; and after exhorting his seamen cheerfully to obey their new leaders, he departed, deeply regretted both by them and the allies. Some changes had been made by the opponents of Hermocrates in the Syracusan constitution, which made its democratical character more unqualified, but tended to lessen the energy of its administration. It had been enacted that most of the magistracies, hitherto elective, should be filled by lot ; a measure likely to be popular, as opening equally to all the chance of office, but certainly not favourable to the able discharge of its duties. While things were yet unsettled, the Carthaginians invaded Sicily, for the first time since their defeat by Gelon, seventy years before : there was neither union in the Sicilian cities nor vigour in the Syracusan government, and Selinus and Himera were quickly taken. At this time Hermocrates arriving, was received at Messene. Pharnabazus had given him money to aid in effecting his restoration, and he was thus enabled to build five triremes, and raise a thousand mercenary soldiers ; he was joined by many Syracusan exiles and fugitive Himærans, and he first employed his force against the common enemy with great activity and success. His fame spread wide ; he grew daily more popular in Syracuse, till his friends there thought the time was ripe for his return. At their invitation he entered Syracuse with a band of his followers ; but a contest ensued in which the ruling party was victorious ; Hermocrates fell, and his surviving friends were condemned to banishment.

Indecision and disunion increased among the cities, and no vigorous effort was made to check the arms of Carthage. Acragas, or Agrigentum, fell, the second city of Sicily, which had enjoyed an overflow of prosperity scarcely credible, were not the testimony of historians confirmed by the magnificent remains of its public buildings. In this crisis, Dionysius came forward in Syracuse. Though a partisan of Hermocrates, he had escaped the doom of banishment, and had since distinguished himself by his gallantry in the war. He now, at the age of twenty-four, commenced his political career by violent invective against the generals, and prevailed so far with the people, that they were displaced ; and he was among those appointed in their room. After this, he obtained a decree to recall the exiled friends of Hermocrates. There was yet a large opposing party ; but every attempt to overthrow him failed, and failing, made him stronger. He was appointed autocrat-general conjointly with Hipparchus, the first in birth of the Syracusans ; and both were continued in office till the death of Hipparchus, after which Dionysius was elected alone. This office, which was usually confined to rare emergencies, united the powers of first minister and commander-in-chief, and gave a constitutional form and mode of exercise to the authority held by the favourite of the people, or, at least of the prevailing party. But, where civil war was only prevented by decided superiority of force in one of the factions, the preservation of the laws was to the ruling party so much less pressing an object than the preservation of their own ascendancy, that their leaders were often encouraged to a vigour beyond the law. In Grecian party language, the friends of the people were to be supported even in somewhat arbitrary dealing with the people's enemies. But the opposite party also claimed to be the people, and complained that they were kept down by the violence of a faction ; and by them any man decidedly pre-eminent in the ruling party,

would be called the Tyrant. In the case of Dionysius, there was much to justify the epithet. He was continued through life in an office rarely filled, and usually for a short term; and, though all great questions were decided by the people, he exercised in the ordinary course of public business, a wider and more discretionary authority than was commonly trusted to officers under a democracy. A great mark of a tyrant was to depend for his support on mercenary troops. Dionysius entertained a large body of mercenaries for his wars with Carthage, and though his chief trust was not in them but in the Syracusans of his party, the mercenaries served him well in some civil contests, and added much to the strength of his government. The effect of all this was, that not his enemies only, but the Greeks in general habitually styled him Tyrant of Syracuse, and sometimes of the Sicilian Greeks, all of whom were latterly under his influence. But it is to be remembered that his power in Syracuse rested on the favour of a majority among the citizens, and that his command over the Sicilian, and many also of the Italian cities, was like to that of Athens or Lacedæmon over their subordinate allies.

Dionysius chiefly prevented all Sicily from falling under the yoke of Carthage; he sustained and repelled with the greatest ability and bravery, the attack of an overwhelming force, and gave union and security to the Grecian interest in the island. He brought under his command the greater part of Sicily, and much of Italy; all which, for sixteen years after the last peace with Carthage, he governed in very remarkable quiet, prosperity, and abundance. These facts prove him an able and liberal politician; his moral character is more questionable. It has been his fortune to be known to us only through his bitterest enemies, who have striven to represent him as a monster of cruelty and rapacity; and some have sought to make him an object of contempt as well as hatred by describing him as a slave to the weakest vanity and the most unmanly suspicion. Such imputations are irreconcilable with admitted facts; and Mr. Milford has gone so far in his defence, as to discredit, soften, or explain away every story which bears against him, and to set him up as a model of generosity and political virtue. The truth probably lies in the middle. The sway of Dionysius was evidently popular and

beneficial, and in some actions he showed a humanity very unusual in his age. We may willingly believe that his nature was kind, when no political interest opposed it; but he was ambitious and unscrupulous; and there is little appearance that pity ever stopped him in the prosecution of a favourite design. Two opposite anecdotes shall be given, and let it be remembered that both are taken from an unfriendly witness. The cities of Naxos and Catana being betrayed to him by their generals, he sold as slaves nearly all the citizens of both, and gave up the towns to be plundered by his soldiery. On the other hand, in Italy he defeated an army of his bitterest enemies, and reduced a body of 10,000 men to surrender at discretion, all of whom he dismissed without ransom. Policy, doubtless, had much to do in prompting both his cruelty and his generosity; but it is fair to state, that the latter was not out of harmony with his general conduct, and that in his victories he seems to have been habitually anxious to spare unnecessary bloodshed.

Dionysius died about the time of Epaminondas's second invasion of Peloponnesus (B. C. 367). Though the form of his government was democratical, the authority gained by his popularity and abilities, in the general looseness of Grecian law, was greater than that of kings in a well-regulated monarchy. He had strengthened his ascendancy by intermarriage with the first houses of Syracuse; and such was the combined effect of personal popularity and family influence that, on his death, his son, Dionysius, was elected autocrat-general, and stepped unopposed, as if by hereditary title, into the full authority of his father. Thus it is that, in turbulent times, or in an ill-constituted democracy, a popular leader, passes gradually into a monarch. The case of Dionysius runs parallel with those of Gelon and Peisistratus among the Greeks, and of the Medici in Florence; and it is to be observed that, in these three cases, but particularly the last, the power which originated in public favour became, before its fall, a grinding tyranny under the successors of the founder.

The younger Dionysius was indolent and dissolute, and his government, though it lasted undisturbed for twelve years, became before the end of that period both weak and unpopular. It was then overthrown by the revolt of the

Syracusans, under Dion the son of Hipparinus, a man of great courage and ability, and of cultivated taste for literature and philosophy; but haughty, violent, and arbitrary; not indeed destitute of patriotism, but far more governed by ambition. He had been in high trust and favour with the elder Dionysius, who had married his sister; but after his death disagreements had arisen between his son and Dion, which ended in the banishment of the latter. Returning with a small band of followers, Dion was welcomed as a deliverer by the greater part of the Syracusans, and elected autocrat-general without opposition; while Dionysius was besieged in the citadel, and both he and his followers were in the end obliged to retire into Italy. But Dion soon became almost universally unpopular, and when, after great struggles, he succeeded in holding his office, his reliance was not on the citizens, but on a band of foreign mercenaries. His mind was full of projected reforms, but his rigid and haughty character was little fitted to work their adoption by gentle measures, though persuasion or conviction. In all he was opposed by Heracleides, his principal coadjutor in the outset, and now his rival in authority, who was appointed autocrat-general in conjunction with him, and intrusted with the command of the fleet. Heracleides had made himself highly popular by unbounded indulgence to the multitude, and Dion, unable to cope with him in favour, endeavoured to supply the deficiency by force. Urged on partly by his temper and partly by the difficulty of his situation, and exasperated by the galling change in the public feeling, he became daily more tyrannical. He removed Heracleides by assassination, and confiscated the property of others among his adversaries, to pay his soldiers; till at length his most trusted friend plotted his murder, and he was assassinated in the hearing of his guards, no man moving to assist him. Thus perished Dion four years after his return from exile (B. C. 353). It is difficult to say why the name of tyrant, universally given to the elder Dionysius, has been refused to Dion, whose power appears to have been latterly both more arbitrary in its tenure and more severe in its exercise. Much probably is to be ascribed to the party bias of the historians, and much to the wide extent and long duration of the power held by the Dionysii, and the shortness of Dion's,

which has made his name more remarkable as the overthrower, than as the holder of a tyranny. In justice it must be observed, that the state of Syracuse, after the expulsion of Dionysius, was one of great confusion, where faction was violent, law unsettled, and the difficulty was very great to reconcile liberty with authority. Many of Dion's earlier unpopular measures may have been prompted by the opinion of public duty in a man, whose principles were adverse to democracy, and whose habit of mind revolted more from weakness and disorder in a government than from excessive rigour; but it seems likely that the changes which he projected were not the best, and it is certain, that his manner of enforcing them was altogether unjustifiable.

For eight years after the death of Dion, Syracuse was ever changing one tyrant for another, till it became half deserted through the multitude of its calamities. Of the other cities, some were utterly ruined and made desolate by war; others filled with a mixed crowd of unpaid mercenaries, Greek and barbarian, incapable of peaceful industry, and ready to lend their swords to any revolution which promised pay or plunder. At length a Syracusan party cast their eyes to their mother city, and requested a Corinthian general, whose authority might command respect from all, and repress the ambition of those who desired to be tyrants. Meantime the party friendly to Dionysius invited back their leader, and he again became the lord of Syracuse; while his most active opponents fled to Hicetes, the tyrant of Leontini, and with him made war on Dionysius.

Timoleon was a Corinthian of noble birth, and distinguished ability as a warrior and statesman. His brother having, partly by popularity and partly by the aid of a mercenary force, made himself tyrant of Corinth, Timoleon, after vain remonstrances, slew him. When the Syracusan ambassadors arrived, the deed was recent, and all Corinth was in a ferment,—some extolling Timoleon, as the most magnanimous of patriots; others execrating him as a patricide. The request of the Syracusans offered to the Corinthians the means of calming their dissensions, by the removal of the obnoxious individual, and to Timoleon a field of honourable action, in which he might escape from the misgivings of his own mind. and the

reproaches of his mother, who never forgave him. Timoleon proceeded to Sicily, with a small band of mercenaries, principally raised by his own credit. On arriving he received considerable reinforcements, and soon gained a footing in Syracuse. The greater part of the city had already been taken by Hicetes from Dionysius, and the whole was divided between three parties, each hostile to both the others. Timoleon was in the end successful. Hicetes withdrew to Leontini, and Dionysius surrendered, himself and his friends retiring to Corinth; while two thousand mercenaries of the garrison engaged in the service of Timoleon. This final expulsion of Dionysius took place fifty years after the rise of his father; and four after the landing of Timoleon in Sicily. (b. c. 343.)

Timoleon remained master of a city, the largest of all in the Grecian settlements; but almost a desert through the multitudes slain, or driven into banishment in successive revolutions. So great, it is said, was the desolation, that the horses of the cavalry grazed in the market place, while the grooms slept at their ease on the luxuriant herbage. The winter was passed in assigning deserted lands and houses as a provision to the few remaining Syracusans of the Corinthian party, and to the mercenaries instead of pay, which the general had not to give. In winter, when Grecian warfare was slackened or interrupted, the possession of good houses would, doubtless, be gratifying; but to men unused to peaceful labour, lands without slaves and cattle were little worth, and it was necessary in the spring to find them some profitable employment. Unable sufficiently to supply the wants of his soldiers from any Grecian enemy, Timoleon sent one thousand men into the territory belonging to Carthage, and gathered thence abundance of spoil. The measure may seem rash, but he probably knew that an invasion was preparing, and that quiescence would not avert the storm, while a rich booty would make his soldiers meet it better. The Carthaginians landed in Sicily. Their force was stated at seventy thousand foot, and ten thousand horse; while Timoleon could only muster three thousand Syracusans, and nine thousand mercenaries. Nevertheless, he advanced to meet them in their own possessions, and, by the union of admirable conduct with singular good fortune, won a glo-

rious victory, which was soon followed by an honourable peace.

Timoleon, professing to be the liberator of Sicily, next directed his arms against the various chiefs or tyrants, who held dominion in the towns. In this he may probably have been actuated by a sincere hatred of such governments; but he frequently seems to have little consulted the wishes of the people, whose deliverer he declared, himself. Most of the smaller chiefs withdrew; the more powerful resisting, were conquered, and being given up to their political adversaries, were put to death,—in some cases with studied cruelty. Among the victims was Hicetes, who was submitted, with his whole family, to the judgment of that mixed multitude, now called the Syracusan people, and all were put to death. There is much appearance that Hicetes deserved his fate; but what shall we say of the people, which doomed to death his unoffending wife and daughters; and what of the general who, holding little less than absolute authority over his followers, referred such a matter to the decision of such a body?

Having every where established for Syracuse and for himself a superintending authority, which rested on the support of a prevailing party, like the controul of Athens or Lacedæmon over their allies, Timoleon sought to restore good order, abundance, and population, to the long afflicted island. Syracuse was still very thinly peopled, and it was torn by mutual jealousy between the remnant of the ancient Syracusans, and the numerous mercenaries and foreign adventurers, who had been rewarded for their services with lands and houses, and admission to all the rights of citizens. At one time the struggle ripened to a civil war, of which we know not the circumstances or the issue, but, probably, it was suppressed without the ruin of either party. At once to supply the void in the city, and to strengthen his government by a body of adherents who owed their all to him, Timoleon invited colonists from Greece, and settled at one time four thousand families on the Syracusan territory, and on a neighbouring plain of great extent and fertility no less than ten thousand. Similar measures were adopted in many of the other cities, under his controul. He revised the ancient laws of Syracuse, and restored them with amendments skilfully adapted to the altered state of the com-

monwealth. But to amalgamate into an united people so many bodies of men of various interests, and mostly trained to war and violence, was a work only to be accomplished by the energy of one able man; and in accomplishing that work, Timoleon was both enabled and obliged, by the lawless habits of his followers, to exercise an authority not less arbitrary than that of any tyrant he had overthrown. In one most important particular, he is superior, not only to those chiefs, to Gelon and Dionysius, and to all who ever held like power in Sicily, but perhaps, to all, with the single exception of Washington, who has ever risen to the highest power in times of tumult: for he appears to have directed his endeavours honestly and wisely to the object, not of establishing a dynasty of princes, but of so settling the government, and training the people, that they should be able after his death to govern themselves without an arbitrary leader. He died highly honoured and generally beloved, and for many years after his death the whole of Sicily continued in unusual quiet and growing prosperity. Yet, in doing justice to the great qualities of Timoleon, and the sincerity of his zeal for the public good, we cannot but own, that he was unscrupulous in the choice of means, even beyond the ordinary laxity of political morality in Greece, and that his fame is tarnished by some acts of atrocious cruelty, and of gross injustice.

CHAPTER VIII.

Of Greece, from the peace which followed the battle of Mantinea, to the destruction of Thebes, by Alexander the Macedonian.

SECT. I.—THE institutions of Lycurgus had impressed on his people a completely artificial character. By stimulating some feelings and principles to excess, and almost eradicating others, it had turned every thought and passion to the one pursuit of national aggrandisement. The sagacity of the author was great, and the scheme for awhile attained its end. But man's wisdom is foolishness, when, instead of taking his fellows as their Maker formed them; and endeavouring to favour the happy development of their whole nature by reason and conscience, he undertakes to make them the mere creatures of a system, and determines by an arbi-

trary standard what virtues he will cultivate, and what vices admit. In its best times the system of Lycurgus promoted neither happiness nor goodness. But when foreign command and distant warfare had rendered large communication with strangers unavoidable, the Spartan virtues gave way to foreign vices, but the Spartan vices kept their hold; avarice and corruption were no longer aliens, but, pride, cruelty, contempt of mankind were as prevalent as ever. Nay, the latter feeling had a wider field than when the system was new; for the same disdain and jealousy, with which the early Lacedæmonians were wont to view the wretched Helots, were lavished by the few who latterly monopolized the Spartan game on all their unprivileged fellow-citizens. Hence the internal weakness which, when Lacedæmon was at the highest, enabled a people hitherto undistinguished, to strike her down never more to rise. The greatness of Athens rested on a different footing. Favoured by circumstances and situation, she had early outstripped her neighbours in peaceful arts, in civilization and intelligence. The wisdom of Theseus had laid the foundation of good government, which was built upon by Solon. Less ingenious, less original, less elaborately systematic, the views of Solon were juster and more sober than those of Lycurgus. He did not attempt to new create his people, but simply to moderate their dissensions, restrain their injurious passions, and open a fair field to the growth and exercise of ability and virtue. Good order was so far established that civil disturbance was more rare, and life and property secured, though very imperfectly, yet better than in any other Grecian city; both speech and action were singularly free; the career of ambition was open to all, and its prizes splendid. The fruits of this system were considerable mitigation of party-rancour; humanity of manners greater than was usual in Greece, and extending even to the kinder treatment of slaves; an unparalleled development of the national intellect, displaying itself in every channel both of action and speculation; a patriotic pride and attachment, less bigoted and less founded in contempt of others; but not less warm than that of the Lacedæmonians. These merits rested not, like those of the Lacedæmonians, on unvarying conformity to the institutions which had nursed them, but rather on the habits resulting from free

and regular government, yet not identified with any particular form; and, above all, on this one great safeguard against gross abuse, that the people were accustomed to exercise a legal, peaceable, and effectual control over the administration. The city was twice taken; the first time abandoned and destroyed; the second, enthralled to a tyrannical oligarchy, that purchased the privilege of unlimited oppression by keeping it subject to Lacedæmon; yet, on both occasions, it soon recovered freedom and greatness. When the might of Lacedæmon once was broken, and her hitherto inviolate territory invaded, though the occupation was short, and the city was not taken, she never recovered from the blow. The one state may be compared to an engine of vast power, but limited to a single mode of action, and unable to restore itself when the springs are strained, or its play impeded: the other to a living body, containing an energy which enables it to repair the damage of accident or disease, and adapt its constitution to every change of circumstance. When Thebes had humbled Lacedæmon, it seemed as if its task were done: it had risen to empire by the accidental production of one great man, with some able coadjutors, and it sunk with the mastermind which had raised it. But great men were the constant growth of Athens, and by the ability of its statesmen, and the intelligence and resources of its people, it became again, and long continued, the first city of Greece.

But though Athens had now recovered its importance, in so many changes the character of its government and people had grievously suffered. The most perfect state of the Athenian constitution was probably that which followed the reform of Cleisthenes: all after changes seem to have been for the worse. In every country there are certain advantages of education and habits which tend to foster that general liberality of conduct and feeling, which is emphatically said to mark the character of a gentleman. It is not, however, where excessive privileges are attached to rank and wealth, that this character is chiefly found; for in such states the privileged caste, thinking their superiority enough attested by the accidents of situation and the outward polish of manners, are apt to neglect the more essential ornaments of courtesy, generosity, and candour, or, observing those virtues towards their equals, are yet prone to

treat their poorer countrymen with harshness and injustice. Of Grecian oligarchies by far the best regulated was the Lacedæmonian; and here we have seen the tyranny of the Spartans as a body: but in most others, besides the general oppression of the government, the people suffered without redress, from the rapine, or brutal licentiousness of powerful individuals. The case was different in Athens. The law was equal, and the courts were popularly constituted; and though personal and family interest might sometimes screen an ordinary delinquent, it seldom protected a criminal whose trespass was of a nature to provoke extensive indignation. The only road to greatness was through the favour of the people; by communication with whom all important public business was transacted; and thus controlled by law, by opinion, and by frequent intercourse with all classes, the noble Athenian was prevented from indulging a tyrannical haughtiness. The same causes which checked in him the besetting vices of over-powerful nobilities, were stimulants to exercise the virtues becoming his station; for being unable to enforce deference by terror, and equally unable to decline the jurisdiction of public opinion, and rest his credit on the suffrage of a narrow circle of equals, the only way to make his rank respected was by a suitable superiority in accomplishments and dignity of character. To men thus prepared distinguished birth was a ready introduction to political success; for the Athenians dwelt too fondly on the ancient glories of their country, to be without partiality towards the descendants of their heroes. Hence, long after the highest offices were open to all, we find political leaders mostly men of family, and universally of liberal education. But a change became visible after the death of Pericles. The prevailing character of the poor citizens who lived idle on the bounty of the state has been described, (p. 50,) and these, by their numbers, and frequent attendance, held far too great a weight in the assembly. As pensioners on the public they were eager to promote a large revenue and a large expenditure: as light-minded idlers, they were ever watching for amusement: as coarsely educated persons, they were little solicitous about the refinement of the sources whence that amusement came. For them the very orator was a man like Cleon, who would squeeze the tributaries, lavish the produce in addi-

tional shows and sacrifices, and raise laughter alternately by his railings against the most respectable characters, and by his own detected presumption and folly. It is probably from the prevalence of such as Cleon, that we are to date the formation of an aristocratical party in Athens, completely distinct from the old oligarchical. By the oligarchical party may be understood those who wished for a constitution placing all power in the high-born and wealthy few; and their last considerable efforts were in the governments of the Four Hundred and the Thirty. By the aristocratical, those are meant who, without hostility to the democratical constitution, wished to keep the administration, as formerly, in men whose influence rested on rank, ability, and character, and who were fitted to advise and lead, instead of flattering and following the people. The earlier struggle was between the rich and the not rich, and the object was to determine the constitution; the latter, between the poor and the not poor, the educated and the uneducated, and the object to settle the administration. The present application of the word aristocratical is not according to the most popular usage, in which it is made nearly synonymous with oligarchical; but it comes nearer to the original meaning of the word, and it also enables us to express a distinction which otherwise we could not convey in a single term.

Of the aristocratical party thus understood the first decided head was the unfortunate Nicias. His opponent Cleon had many successors, but in the latter part of the Peloponnesian war the struggle between the aristocratical interest and the demagogues gave way in great measure to the revived contest between oligarchy and democracy. After the war, when democracy was re-established, it still slept for a considerable time. While Thrasylus lived, his merit was so great, his services so recent, and his attachment to the interest of the people so unquestioned, that no permanent opposition to his influence could be maintained. Even after his death the situation of Athens was long so critical as to check the capricious temper of the Many, and incline them to be guided by men of ability and character. Among these, the principal were Conon, Iphicrates, Timotheus, and Chabrias, who were generally employed in the most important commands, and

whose conduct brought to the Athenian government the reputation of liberality and moderation, as well as capacity. Of this we have seen an instance in the measures of Timotheus at Corcyra. The states of Greece were never able to maintain themselves securely in independence, and the maritime and commercial cities especially suffered from the want of a powerful superintending government; for, the Ægean sea swarmed with pirates, and not only with individual plunderers, but with the vessels of piratical states. From these the coasts and islands had formerly been guarded by the fleets of Athens, but they had been made to pay so dearly for their safety, that they gladly transferred their obedience to Lacedæmon. Its protection however proving full as oppressive, and apparently less effectual, it was not without satisfaction that they saw the command of the sea again transferred from Lacedæmon to Athens. The power of Athens deterred resistance, and promised protection; and the liberal conduct of its officers invited confidence. The evils of Lacedæmonian supremacy, and of independence, had been more recently felt than those of Athenian empire; which, accordingly, revived with the willing consent of most of its subjects.

But the Athenian people, though schooled by past misfortune and present danger, to temporary good behaviour, were at bottom yet more unfit for dominion than before. In so many revolutions the class of gentlemen had been much diminished, by death, by confiscation, and by gradual impoverishment. Many, who had previously only struggled to preserve the legitimate influence of superior education, and habits formed by exemption from the necessity of constant attention to gain, had now become decided oligarchists, perhaps accomplices in the enormities of the Thirty; while those on whom the proscription of these despots had fallen heaviest, were the men, of all the most valuable in a state like Athens, who united popular manners and principles favourable to equality, with distinguished birth, fortune, breeding, and accomplishment. The number of the poorer citizens had been increased, and the standard of their taste and intellect lowered, by the large admission of slaves and foreigners, after the fall of the tyrants: the remembrance of past sufferings exasperated their indiscriminate jealousy of all who claimed superiority on the ground of talents or

services, or on any but the mere arbitrary favour of the people. The field was, therefore, more open than ever for new Cleons to arise, to flatter the people by professions of unlimited devotion, and to rail at those as disaffected, who strove to guide and really to serve it. Awhile such pickthanks were kept in check by the dangerous situation of the commonwealth; but when the fear of Thebes and Lacedæmon was over, they played their part more boldly and successfully. They were eagerly heard when they asked why it was that the fleets brought home no treasure, and why any city was allowed to have ships and commerce that would not pay tribute as of old. Extortion rose higher than ever; persons of no ability or character were often sent out with unlimited powers as commissioners to levy money; complaints from the allies ensuing without end, were disregarded, till, at length, about five years after the battle of Mantinea, the states of Rhodes, Chios, Byzantium, and Cos, the first three among the most powerful allies of Athens, joined in declaring that they would henceforth protect their commerce with their own fleets, and wanting no help from the Athenian navy, would pay no tribute for its support. (B. C. 358.)

This declaration was received by the Athenians with mingled anger and alarm, and war was voted against the rebellious allies; but little had been done in pursuance of this decree, when the people heard the still more alarming news that Eubœa had revolted, the most important foreign dependency of Athens, and the principal source from which its inhabitants were fed. A petty war had been going on in the island, and one of the parties had called in Theban aid: a Bœotian force had been welcomed in Chalcis and Eretria, the two principal towns; and though there was everywhere an Athenian party, the revolt was clearly the stronger throughout the island. In the general dismay Timotheus came forward: "What!" he said, "When the Thebans are in the islands, do you deliberate? Will you not fill the sea with your ships? Will you not break up the assembly and hurry on board?" The people were roused. Only five days after the Thebans landed in Eubœa the Athenians were there, and within thirty the Thebans capitulated to quit the island. No executions followed, and the affairs of Eubœa were wisely and liberally settled, probably by Timotheus. It was agreed that every town

should acknowledge as formerly the supremacy of Athens, and pay a stated tribute; that each should keep a minister resident in Athens, to represent it in the congress of the allies, and to be its organ of communication with the Athenian assembly; but that for its internal affairs each should preserve its former constitution, and its independent administration. The rejoicing in Athens was scarcely over when a memorable opposition arose from a new quarter.

Macedonia had early been united in a kingdom of considerable extent. Here, as at first in the states of Greece, the chief power had been in the landholders, with the king as their military leader and political head; but both the whole country and the lordships into which it was divided being larger, the proprietors, instead of assembling in cities, had separately ruled their vassals on their own estates. This gave a completely different character to the government and its revolutions. The great men felt their importance more as individuals and less as members of a class; they had less facility of combination, and less disposition to combine; and when they did so, it was rather as allies united to promote each other's several objects of ambition, than as persons bound together by a common interest, and pursuing a common end in the aggrandisement of their order. Hence, amidst much turbulence and many contests for the crown, the form and spirit of the government altered little. In its leading features, the Macedonian government was like that established throughout Europe by the northern conquerors. It is that into which rude nations naturally fall, with more or less of freedom and good order according to the temper of the people; and it is one in which rude nations only can continue. As civilization advances, and large cities are formed, a popular power necessarily arises, in opposition to the great proprietors. In the kingdoms of Europe, the monarch has frequently united with the commons to beat down the excessive power of the nobles; and, when this was accomplished, has again joined the fallen nobility to crush the spirit of freedom which was rising in the people. In England the same game was played, but unsuccessfully; for, by the time when the crown had triumphed over the nobility, the spirit and power of the commons had struck root so deeply, that in the long and perilous struggle

which ensued, a settlement favourable to popular liberty was effected after many revolutions. The Macedonian kingdom was not ripe for such a series of changes. The people were yet dispersed, and little civilized; the only large trading towns were Grecian colonies, whose inhabitants exercised republican government within their own territories, and held themselves allies rather than countrymen of the Macedonians, and tributaries rather than liege subjects of their king. The manners of the Macedonians continuing to suit their government, the government stood unchanged.

Archelaus, the son of Perdiccas, had much increased the resources of his kingdom, and prepared the way for its advance in civilization; but in the fourteenth year of his reign (B. C. 399), he was assassinated, and the fruits of his able administration perished in seven years of confusion which followed. The crown was banded from one to another, and most of the claimants perished by assassination; at length Amyntas gained the kingdom, and held it for twenty-four years. During this period, he was once expelled by the Illyrians, a predatory nation on his western border, and restored by the Thessalians; another time, but we know not whether before or after, he was nearly expelled by the Thessalians. He died a year after the battle of Leuctra, leaving three sons, Alexander, Perdiccas, and Philip. Then came another period of war and disputed succession. Alexander was murdered; Perdiccas fell five years after in battle against the Illyrians; and when the reign of Philip began (B. C. 359), the Illyrians commanded the country, the Pæonians were threatening invasion, and two rival claimants were preparing to renew the struggle for the throne, Pausanias by Thracian, Argæus by Athenian support.

The young king (he was only twenty-three years old) was not unequal to the difficulties of his situation. The powers of his mind and the graces of his person were both uncommon; and his natural gifts had been improved to the utmost by an excellent Grecian education, his boyhood having been passed at Thebes, and, as it is said, in the house of Epaminondas. His eloquence was allowed, even by the Athenians, to be both pure and forcible, and his manners singularly polished. Philip vigorously applied himself to reanimate his disheartened

subjects; he called frequent assemblies of the Macedonian people, and roused their courage by eloquent exhortations; he reviewed and exercised his forces; and introduced the Grecian discipline of the phalanx, which had hitherto been unknown among them. Having procured by negotiation a suspension of the other attacks, he went against the Athenian troops, who had marched to set up Argæus. These he defeated, and reduced them to a capitulation, by which they agreed to deliver to him the Macedonian exiles whom they had brought with them, and to retire. To win the favour of Athens was most important; and the temper of Philip as well as his policy was favourable to conciliation. He treated all the Athenian prisoners who had been taken in the battle with the greatest kindness, dismissed them unransomed, recompensed their losses, and provided conveyance for them to Athens. He voluntarily abandoned all claim to Amphipolis, which, since they lost it, had ever been coveted by the Athenians; and he thus obtained peace with Athens*. He then attacked his other enemies, reduced the Pæonians to submission, and compelled the Illyrians to accept of peace on terms dictated by himself. All this he accomplished before he had reigned a year.

We have seen that at the peace between Athens and Lacedæmon, in the tenth year of the Peloponnesian war, it was agreed that Amphipolis should again be subject to Athens,* but the Amphipolitans refused submission. Since that time the city had generally continued independent, though the Athenians always claimed dominion over it. In the year before Philip's accession, it was connected with Olynthus, and the Athenian general, Timotheus, failed in an attempt to recover it. ^{Next year,} we find it, apparently, under the power of Macedonia. That it should have been forcibly conquered during the interval, either by Philip or his brother, is little likely, considering the then condition of their kingdom. But Amphipolis was divided by hostile factions, severally devoted to Athens, Olynthus, and Macedonia; and it may be that the Macedonian party, supported, perhaps, by timely aid from Philip, had gained the upper hand, and then proceeded to

* It has been supposed, that Philip not only made peace with the Athenians, but entered into alliance with them against Olynthus; but there seems to be no sufficient authority for this belief.

secure it by maintaining a body of his troops in the city. To remove a subject of quarrel with the Athenians, who supported Argæus chiefly in the hope of recovering Amphipolis, Philip declared that city independent. The garrison being withdrawn, the friends of Macedonia could no longer maintain themselves, and the Olynthian party recovering the ascendant, employed the resources of the state in annoying the neighbouring kingdom. In consequence, Philip, after his Illyrian campaign, besieged and took Amphipolis. The conduct of the conqueror was milder than usual in Greece; his most decided opponents only suffered banishment, and the constitution of the commonwealth remained unaltered, while the administration passed into the hands of the Macedonian party. But a quarrel arose between Philip and the Athenians for the sovereignty of Amphipolis. Philip urged that he had fairly won it; that the Athenians, not possessing it, had suffered no injury; and that it was just that he and not the Athenians should enjoy the fruit of his toil and danger. The Athenians contended that Philip had procured their friendship at a critical moment by renouncing all claim to Amphipolis: that the renunciation was illusory, unless made in their favour, and intended to bind him to assist them in its recovery, or, at least, to debar him from impeding them; and that if he had conquered it for any purpose except to restore it to the Athenians, he had made its recovery not only difficult, but, while they continued in friendship with him, impossible. A compromise was attempted. The Macedonian town of Pydna had revolted to the Athenians. The time of this revolt is quite uncertain. If it took place, as Mr. Mitford supposes, during the continuance of friendship between Philip and the Athenians, it was enough to put them entirely in the wrong, and to deprive them of all claim to the restoration of Amphipolis. But there appears to be no evidence which can fix it to that particular period, or exclude the supposition of its having happened before the peace. However, it was secretly proposed, that Philip should give up Amphipolis, and receive Pydna in return. The arrangement was not concluded, and finally war ensued, soon after the reduction of Eubœa. (B. C. 358).

The Olynthian confederacy had revived since the decline of Lacedæmon.

Most of its towns were founded on territory originally belonging to Macedonia, and all had, at a former time, been subject to Athens; its further extension could take place only at the expense of one power or the other; and it was only from the navy of Athens or the land force of Macedonia that any present danger could be feared. There was ground enough for jealousy and rivalry with both; and in the approaching contest between Macedonia and Athens, it was uncertain what part Olynthus would take, but certain, that its friendship would be highly valuable to either. Both negotiated with the Olynthians; but Philip obtained their favour by the promise that he would take Potidæa from the Athenians and give it to them. Accordingly, the Olynthian forces proceeded with him against Pydna and Potidæa, both of which were in the possession of the Athenians. Both towns submitted, and Potidæa was added to the Olynthian league; but Philip protected the Athenian garrison, and after treating them with the greatest courtesy, sent them home.

In the next spring, Philip's attention was occupied by the affairs of Thessaly. The Tagus Alexander of Phœræ had recently been assassinated by his wife's brothers, Tisiphonus and Lycophron. Since the settlement of the affairs of Thessaly by Thebes, which has already been related, the Tagus had again succeeded in assuming tyrannical power; and his government was so hated, and Grecian morality so loose, that his murderers became for the moment generally popular, and succeeded unopposed to his office. Their sway, however, though less able, soon grew to be as arbitrary as his. Discontent became general, and the opposing party called in Philip, whose family had ancient connexion in Thessaly; "and he," says the historian, "entering Thessaly, overcame the tyrants, and, restoring freedom to the cities, gave proof of great good will to the Thessalians; wherefore, in his after actions, he had them always as his zealous auxiliaries, and not only he, but Alexander his son." (*Diodorus*.)

Meantime, the Athenians had carried on the war against their revolted allies with little success. The chief commander was generally Chares, a bold and active officer, but of limited capacity, careless, dissolute, and corrupt. Public money and private fortune he squandered alike in his own licentious pleasures,

and in bribery to the most popular orators, and to the poor citizens who subsisted by attending the courts and the assembly; and so strong was the party which by such arts he managed to retain, that he was able, as if in defiance of public opinion, to carry about with him, when in command abroad, a train of musicians, dancers, and harlots. The Athenians now would rarely consent to go on foreign service: those who had property or lucrative concerns would attend to their business at home; those who had not would live at the expense of the state in idleness, or with no employment but sitting in the courts. The Athenian armies were, therefore, principally mercenary, while the wasteful expenditure at home left but little money for their support; and we may easily imagine the degree of obedience and efficiency which could be expected from a hired army of strangers, with supplies at best very insufficient, of which a great part was usually lavished on the private pleasures of the general. Chares made an unsuccessful attack on Chios, in which Chabrias, who was serving under him, fell. On another occasion, Iphicrates and Timotheus were joined with him in command, and when his rashness would have brought on an action by sea under very disadvantageous circumstances, they overruled him. Chares, on his return, accused his colleagues of corruption, and it seems that they were both displaced, and Timotheus was fined so heavily that he was obliged to retire from Athens, and passed his remaining years at Chalcis in Eubœa. Chares remained alone in command, but without the means of paying his soldiers. In this emergency, though Athens was at peace with Persia, Chares accepted the offers of Artabazus, the rebel satrap of Bithynia, and, joining him with all his forces, enabled him to defeat the royal army. By this the present wants of the armament were supplied, but Athens incurred the enmity of Persia; and, hearing that a powerful Phœnician fleet was preparing to assist the revolted allies, the Athenians, in the third year of the war, hastily concluded a peace, resigning all claim to obedience and tribute from Rhodes, Chios, Cos, and Byzantium. (B. C. 355.)

SECT. II.—The institution of the Council of Amphictyons was one of the earliest events in Greek history. It is impossible now to ascertain the date of

its origin; and even the name and nation of its founder [have been differently represented by conflicting traditions. One account attributes the institution to Amphictyon, a Thessalian prince; another to Acrisius, a king of Argos. It originally consisted of deputies from twelve Thessalian tribes; and (as it seems, though there is some difficulty and confusion on this point) the modern states of Greece possessed no direct power in it, beyond the vote to which they might happen to be entitled as descendants of some of the original constituents. Thus the Dorians were entitled to representatives in the Council; but in the election of these representatives, several Dorian states concurred on equal terms, Lacedæmon possessing no direct power beyond that which was enjoyed by the insignificant towns of Dorium and Cythium, in Doris. The number of tribes represented had probably varied; the privilege having been, at different times, taken away from some, and bestowed on others. If the Council was at first an independent Thessalian confederacy, its existence is a remarkable proof of the ascendancy of the Thessalian and Hellenic tribes at the time: but, if the institution be really owing to Acrisius, it can be considered as no more than a political engine, devised by a powerful monarch of the Peninsula, for the purpose of consolidating his influence in the North.

The Council met at Delphi in the spring, and at Anthela, near Thermopylæ (or Pylæ) in the autumn. Originally the meetings were held at the latter place only. The jurisdiction of the Council extended to the national religion, and, in particular to enforcing due reverence to Apollo, the Delphian god, as well as to disputes connected with international law. The deputies took an oath, the substance of which is still preserved in an oration of *Æschines*. They swore "never to raze any of the Amphictyonic cities, nor to prohibit them from fountains, in war or peace; and, if any one transgress this, to make war upon him, and to raze his cities: and if any one despoil what belongs to the god (the Delphian Apollo), or be privy to or devise aught against that which is in the temple, to punish him with foot, and hand, and voice, and all my might." There was annexed to the oath a heavy curse on those who transgressed it, that part of the oath which

relates to the property laid up in the temple, derived its importance from the circumstance that many princes and states, in early times, deposited rich offerings there, retaining nevertheless some interest in these deposits, and possessing distinct treasuries in the temple.

Each of the tribes sent two deputies, a Hieromnemon and a Pylagoras. The former, whose peculiar office was to attend to the questions connected with religion, was appointed by lot for the whole year. The Pylagoras was chosen for each meeting, and had more unconfined functions. Each of them however voted on all matters supposed to be of general interest. In early times, the tribes sent only a Pylagoras. It is not very easy to reconcile the different accounts we obtain from Greek authors who mention these details incidentally; but it seems most probable that the states composing a single tribe, as for instance the Ionian, sent each their deputies, and that these deputies elected from among themselves the one Ionian Hieromnemon and Pylagoras. It seems certain that none but the Hieromnemon and Pylagoras voted: the other deputies probably joined in the debates. One of the Hieromnemons presided in the Council. The only individual said to have been punished by the Council was Ephialtes the Malian, who guided the Persians over the mountain-pass by which, in Xerxes's invasion, they turned the position of Thermopylæ.

Athens, as a member of the Ionian, and Lacedæmon, as one of the Doran tribe, were represented in the Council of Amphictyons: but, while they had been paramount, the political power of the Amphictyons had been but small, since those proud commonwealths could not be controlled by the votes of obscure tribes in the North of Greece. But the Thebans, holding, at their rise to empire, a leading influence in Thessaly, appear to have considered that they might direct the Council and make it an useful instrument. Accordingly, they prosecuted Lacedæmon for the seizure of the Cadmeia, and obtained a decree condemning that state to a fine, of 500 talents, upwards of 100,000*l.* Had this award been made at the time, its justice could not have been disputed: but, being deferred till the crime was old, when arms had been appealed to in the interval, and signal vengeance taken on the aggressors; and pronounced by a body

which, when the guilt was unpunished and the power of the guilty unbroken, had not ventured even to remonstrate,—it was neither just, wise, nor manly. The Lacedæmonians refusing payment, after a certain time the fine was doubled, according to the Amphictyonic law, and it still remained unpaid.

The Phocians were next attacked. To hold them in obedience had ever been a favourite object with Thebes, and had been warmly resisted by the Phocians, protected sometimes by Athens, sometimes by Lacedæmon. The Thebans now hoped to obtain a decree of the Amphictyons which might enable them to gratify their ambition under the disguise of religion, and which might deprive the Phocians of those allies who, otherwise, would arm in their cause. The pretext was furnished by a doubtful tradition, that the rich Cirrhæan plain, a most valuable tract in the rugged country of Phocis, had anciently been consecrated by the Amphictyons to the Delphian Apollo, under a heavy curse on whoever should convert it to any human use. The Amphictyons met at Delphi: the direction of the temple was theirs, and they were considered the especial protectors of the worship of the god. But the truth of the consecration was uncertain; the land in question had long been used, time out of mind, by the Phocians, and was necessary to the support of the existing population; and, though every Amphictyon was bound to demand the execution of the Amphictyonic law, more especially against impiety, no notice had ever been taken of the alleged profanation. Nevertheless, the Thebans being supported by the Thes-salians, inveterate enemies to the Phocians for ages, a decree was passed, importing that the Phocians must immediately cease to use the sacred land, and must pay a heavy fine.

Philomelus was the first among the Phocians by the union of birth, riches, and capacity. He excited his countrymen to vigorous resistance, impeaching the justice of the sentence, and showing that it was beyond their means to comply with its exactions. He further asserted that the superintendence of the temple at Delphi belonged of right to the Phocians, and not to the Amphictyons: and he declared that if they would make him autocrat-general, he would not only repel the present aggression, but vindicate their ancient rights. Being elected to the office he

desired, he immediately went to Lacedæmon, which was interested, as well as Phocis, in opposing the Amphictyons, and he obtained from that state a sum of money which enabled him to raise a powerful body of mercenaries. He made himself master of the city and temple: the Boeotians and Thessalians exclaimed against his impiety; but he proclaimed to all that his purpose was to recover the rights which had been usurped from his countrymen, and that he was resolved scrupulously to respect the sacred treasury. The Athenians, Lacedæmonians, and some other states, declared themselves in favour of the Phocians: the Locrians were the first to act against them, and they were supported by the Boeotians and Thessalians. Philomelus maintained the war with great ability, and most commonly with success, till he fell in a partial defeat of his army, in the second year of the contest.

Philomelus was succeeded by his brother Onomarchus, a man not his inferior in talent or energy, but apparently of a more violent and unscrupulous character. His administration began with the execution of many political adversaries and the confiscation of their goods; on what provocation and with what degree of justice does not appear. The native strength of Phocis was very inadequate to its defence against the Thebans; a mercenary force was necessary, but money was wanting to support it; the scanty resources of Phocis were nearly exhausted, and the Delphian treasury was at hand. Onomarchus yielded to the temptation, and trespassed largely on the sacred treasury for the pay of his mercenaries; and the governments both of Athens and Lacedæmon are accused of having shared in the robbery. He soon carried his arms successfully into Boeotia, and won there the town of Orchomenus, which had been restored since its destruction by the Thebans.

Meanwhile the power of Philip had been increasing. The Thracian, Pæonian, and Illyrian princes had combined to attack him; but Philip, anticipating their purpose, had fallen on them unprepared, and reduced them to submission. An Athenian armament, however, being sent to the Hellespont, Kersobleptes, the Thracian king, again revolted. He was, probably, little friendly either to Athens or Macedonia, but ready, in the weak and divided state of his kingdom, to take part with which-

ever seemed at the moment most able to protect or to annoy. He now ceded to Athens all the towns of the Thracian Chersonese except Cardia; and to secure their acquisition, and at the same time to provide for a number of citizens, the Athenians sent colonists to each.

Methone was the only Macedonian port which now acknowledged the authority of Athens. It was therefore the general refuge for the Athenian party expelled from Pydna, Potidæa, and the other towns recently united to Macedonia and Olynthus; it was also the only town on a wide extent of coast, whose commerce was protected by the Athenian navy from pirates, or even safe from the depredations often committed by the Athenian commanders themselves; and with these advantages it had grown populous, rich, and strong. Relying on its strength, it ventured to provoke the king of Macedonia by receiving and abetting his enemies. Philip besieged the town: the resistance was vigorous, but in the end the place capitulated, and Philip granted a safe conduct for the people to depart, carrying each only the clothes he wore. He then demolished the town, and portioned out the territory to Macedonians. In the course of the siege Philip lost an eye by an arrow shot.

He next proceeded to the assistance of his Thessalian friends against Lycophron, the tyrant of Pheræ. The party which Philip supported was that connected with Thebes, and Lycophron, therefore, naturally looked for aid to the rising power of Phocis. Phayllus, the brother of Onomarchus, being sent to his assistance, was defeated by the Thessalians, under Philip; but Onomarchus himself, being assisted by Athens, entered Thessaly with a force, which, when joined by the adherents of Lycophron, was far superior to that opposed to him. Philip was twice defeated, and reduced to such difficulty that it was only by the greatest exertions of military talent that he could effect his retreat into Macedonia. Onomarchus next invaded Boeotia, where he won a battle, and took the city of Coroneia. Soon after, Philip again entered Thessaly to assist his friends, and Onomarchus to aid Lycophron; and a great battle was fought, in which the Phocians were completely defeated and their general slain. Three thousand were made prisoners, all of whom were executed as temple robbers, and the dead body of Onomarchus was

ignominiously suspended on a cross. Mr. Mitford has discredited these cruelties, merely on the ground that they are not mentioned by any of the contemporary orators hostile to Philip. This, however, only proves that the Phocian cause was now unpopular, and that the most bloody vengeance on the profane and sacrilegious was rather considered a merit than a reproach. Philip was not cruel either by character or by habitual policy; but his humanity could sometimes give way to his convenience, and in the present case the motives are obvious. The execution of the prisoners would be loudly called for by the Thesalians of his army, who hated the Phocians as ancient enemies, as supporters of their tyrants, and as perpetrators of sacrilege; and, while it gratified his warmest adherents, it would give to the Greeks in general a testimony of his zeal for religion, and incline them to ascribe to piety rather than ambition his further interference in the affairs of Phocis. Lycophron surrendered Pheræ; the influence of Philip prevailed through all Thessaly; his fame and popularity as the avenger of the gods became general in Greece; and to both these results there is reason to fear that the massacre of the Phocian prisoners much contributed. (B.C. 352.)

Phayllus succeeded his brother Onomarchus; and dying of disease within a year, was followed in his office by Phalæcus, the son of Onomarchus: but both parties were much exhausted, and the war went on languidly and indecisively. A diversion was occasioned for a while by a contest in Peloponnesus. Megalopolis, originally founded by a party hostile to Lacedæmon, with the view of uniting all Arcadia against her, had ever since continued her enemy, and had been fitted by situation for a curb on her exertions, and a rampart of protection to Messenia. The internal politics of this commonwealth may be illustrated by referring to some transactions already related of Mantinea (p. 98 and 107). The city had been formed by collecting the inhabitants from many scattered villages, and uniting them in a democratical government; a measure highly gratifying to the multitude, but displeasing to the landholders, who had been accustomed to hold dominion over them, when scattered. The landholders looked to Lacedæmon for restoration to their country-houses and their ancient ascendancy: the Many were devoted to

Thebes, inveterately jealous of Lacedæmon, and peculiarly bound by common interests and dangers to their neighbours of Messenia. The dispersion of the Megalopolitans was a necessary step to the reduction of Messenia, and the Lacedæmonians were the more encouraged to the attempt by the knowledge that they had a party among the Megalopolitans. To procure the support of Athens to their design they proposed to combine with it some other measures for the humiliation of Thebes, mostly just and beneficial. Such were the restoration of Thespisæ and Plataea, and the restitution of Oropus to Athens. The Athenians, allied with Lacedæmon and at war with Thebes, made no active opposition to the attempt; but they neither assisted it nor wished it success. The Lacedæmonians were aided by the Phocians, the Megalopolitans by the Thebans, Argians, and Messenians, and an active campaign ensued, but with no decisive result.

New troubles had arisen in Eubœa, and a Macedonian party was gaining ascendancy in the island. An Athenian force was sent thither under Phocion, a man remarkable in a corrupt age for singular integrity. He had risen to eminence as an officer under Chabrias, who, on one occasion, commissioned him to collect the tribute from the allies, and placed twenty triremes under his orders for that purpose. Phocion objected: "To meet enemies," he said, "the force was insufficient; to visit friends, it was needlessly great." Chabrias allowed him to go with a single trireme. Such visits were dreaded by the subject states; for, besides the tribute, the Athenian commanders commonly exacted large presents both for themselves and their crews, who, if not gratified with a share in the spoil, would, on returning home, be formidable to their commanders as witnesses against them, and very possibly as judges. Phocion, probably, took little or nothing for himself. Assured of his own innocence, he had the less need to indulge the rapacity of his men; and, even if gratified to the full, the appetite of a single crew was more easily glutted than that of twenty. Altogether, he made his mission unusually acceptable, and numerous vessels of the allies voluntarily attended him home, bearing the full amount of tribute. He had since come forward as a speaker in the assembly; though not eloquent, he

was a singularly ready and acute debater, and his opinion carried weight from the known soundness of his judgment and the excellence of his character. On the present occasion, the favour of the higher classes towards Phocion was proved by their willingness to promote the success of his expedition, as well by money as by personal service. Many freely engaged themselves as soldiers under him, both in the cavalry, which was their own peculiar province, and also in the heavy-armed foot; and now, for the first time within memory, the expense of equipping ships of war was voluntarily undertaken by individuals. A battle was won, and Eubœa was, for the present time, secured to Athens.

Since his successes in Thessaly, Philip had been employed, partly in repressing the turbulence of the surrounding barbarians, and bringing them completely under his dominion, partly in raising a naval force. In the latter effort, he had succeeded so far, that he plundered the islands Imbros and Lemnos, the constant possessions of Athens, carried off a rich fleet of merchant vessels from Geræstus in Eubœa, and even insulted the coast of Attica itself. The Olynthians, now becoming jealous of Philip's growing greatness, made a separate peace with Athens, in violation of their alliance with Macedonia. Philip made war on them, and they naturally sought the alliance of Athens.

In ancient times, the first minister of Athens had commonly been the chief commander of her armies. Such were Themistocles, Cimon, Pericles, Nicias, Alcibiades, Thrasybulus. But now, though war continued to be almost as constant as before, it was not so universal an occupation. Besides, in the course of the changes which we have been contemplating, the influence of personal consideration was much lessened, and that of oratory increased; and hence a class of men arose who devoted all their attention to the cultivation of eloquence and the art of managing the people, and who, being constantly present, could improve every opportunity, when the generals were on foreign service. The first specimen which we have seen of this class was Cleon; and in his time the system was so imperfectly established, that he thought his eminence incomplete till he had attained to military command, for which he was notoriously unfit. But, in after times, the

same line was taken by men of high ability and character, such as Callistratus, whom Iphicrates requested to have for his colleague in command, that he might be assisted and supported by his eloquence and political capacity. Hence the connection described by Demosthenes, when there was "an orator commander-in-chief, and a general under him;" that is, an orator as political leader, directing the enterprise to be undertaken and the officer to be employed, defending the conduct of his military friends, and providing supplies for the armament; while the general executed whatever project the assembly was persuaded to command. And hence it was necessary that every party should include both orators and military men; for even when a commander was, like Phocion, an able speaker, he still wanted friends to support him in his absence.

Demosthenes, who has been almost universally allowed to be the greatest master of eloquence in ancient or modern times, was now a young man rising to eminence as a professional orator. In early youth he had inherited from his father a considerable fortune, but this he rapidly dissipated, and then, at the age of twenty-five, betook himself to a profession by which many had risen to wealth and importance in Athens, that of writing speeches for suitors in the courts of judicature. At the time now in question, he had become a leading speaker in the assembly, and had embarked himself in the party most hostile to Philip; and, in spite of a disadvantageous voice and person, and an unamiable temper, he became, by the force of industry and ability, the first man of Athens, her most consummate orator, and most prevailing political leader. When the Olynthian ambassadors came, he was foremost in urging the people to accept their alliance, and to assist them with promptitude and vigour. Large succours were voted, and embassies were sent to the different states of Peloponnesus to excite their fears of Philip's ambition, and to rouse them to resistance. These embassies were generally unsuccessful; and, though some troops were sent from Athens to Olynthus, it was long before the body of the succours voted arrived there. Meantime, Philip had taken by force some towns of the Olynthian confederacy, received the submission of others, and laid siege to Olynthus itself. The Olyn-

thians now expressed a wish to treat; but Philip declared that either they must quit Olynthus or he Macedonia. If the Olynthians had been united, their force was amply sufficient for defence; but there was in the town a strong Macedonian party, as was evidenced by five hundred horse, more than half the effective cavalry of the state, deserting in a body. After some unsuccessful assaults, Philip was admitted into the town by Euthykrates and Lasthenes, the leading men of the Macedonian party. Demosthenes imputes their conduct to bribery; but an opposition more friendly to a foreign enemy than to their ruling fellow-citizens was no new thing in Grecian history; and as there is much appearance that such a faction existed in Olynthus, it is probably to party enmity that the conduct of Euthykrates and Lasthenes is to be ascribed; though, perhaps, as known friends of Philip, they may have previously received from him favours which might give a pretext for the accusation of Demosthenes. Philip destroyed the town, and sold the greater part of the people into slavery.

The annihilation of a state commanding the greater part of the Macedonian coast, and the acquisition of its rich peninsulas and commercial towns, formed a great addition to the wealth, strength, and security of the conqueror. He was now at liberty to proceed either against the Athenian dependencies in Thrace, or against Eubœa, where fresh troubles had broken out. Alarm was great in Athens. But Philip, with all his ambition, had much of prudence in his character, and something even of moderation. He had already extended his dominion far beyond its ancient limits; and he was at present less anxious to push it further than to consolidate it, so that it should not fall to pieces on his death, or on any accidental reverse. He wished to civilize his old subjects, to accustom his new to obedience and attachment; and to these objects peace would be highly conducive. There was a decree of the Athenians forbidding the reception of any herald or ambassador from Philip; but he nevertheless found means to intimate that he was willing to make peace, and the offensive decree was reversed. It should seem that this took place rather before the fall of Olynthus, but Philip's conduct was not altered by that event. The conclusion of peace was, however,

delayed by new hopes arising to the Athenian war party from affairs in Phocia.

By the long maintenance of an overwhelming force of mercenaries, which was entirely at their command, the Phocian generals had attained a power almost unlimited, insomuch that the contemporary orators frequently style them tyrants. But the sacred treasury was now beginning to fail, and Phalæcus being unable to keep up to their former standard the zeal and number of his soldiers, an opposing party reared its head. Phalæcus was displaced and prosecuted for sacrilege. The new administration sent ministers to Athens, and as an inducement to support them, they offered the possession of three small Phocian towns, valuable, not from their revenues but from their situation, which commanded the pass of Thermopylæ, the readiest entrance for Philip into Southern Greece. The Athenian government had been allied with the Phocian under Phalæcus; but Phalæcus had been also connected with Lacedæmon, while the new rulers, if they stood, would be solely dependent on Athens. Besides, if Athens took the part of Phalæcus, the administration might throw itself on the mercy of Philip or Thebes; whereas, if the offers made were accepted, the resources of Phocia would be at the disposal of Athens, and Thermopylæ commanded by its troops. A force was sent to occupy the towns; but in the mean time Phalæcus recovered the ascendancy. Not unreasonably offended at the defection of his ally, he refused to give up the towns, and declared war against Athens. This news ended the hopes of the war party in Athens, and all concurred in voting an embassy to treat of peace with Philip.

The embassy was sent, consisting of ten persons, all distinguished either by rank or talent, one of whom was Demosthenes. It brought back a very favourable report of Philip's disposition towards peace. A negotiation would naturally tend to throw the administration into the hands of those who had originally been adverse to the war: but these were chiefly led by men of moderate character; while Phocian, the most eminent of them all, was as rigid and unbending, as Demosthenes was pliant and unscrupulous; and hereon Demosthenes founded his plan for taking the business out of the hands

of his opponents, and making his own party the peace-makers. Accordingly he now urged on the pacification with the greatest eagerness; and magnifying to the utmost the danger of the state, he hastened the negotiation in a manner on which the timid among his adversaries would not venture, and to which the rigid would not stoop. Ambassadors had previously been sent to the allies of Athens, to invite a congress to deliberate on the conduct of war or negotiation with Philip; and, before the return of the ambassadors, or the arrival of the deputies from the allies, Demosthenes obtained a vote, appointing a day when the Athenian people were separately to debate on the terms of peace. The Synedri, or resident deputies of the subject allies, met to consider the matter: they voted a resolution to be offered to the Athenian assembly, which strongly marks the submission to which they were reduced, and, in the present case, the sense of injury which they dared not more plainly express. "Since," it said, "the Athenian people are deliberating on a peace with Philip, but the ambassadors are not returned whom they sent through Greece to exhort the cities concerning the freedom of the Greeks,—it is resolved by the allies, that, when the ambassadors shall be returned, and shall have made their report to the Athenians and their allies, and two assemblies shall have been held according to the laws, in which the Athenians may deliberate about the peace,—whatever the Athenian people may decree shall be as the common decree of the allies." The Macedonian ambassadors, however, arrived, and without waiting for the return of the ministers from the cities, peace was made with Philip, and not only peace, but alliance. The allies of both parties were included in the treaty, each by name: but neither Phocis nor Lacedæmon were mentioned, nor Kersobleptes, the king of Thrace, who had been led, or forced, into war with Philip entirely by Athens. The last omission the Athenians afterwards wished, as well they might, to remedy; but the treaty was already concluded, and Philip had immediately overrun the kingdom of Kersobleptes, and reduced that prince to entire submission.

An Athenian embassy was sent to take Philip's oath to the treaty which had been concluded. Its return was followed by a letter from Philip, invit-

ing the Athenian people as Amphictyons, and as his allies, to join with his other allies, and the whole Amphictyonic league, in putting an end to the Phocians' war, and restoring the temple at Delphi to the Amphictyons. The Athenians did not comply, and Philip, advancing through the pass of Thermopylæ, with a powerful army of Macedonians and Thessalians, and being joined by the Theban forces, prepared to act against the Phocians. They submitted without resistance; the principal families stipulating for leave to emigrate with their effects. The like permission seems to have been obtained for the entire people of the Bœotian towns, which had taken part with the Phocians. The middle and lower classes of the Phocians surrendered their towns to Philip, trusting that he would save them from the vengeance of the Thebans and Thessalians. To determine their fate, Philip summoned the Amphictyons at Thermopylæ, inviting the attendance of ministers from every state of Greece. The congress met: the Thebans and Thessalians were urgent for severity; but even their animosity was surpassed by the savage mountaineers of Cæta, who insisted that the full punishment allotted to sacrilege by the Amphictyonic law should be inflicted, and that the whole Phocian people should be precipitated from the cliffs of the sacred mountain. A more moderate sentence was approved by the majority. All the Amphictyonic rights of the Phocians were declared to be forfeited: it was directed that the three principal cities of Phocis should be dismantled, and the other towns destroyed; that the people should live in villages, not less than a furlong one from another, and none containing more than fifty houses; that they should surrender all heavy armour and horses, and possess none till the debt to the god were paid; for the liquidation of which a yearly rent of sixty talents, about 12,000*l.*, was assessed on the Phocian lands. Thus ended, in its tenth year, what was called the Sacred War against the Phocians. The right of suffrage in the Council of Amphictyons, which the Phocians had possessed, was given to Macedonia. (B.C. 346.)

SECT. III.—The result of the Sacred War was generally displeasing to the Athenians, and each party made it a matter of heavy charge against its opponents. The most eloquent speaker of the party adverse to Demosthenes, was *Æs-*

chines, who had gone, as well as Demosthenes himself, on both the embassies to Macedonia. Demosthenes declared that Æschines had sold himself to Philip, and had persuaded the Athenians that Philip would settle the affairs of Phocis to their wish, and not to that of the Thebans; whereby the Athenians had been prevented from interfering to save the Phocians. Æschines, in his turn, declared that Demosthenes had been corrupted by the Thebans, and that he, not Æschines, had caused the ruin of the Phocians; that Philip had wished to grant to the Phocians more favourable terms, and in order that he might be able to do so, had invited the Athenians to join the Amphictyonic army; that Demosthenes had prevented the Athenians from complying, and that the Boeotians and Thessalians in Philip's army far outnumbered the Macedonians, and the Athenians not being there to balance them, Philip was obliged to comply much further than he wished with the Thebans and Thessalians. The merits of the dispute seem very doubtful: the accusations of corruption, on both sides, are probably false, for such charges were among the commonest weapons of party warfare in Athens; and, shameful as must have been the state of political morality, when corrupt subserviency to a foreign power was so ordinary an imputation, it is not to be fixed on an individual without better warrant than an adversary's word. On the other points, the balance of probability may seem to be rather in favour of Æschines: for, by acting as the allies of Philip, the Athenians might, perhaps, have moderated the proceedings of the confederacy, while, by opposition in arms, they would have forfeited a peace which they had sacrificed much to obtain, and that with little hope of success, since the then ruling Phocians were more inclined to trust Philip than them.

By Philip's success in the Phocian war, and by the reputed holiness of the cause wherein he had been engaged, his fame and popularity spread wide in Greece. The Thebans especially were loud in his praise, and so were their constant allies, the democratical commonwealths of Peloponnesus. These cities, especially Argos, Megalopolis, and Messene, ever needed protection against their dangerous neighbour, Lacedæmon: they had preferred the alliance of Thebes to that of Athens; and now, when Theban energy

was failing, there arose in friendship with Thebes a protector more effectual by his power and activity, and less dangerous, as was thought, to their independence, both on account of his liberality, and the remoteness of his situation. The Theban everywhere became the Macedonian party; and Macedonia, already recognised as a member of the Grecian nation by its admission among the Amphictyons, seemed likely to attain a similar supremacy to that which had at different times been exercised by Lacedæmon, Athens, and Thebes.

It would appear that, since the conclusion of peace, the party of Demosthenes had engaged in intrigues, for which they apprehended Philip's vengeance on their country. If this impression was well founded, prompt precautions would be necessary, for the Thebans and Thessalians were sure to second him: if not, at least the power of the war party would be promoted by exciting jealousy of Philip. Immediately on hearing that the Phocian towns had surrendered to Philip, a vote of the people was obtained, commanding all Athenians in the country to withdraw their families into the fortified towns. No hostile act was done by Philip, probably none had been meditated; but there may, perhaps, have been grounds for apprehension, and at any rate the party purpose of the movers was answered in the alarm excited. Soon afterwards ministers came to Athens from Philip, to announce his admission as an Amphictyon, and to request his acknowledgment as such by the Athenians. Demosthenes, professing the greatest enmity to Philip, and declaring that he disapproved the peace which had been concluded, still dissuaded the renouncing it on the present question. The more violent orators prevailed, and it was voted that the Athenian people did not acknowledge Philip as an Amphictyon. Nevertheless, peace lasted for a considerable period, during which intrigue was busy throughout Greece between the Macedonian party and the Athenian. The Athenians sent ambassadors into Peloponnesus, to rouse into jealousy of Philip the states inclined to his alliance; and Philip, intriguing more successfully in Eubœa, drew most of the island from the Athenian interest to his own; yet, before war broke out, the ascendancy of Athens was again established, and the Macedonian party suppressed. On either side it was

not friendship, but suspended hostility; and if Athens first decidedly broke the treaty, it must be remembered that in the secrecy of Philip's negotiations, and the publicity of all important transactions among the Athenians, it was easy for him, and very difficult for them, to violate the substance of the covenant, without expressly contravening its terms. Philip's conduct was regular in form, and that of Athens most blameably irregular; their comparative merits, in spirit and principle, it is more difficult to estimate. One point is very remarkable in the conduct of the Athenians;—the extravagant notion which they entertained, that they were at liberty to recal any concession which they deemed unadvised, and that the king of Macedonia was bound to consent, if he called himself their friend.

Above three years after the conclusion of peace, when Philip had been ten months warring in the northern wilds of Thrace, and on the borders of Scythia, those events took place which led to renewed hostility with Athens. Byzantium, which had been included in the treaty as an ally of Philip, we now find at war with him, and supported by Athens. Perinthus and Selymbria, towns closely connected with Byzantium, were in the same situation. We have little means of judging who was chiefly to blame, but ill faith was imputed by both parties: by the Athenians to Philip as attacking their allies; by Philip to the Athenians as supporting his enemies. Here the blame is doubtful; in the next instance it belongs decidedly to Athens. An Athenian colony was sent into the Chersonese under Diopieithes, a zealot in the war party, and to him was given the Thracian command by land and sea. A fleet was readily voted to accompany him, but for the land force the people would neither serve nor pay. Diopieithes offered to raise and pay a sufficient body of mercenaries; his offer was accepted; he employed his troops against some towns belonging to Philip, and supported them by piracy, and by levying contributions from the allies, both of Macedonia and of Athens. Complaints poured in, but Demosthenes defended him. The injuries done to Macedonia, the orator justified on the ground that Philip, having previously committed aggressions, was to be treated as an enemy; a false and pernicious principle, since breaches of treaty, even if undisputed, are to be punished by declared hostility and by

public exposure, not by other acts of ill faith, which, however excused under pretence of retaliation, are really nothing better than fresh offences of a similar kind. The wrongs of the allies he excused by the plea of necessity. "I must speak out," he then proceeded, "and I pledge myself that every commander who sails from your harbours takes money from the Chians, the Erythræans, and from whomsoever he can, of those, I mean, who inhabit Asia. And this is not given for nothing, but that their merchant vessels may be protected, and not plundered. They call it, however, a gift of friendship." Demosthenes prevailed: Diopieithes was continued in command, and Callias, the commander on the Thessalian coast, was encouraged to conduct yet more violent. He attacked and took the cities on the Pagasæan bay, allies of Philip, and named as such in the treaty: he stopped all vessels bound for Macedonia, and condemning the crews as enemies to Athens, sold them for slaves. Induced by these and other provocations, Philip, in a letter to the Athenians, set forth his complaints, and declared that he would redress them by arms. The style of this document is temperate and manly, and its statements are confirmed by the fact that Demosthenes declined to answer them. It proves that the treaty had been repeatedly and grossly violated by Athens, and that whatever grounds of jealousy may have arisen from other parts of Philip's conduct, his behaviour in his direct intercourse with Athens had been moderate and conciliatory; that he had offered to refer all disputed points to arbitration, and had yielded some things which could not in strictness have been required. Nevertheless the adverse orators persuaded the people not only that Philip was their determined enemy, but that he had broken the treaty so far as to justify them in totally disregarding it. The war began, and Demosthenes became the effective chief minister of Athens; apparently the first who ever held that eminence entirely without military command.

The confederacy against Philip was a powerful one. The Chians, Rhodians, and Coans were strong at sea, and closely connected with Byzantium: the power of Athens was singly most formidable; and supplies abounded, for the Athenians had secured the alliance of Persia. Their armament in the Hellespont was at first commanded by Chares, and under

him it sustained a defeat; but Phocion superseding him, restored the face of affairs by his ability against the enemy, and his justice and liberality towards the allies. The system of operations, ably projected by Demosthenes, was as ably carried into effect by Phocion; and the success of his measures was materially facilitated by the weight of his character: Philip, abandoning the hope of reducing the adverse towns of the Thracian shore, came to a composition with his enemies, and another interval of peace ensued.

Callias and Taurosthenes of Chalcis were brothers, and the leaders of a party which desired to unite the cities of Eubœa under a general government. In the former troubles of the island, they had rested on the support of Thebes or Macedonia; but, during the last, they had quarrelled with Philip, and it was therefore necessary to resort to Athens. Their proposals were made through Demosthenes, with whom Callias had before been connected; and so important did the willing alliance of Eubœa seem to him, that he obtained the consent of the people to a decree resigning all claims of dominion and tribute from the island. A body of Athenians, under Phocion, crossing the strait, expelled all Theban and Macedonian troops, and gave ascendancy to the friends of Callias; and this revolution restoring the influence of Athens in Eubœa took place shortly before the breaking out of war between Philip and Byzantium. When the Hellespontine war was over, Callias was still in power, and Demosthenes trusted much to him in the attempt which he now made to form a new league against Philip. The Byzantines and Perinthians testified to Athens the warmest gratitude for its late assistance; Acarnania was friendly; and Demosthenes himself became ambassador to confirm the Athenian interest there, and to establish it in Peloponnesus. Returning before the business was completed, he left its further prosecution to Callias, who came to Athens, and was introduced by Demosthenes to the people, to report his success. He had effected, he said, the desired alliance: a powerful armament would be raised from Eubœa, Acarnania, and Peloponnesus; the chief command would be yielded to the Athenians; and a congress of deputies would meet at Athens. These promises, however, failed, from what cause is uncertain: no war ensued, and the year passed quietly away.

Amphissa, the chief town of the Ozolian Locrians, overlooked the Cirrhæan plain, and their territory bordered on the "accursed land," for using which the Phocians had so been punished. In the Phocian war, the Ozolian Locrians, as being the most zealous allies of Thebes, had been the greatest sufferers; and trusting to the influence of Thebes among the Amphictyons, they hoped for the allowance of that body, while they remunerated themselves by silently occupying the accursed land. No notice was taken, till, emboldened by connivance, they even fortified the devoted Cirrhæan port, and exacted duties from all passengers to Delphi. It happened that Æschines, being chosen as an Amphictyonic representative of Athens, was provoked by some proceedings of the Amphissian deputies against his country: he called on the council to judge and punish the profanation of the Amphissians; and a decree was passed requiring that all grown up Delphians, free or slaves, should meet on the morrow at daybreak, with spades and mattocks; that all members of the council should attend, or, if any failed, their state should be excluded from the temple. The decree was obeyed. The multitude assembled, and descending into the plain, under the command of the Amphictyons, destroyed the port, burnt the houses, and returned. The Amphissians met in arms, too late for prevention, but not too late for revenge. The unarmed Delphians fled, but many were wounded, and some members of the council were seized and stripped. Next day the Amphictyons met, and resolved on those regular measures which ought to have preceded their late hasty and violent act. It was decreed that before their next regular sitting, an extraordinary meeting should be held, when a decree should be proposed for punishing the offences of the Amphissians against the god and the council.

Demosthenes had already formed connexion with a party in Thebes, who desired to withdraw their country from its alliance with Philip; and there is reason to think that the Amphissians had been encouraged to resistance by hopes of support not only from Thebes, but from the party of Demosthenes in Athens. Accordingly, he prevailed on the Athenians to decline all part in the proceedings of the Amphictyons, and neither Athenian nor Theban deputies attended the meeting. War was declared, and an army collected, by the Amphic-

tyons; the Amphiſſians were brought to ſubmiſſion; a fine was impoſed on the ſtate, ſome leading men were baniſhed, and ſome exiles reſtored. But as ſoon as the army was withdrawn, the Amphiſſians reſuſed to pay the fine, recalled thoſe whom the Amphiſtyons had baniſhed, and baniſhed thoſe whom they had recalled. War was again decreed againſt them, but troops were not duly furniſhed by the ſtates, and nothing was effected. The Amphiſſians were weak, but it was known that they would not be unſupported; and at the next Amphiſtyonic meeting it was reſolved to give vigour and union to the league, by inviting Philip to become its general.

This meaſure ſanctioning a freſh interference of Philip in Greece, and enſuring him the ſupport of powerful allies, made greater activity neceſſary to his oppoſers; and Demotheſenes made uſe of every engine for ſtimulating the people and intimidating his adversaries. One part of his conduct ſtrikingly ſhows the oppreſſion which ſometimes may be exerciſed among a people, however generally zealous for liberty, who do not duly feel the paramount importance of regular proceeding and the ſacredneſs of law. Antiphon, an Athenian exile, had returned illegally, and was living ſecretly in Peiræus; and Demotheſenes, unable to procure ſuch precise information of his reſidence as might enable the officers of juſtice to apprehend him, aſſumed authority to ſearch private houſes, diſcovered the delinquent, and carried him into the city. The fact of his illegal return made him liable to death, but would not warrant the arbitrary conduct of Demotheſenes in arreſting him. Demotheſenes accuſed him of having plotted with Philip to burn the arsenal: ſuch charges were commonly received far too readily in Athens, and if this were now believed, the importance of the arreſt might be expected to excuſe its irregularity. From the ſilence of Demotheſenes as to the evidence for this accuſation, we may probably preſume that it was but weakly ſupported; and Aſchines inveighing bitterly againſt the illegal conduct of his rival, determined the aſſembly to reſeal the priſoner. But the danger of Antiphon was not yet over; the council of Areiopagus ſometimes exerciſed the privilege of reverſing the deciſions of the people, and though it is improbable that ſuch a reverſal could be maintained if the people were determined to ſupport

their act, it might be riſked in the preſent inſtance, when the people were divided and the majority accuſtomed to follow the lead of Demotheſenes. His influence in the Areiopagus was complete, and Antiphon, though already diſmiſſed, was by order of that court, in flagrant violation of all law and juſtice, again arreſted, tortured, and executed.

While Demotheſenes was thus overbearing all oppoſition at home, he was negotiating abroad with great ability and unwearied perſeverance to riſe a powerful league againſt Philip. His ſucceſs would chiefly depend on the diſpoſition of Thebes, where a ſtrong party exiſted adverſe to that which had maintained the ſtate in alliance with Macedonia. Demotheſenes went himſelf to Thebes, and negotiated with ſuch effect that when Philip, as the Amphiſtyonic general, ſent a requeſition to the Thebans to join his army, they reſuſed compliance. Yet ſhortly after the Macedonian party again prevailed ſo far, that a body of Theban troops was ſent to the confederate army. The Amphiſſians were reinforced from Athens with 10,000 mercenaries; but notwithſtanding, they were ſoon reduced to ſubmiſſion.

The moment was critical. Philip was in the heart of Greece, in command of the Amphiſtyonic army, which if he wiſhed to direct againſt Athens, the ſupport given by that ſtate to the Amphiſſians furniſhed a ground for requiring it to follow him as in an Amphiſtyonic quarrel, and not a particular one of his own. Peace yet exiſted, nominally, between Macedonia and Athens; but it had been ill obſerved, and pretexts for a rupture abounded: the unfriendly diſpoſition was certain on the part of Athens, and on that of Philip highly probable. According to the reſult of the preſent criſis Macedonia or Athens would be miſtreſs of Greece: if Thebes were warm in favour of Philip, Athens probably could not reſiſt him; if Thebes took part with Athens, he might himſelf be in no ſmall jeopardy. Both, therefore, earneſtly courted Thebes; and each being there ſupported by a powerful faction, the conteſt was violent and doubtful.

After much wavering, the Thebans ſolemnly renewed the alliance with Philip, which they had nearly broken off; but the Athenian party, though defeated, was not effectually ſuppreſſed, when Philip took a ſtep which haſtened

the crisis. He fortified the Phocian town of Elateia, commanding the passes from Delphi, where he was stationed, both towards Thermopylæ and into Bœotia. For this his motives might be various. If the Thebans turned against him, and he found himself unsafe in Phocia, it secured his retreat into Thes-saly: if he wished to fall on Attica, and the Thebans opposed him, it gave a ready entrance into Bœotia; and Thebes, while doubtful, might perhaps be deterred from declaring against him by his commanding position. Whatever were his purpose, on hearing that he had occupied Elateia, alarm rose as high in Athens as if he were in march against the city. It was evening when the news was brought to the Prytanes: they immediately rose. Some went to the generals, and ordered the trumpets to sound; others hastened to clear the market-place, and set fire to the booths as the speediest method of removal. The whole city was in tumult and consternation during the night. When day broke the council met, but before they could prepare a decree, the people were assembled and clamorous for their appearance. They came in without having determined on any measure to propose for the adoption of the assembly. The Prytanes made their report: the crier repeatedly proclaimed that any Athenian might speak. Still none came forward. At length Demosthenes arose and proposed a decree severely arraigning Philip, and ordering that ambassadors should straightway be sent to Thebes to offer strict alliance and friendship. The decree was carried. It is a circumstance which strongly marks the intimacy of the union proposed, that intermarriage, rarely allowed between the citizens of different states, was to be permitted between those of Thebes and Athens.

The Athenian ambassadors, of whom Demosthenes was the chief, were received by the assembled Theban people, and at the same time, those of Philip were heard in reply. Python, the leader of the latter embassy, was no common orator, but the eloquence of Demosthenes and the largeness of his offers prevailed. The Athenians had long been protectors of the Bœotian towns claiming independence, particularly Platæa and Thepiæ. These were given up; and it was agreed that Thebes should have an equal vote in directing the measures of the confederacy, as well by sea as by land; that Athens should

bear the whole expense of the fleet and two thirds of that of the army; that a Theban general should command in chief; that all political measures should be concerted with the Bœotarchs in the Cadmeia. The eloquence of Demosthenes was powerful with the multitude, and his political ability and commanding influence in Athens were necessary to the leaders who had pledged themselves to stand or fall with their new ally. He quickly attained great power in Thebes, and became the channel of communication between the two states and the effective director of both.

An Athenian army was sent into Bœotia, and being joined by the forces of Thebes, the combined host encamped itself at Charoneia, a few miles distant from Elateia. A few skirmishes took place; but winter, as was usual in Greece, prevented decisive action. Meantime Philip negotiated for peace, both with Thebes and Athens. At Athens his overtures were principally supported by Phocion; but they were rejected by the people, full of ambitious hopes, and bold in the knowledge that Bœotia lay between them and the enemy, and that Thebes would bear the first brunt of the attack. Thus far Demosthenes was triumphant; but his task was more difficult at Thebes, where the danger was nearer, and the party stronger that wished for peace. A decree that the proposals of Philip should be considered had already passed the assembly, when Demosthenes hastened to Thebes. The people were summoned, and he addressed them; he praised to the utmost those who adhered to the resolution of war, and inveighed against all who spoke in favour of Philip, as corrupt and traitors. When he found that the passions of the multitude were sufficiently excited, he proceeded even to threats, and exclaimed, that if any should dare to speak of peace with Philip, he would himself seize him by the hair, and drag him as a traitor to prison. That such a sally should have been ventured, and that it should have been unresented, and even successful, strongly shows both the ascendancy which Demosthenes had attained in Thebes, and the power of his eloquence in stirring the passions of his audience. But his objects were not yet secured; the Bœotarchs were divided; and at length they resolved again to lay the proposals of Philip before the people. The assembly was called; Demosthenes addressed it, and after arraigning the

Boeotarchs as traitors to Greece, he concluded with declaring that if the Thebans, deceived by their leaders, so shrunk from the common cause, he would return immediately to Athens, and move for an embassy to Thebes, to ask a passage through Boeotia for the Athenian army, which would then go alone against the common enemy. The Boeotarchs gave way, and war was finally resolved on. This, the greatest triumph perhaps of the orator and of his political system, ended certainly in the most signal discomfiture of both.

The Athenian and Theban army had been joined during the winter by troops from the allies of Athens, Eubœa, Megara, Corinth, Achaia, Corecya, Leucas, and Acarnania. The aggregate force appears to have considerably exceeded that of Philip; but the advantage was balanced by the latter being united under one able commander. The Athenian generals were Chares and Lysicles; the names of the Theban commanders have not been preserved. The battle took place near Charoneia; it was hard fought and decisive, and the victory of Philip complete. (B. C. 338.)

The news filled Athens with dismay. Nothing less was now expected than the advance of the conqueror into Attica, the ravage of the country, perhaps the siege of the city. The resources which had formerly enabled Athens to disregard the devastation of her territory, were lost by the revolt of some allies, and her own impolitic relinquishment of authority over others. The time was past when every Athenian was a soldier; for the wars of Athens had lately been carried on by mercenary troops, while the citizens had been idling at home, incurring the guilt of warfare, without participating in its dangers or its glories, such as they are. From violent fear to violent resentment was an easy passage, and the late advisers of war might not unreasonably expect the severest treatment from the people, whether in anger at the situation into which their counsels had brought the city, or as an intended peace-offering to the king of Macedonia, whom they had so vehemently opposed. Demosthenes had borne arms in the battle, and for speedier flight had thrown away his shield,—an action deemed the most disgraceful proof of cowardice. The sense of his political failure,* and his military dishonour, deterred him from showing himself in the first burst of popular indignation,

and he procured a mission, which withdrew him a while from Athens. No proceedings were immediately commenced against the leaders of the war party, and they profited by the moderation of their adversaries to divert the popular fury from themselves against the generals. Lysicles was the victim chosen, probably because he was not, like Chares, highly popular or powerful. He was accused by an orator of the war party, condemned, and executed. The rage of the multitude was satisfied, and never doubting that their vengeance had fallen on the real culprit, they again were willing to listen as before to their late advisers.

The Athenians now sent Æschines to Philip, to learn his purposes, and to soften his resentment. But before his arrival, Demades, an eminent orator, who was among the prisoners, had already been set free, and directed to assure the Athenians, that the Macedonian king was disposed to be their friend. Soon after, all the Athenian prisoners were released, and a supply of clothing given to such as were in want of it. His conduct had been similar in every victory, which had given a body of Athenian citizens into his hands; and it is worth considering what could have been the motive to such sustained generosity towards his most inveterate enemies, in a man, who, though not sanguinary by nature, and generally more merciful than most Grecian warriors, had been known to act with harshness on less provocation. Some reasons for the difference may be found both in his interests and his character. The greatness and security of Macedonia were to be promoted by the total destruction of Olynthus, as a state. When this act was done, no personal forbearance would avert from the conqueror the general hatred of the citizens; and to reduce them to slavery, therefore, seemed a measure of security, as well as of revenge and profit. But the destruction of Athens was not in his wish; its subjection had not hitherto been in his power; and even now, if he pushed the war to extremity against it, there might be some doubt of his allies supporting him. Athens remaining independent, to conciliate it might be politic; and Philip's prudence would here concur with the natural kindness of his disposition, which in the other case had been overborne by different interests and feelings. Besides, as a man of letters and accomplishment, Philip respected the chief seat of

philosophy and art; as a lover of fame and popularity, no less than of power, he was anxious to appear advantageously in his dealings with a people the most conspicuous, as well as the most intelligent, in Greece. His conduct in these instances was most honourable, and it is but just and candid to suppose that it sprang in a great measure from honourable feelings; but we cannot give him the same credit for real generosity on the present occasion, which we might, if his proceedings had been consistently humane, when the temptation to cruelty was stronger, and there were fewer reasons of policy to prevent him from yielding to it.

The conquerors went from the field to Thebes, where they found a ready submission. The government passed into the hands of the Macedonian party, and to make sure their ascendancy, the Cadmeia was garrisoned with a detachment from the army under Philip. The revolution now effected was not disgraced with executions, banishments, or confiscations. The Boeotian towns were made independent, the numerous exiles restored, and all prisoners, both Thebans and others, set free, unransomed. Philip next proceeded to show to Athens a still greater liberality. When it was known there that favour might be expected, an embassy had immediately been sent to wait on him. Meanwhile he had caused the bodies of the Athenian slain to be burnt, and the bones to be sent to Athens; and he committed the procession to the charge of his principal minister, Antipater, whom he also appointed his ambassador to the people. He freely offered the renewal of peace and alliance on the former terms; and to testify his disposition, as general of the Amphictyons, to do impartial justice between state and state, he procured the restoration of Oropus, which, belonging to Athens, had long been forcibly held by the Thebans.

Philip was now beyond dispute the first potentate of Greece. His kingdom was flourishing; his enemies depressed; his allies many and powerful, and completely under his direction. Henceforth, at least, he might safely devote himself to increase the happiness of his kingdom, by peacefully cultivating its resources and improving its government. But the rarest, as well as the most excellent of patriots, is he who, bred to war and accustomed to victory, has yet the

wisdom and virtue rightly to value the blessings of peace. Only one winter had elapsed after the battle of Chæroneia, when Philip was preparing to attempt the conquest of Persia. There can be little doubt that his principal motives were ambition, and the hateful love of war; but his determination may very probably have been aided by a persuasion common among the most liberal Grecian statesmen, that the turbulent spirit of their countrymen wanted a vent, and that the only effectual method of preserving tranquillity at home, was by uniting them against the barbarian, whom they were wont to consider as their natural enemy. At the proposal of Philip a general congress was assembled at Corinth. His views were approved, and he was elected captain-general of Greece. In the midst of his preparations Philip was assassinated by a young Macedonian of rank. But his plans of conquest did not perish with himself, like the similar projects of Jason the Thessalian; for he left a son, the celebrated Alexander, of talents not inferior, and more unbounded ambition.

SECT. IV.—The party of Demosthenes had recovered its predominance in Athens, and the news of Philip's death was received there with the most unmanly exultation. The murderer had been slain; but high honours were voted to his memory. To reward the assassination of an enemy, especially if a king or tyrant, was a common measure, which however detestable to the better taught morality of modern times, appears in Greece to have been extensively approved. But, in the present case, the conduct of Philip after the battle of Chæroneia stamps the act with a character of ingratitude, which has shocked some of his warmest enemies. A sacrifice of thanksgiving was ordered by the people, as if they had heard the news of a great victory; and Demosthenes, though he had recently lost his only child, and though custom, deemed sacred, forbade all persons under such a loss to show themselves except in mourning, appeared at the ceremony in a robe of white, and with a crown of flowers on his head.

The high natural gifts of Alexander had been improved by the best instructions which the age could supply. As a patron of letters, Philip was both liberal and discerning; his court was the resort of many eminent philosophers, but the education of his son had been

chiefly intrusted to Aristotle, the most eminent of them all. The murder of Philip seems to have been connected with a plot to set another member of the royal house upon the throne; but all disturbance was prevented or suppressed by the promptitude of Alexander and the prudence of the counsellors by whom he was surrounded; and the young king then turned his attention towards Thessaly, his father's surest and most valuable ally. The Thessalian states were readily persuaded to elect him as the chief of their confederacy, and to support him in claiming the later and loftier acquisition of Philip, the political and military leadership of all Greece. He then went to Thermopylæ, took his seat among the Amphictyons, and obtained from that body a vote which constituted him captain-general of the Greeks; an important sanction to his claim, though not by itself sufficient to confer the desired authority without the consent of a more general congress of the states. Opposition was apprehended from Athens and Thebes, of which the former had abundantly shown a hostile temper, while in the latter, though the administration was yet in the hands of Alexander's friends, the opposing party were fast recovering strength and boldness. Alexander suddenly entered Bœotia with an army. His presence confirmed the tottering power of his Theban friends, and deterred the Athenians from manifesting their enmity in open opposition to the meeting which it was now proposed to call at Corinth, to consider the claim of Alexander to the leading of Greece. The meeting was called, and its debates would seem to have been free from the present terror of an over-awing force, though influenced no doubt by the fear of after-resentment from the powerful Macedonian. The vote which gave the command to Alexander was nearly unanimous; the Lacedæmonian deputies alone protested, saying, "that their national inheritance was not to follow, but to lead."

The Grecian states were generally making ready to war against Persia under Alexander, who had himself returned into Macedonia to complete his own preparations, when his kingdom was threatened by an extensive combination of the barbarians on its northern and western borders. He broke their measures by his energy and rapidity, defeated them, and then proceeded to take vengeance; nor during a long and

every where successful campaign, in which he carried his arms even beyond the Danube, did he fail to enforce the entire submission of every tribe that had provoked him. His return was hastened by alarming news from Greece.

We have often seen the riches of Persia employed in fomenting the dissensions of Greece, and supporting the parties which seemed at the moment, whether from weakness or from whatever cause, the least to be dreaded. Such a policy seemed now more than ever necessary, when the greater part of Greece was united avowedly against Persia; and, accordingly, the treasures of the king were largely dispensed in aid of the party hostile to Macedonia. The agent in these transactions was Demosthenes, the determined enemy of Philip and Alexander, and now all-powerful in Athens; and his detractors accused him of embezzling much of the wealth which confessedly passed through his hands.

The ascendancy of the Macedonian party in Thebes had been protected by a garrison in the Cadmeia, under the joint command, apparently, of a Macedonian officer and a Theban party chief. Both were assassinated by some Theban exiles who secretly returned. An assembly was hastily summoned; the ruling party were surprised and disheartened; the friends of the exiles full of hope and alacrity; and to heighten both these feelings, a report was spread that Alexander had perished in Illyria. The assembly voted that the liberty of Thebes should be asserted against Macedonian dominion, and siege was straightway laid to the Cadmeia.

The Theban revolution appears to have been part of an extensive scheme concerted at Athens. A large supply of arms was furnished by Demosthenes, probably at the expense of Persia; and on his proposal the Athenian assembly voted succours to the Thebans. Troops were also voted by the Argians, Arcadians, and Eleians; but the Peloponnesian succours were detained at the Isthmus, and the Athenian at home, through the wish to gain some insight into the probable event of the war before taking part in it. Such was the state of things when the Theban leaders learnt with dismay that Alexander, by a rapid march through a difficult mountain region, had unexpectedly made his way into Bœotia in a time almost incredibly short. Their danger was great, not only from the Macedo-

nian force, but from the reviving hopes of their fellow-citizens of the opposite party. They ventured the bold assertion that the son of Philip was certainly dead, and that it was another Alexander, the son of Aeropus, who was come against them; and hereby they succeeded in silencing all proposals of accommodation. Alexander advanced towards Thebes, but did not immediately attack it, being willing to leave an opening for peace, and trusting to the strength of his party within the walls.

After Alexander had been for some time before the city, a skirmish, begun without orders by one of his officers, brought on a general engagement. The besiegers were victorious, and their vanguard, pursuing the enemies to the gates, broke in with them. The city was taken, unexpectedly alike to the conquerors and the conquered; and terrible was the destruction which ensued by the hands, not so much of the Macedonians, as of the Bœotians and Phocians, who were numerous in the invading army. These had deep wrongs to avenge; and the Thebans now drunk to the dregs the bitter cup which they had held to the lips of the Plataeans, Thespians, and Orchomenians. Old men, women, and children were slaughtered in the streets, in the houses, and at the altars. When the butchery was over, the fate of the survivors and of the city was referred by Alexander to the common decision of the confederate Greeks. It was decreed that the city should be levelled with the ground, and all the inhabitants sold as slaves, save only the priests and priestesses, and such as were known friends of Macedonia. It was also voted that Plataea and Orchomenus should be restored. Alexander, an ardent lover of literature, is said to have procured that the house of Pindar, the great Theban poet, should be spared, and his posterity exempted from the doom of slavery. Otherwise the decree was fully executed. It is reported that Alexander bitterly regretted the destruction of Thebes, not only for the amount of misery occasioned by it, but also because that city was the birth-place of Hercules, the boasted founder of his race. If, indeed, there was mingled with this fanciful motive for sorrow any real and lively concern for the calamities inflicted, his repentance is a rare phenomenon in the history of conquerors: but even in this case little importance is to be attached to a vain and transitory feeling, which never ex-

erted any influence on his subsequent career. (B. C. 335.)

Other Grecian cities had been ruined not less completely than Thebes, but in gone had the sufferers been so many; and the extent of the calamity struck deep awe into all who heard it, though few regretted the downfall of a power, which had rested almost entirely on force, and little on good will or superior reputation. Its sudden and apparently accidental capture gave strength to the opinion, extensively prevalent, that Thebes was labouring under a divine retribution; and men's minds ran back through various deeds of oppression and bloodshed, which had stained the short period of Theban empire, to the treacherous seizure of Plataea, and the old but unforgotten crime of alliance with the Persian against the freedom of Greece. Those states, which had prepared for Thebes an aid too tardy to save it, but prompt enough to expose them to the vengeance of the conqueror, had more pressing subjects to consider than its guilt or its calamity. Alarmed at the perils which their miserable and treacherous policy had brought near their own doors, they mostly acted with as much meanness as before. The Arcadians put to death their late advisers; the Eleians restored the banished friends of Macedonia; but the danger was greatest to Athens, as the nearest state, and the most offending. When the news came that Thebes was taken, the Eleusinian mysteries were in celebration; but they were immediately interrupted, and all hands employed in carrying every thing valuable within the walls. An embassy was sent to Alexander, chiefly made up of the friends of Phocia; but it is probable that Demosthenes accompanied it, and that we may refer to this occasion the story told of him by Æschines,—that, being sent ambassador to Alexander, he went no farther than the Bœotian border, but returned in fear, either of Alexander or of his republican Greek allies. Alexander demanded that Demosthenes, and nine others, should be given up to him, as authors of the battle of Chæroneia, and of all the succeeding troubles of Greece. A second embassy was sent to deprecate this severity; and Alexander, whether through respect to the fame of Athens, or through the desire to settle Greece without delay, and proceed against Asia, contented himself with requiring the banishment of Charidemus, one of the number.

CHAPTER IX.

Of the conquests of Alexander in Asia, and of the affairs of Greece, from the time when that prince set out on his enterprize to his death.

THE long reign of the second Artaxerxes had closed with a shocking tissue of family dissension and bloodshed. To secure the succession to Darius, his eldest born, the old king had made him a partner in the sovereignty: but he was rewarded with presumptuous ingratitude, and a quarrel ensued, which ended in an attempt by Darius to assassinate his father, and in his death by the hand of the executioner. The few remaining years of Artaxerxes were full of troubles: he took for his first minister Arsames, his bastard son; Arsames was murdered, and the deed was imputed to the jealousy of Ochus, the only then living legitimate son. The same year an extensive revolt broke out in the western provinces; and Artaxerxes died in the following year, which was that of the battle of Mantinea. Ochus took the throne, but according to the bloody policy which has ever prevailed in Asiatic monarchies, he did not deem it secured till all his illegitimate brethren had been assassinated, in number eighty. He then first made known his father's death, and proclaimed himself king, taking the name Artaxerxes.

The reign of Artaxerxes Ochus was a troubled one. The great western revolt was speedily suppressed, and the king then setting himself to re-conquer Egypt, sent thither several armies, which failed disgracefully. Artabazus, the satrap of Bithynia, revolted, and, by the aid of Grecian mercenaries, he maintained himself against all the strength of Asia, till his treasury failed, and, unable longer to supply his Grecian troops, he fled to the court of Philip. The Phœnicians too revolted. They had been, like the Grecian subjects of Persia, allowed to govern themselves by their own republican institutions, under the controul of a Satrap, who levied from each city its stipulated tribute, and commanded the armies of the province. They were rich and prosperous through commerce; they had ever been courted and respected by the sovereign, for as their ships and sailors mainly constituted the naval strength of the empire, it was most important that their service should be willing. The present satrap, jealous probably of their grow-

ing power and rising pretensions, had attempted, injudiciously, to tighten the bands of authority. He was accused of arrogance and tyranny, and the Phœnicians revolting allied themselves with Egypt. Ochus went in person against them, and reduced them to submission; but his triumph was disgraced by a series of cruel and treacherous acts, which ended in the utter destruction of Sidon by the despair of its inhabitants*. He next subdued the island of Cyprus, which was also in rebellion; and then prepared an expedition against Egypt. He assembled an overwhelming force of Grecian mercenaries, and placed a division under Mentor, a Rhodian soldier of fortune, who being sent by the King of Egypt to assist the Phœnicians, had deserted to the Persians with 4000 Greeks, whom he commanded. To his second employer Mentor was more faithful: Egypt was conquered, and so great were Mentor's services, and such the opinion which Ochus entertained of his ability, that he was set in command over all the maritime provinces of Asia Minor. His sister was wife to the rebel satrap Artabazus; and, at his intercession, Artabazus was pardoned, and restored to his command. For twelve years the western provinces enjoyed unusual quiet under the vigorous rule of Mentor and his brother Memnon, the confidential friend and minister of Artabazus. At the end of that period, in the year after the battle of Chæroneia, Artaxerxes Ochus died.

It was believed that Ochus had been poisoned by the eunuch Bagoas, his chief minister and favourite, who, still retaining his power, gave the diadem to Arses, the youngest son of the late king. The other sons were murdered, and Arses also perished in the third year of his reign, by the act of his all-powerful minister, whom he had dared to thwart. Codomannus, a descendant of the second Darius, and a man of tried valour and considerable military experience, was chosen as the successor. On ascending the throne he took the name of Darius. Bagoas died soon after; and it was ru-

* This is Diodorus's account. It must, however, be taken with some qualification, as we shall find the Sidonians again conspicuous about twenty years after in the wars of Alexander. Probably, the conflagration related by the historian only extended to some particular quarter of the city, in which the most determined of the Sidonians may have maintained themselves, when the rest of the town had submitted to the conqueror.

moured that dissension had arisen between the king and minister; that Bagoas had prepared a poisoned draught for Darius, and had been himself compelled to drink it.

Soon after the death of Ochus, Philip had undertaken to deliver the Greeks of Asia from the Persian yoke, and had sent an army into Æolis, under Parmenion, his ablest general. Parmenion was opposed by Memnon, with force enough to check, but not to crush him. The attention of the court was elsewhere occupied, and it was not till Alexander was preparing to cross the Hellespont in person, that the Persian government began to gather any considerable force by sea or land. Two years had passed since Philip's death, and four since the battle of Chæroneia, when Alexander, at the age of twenty-two, commenced the expedition which was to change the dynasties, and remodel the political state of half Asia. On the Asiatic side of the Hellespont, was the territory of ancient Troy, the stage of the principal actions celebrated by Homer. The imagination of Alexander was naturally lively; he was deeply tinctured with love of letters, and reverence for antiquity. Of this we have seen some instances in his conduct after the taking of Thebes. The *Iliad* of Homer was especially gratifying to his poetical tastes and to his warlike propensities, and he is said to have made it his constant companion in his journeys and campaigns. But when he stood on the scene of his favourite story, his admiration of the poet and his heroes was exalted into passionate enthusiasm; and while his army passed the strait unopposed, under the direction of Parmenion, he was visiting the village and surrounding fields, where the fallen city once had stood, and sacrificing to the deities of the place, and the chiefs and princes there entombed. The foot in the army somewhat exceeded thirty thousand, of whom twenty-four thousand were heavy-armed, and about half of these Macedonian: the horse were nearly five thousand, chiefly Macedonian, Thessalian, and Thracian. In proceeding towards Ionia, it was resolved to skirt the eastern highlands of Ida. The neighbouring satraps gathered their forces to oppose him, as soon as they learnt the direction of his march, and they were joined by Memnon, who had till now been engaged in protecting the coast. The assembled army consisted of twenty thousand Persian horse, and as many

mercenary Grecian heavy-armed infantry, with light troops whose number is uncertain. Thus inferior in regular foot, it was Memnon's wish to avoid a battle, but to hang on the advancing enemy with a numerous cavalry, which should let him neither eat nor rest, to destroy the harvest in his way, and even the towns in which he could shelter. This mode of defence would probably have been the most effectual; but it carried with it an amount of public loss and private suffering, to which the Persian officers would not consent. It was therefore rejected, and a stand was made in a very advantageous position, at the ford of the Granicus, a rapid river, running northwards from Ida to the Propontis. Alexander forced the passage, and completely defeated the enemy, but not without a severe struggle, in which his person was exposed to imminent danger. This victory opened to him all Asia Minor. Sardis submitted without resistance, and he went into Ionia. The people of Ephesus had risen on the oligarchy supported there by Persia, and Alexander arriving confirmed the ascendancy of the democratical party, restrained their violence, and established good order. Most Grecian cities readily allied themselves with him, and in all these he set up democracy. Miletus and Halicarnassus holding out for Persia were taken by force. The successes of Alexander were brilliant, his policy was liberal towards barbarians as well as Greeks. He won the Lydians by reviving their ancient laws, which had been overborne by the Persian satraps; and the Carians, by restoring the government to the legitimate heir, who had been deposed in favour of a Persian. In the course of a year by force and conciliation he had made himself the master of Asia within Taurus, the vast mountain chain extending from the Mediterranean to the Euxine sea; that is, of all Asia Minor, save the narrow maritime province Cilicia.

Meanwhile Memnon had returned into the Ægean sea with a fleet far outnumbering any which Macedonia and its confederates could support, and had raised a powerful body of Grecian mercenaries to co-operate with it. He had reduced the important islands of Chios and Lesbos, and struck a terror into the enemies of Persia, as far as Eubœa; and negotiating with the Grecian states unfriendly to Macedonia, he had persuaded many of them, and among others

Lacedæmon, to ally themselves with Persia. His intention was, after completing the conquest of Lesbos, to proceed to the Hellespont, when his irresistible fleet would cut off from Alexander all communication with Europe. The small army of the invader might then be crushed by the collected forces of Asia, while Memnon himself, with his Grecian allies, would overrun and conquer Macedonia, and thus, in the language of the party hostile to Alexander, secure the liberty of Greece. In the midst of these projects Memnon died, and with him his designs. The land force of his armament was summoned to join the king in Syria.

With the arrival of spring, Alexander, crossing Taurus, overran Cilicia. That province is separated from Syria by a branch of Taurus, on the opposite side of which the vast host of Darius was now assembled. For some time each army waited for the other to advance; for it was the wish of the Persians to engage in the plains of Syria, where their numerous cavalry might range at will, while the smaller and more stationary forces of the Greeks and Macedonians would have acted to advantage in the confined valleys of Cilicia. At length Alexander led his forces through the pass which opened into Syria. Darius immediately crossed the mountains by a different pass into Cilicia, and thus placed himself in Alexander's rear. His object was probably, by occupying the passes, to prevent his enemy from returning into Cilicia, and at the same time to cut off from him all supplies and reinforcements; so that his army, debarred from retreat, and deprived of all provisions, but what it could find in the country, might perish by want, and by the continual harassing of a superior cavalry. But Alexander, though surprised by the movement, was prompt enough to secure the command of the principal pass, and he led back his army to attack the Persians, near Issus, at the entrance of Cilicia. Besides the light-armed soldiers, they had thirty thousand heavy-armed Greeks, and a greater number of Asiatics armed and trained in the Grecian manner. The horse were thirty thousand. The whole was advantageously posted along the bank of a river, and extending from the mountains to the sea. Nevertheless, after a hotly contested action, Alexander forced a passage. The slaughter was great both in the battle and in the pursuit.

Darius escaped with a portion of his cavalry, but his wife, mother, and sister, and two daughters, were taken in his camp. They were treated by Alexander with kindness, and even with delicate respect; and so great it is said was the effect produced on Darius by a generosity little usual either in Grecian or in Asiatic warfare, that when he heard it he prayed to have no other successor but Alexander, if it were God's will that he should no longer be king of Asia.

Having taken possession of Damascus, the capital of Syria, Alexander soon turned his eyes to the narrow, but rich, populous, and powerful country of Phœnicia. The small states of that province were popularly governed, though mostly with a single chief at the head of the administration; and they seem to have been very subject both to internal dissension and to mutual quarrels and jealousy. Tyre, the wealthiest and most powerful, was also the most favoured by the Persian government, to a degree which gave offence in Sidon, its mother city, and the nominal capital of the province. The Sidonians invited Alexander, and he took possession of their city unopposed. Others also submitted; but the Tyrians, the most favoured of the favoured Phœnician nation, refused to transfer their allegiance to the conqueror. They professed their willingness to be strictly neutral, admitting within their walls neither Persians nor Macedonians; but this did not satisfy Alexander, and he besieged the city. Tyre was built on an island, strongly fortified, and vigorously defended. The assailants attempted to carry out a mole from the main land, for the support of towers and battering engines, such as were used in that age. These were burnt by the Tyrians from their shipping, and Alexander found that he could not succeed as long as they commanded the sea. He raised a navy from such of the Phœnicians as were friendly to him, from the Cyprians, whose support had been engaged by his successes, and from some of the maritime Greeks. His fleet was now too strong for the besieged, so that he soon confined them within their walls, and finally took the city by assault. Eight thousand Tyrians perished in the storming, the remainder of the people were sold into slavery; and of this great calamity it is nowhere stated that it ever disturbed the tranquillity of the victor.

Alexander next proceeded to Egypt, which submitted without resistance. He

gratified his new subjects by magnificent sacrifices to the gods of the country, and held a splendid festival after the Grecian manner, with contests in athletic exercises, poetry, and music. He then commenced a more permanent and more useful monument of his greatness. The singularly rich and populous country of Egypt was without a convenient haven; and Alexander having selected a spot on the western branch of the Nile, where there was every advantage of situation for a great commercial town and port, resolved to make it the Grecian capital of Egypt, the seat of government, and the centre of trade. He gave the name of Alexandria to the new city, which was largely colonized by Greeks, and soon became and long continued wealthy, populous, and flourishing. It retains, even now, the ancient appellation, and though fallen from its former greatness is still a considerable town: but its decline must be progressive; for its excellent harbour is fast verging to ruin from the deposits of the river, which have already in great measure choked it up. While engaged with his new capital, Alexander learnt that the Persian fleet had been completely broken up through the defection of the Phœnicians and Cyprians, and that all the Grecian islands allied with Persia had returned to the Macedonian confederacy. (B. C. 332.)

During his stay in Egypt he undertook an expedition of no political or military importance, but yet too singular to pass unnoticed. In the sandy desert which stretches westward from the boundary of Egypt, there are scattered spots, like green islands in the waste, where springs of water give fertility to the elsewhere barren and burning soil. On one of these stood the ancient and far-famed oracular temple of Jupiter Ammon. The difficulty and danger of approaching it diminished the number of votaries, but surrounded the shrine with a more mysterious sanctity. In sending Alexander thither, we may well believe that religion had a share; but it was probably combined with curiosity, with the habitual love of extraordinary things, with the vanity of imitating Perseus and Hercules, his boasted progenitors, both of whom were said to have visited the oracle, perhaps with some project of discovering a communication with the interior of Africa for purposes of trade. He set out with a detachment of his army, reached the land of Ammon, con-

sulted the oracle, and returned in safety, but not without experiencing the perils and sufferings which arise, in crossing the deserts, from the intolerable heat, the want of water, and the shifting nature of the sands.

In the next spring he went against Darius, crossed the great rivers Euphrates and Tigris unopposed, and found the enemy at Gaugamela near Arbela, on the eastern bank of the latter. The country was favourable to cavalry, in which the Persian army was stronger than that defeated at Issus; it had also elephants, and scythe-armed chariots, but it was weak in Grecian foot. A hard fought battle ensued: great gallantry was shown by the Persian leaders, and some skill; but they could not withstand the superior discipline of the Greeks and the ability of their commander, whose conduct on this occasion gave the highest proof of military science, and original genius for war. Their army was completely destroyed: Darius fled towards the northern provinces, the most warlike and the most attached to himself; and Alexander seized on the rich provinces of the south almost unresisted.

Darius was now at Ecbatana, the capital of Media; and his only hope was to maintain himself in that and the adjoining provinces, till Alexander might be called away by troubles at home. Of this there was no small prospect, for an important contest had indeed arisen, but it was decided about the time when Alexander was conquering at Gaugamela. The Lacedæmonians had ever disallowed the claim of Macedonia to the supremacy of Greece, and had laboured to place themselves at the head of a hostile league. Their hopes had been weakened by the death of Memnon, by the breaking up of the Persian fleet, and by the battle of Issus; but their party was still powerful, especially when seconded by the gold which the agents of Persia still supplied in considerable abundance. Three hundred talents (upwards of 60,000*l.*) were offered to the people of Athens, to induce them to join the confederacy. The offer was refused; but there was still in Athens a powerful party headed by Demosthenes, which though unable to induce the people to side with the enemies of Alexander, was yet strong enough to prevent them from effectually supporting his friends. Eleia, Achaia, all Arcadia, except Megalopolis, took part with Lacedæ-

dæmon; and their army was strengthened with ten thousand mercenaries, probably supported by Persia. On the opposite side were Argos and Messenia, the constant enemies of Lacedæmon, with most of the states north of the Isthmus. Athens stood aloof from the contest; but the intriguing policy of Demosthenes was successfully employed in exciting a revolt among the Thes-salians.

Antipater, one of Philip's ablest ministers, had been left by Alexander as his vicegerent. He quelled the disturbances in Thessaly, and then succeeded in obtaining from the states of the confederacy a force which, when joined with such of the Macedonian troops as could be spared, might enable him to meet the hostile league with advantage. The Lacedæmonians and their allies had already formed the siege of Megalopolis, and its fall was expected daily, before Antipater could enter Peloponnesus to relieve it. It held out, however, till his arrival. A well fought and bloody battle ensued, but the Lacedæmonians were overborne by superior numbers. Agis their king fell fighting after his phalanx was broken. The Lacedæmonians sued for peace, and Antipater referred their ministers to a congress which was held at Corinth. It was decided that the fate of Lacedæmon should be decided by Alexander, and that fifty of the noblest Spartans should be given as hostages that their state would submit to his determination.

Meanwhile Alexander had advanced into Media with the beginning of spring. Surprised by his rapidity, and disappointed of expected succours, Darius was again compelled to fly, and the Median kingdom yielded to the conqueror. Darius escaped into Bactria, where Bessus, the satrap of the province, and some others, conspired against him, made him prisoner, and finally murdered him. When overtaken by the cavalry of Alexander, the body was found by the Macedonian prince, and taken up and sent to be buried in the royal sepulchre in Persia. Bessus declared himself the king of Asia, but he soon was driven from his satrapy, and delivered by his followers to the mercy of Alexander, who put him to death as a murderer and traitor. But the resistance of the northern provinces under different chiefs was long continued and frequently renewed; and it was not till the third year after the battle of Arbela, that the Per-

sian empire was entirely subdued. The dominions of Alexander then reached to the Caspian sea, and the river Taxartes (the Sirr), which divided them from the velds of the wandering Scythians. There was little temptation to cross the river with any view of conquest; and though Alexander once carried his arms against the Scythians, it was only to chastise their turbulence. But the subjugated provinces included nearly all the most valuable districts and principal cities of central Asia. Sogdiana, the most northerly, had for its capital Maracanda, which will easily be recognised as the still flourishing Samarcand. In the city of Bactra we find Balkh, and Candahar in Alexandria, a Grecian colony founded by Alexander, and named, like his Egyptian capital, from himself. These names will show how far the empire extended towards the north-east; its southern and western limits have been indicated sufficiently in describing the course of the Macedonian conquests.

The difficulties of Alexander's situation were great. In a few years he had made himself the lord of many nations of various manners, but all widely differing from the comparatively scanty band of Greeks and Macedonians, by whom all were to be held in subjection. The very rapidity of his progress had precluded the growth of any habitual principle of loyalty, so that nearly his whole empire was in the state of a newly conquered province, only kept in obedience through force and fear. It was necessary to conciliate his new subjects, lest his small army should be harassed and worn out with continual service: it was necessary to retain the affection of his Grecian followers, since it was by their power only that he could secure a single province. These objects he endeavoured to reconcile, by distributing offices of trust and favour both to Europeans and to Asiatics, retaining, however, the sword almost entirely in the hands of the former, while the civil administration was principally committed to the natives of the country. A more questionable part of his policy was the adoption of the Median dress, and the exaction from all alike of the Asiatic homage of prostration, which seemed to the Greeks an act of degrading servility when tendered to any mortal. To justify the demand, his flatterers asserted that Alexander was really more than man; that his deeds had far exceeded those of the ancient

heroes, his own ancestor Hercules, and Bacchus the conqueror of India, who were worshipped as gods by all; and the fable was spread, that he, like them, had something of divinity in his origin, as well as in his actions, and that he was really the son, not of Philip, but of Ammon, the great divinity, to worship in whose temple he had already undergone so much toil and danger. These extravagant pretensions were far less shocking to the Greeks than to persons educated in a purer religion: for even those who most condemned them worshipped mortals not more distinguished than Alexander, and having only this advantage, that they had lived in a distant age. The result, however, was general dissatisfaction, and heart burnings between Alexander and some of his trustiest followers. It is probable, that views of policy were less the motive to his present conduct than the excuse by which he coloured to himself a weakness, of which he would otherwise have been ashamed; and that he was really actuated by the overweening spirit, which unparalleled successes had fostered in a youth of temper naturally vehement and ambitious. The Persians had, indeed, been accustomed to honour their kings almost as divinities, and Alexander might fear that their respect for him would be lessened by observing that others acted differently. But the Persian great well knew that Grecian manners differed from their own, and they were prepared, by repeated experience of Grecian superiority in policy and war, to respect the peculiarities of their conquerors, and associate them with the ideas of power and ability. With regard to them, the present claims of Alexander could not have been necessary, but might, perhaps, if unresisted, have been advantageous: to the Greeks and Macedonians they were deeply disgusting; but to all the king must have been degraded, by appearing as the eager claimant of a homage which was either refused, or extorted with difficulty. Fresh matter was given for dissension, already too prevalent in the camp. The republican Greeks and the Macedonians were mutually jealous, and the latter were again divided into factions among themselves. These disorders had recently been much exasperated. Philotas, the son of Parmenion, was an excellent officer, and high in trust, but boastful, profuse, and extravagant in self-opinion. He was accused

of treason, and condemned to death by the assembled Macedonians, under circumstances, if not of proved guilt, at least of strong suspicion. His father was also put to death on slighter evidence, and without the opportunity of making a defence. This most unjust precipitation was probably occasioned by the fear, that if time and warning were given to the accused, his power and popularity might enable him to resist the authority of the government; but it leaves a deep stain on the character of Alexander, especially as both he and Philip owed more gratitude to Parmenion than to any other individual. The ferment caused by the ruin of the second family in Macedonia had scarcely subsided, when fresh heats were kindled by Alexander's demand to be honoured after a manner wholly alien from the habits and principles of the Greeks.

Among those who saw with displeasure the rising arrogance of Alexander, and his growing preference of oriental customs, was Cleitus, the companion of his youth, and now one of his most favoured generals, who had saved his life in the battle of the Granicus. It happened at a banquet that some flatterers of the king, after pursuing their accustomed theme of the superiority of his exploits to those of Bacchus, went on further to pay their court to him by depreciating the actions of his father—an unworthy homage, equally disgraceful to those who offered, and to him who accepted it. Cleitus rebuked their baseness with honest resentment, took up the praise of Philip, and drew a comparatively disparaging picture of the actions of Alexander; but he was unfortunately heated with wine, and after replying to the courtiers, he addressed himself to Alexander, with intemperate and unmannerly violence. The prince, mad with wine and anger, attempted to rush upon him, but was held by some of his companions, while others forced Cleitus out of the room. All was vain; he snatched a weapon, and following Cleitus, who returned to brave him, killed him on the spot. The deed was scarcely done when he was seized with the bitterest repentance. For three days he kept his chamber, and would neither eat nor drink; but his friends at length persuaded him to resume the duties of his station. He never seems to have formally renounced the extravagant pretensions which led to this murder, and to other mischiefs, which are recorded by his

historians; but he seems to have found the dislike of the Macedonians to the new ceremonies insurmountable, and to have felt it necessary no longer to insist upon their universal observance.

Scarcely had the empire of Darius entirely submitted, when the odious lust of war and conquest was already driving Alexander to more distant enterprise. South-eastward lay the wide and fertile India; and into it he advanced, fully bent on subduing the whole. For his previous course of action, some excuse may be found in the enmity subsisting between Greece and Persia. It might concern the security of the Greeks, or at least of those in Asia, that Darius's power should be curtailed; though, assuredly, no lawful object could demand the entire subjugation of his empire. But the present expedition was neither prompted by provocation, old or recent, nor covered even with the flimsiest pretext of political necessity; it was undertaken avowedly in the spirit of the robber, who seizes every thing indifferently which his eye covets and his hand can master. He carried his arms with uniform success to the great river Indus, and considerably beyond. But his soldiers were weary with toils and dangers, and alarmed at the prospect of warfare endlessly renewed by the wild ambition of their chief: their discontent at length broke out in open remonstrance; and Alexander, after a passionate attempt to change their resolution, was obliged to give way. He returned to the Indus, which he intended to make the Eastern boundary of his dominions, and proceeded down the stream to the Indian ocean, reducing all on the right bank who still refused obedience.

The most praiseworthy point in Alexander's character was his attention to the welfare of the conquered nations; and his capacity was most commendably shown in the originality and wisdom of some of his plans for their improvement. This does not remove the guilt of his ambition. It is injustice for any, without lawful authority, violently to force upon a nation even what may be for its good; it is fearful presumption to kill, burn, and pillage through a continent, in the hope of outweighing the certain miseries of war by the benefits of wiser administration in the chance of victory. It is not for a prince to judge whether his neighbours would be happier under their existing government or under his own; nor can his territories in any wise

be rightfully extended, except by the free consent of his new subjects, or sometimes when, by a most rare combination of circumstances, conquest has become necessary to protect his people from aggression. The original iniquity of Alexander's invasions is not excused by any merit in his government, and can be extenuated only by considering the loose morality of his age and the misfortune of a princely education. Even considering his career in the most favourable light, we cannot but look with horror at a boy rushing headlong upon the work of devastation and blood, to make himself to be talked about; yet it must not be denied that he showed a more liberal ambition and thoughts more enlarged than form the ordinary character of a mere conqueror. Notwithstanding the vast extent of his subject provinces, and the short time allowed to the regulation of each, his officers were mostly well chosen, while he was himself ever ready to hear complaints and punish oppressions; so that Asia, during his brief reign, appears to have enjoyed considerably more than its usual portion of quiet and good order. He founded many Grecian colonies in various regions, with the double purpose, probably, of securing the obedience of the people and advancing their civilisation. He sedulously encouraged commerce, and first conceived the idea of opening a communication between India and Europe. Near the mouth of the Indus, he had fortified a place for a principal haven and trading station; and from hence a fleet was sent to explore the coasts of the Indian Ocean to the Persian Gulf, and finally to proceed up the gulf to the Euphrates. Great hardships were endured, and great difficulties overcome, by the crews of the exploring squadron; but the voyage was completed, and knowledge gained that might facilitate bringing the merchandise of India to Babylon and the central part of Asia by the Persian Gulf, or by the Red Sea to Egypt. Goods landed in Egypt might be brought by canals into the Nile, and down the Nile to Alexandria, and thence dispersed through Europe by the Mediterranean and its communicating seas. Both these became and long continued important channels of trade—the former, as long as the countries round the Euphrates were flourishing and wealthy; the latter, till the bolder spirit of modern navigation had explored a

passage round the continent of Africa. The latter traffic especially enriched every people engaged in conducting it, and made Alexandria long one of the greatest cities on the earth.

Before the sailing of his fleet from the Indus, Alexander had commenced his march towards Persia. That he might provide for the relief of his crews at various stations along an unknown and inhospitable coast, he led a division of his troops through the dry and barren desert which stretches from the confines of India along the sea, the grave of every army which had hitherto attempted to cross it. The perilous march was not completed without the loss of many by fatigue and thirst; but the spirits of the soldiers were kept up by the fortitude of their commander, who took his full share in every hardship; and, instead of riding among his cavalry according to his usual custom, dismounted, and walked in full armour, beneath the burning sun, at the head of the infantry. It happened once, when all had long been suffering from thirst, that some soldiers found a small pool, and filling a helmet with water, brought it to the king. Alexander thanked them, but declared that he would have no relief in which all the army could not share, and taking the helmet, poured the water on the ground. The effect, we are told, was as if every man had drunk the water. Thus cheered and supported by the example of their leader, the troops completed their march into the fertile country beyond, where they were rejoined by their comrades, who had been sent by the safer and easier route through the higher regions.

The attention of Alexander was now directed to the punishment of satraps and other officers, who had abused their authority in his absence, and to the better internal administration of his empire. He wisely strove to establish harmony between the different races of his subjects, and to throw into the shade, as far as might be, the distinctions of European and Asiatic, the conqueror and the conquered. The very highest offices of trust and favour were still in the hands of Macedonians; but, in general, the administration was shared in such a manner between the nations, as to testify the impartiality of the sovereign, and his desire of ensuring equal protection to all his subjects. The army was extensively recruited with Asiatics, trained in the Grecian discipline, many of whom

were admitted into the choicest and most distinguished bodies, both of foot and horse. Inter-marriage between the different races was encouraged, and the king himself, who had already been united with a Bactrian princess, contracted a second marriage with one of the daughters of Darius. These things were not done without opposition. The pride of conquest and of Grecian blood ill brooked to be associated on equal terms with vanquished barbarians; and though much of Alexander's conduct only showed a just and liberal impartiality, there were parts of it which overstepped that boundary, and seemed to show an unworthy preference given to the more servile principles and more submissive manners of his Eastern subjects. Peucestas, being made satrap of Persia, learnt the Persian language, and habitually used it to the people of the country. He was justly praised by Alexander, and most unreasonably censured by the Macedonians. But he also took the Median dress, as had been done long since by Alexander himself; and this was complained of, not unjustly, both in the king and the satrap. By learning the language and manners of Persia, Peucestas could address himself both to Asiatics and Europeans, with equal convenience and equal respect. By the change of dress, he seemed to be disowning the country of his birth, and affecting to consider himself rather as a Persian than a Macedonian. The offence which had been given by Alexander's adoption of Eastern manners was revived by his approval of similar conduct in his officer. All these causes swelled the murmur which had now begun to prevail, that Alexander had subjected, not Asia to Greece, but Greece to Asia; and the result was a most perilous mutiny, and the threatened desertion of nearly all the Macedonians in the army. The commotion was however quelled by the energy and eloquence of Alexander, and his unbounded personal popularity among the soldiers.

The short remainder of his life was chiefly spent in the improvement of Babylon, the ancient capital of the Babylonian, Chaldean, or second Assyrian empire, which he chose for the seat of his government in preference to Susa or Ecbatana, the capitals of the Persian and Median monarchies. The reasons for the selection were manifold. A wide and fruitful plain, and two mighty rivers, the Euphrates and the Tigris, on the one

of which the city was built, while with the other it commanded a ready communication by numerous canals, made it a spot singularly fit for the support of a great collected population, and for all the purposes of trade, both inland and foreign. It was further recommended by its more central situation, and especially its lying nearer than the other capitals to Lower Asia and Europe. Babylonia, like Egypt, owed its extraordinary fertility entirely to the overflowing of its river; and to regulate this overflow the old monarchs had constructed channels, dams, and various other works, of great extent. These had fallen into decay under the Median and Persian kings, who resided in the upper provinces, and comparatively neglected the Babylonians; but Alexander applied himself vigorously to the work of restoration, and was rapidly bringing back the province to its ancient fruitfulness and prosperity, when, in the second summer of his residence at Babylon, as he was overlooking the works, with his wonted activity and carelessness of his person, in an open boat among the unwholesome marshes, he was seized with a fever, and shortly after died, in the thirty-third year of his age, and the thirteenth of his reign. By some writers it has been represented that his sickness was rendered fatal by intemperance; and a report was afterwards current among the Macedonians, which imputed his death to poison. But neither of these statements is countenanced by the most authentic records existing with respect to his last moments. (B. C. 323.)

During the latter years of Alexander, Greece was generally quiet, and little remarkable occurred, except some considerable party struggles in Athens. Before the battle of Chæronæia, when strife ran highest in that city, Ctesiphon had proposed a decree, to honour Demosthenes with a golden crown, for his eminent public services. The crown being voted, Æschines arraigned the decree, as irregular in form, and false in statement. It was passed, he said, while Demosthenes was accountable for an office, which he held, though the law expressly forbade the crowning any man while he had an account to render; it appointed that the crown should be presented at a time and place other than that which the law prescribed; and it declared, that Demosthenes merited reward for eminent services; whereas,

in truth, he was justly punishable for gross misconduct. On these grounds, Æschines impeached Ctesiphon, the proposer of the decree, and instituted proceedings against him for a penalty of fifty talents, upwards of ten thousand pounds. Soon after its commencement the prosecution was dropped, and slept for many years, till at last, while Alexander was warring in eastern Asia, it was resumed as a ready method of attacking Demosthenes, who then held the lead in Athens. The speeches of Æschines for the prosecution, and of Demosthenes for the defence, are the most elaborate works of their respective authors; and the latter in particular, which is commonly known as the Oration on the Crown, might alone prove Demosthenes the first of orators. The charge of informality may be considered as established; but that was, as well with the judges as with the advocates, a question very subordinate to the comparison instituted between the characters of the rival orators, and the merits of their respective systems of policy. Ctesiphon was acquitted, and the accuser failing to obtain a fifth of the votes, became liable to a heavy fine;—so far had he underrated the power of his opponent's eloquence or interest. Unable to pay the fine, or perhaps unwilling to live under his triumphant enemies, Æschines quitted Athens, and retired to Rhodes.

Not long before the death of Alexander, Demosthenes also went into banishment. The circumstances which led to his retreat were these: Harpalus, an early and favoured friend of Alexander, being left at Babylon as satrap of the province, and treasurer over a more considerable portion of the empire, had abused his trust so grossly that on the king's return he was driven to rebellion by the fear of punishment. He had gathered six thousand soldiers, and with those he landed in Laconia, in the hope, it may be supposed, of engaging the Lacedæmonians to renew their opposition to Alexander. Failing there of support, he left his army, and went to Athens as a suppliant, but carrying with him money to a large amount. His cause was taken up by many eminent orators, hostile to Macedonia; and Demosthenes himself, who had at first held back, was prevailed on to espouse it. It failed, however; the Athenians adhered to the existing treaties; and Harpalus, being obliged to quit Athens, carried his troops into Crete, and there perished by assass-

ination. It was said that his gold had been largely distributed among his Athenian supporters, and a prosecution was instituted against Demosthenes and his associates, as having been bribed to mis counsel the people. Demosthenes, finding probably the popular current strong against him, and wishing, therefore, to take his trial before a more dispassionate tribunal, procured a decree to refer the matter to the Areiopagus. The court pronounced against the accused; and Demosthenes, being fined in the sum of fifty talents (upwards of 10,000*l.*), withdrew to Ægina.

The age of Philip and Alexander is remarkable no less in the philosophical than in the political history of Greece; and it is pleasing to turn from those two great idols of the vulgar, the fury of the conqueror, and the busy keenness of the state-intriguer, to energies more guiltless and triumphs more lasting. The death of Socrates was soon repented by the Athenians; and so general was the admiration of that excellent man; that there were few succeeding philosophers who did not own his teaching as the fountain from which their doctrines were ultimately derived. His carelessness of outward splendour and patience in hardship were imitated by his scholar Antisthenes; but that which was in the master a genuine indifference to all but moral and intellectual pre-eminence, and an equal estimation of wisdom and virtue, whether in rags or in purple, became in the pupil an ostentatious preference of poverty. Antisthenes was the head of a sect which made it their boast to discard all prejudices, all arbitrary likings and dislikings, and to live by the dictates of pure reason, without regard to the habits and opinions of men. But they who glory in freedom of thought are sometimes misled as far by the love of paradox as others by prejudice. The followers of Antisthenes ridiculed those who placed their happiness in the ostentation of riches; yet they were no less vainly boastful in the display of their filth and raggedness: they ridiculed all who lived according to other men's opinions, and not to their own; and they pursued their maxims even to the disregard of the most natural and necessary decencies. In speaking of the business, pomps, and pleasures of the world, they were apt to use a satirical bitterness, that savoured more of spleen than of philosophical contempt. From their rude and slovenly manner of

life, and their snarling moroseness, they were known by the name of Cynics, or dog-philosophers. Of this sect was the celebrated Diogenes.

Far more important are those philosophers who grew up in the school of Plato; the Academics, headed by Speusippus, Plato's nephew, and Xenocrates, the Chalcedonian; and the Peripatetics (walkers), the followers of Aristotle, who was born at Stageirus, a Grecian city in Thrace. The former were named from the hall and grove of Academus, where Plato, and, after him, Speusippus, usually discoursed: the latter from Aristotle's manner of delivering his instructions while walking in the gardens of the Lyceum. The doctrines of both were nearly the same, for though Aristotle often opposes his master, Plato, it is commonly in points to which the Academics held but lightly, or which they entirely gave up. But the different character of the teachers variously affected their followers. Among many eminent names, the Academy had none which could rival those of Socrates and Plato; the first of whom was wont to say that, when the oracle styled him the wisest of men, it was because he knew that he knew nothing, while others thought that they knew much. These words have been interpreted by many as directing them to acquiesce in universal scepticism: but it is plain, from the general tenour of his discourses, that Socrates rather meant to produce in his disciples a patient search for truth, a due distrust in themselves, and a willingness to amend their most favourite conclusions, should subsequent inquiry prove it needful. However understood, the declaration betokens, both in the speaker and in the approving reporter, a disposition very different from that of Aristotle, whose vast and varied erudition and wonderful subtlety and acuteness were joined with a somewhat dogmatical temper, and a strong desire to give to his treatment of every subject an air of scientific completeness. Hence it comes that while the individual reputation of Aristotle was almost unrivalled; his school was comparatively barren of eminent men: whereas most of the greatest Grecian philosophers in after times are found in the Academy and its many off-sets. For among the followers of Aristotle, improvement has ever been trammelled by the opinion that they had in his works a perfect system of human knowledge: this made

them consent to explain and enforce his conclusions, without pursuing them farther or inquiring into their evidence; and sometimes rendered them loth to examine a questionable position of their master, lest by loosening a single stone of the connected fabric they should disjoint and weaken the whole.

The faults of Aristotle have probably contributed, as well as his merits, to the astonishing influence which his writings have exercised over ages so various and nations so widely scattered, as those in which his name has been regarded with an almost idolatrous veneration. He was, however, a man of understanding, at once the most comprehensive and the most discerning; the father of philosophical criticism; the ablest of Grecian speculative politicians; an acute and curious observer of all remarkable phenomena, whether in the material or in the intellectual world. In attempting to demonstrate the conclusiveness of demonstration, his logical works are essentially unphilosophical; but they are admirable as a classification of the forms which arguments may take, and the conditions necessary to render them conclusive. His power of systematic arrangement was indeed extraordinary, and the talent was accompanied by the disposition to riot in its exercise. This is peculiarly striking in his ethics, in reading which we can hardly fail to be impressed with the idea that, while Plato teaches men to feel and act, the object of Aristotle is rather to instruct them how to define and classify their actions. On abstract questions, especially of morals, he wants Plato's liveliness and distinctness of conception; and hence his treatment of such subjects is comparatively dry and barren. Inaccuracies are pointed out, and language and arrangement improved; but little is done to open the mind to the reception of truth. It is where outward observation furnishes the materials on which reason is to work, that his superiority appears; and the more in proportion to the complexity of the considerations embraced in the question. And here he is as pre-eminent, as Plato is, where the premises and the reasoning process are both from within. But these unfortunately are not the passages which have chiefly attracted his indiscriminating adorers: and hence, in those times when his authority has been most blindly revered; though his writings have often excited some degree of in-

tellectual activity among those whose minds would otherwise have slept in contempted ignorance, they have often also misdirected that activity to unprofitable subtleties and idle verbal disquisitions.

CHAPTER X.

Of Greece, and of the Macedonian Empire, from the death of Alexander, to the death of Ptolemy and Seleucus, and the Invasion of Greece by the Gauls.

THE sudden death of Alexander seemed to leave his diadem as a prize to be fought for by his generals. A contest was threatened between different bodies of the army, but the wiser heads succeeded in effecting a peaceable settlement. Alexander had left two infant sons by Persian mothers, and a brother, Arrhidæus, whose weakness of mind unfitted him for rule, but whose claim was nevertheless supported by the body of the Macedonian infantry. It was agreed that Arrhidæus should take the kingly title, with the name of Philip, while Perdicas, an eminent general, held, as protector, the actual sway. The satrapies were distributed among the principal leaders, and mostly according to Alexander's appointment. Ptolemy was made the viceroy of Egypt, Antipater of Macedonia, Lysimachus of Thrace, Antigonus and Eumenes of different provinces in Asia Minor; all men of note in Alexander's wars, and about to become yet more remarkable in those which were waged to acquire distinct kingdoms for themselves.

The first commotion which disturbed the Macedonian empire arose from the Grecian colonies established by Alexander in Upper Asia. The settlers were mostly disabled soldiers, or such as, weary of a seemingly interminable warfare, which carried them daily into regions more remote, preferred a grant of lands, with immediate quiet, to the chance of one day revisiting their native country with the fruits of their successful valour. Many soon began to regret their choice, and to pine for Greece and Grecian customs and modes of living; and it was only the fear of Alexander which prevented their return. On hearing of his death, they generally quitted their dwellings, assembled in a body of twenty thousand foot and three thousand horse, and began their march. They were met by Pithon, who had been commanded by Perdicas to oppose

them, and had gladly undertaken it, hoping to win them to his interest, and to make himself powerful by their means. With the aid of treachery in one of their chiefs, he vanquished them in battle: and then he offered them permission, laying down their arms, to return to their dwellings. Oaths were mutually given and received, and the disarmed and defenceless Greeks mingled fearlessly among the Macedonians. But Perdiccas, suspecting the secret purpose of Pithon, had strictly charged him to slaughter them, and to distribute the spoils among his soldiers: and the Macedonians, whether through obedience to the protector, or for the sake of the booty promised, fulfilled to the letter his bloody command, in defiance of their leader's wish, and of the faith just pledged.

Antipater was soon at war with a confederacy headed by the Athenians and Ætolians. The cause of quarrel was a promise given by Alexander, and entrusted to Antipater for fulfilment, to restore all Grecian exiles to their several cities. In many states this would shake the government, in some would overturn it: and suspicion and resentment were the more excited, as there could be no doubt that whatever power was vested in the restored exiles would be exercised by them in entire subserviency to Macedonia. Among those offended were the Athenians, who had recently colonised a part of Samos, which, if the measure of Antipater were carried through, they would be obliged to give up to the former owners. The richer part of them disliked the war, but the majority of the people approved it, and a vote was passed that the Athenians would assert the liberty of Greece, and free the cities which were held in awe by Macedonian garrisons. Fleets and armies were levied, and ambassadors sent to rouse the Greeks into action; and the Ætolians, Thessalians, Argians, and many others engaged in the enterprise. The Boeotians were bound to Macedonia by the possession of the Theban lands, which had been parcelled among them when the city was destroyed; and their defeat was the first exploit of Leosthenes the Athenian commander. Antipater, unable to raise an army equal to that of the hostile confederacy, tried one battle unsuccessfully, and then retiring to Lamia, a town of Thessaly, was there besieged by Leosthenes. In the course of the siege Leosthenes was killed, and Antiphilus succeeded him.

The place was strong, and well-defended, but the garrison was already starving, when the eminent Macedonian general Leonnatus raised the siege. Having thus far attained his object, in the battle which ensued he was defeated and killed; and Antipater effected a junction with the beaten army, but still was weaker than his enemies. The scene was changed, when another army came up, under Craterus, the best, in Alexander's judgment, of all his commanders since the death of Parmenion. The Macedonians had already been twice victorious by sea, and they now attained a decided superiority on the land. Ambassadors came from the Grecian league to ask for peace; but Antipater refused a general treaty, and required that each state should negotiate separately; and the war being pushed on briskly, fear drove all the cities successively to make terms for themselves, leaving the Athenians and Ætolians alone in opposition. Antipater led his host to Athens. While he was shut up in Lamia, peace had been denied him on any terms but unconditional surrender. It was now the turn of the Athenians to sue for a capitulation, which Antipater refused to grant. Alike unable to stand a siege, and to obtain conditions, they gave themselves up to the conqueror's mercy, and their treatment was milder than they had reason to expect. They were left in possession of the city and its territory, and of all property, both public and private: but the democracy was abolished, and the poorer citizens entirely shut out from the powers of government. To such as wished to quit the city, Antipater offered lands in Thrace, and more than twenty-two thousand persons accepted the proffer. The rest remained untouched in person and property, but politically subjected to the privileged class of about nine thousand citizens, whose fortunes reached the standard fixed by Antipater. The laws of Solon were again adopted, as the rule of government, and all subsequent changes annulled. To guard against a counter-revolution, a Macedonian garrison was placed in Munychia, one of the ports of Athens: and Antipater, having done these things, returned into Macedonia. Thus ended what was called the Lamian war, in the year after the death of Alexander. (B. C. 322.)

The recovered ascendancy of the party hostile to Macedonia had led to the recall of Demosthenes: but Antipater's victory and approach to Athens again

obliged him to retire. A decree of the people was passed in his absence, condemning to death both himself and those associates who had fled with him. In ordinary cases this would only have operated as a sentence of perpetual banishment; but Antipater had been deeply and repeatedly offended by the fugitives, and his character was unforgiving. He sent emissaries to seize them in all the cities whither they had fled, and all who were arrested were brought to him and put to death. Demosthenes had passed into Italy, and taken refuge in a temple in Calabria; and being found there, that he might not fall into the hands of Antipater, he swallowed poison.

Of the many states so lately leagued against Antipater, the Ætolians only had not submitted; and they still held out, when the Macedonian leaders entered their country at the head of an army such as they could not cope with in the field. The weaker towns were abandoned, the stronger garrisoned and provided for a siege, while the mass of the people retired to the mountains, where bold and active men, acquainted with the country, might readily foil the powerful but cumbrous phalanx of the enemy. The Macedonians attempting to drive them from their fastnesses were repulsed with loss; but Craterus prudently gave up the endeavour, and prepared to quarter his troops for the winter in the open country. The case of the Ætolians now seemed hopeless. Remaining among the barren and snowy heights, unprovided and unsheltered, they might perish with cold and hunger: coming down into the plain they must fight and be beaten, for their enemies were far superior in numbers as well as in discipline and in the ability of their commanders. Submission, therefore, seemed inevitable, till they were unexpectedly relieved by news arriving from Asia.

Perdiccas seeking, while his ascendancy was doubtful, to connect himself closely with Antipater, had asked and obtained his daughter in marriage. His ambition, however, had risen with his fortunes, so that he now aimed at nothing less than the royalty of Macedonia and its conquests; as a step towards which he wished to put away his wife, and marry Cleopatra, the sister of Alexander. Aware that Antigonus, a friend of Antipater, and an able soldier and statesman, had penetrated his design, and was likely to oppose it, he endeavoured to destroy him by false accusations. Antigonus escap-

ing to Europe, carried his tale to Antipater and Craterus, who made a hasty peace with the Ætolians, and prepared for war with Perdiccas. They allied themselves with Ptolemy, who was no less threatened than themselves. Perdiccas went in person against Ptolemy, but he sent a powerful army against Antipater, under Eumenes, an excellent officer, who had formerly been Alexander's confidential secretary.

Eumenes found the enemy already in Asia, but he succeeded in falling on the division of Craterus when separated from the rest. Craterus fell in the battle, and his army was defeated; but this success came too late to benefit Perdiccas. That commander's Egyptian campaign had been tedious and unsuccessful, and time was given for his troops to scan the characters of the rival leaders, and to draw conclusions far from being favourable to their own. Perdiccas was violent, arbitrary, and often cruel; Ptolemy, mild and affably kind to his followers, and, at least by comparison with Perdiccas, liberal to his enemies; he was also, like Alexander, remarkable for prowess as a combatant, and habitually profuse in the exposure of his person, qualities ever highly conducive to the popularity of a general. The result was discontent in the army of Perdiccas, which increased with every new delay and failure, and rose at length to such a height that Perdiccas was assassinated in his tent. The troops transferred their obedience to Ptolemy, and the news of Eumenes's victory, which arriving sooner would probably have prevented their revolt, now only produced a vote of death to Eumenes, and to fifty of his officers.

For a short time after this, Eurydice, the wife of king Arrhidæus, and niece of Philip, contended for power with Pithon, whom the soldiers had chosen protector in conjunction with another general. Pithon, finding himself the weaker, resigned his office; but Antipater, being elected sole protector, quelled the intrigues of Eurydice. He then made a new allotment of various satrapies, whereby Babylonia was entrusted to Seleucus, and Susiana added to the former commands of Antigonus, who was also appointed to conduct the war against Eumenes, with the authority of captain-general of Asia Minor, while Antipater, with Arrhidæus, fixed his residence in Macedonia. Antigonus defeated Eumenes in a great battle, and

obliged him to take refuge with a scanty band of followers in the strong hold of Nora, where Antigonos besieged him, having first suppressed the remaining friends of Perdiccas. The siege was long protracted by the resolution and ability of Eumenes, and still continued, when the death of Antipater gave a wider field to the ambition of Antigonos. (B. C. 318.)

Antipater left the regency to Polysperchon, one of the oldest of Alexander's surviving generals. This was highly displeasing to Cassander, Antipater's son, who had himself expected to succeed to it; but his party being too weak for open resistance, he escaped into Asia, and besought the aid of Antigonos. Both Antigonos and Ptolemy promised their assistance, professedly through friendship for his father, but really to promote their own aggrandisement and secure their independence by embarrassing Polysperchon, and weakening the general government.

In the Grecian towns which had been garrisoned by Antipater, or in which the constitution had been altered and the ruling party changed by him, the leading men mostly favoured Cassander. Polysperchon therefore undertook to make these states his own by undoing all that Antipater had done. He proclaimed himself the patron of universal independence; re-established democracies in place of the oligarchies set up by Antipater, and recalled the exiles banished for opposing him. Moreover, he procured that the chief partisans of Antipater, in each state, should suffer exile, confiscation, or death, though it was to Antipater chiefly that he owed his present greatness. His party was strengthened by the accession of Eumenes, and of Olympias, the mother of Alexander, a violent woman of some ability, and an inveterate enemy of Antipater and his son.

Since Athens submitted to Antipater, a Macedonian garrison had constantly held Munychia. We have seen several instances of a like proceeding, and particularly in the occupation of the Athenian citadel by the Lacedæmonians during the tyranny of the Thirty, and of that of Thebes, after the treachery of Phœbidas. In both these instances, the object was at once to ensure the ascendancy of a ruling party, friendly to the foreign power, which maintained the garrison, and to keep the city not only in alliance, but in a kind of subjection.

Accordingly the troops were commandingly posted in the Acropolis, and all political measures were concerted with the Lacedæmonian commander, and carried through by his support. But the present government of Athens was on a different footing. The chief authority remained with Phocion, who was recommended by his superior character and talents, and by the high esteem in which he was known to be held by Antipater. He was not a person likely to aim at power by holding his country in subjection to foreigners; but it is probable that the mildness of the terms which were granted to the city was chiefly produced by respect to Phocion, and by the wish to settle affairs in such a manner, that he and his friends might honourably exercise the powers of government. The party of Phocion was the weaker in numbers, and that weakness was the more dangerous, as in the turbulent times which had just been passing, both the authority of the laws had been considerably shaken, and the character of the people deteriorated. In these circumstances the greater part were probably not unwilling that a force should be at hand, which might encourage their friends, dishearten their enemies, and, perhaps, turn the scale, should it be necessary, in case of sedition or civil war. And if Phocion himself, or any others of the sterner patriots among them, disliked an arrangement which trenchanted so far on the independence of their country, they would nevertheless be obliged to submit to it, as the only means of giving to Antipater that confidence in the stability of their government, which would induce him to abstain from harsher measures of coercion. But the Macedonian force was posted neither in the city, nor in Peiræus, but in one of the inferior ports; its commander was not consulted in any measures of the government, nor were his troops employed in carrying them into effect; and their presence was only designed as a security to Antipater against the danger of hostility on the part of the government, and to the government, against that of popular insurrection.

Immediately on the death of Antipater, and before it was known at Athens, Cassander had sent Nicanor, an officer entirely devoted to him, to take the command of the garrison in Munychia. When the breach with Polysperchon

had become decided, Nicanor urged the Athenian people to remain in friendship with Cassander; but the support of the new protector had again given courage to the democratical party, and the answer made was a requisition to withdraw his troops, according to the royal proclamation. He persuaded them to grant a few days respite, during which he secretly gathered strength to stand a siege. The Athenians sent ambassadors to ask for aid of the king and Polysperchon, and held repeated assemblies to deliberate on the conduct of the war; but Nicanor in the mean time raised a powerful force of mercenaries, and, issuing one night unexpectedly from Munychia, made himself master of Peiræus. The Athenians now appointed an embassy, with Phocion at its head, to require that Nicanor would desist from his aggression, and restore to them their independence, as the king had commanded. Nicanor at first referred them to Cassander, under whose authority he was acting; but when their demand was backed by letters from Olympias, and by the approach of an army under Alexander, the son of Polysperchon, he became alarmed, and promised to evacuate the place. He delayed, however, to perform his promise, and Alexander arriving, soon proved that his intention was not to restore their ports to the Athenians, but to retain them for himself. Meanwhile the Athenian people held an assembly, with every circumstance of tumult and confusion, in which they voted the complete re-establishment of democracy, and the death or banishment of all who had borne office in the oligarchy, of whom the most conspicuous was Phocion. The exiles fled to the camp of Alexander, and were sent by him to his father's court, and recommended to his favour. They were followed thither by an Athenian embassy, sent to accuse them, and to demand their surrender. Polysperchon had now repented the treachery which he had meditated against the Athenians, but which shame and fear had prevented him from fulfilling, and he hoped by a second act of baseness to soften the resentment excited by the first. He gave up the fugitives, in words, to stand their trial, but, in truth, to perish by the party fury of their bitterest enemies. When the victims were brought before the assembly, their voices were drowned by the clamour of their judges, who were mostly of the persons

newly restored to a share in the government, from which they had been excluded after the victory of Antipater. Every one was hooted down, who attempted to speak in favour of the accused, and a tumultuous vote was passed, condemning all the prisoners to death. They were for the most part men of distinguished rank and respectable character, and while their hard fate affected many with pity and consternation, there were others who vented in insults that envious malice which, while its objects were in prosperity, had been prudently suppressed. One of these wretches is said to have spit on Phocion, as he was led to prison; but the outrage failed to ruffle the composure of the captive, who only looked towards the magistrates, and asked—"Will no one stop this man's indecency?" Before he drank the hemlock, he was asked if he had any message for his son; he replied—"I bid him cherish no resentment against the Athenians." Thus perished a statesman and warrior of eminent ability; but far more remarkable for the rarer gift of determined uprightness. The Athenians soon repented of their deed; they erected to him a statue of brass, and honoured with a public funeral his remains, which had at first been cast out unburied. His principal accuser was put to death, and the others driven into exile; the people hoping, as in many other instances, to atone for their crime by punishing their advisers.

Shortly afterwards Cassander landed in Peiræus, with four thousand soldiers. He was there besieged by Polysperchon, who soon, however, found himself in want of provisions to maintain his army; and therefore, leaving a division of his forces at Athens, he proceeded with the greater part into Peloponnesus, in the hope of enforcing the obedience of the Megalopolitans, who were warm supporters of Cassander. Meanwhile Cassander sailed against the Æginetans, and readily brought them over to his party. The Salaminians, refusing compliance, were besieged and brought to extremity, when Polysperchon sent an armament, which obliged Cassander to retire. The protector then returned into Peloponnesus, and called a meeting of the cities, and to such as did not attend it he sent ambassadors. He offered alliance to all, on the conditions that they should establish democracy, and put to death their oligarchical

rulers established by Antipater. The greater part immediately entered on a course of bloody executions; the friends of Antipater were slain or banished; democracy was everywhere embraced, and with it the alliance of Polysperchon. The Megalopolitans alone firmly clung to the party of Cassander; they secured their moveables within the city, strengthened their walls, enrolled and numbered the inhabitants, both slaves and free, and appointed to each his particular province in the defence; they did all, in short, which befitted resolute men when preparing to be besieged by an enemy of overwhelming force. The Macedonian host was highly formidable both by numbers and discipline; and it was well provided with skilful engineers. A breach was effected, and desperate attempts made to carry it; but all were foiled by the courage of the besieged, and the able conduct of their leader. The besiegers had elephants, which are now first mentioned as used in Greece, though they had long been common in the wars of Asia. The approaches to the breach were levelled, and it was attempted to force a passage with the elephants; but spikes had been set to pierce their feet, and prevent their advancing, while they were plied with darts till many fell, and the rest recoiling trampled down their employers,—a danger which has always attended the use of such uncertain auxiliaries. In the end Polysperchon was obliged to raise the siege; and attend to matters of deeper interest. His failure determined most of the Grecian cities to seek the friendship of Cassander. The Athenians, unable otherwise to recover their ports, negotiated for peace, and peace was made on the terms that they should enjoy their city and territory, with all their ports, except Munychia, which Cassander should hold during the war; that he should nominate an Athenian citizen to be at the head of the administration; and that all, whose property fell short of ten minæ (about 34*l*.) should be excluded from the government.

The conduct of Polysperchon had been but weak, and the queen Eurydice appears to have succeeded in that which was her constant endeavour, to supplant him in the management of her feeble husband, and the government of Macedonia. To recover his lost power, he brought Olympias into play. He advanced with her into Macedonia, and Eurydice and Arrhidæus led their forces

to oppose him; but the Macedonians refused to fight against the mother of Alexander, and Eurydice and her husband fell into the power of Olympias. She mercilessly abused her success; the royal captives were put to death, with circumstances of studied cruelty; and the chief friends of Cassander were sought out for slaughter, including his brother, with a hundred of the most eminent Macedonians. But the hour of vengeance was not far off. Cassander had been united with Eurydice, by the closest friendship certainly, and, if prevailing report be trusted, by unlawful love. He was now hastening to avenge her death, and that of his brother and friends. By vast activity he made his way into Macedonia, though great endeavours had been made by the friends of Polysperchon to occupy the passes. The barbarity of Olympias had disgusted the Macedonians, and she now obtained from them but little support. She was besieged through the winter in Pydna, and in the spring the town was obliged to submit, and Olympias surrendered, only stipulating for her life.

The sequel is an abominable tissue of treachery and murder. Amphipolis still held out for Olympias, and it was only by her bidding that Aristonous, the commander, was induced to surrender the place. The high character of Aristonous excited apprehension in Cassander, who had adopted the base policy of destroying all whose ability was such that their opposition might be dangerous. He procured the death of Aristonous; and then proceeded by dark and crooked ways to fulfil his revenge against Olympias. Some of the kindred of those whom she had murdered were prevailed on to accuse her in the Macedonian assembly; she was absent, and had none to speak for her; and the assembly condemned her to death. Cassander sent some of his own friends to advise her to secret flight; he offered to provide a ship which should convey her to Athens; and this he did that, by her flight, she might appear to acknowledge the justice of her sentence, and might then be put to death in the course of the voyage. She refused to escape, and demanded to be heard in her defence before the assembled Macedonians; but Cassander, dreading the effect of her presence, withheld his consent. He then selected two hundred soldiers to discomfit her; they entered the house, but on seeing her, their resolution failed, and they

retired. At length the execution was performed by the hand of her victim. She died with the greatest firmness. (A. C. 315.)

Cassander was now the undisputed lord of Macedonia, and, to confirm his ascendancy, married Thessalonica, the daughter of Philip, and half sister of Alexander. As a permanent memorial of his greatness he founded a city in the peninsula of Pallene, and named it Cassandreia. He transported thither the inhabitants of Potidæa and of several neighbouring cities, and there he planted the remnant of the unfortunate Olynthian people. The territory allotted to the settlement was large and fruitful; it grew and flourished, and became the most powerful of the Macedonian cities. Cassander also rebuilt Thebes in the twentieth year after its destruction by Alexander, many Grecian states, and especially Athens, assisting in the work.

On learning the death of Antipater, Antigonus had attempted to win over Eumenes to his interest, and had offered as the price of his support to restore his satrapy and to grant him yet higher honours than he had before enjoyed. While the negotiation was pending, Eumenes escaped from Nora, and again made head in Cappadocia: and when Polysperchon had been declared protector, and Antigonus had openly disclaimed the royal authority, Eumenes, having declared himself in favour of the king Arrhidæus, and of Polysperchon who then governed in his name, was appointed commander in chief of the royal forces, and soon found himself again at the head of a powerful army. His situation was still very difficult and dangerous. Eumenes was a Thracian Greek, of Cardia in the Chersonese, and the pride of the Macedonian, officers and soldiers ill brooked to be commanded by a foreigner; nor was it likely to be forgotten, in any time of discontent, that he had already been condemned to death by a vote of the army. The means which he took to mitigate the envy attaching to his station curiously illustrates the character of the people. He declined a

of five hundred talents offered the king, on the ground that he did not need it, for he wished not to be placed in any situation of power or splendour, but had unwillingly accepted his present command in compliance with authority which he was bound to obey. He then

related a remarkable dream. He had thought, he said, that he saw king Alexander sitting on his throne, and issuing orders to his generals; and from thence he gathered the direction that a golden throne should be set forth, with the diadem, and sceptre and other emblems of royalty; that sacrifice should be performed to it, as if the deified of the departed hero were actually present; that all councils of war should be held before the throne, and all commands issued in the name of Alexander, as if he were living. The proposal was adopted. The load of envy that weighed on Eumenes was greatly lightened when the orders ran not in his name, but in that of Alexander. The affections of the Macedonians were gratified and their superstitious hopes excited by the imagination that they were warring under the patronage and guidance of their late invincible king; and the advantage which Eumenes had gained by adroitly practising on the superstition of his followers, was so improved by his uniform affability and courtesy, both to chiefs and soldiers, that he soon brought the army into a temper favourable to cheerful obedience and zealous service, and long maintained them in it, in spite of several attempts to stir up mutiny which were made both by Ptolemy and Antigonus. The war was continued through several campaigns, with various success, and with signal proof of ability in both the opposing leaders. But Eumenes was surrounded with chiefs who were inclined to dispute his authority, and whose influence in the army was greater than his own; and not all his skill could for ever convert jealous rivals into obedient lieutenants. By the desertion of one of his principal officers, he lost a battle when the victory seemed within his grasp: and in the following night, while he was urging the division of his troops which had been victorious to try the fortune of another struggle, they secretly negotiated with Antigonus, and made their peace by betraying their commander. He was delivered to Antigonus, and soon after put to death. This happened in the same year with the death of Olympias.

The grasping desires of Antigonus now knew no bounds, and to gratify them he spared neither treasury nor blood. Pithon, the satrap of Media, lured into his power by professions of friendship, was seized, condemned, and executed, Seleucus the ruler of Baby-

lonia had served him eminently in the war, but this did not prevent Antigonus from seeking to despoil him. He led his forces to Babylon, where they were entertained in the most friendly manner. On arriving he demanded an account of the revenues arising from the province. Seleucus replied that he owed him no account for the government which had been freely given to himself by the Macedonians in reward for his services in the wars of Alexander. A quarrel ensued, and Seleucus, warned by the fate of Pithon, saved himself by flight. He arrived in the court of Ptolemy, who received him with all kindness; and a league was quickly formed between Ptolemy, Lysimachus, Cassander, and Seleucus, to curb the threatening ambition of Antigonus.

It is needless to dwell on wars in which there was no political principle in question, nor any object even of national ambition: in which the lust of personal aggrandisement deigned not even to veil its gross features with the flimsy cover of narrow and exclusive patriotism; but subject millions were only considered as the counters and the stake in the game of conquest, and provinces with their inhabitants were lost and won, as if they had been estates with the live stock required for their cultivation. In Greece, indeed, disorganized as it had been by the frequent interference of Macedonian kings and generals with its political relations, it was still necessary to make pretence of some attention to the public good. Each contending potentate proclaimed aloud to the Greeks that he fought to free them from the tyranny of his opponent; each found a party to support him in various cities: for in every state there was war without and strife within, with the certainty that whether the friends of Cassander prevailed or those of Antigonus, they would be equally bound down in unlimited subserviency to their too powerful ally.

Hostilities were actively carried on by land and sea, in Europe and in Asia, and many battles fought with various changes of success and defeat. The party of Antigonus gained ground in Greece; and in Peloponnesus particularly, as well as in Bœotia and Locris, it became decidedly superior. Meanwhile, Antigonus being employed in pursuing the war in Greece and in Asia Minor, the defence of Syria was entrusted to Demetrius his son, a youth of great

spirit and ability. In the third year of the war, (B. C. 312.) Demetrius was completely defeated at Gaza by the forces of Ptolemy and Seleucus. The opportunity was inviting, and Seleucus resolved to attempt the recovery of his satrapy. He had been, like Ptolemy, honourably remarkable among the chiefs of his time for mildness of character and attention to the welfare of his subjects: and so confident was he in his popularity among the Babylonians, that if Ptolemy had been unwilling to furnish troops for the enterprise he would have gone up attended only by his sons and personal friends. As it was, he carried with him but eight hundred foot and two hundred horse; but the people flocked from all sides to his standard; he soon became master of the province, almost without resistance, and then went on to conquer the neighbouring satrapies of Susiana and Media—so rapid and easy was his change from a destitute wanderer to a powerful prince, from a mere dependant of Ptolemy to a valuable ally!

At the time when the Athenians agreed to receive as their governor a citizen of their own who should be nominated by Cassander, Demetrius of Phalerum, one of the smallest ports of Athens, was chosen to the office, which he exercised with great moderation and benevolence. The government continued in the form in which it was then established till the year B. C. 307, when Demetrius the son of Antigonus arriving in Greece with a powerful fleet and army, and with a commission to liberate all the cities, but especially Athens, commenced his operations by making himself master of Peiræus. The majority of the Athenian people was already friendly to Antigonus, from whom they expected the restoration of democracy: it was vain to resist, and Demetrius the Phalærean consented to go at the head of an embassy to the son of Antigonus. He stipulated according to his instructions for the independence of the commonwealth, and personally also for safety to himself: and both demands being granted, he retired with a safe-conduct to Thebes, and afterwards to the court of Ptolemy, where he employed himself in literary pursuits during the remainder of his life.

Demetrius, the son of Antigonus, being admitted into Athens, invested Munychia, which was still held by the soldiers of Cassander. An accomplished commander in every respect,

he was especially remarkable for inventive genius as an engineer, and skill in conducting sieges, inasmuch that he was popularly distinguished by the title of Poliorcetes, signifying The Besieger. Munychia, though a place of great strength and well defended, was soon taken; and Demetrius completed his work of giving freedom to Athens by demolishing the fortress which had held it in subjection. The democracy was re-established in the fifteenth year after its suppression by Antipater: and the people went on to express their gratitude by extravagant honours paid to Demetrius and his father. Golden statues of them both were set on chariots near to those of Harmodius and Aristogeiton; massive golden crowns were voted to them, and altars erected, at which they were honoured as gods, and with the title of saviours: and as every Athenian ward (*phyle*) had its protecting hero after whom it was named and to whom its members paid a peculiar worship, two new wards were added to the ten already existing, and were named respectively after Antigonus and Demetrius.

Demetrius now, in obedience to instructions sent by his father, called a meeting of deputies from the allied cities to take counsel for the interests of Greece, and himself proceeded to dislodge the forces of Ptolemy from Cyprus. He had defeated the opposing army there, and shut it up in the city of Salamis, when Ptolemy came in person with a powerful armament to the aid of his officers. A great and well contested sea fight ensued, in which Ptolemy being defeated withdrew to Egypt, and gave up the island. On receiving the news of this great success, Antigonus and his son assumed the kingly diadem, and the example was followed by Ptolemy, Lysimachus, and Seleucus, (B. C. 306.) In the following year Antigonus attempted to decide the war by invading Egypt: but the maritime coasts and the banks and mouth of the Nile were so strongly guarded and actively defended, that his fleet could not make good a landing nor his army force the passage of the river, and he was obliged to retire with loss.

The island of Rhodes had anciently been divided among three cities, Lindus, Ialysus, and Cameirus; but towards the close of the Peloponnesian war the inhabitants had united themselves in one city, and called it by the name of the island. They were oligarchically governed, when under Læ-

dæmonian supremacy; democratically, when under Athenian; but the state flourished under both. When Rhodes combined with Chios and Byzantium in revolt against the Athenians, the democracy seems to have been still maintained: but after the termination of that war it was overthrown by an insurrection of the wealthy Few and their adherents, assisted by Mausolus the king of Caria. Under its new government, Rhodes continued to increase in trade and shipping: from which it may be inferred that the administration was not inattentive to the wishes and interests of the people; for maritime power always strengthened the popular party, and a jealous and arbitrary oligarchy would therefore have discouraged rather than favoured the growth of the navy. We are told, indeed, in one fragment of a contemporary historian (Theopompus, quoted by Athenæus,) that there was a time when all power was in the hands of a small knot of profligate men, who supported each other in every outrage which their fierce passions or brutal caprices could prompt. It is stated that they actually played at dice for the chastity of virgins and matrons, and that the condition of the game was that all should assist the winner to gratify his lust either by persuasion or violence. But whatever chances may have enabled a small faction to exercise for a while so hateful a tyranny, it must have quickly fallen, and the government have reverted to the great body of citizens having certain qualifications of birth and property. In the ordinary state of the Rhodian aristocracy, its conduct was moderate and upright; so we are told by ancient writers, and their testimony is confirmed by the prosperity of the commonwealth, and by its continual increase in commercial wealth and naval power. When all the Grecian seas were swarming with pirates, the Rhodians alone for the common good undertook and effected their suppression. They were highly respected by Alexander, though he kept a garrison in their city, which, on receiving the news of his death, they immediately expelled. As the Macedonian supremacy appears to have been generally favourable to oligarchy, notwithstanding the patronage which Alexander, in the outset of his career, found it expedient to bestow on the democratical interest in Asia Minor, it is probable that this change was accompanied with an increase of power in the great body of the

people. The Rhodians stood aloof from the quarrels of the chiefs who divided the empire of Alexander, and kept friendship with them all, thus enjoying peace when every other state was at war. This could not last for ever. Their habits and interests especially inclined them to close connection with Ptolemy and Egypt: and though they avoided giving any just cause of offence to Antigonus, his violent spirit would be satisfied with nothing short of unqualified support. This being refused, he commissioned officers to seize the Rhodian traders bound for Egypt; and when the execution of the order was resisted, he prepared an armament against the island. The Rhodians endeavoured to pacify him by compliments and submissions, but finding him inexorable they made ready for defence.

In the year which followed the attack of Antigonus on Egypt, (B. C. 304) Demetrius laid siege to Rhodes. The Rhodians sent to solicit the aid of Ptolemy, Lysimachus, and Cassander, and took measures to increase to the utmost their military force, and to unite the hearts and quicken the zeal of all who were in the city. Strangers and foreign residents were invited to join in the defence, but all unserviceable persons were sent away. It was voted that slaves, who fought with courage and fidelity, should be purchased from their masters, emancipated, and made citizens: that every citizen, who fell in battle, should have a public funeral; that his surviving parents should be supported, and his children educated by the state; that marriage portions should be given to his daughters, and a suit of armour publicly presented at the feast of Bacchus to each of his sons on coming of age. The rich men freely gave their money, the poor their labour, the artificers their skill; all strove to surpass each other in zeal and exertion. The besieging army was numerous and disciplined, well supplied, and well appointed, and provided with every variety of warlike engines which the science of the age and the mechanical genius of the commander could furnish. Assaults were made by land and sea, in various fashions and with various success; but no decisive advantage could be gained over the resolute and active defenders of the city, who not only kept the walls, but made several vigorous sallies, in some of which they succeeded in destroy-

ing many ships and engines of the besiegers. Demetrius at length gave up the hope of successfully attacking them from the sea, and turned all his attention to his operations on the side towards the land. The Rhodians, taking advantage of this to employ their ships in distant cruises, made prize of many vessels belonging to Antigonus, and intercepted some convoys, which were coming to the enemy's camp. Meantime the siege was pressed by land, and the walls were shaken in many places, all which the Rhodians made good by new defences built within; and just as they were beginning to be discouraged by the power and perseverance of their adversary, their confidence was renewed by the arrival of an Egyptian fleet, with supplies in great abundance.

The siege was protracted for a year. A second fleet was sent by Ptolemy, which brought large supplies, and a considerable reinforcement of troops. Ambassadors came from Athens, and from many other Grecian states, to intreat that Demetrius would be reconciled with the Rhodians. He yielded so far as to grant a suspension of arms, and commence a negotiation; but the terms could not be agreed on, and the war was renewed. He then attempted a surprise by night. Under cover of the darkness, a chosen body of soldiers entered the town through a breach which had been made; and the rest of the army supported them at day-break by a general assault on the walls. But the Rhodians were cool and firm. All who were defending the ramparts remained at their posts, and made them good against the enemies without; while the rest of the citizens, with the auxiliaries from Egypt, went against those within the city. In the violent contest which ensued the townsmen were victorious, and few of the storming party escaped out of their hands.

Letters now came from Antigonus, directing his son to make peace with the Rhodians, on what conditions he could; and Demetrius accordingly wished for an accommodation on any terms that would save his credit. The Rhodians were no less anxious for peace; and the more so, as Ptolemy had written to them, promising further aid in case of need, but advising them to put an end to the war on any reasonable conditions. Peace was soon concluded on the terms that the Rhodians should be independent, and should retain all their reve-

nues; but that they should assist Antigonus in all his wars, excepting against Ptolemy, and should give one hundred hostages, in pledge of fidelity to their engagements. Thus released from danger, the Rhodians proceeded to fulfil their promises, and reward those who had served them well. Fit honours were bestowed upon the bravest combatants among the free inhabitants, and freedom, with citizenship, given to such of the slaves as had deserved it. Statues were erected to Ptolemy, Lysimachus, and Cassander, all of whom had assisted them largely with provisions. To Ptolemy, whose benefits had been by far the most conspicuous, more extravagant honours were assigned. The oracle of Ammon was consulted, to learn whether the Rhodians might not be allowed to worship him as a god; and, permission being given, a temple was actually erected in his honour. Such instances have already occurred in the case of Alexander, and in that of Antigonus and Demetrius at Athens; but it must be remembered that such a practice would not bear, in Grecian eyes, the same unnatural and impious character which it does in ours, since the step was easy from hero-worship, which had long formed an important part of their religion, to the adoration of distinguished men, even while alive.

Demetrius sailed to Greece to oppose Cassander, expelled his garrisons from Sicyon and Corinth, and from many other important places, and assembled a congress at the Isthmus, by which he was elected captain-general of the Greeks. He had generally the people in his favour; so that his conquests were easy and sure, and he had seldom occasion to weaken his army by garrisons. Meanwhile Cassander and Lysimachus planned an expedition against Antigonus, and Lysimachus, leading an armament into Asia, gained considerable successes; while Cassander remained in Thessaly to check the progress of Demetrius, Lysimachus was obliged by the approach of Antigonus to act on the defensive, while Seleucus was coming down from Upper Asia to help him; but he contrived at the approach of winter to withdraw his army from the camp in which it was besieged by Antigonus, and Antigonus declining to follow him, the three kings dispersed their forces into winter-quarters.

In the following year (B. C. 301) the three kings again took the field, and Demetrius having been recalled from Greece to join his father, a decisive action took place near Ipsus in Phrygia. The armies were nearly equal, and the victory was hotly contested; but in the end Antigonus was slain, and his army completely defeated. The victors proceeded to divide the possessions of Antigonus; but Demetrius escaping, marched to Ephesus with five thousand foot and four thousand horse; and thence embarked for Athens, where he had left the chief part of his navy and his treasure. To the gratitude of the Athenians he trusted for a refuge, and for assistance in the recovery of his fortunes; and the most bitterly felt of all his present mortifications was when he was met by Athenian ambassadors, who requested that he would not approach their city, since the people had voted, not to receive within it any of the contending monarchs. But he suppressed his resentment, and sent to request the restoration of his ships and money, which having obtained, he employed them in a desultory warfare against Lysimachus.

Seleucus had now transferred to Lysimachus the jealousy, of which the fallen fortunes of Demetrius could no longer be the object; and hearing that Lysimachus and his son had each received in marriage a daughter of Ptolemy, he thought it would conduce to his security to marry Stratonice, the daughter of Demetrius. He also reconciled Demetrius with Ptolemy, and procured that he should marry Ptolemy's daughter; but the concord existing between Seleucus and his father-in-law was soon destroyed by a quarrel relating to Cilicia, which Demetrius had recently conquered from Pleistarchus, the brother of Cassander, and which Seleucus wished to purchase from him.

Since the Samian war the Athenian government had been completely disordered by the number of revolutions through which it had passed, and which had mostly been effected by foreign interference. There had recently been struggles within the city, in which one Lachares had obtained the supremacy as tyrant; and through the present confusion and weakness of the state Demetrius hoped to make himself its master. Having failed in his first attempt, he gathered powerful reinforcements, again blockaded the city, and reduced it to

extremity by famine. He defeated a fleet which Ptolemy, who was now again at variance with him, had sent to relieve the place, and obliged the Athenians to submit themselves to his mercy; but he made use of no severities, and contented himself with securing their obedience by a garrison. He defeated the Lacedæmonians near Mantinea, and penetrated to Sparta; but in the midst of his successes he received the alarming news that all his cities in Asia had been taken by Lysimachus, and all in Cyprus, excepting Salamis, by Ptolemy.

Another field of action now was opened by the death of Cassander (B. C. 296) and the quarrels of his sons, Antipater and Alexander. The mother, Thessalonice, favouring Alexander, was murdered by Antipater; but Alexander called to his aid both Demetrius and Pyrrhus, the young king of Epirus, and Antipater flying to the court of Lysimachus, whose daughter he had married, was, notwithstanding their connexion, put to death by him. Before the arrival of Demetrius, Pyrrhus being nearer had performed the service, and had rewarded himself with a considerable portion of the Macedonian kingdom. Demetrius's coming was now unwelcome to his ally; and jealousy arising between them, Alexander attempted his life, but was counterplotted and slain, and Demetrius obtained the kingdom of Macedonia.

Most of Greece was already in the interest of Demetrius, and he twice conquered the Bœotians, who were hostile to him, and twice took the city of Thebes, though not without a vigorous resistance, in the course of which he was severely wounded. But his most formidable enemy was Pyrrhus, a restless prince, but a brave and skilful commander. He was a descendant of Achilles, and a kinsman of Alexander; and his greatest ambition was to emulate the deeds of those celebrated blood-shedders. His signal proofs of warlike ability had won him the hearts of the Macedonians, which Demetrius had forfeited by haughtiness, licentiousness, and insolent contempt of the feelings of his people. Yet so dreaded by the other monarchs were the talents and spirit of Demetrius, that Seleucus, Ptolemy, and Lysimachus combined with Pyrrhus to crush him. In the sixth year of his reign, his kingdom was at once invaded on different sides by Lysimachus and Ptolemy. He found that he could not trust his soldiers

against Lysimachus, and he, therefore, led them against Pyrrhus; but they soon broke out into open mutiny, and Demetrius was obliged to steal away in the habit of a common soldier, while Pyrrhus, coming up, received the submission of his army, and easily occupied his kingdom. (B. C. 287.) Demetrius sailed into Asia, hoping to gain some of the provinces of Lysimachus, but his forces were insufficient, and after a tedious campaign he was driven into Cilicia, which belonged to Seleucus. Hence he wrote to Seleucus calling to mind their affinity, and intreating pity for his fallen condition: but after considerable hesitation Seleucus's compassion yielded to his fears and jealousies, and he led an army against his father-in-law. Demetrius defended himself with the fury of despair, and in most encounters had the advantage; but he was at length deserted by his soldiers, and made prisoner. He was closely confined, but otherwise honourably treated, for the rest of his life, which was shortened by intemperance. Such was the end of a man, whose talents, courage, and natural generosity of disposition, if chastened by temperance, and directed by philanthropy, would have made him truly glorious; but whose rare gifts were alternately drowned in boundless debaucheries, and perverted to the purposes of selfish and wasting ambition.

Pyrrhus was driven from Macedonia, after seven months' possession, by Lysimachus, who held it five years and a half, at the end of which he fell in battle against Seleucus. Both Ptolemy and Demetrius had died in the year preceding this event, and in that which followed Seleucus was assassinated by another Ptolemy surnamed Ceraunus, who had fled to his court from that of Lysimachus, and had been most kindly entertained. The year of Seleucus's death (B. C. 280) was also that when Pyrrhus passed into Italy, to assist the Grecian colony of Tarentum against the Romans, and it was the same in which the Achaian league first revived, a portion of history which will form the subject of part of the next chapter.

Seleucus was killed in the course of an expedition to take possession of the kingdom of Lysimachus: and the murderer seized on Macedonia, and held it till he was slain in battle by the Gauls, which took place sixteen months after the death of Lysimachus, and nine after that of Seleucus.

* See CLARKE'S *Fest. Hellen.*

These barbarians were sprung from that vast portion of the European continent, which extends from the Rhine to the Pyrenees, and from the Alps to the ocean, and comprises France and the Netherlands. They were a turbulent and warlike race, little skilled in the arts which minister to human subsistence. If such a people outgrew their territory, their resources was not to increase its fertility by more artful and laborious culture, but rather to supply their wants at the expense of others, by rapine, conquest, or emigration. When their tribes were mutually unconnected, the result must have been a state of continued disquiet, like that of early Greece already described. Large bodies of men were seeking for abodes; the fugitives from one place were the conquerors in another; and the commotion lasted till the sword had destroyed the excess of population, or till some channel was opened for its removal. Such a vent was often found in the military service of foreign states; and Gallic mercenaries were much employed, especially by Carthage. But the spirit of migration took a different form, when large tracts were united under a single government. If an outlet were then to be provided for an overflowing population, wider conquests were necessary, and greater power was collected to achieve them. From every neighbouring state the needy and the ambitious flocked to the hope of brilliant enterprise and eligible settlements; and all were poured in one gathered stream upon remoter and more cultivated regions. Many instances of this are to be found both in Oriental and in Roman story; but the most memorable of all are contained in the history of those northern hordes, by whose invasions the Roman empire was finally overthrown.

Such a crisis is said to have arrived in Gaul about the year B. C. 588, when the largest part of it was subject to the tribe of the Bituriges and their king Ambigatus. Two mighty hosts of emigrants were formed, under the king's two sons, Bellovesus and Sigovesus. Bellovesus crossed the Alps. Fresh swarms of adventurers quickly followed, and all the north of Italy was conquered, and received the name of Cisalpine Gaul, or Gaul on the hither side of the Alps. About two centuries after, when the Gauls again found their territory too narrow, and sought to enlarge it with

part of Etruria, being provoked by the Romans to march against them, they destroyed the greater part of the city, and obliged the inhabitants to purchase their retreat with money. Such is the historical fact, when stripped of the fables with which it has pleased the Roman writers to embellish it.

Sigovesus followed a course very different from that of his brother. He penetrated into Hungary, and settled on the Danube, in the country called by the Romans Pannonia; and the courage, fierceness, and rapacity of his colonists, were long the dread of surrounding nations. The Pannonian Gauls were those who marched against Ptolemy Ceraunus, and fought the battle in which he perished with his army. They overran all Macedonia, afflicting the country with every kind of waste and cruelty; and in the next year they invaded Greece, and advanced to the pass of Thermopylæ, where a powerful Grecian army was assembled to oppose them.

The Gauls were by far the more numerous; they were taller, larger, and stronger than their adversaries, and they were full of impetuous courage; but they were inferior in arms, skill, and discipline, and in that deliberate valour, which ensures to the soldier of a civilised people his superiority over the savage. They had no defensive armour except a shield; their weapons were a javelin and a large pointless cutting sword; their mode of fighting was irregular; and they vainly strove to penetrate the firm barrier of Grecian spears, that stretched entirely across the narrow valley. To add to their distress they were plied unceasingly with missiles from an Athenian fleet, which was brought as near to the shore as the shoals would admit; and they suffered much, and effected little, till their leaders gave the signal for retreat, which soon became a disorderly flight, so that many were trampled to death in the narrow passage, or buried in the morasses. The chief command in the confederate army had been given to the Athenians, in deference to their ancient fame; which in this day's work they supported so well, that their merit was acknowledged to be the greatest in the action.

Brennus,* the Gallic chieftain, now be-
thought himself to weaken his opponents

* From the frequent occurrence of this name, as applied to Gallic leaders, it seems probable that it was not an appellation, but a title of command.

by drawing off the Ætolians, who were a numerous body, to the defence of their homes. A division of his forces crossed the mountains into Ætolia, and sacked the town of Callion, slaughtering all the males, and brutally abusing the women. The news was brought to the camp; the Ætolians hastened homewards, and were joined by those whom they had left in the towns; the very women were roused to arms by the enormities of the invaders; and the motley assemblage received an important addition of strength in the Achæians of Patræ, an excellent body of heavy-armed soldiers. The returning Gauls were met in front by the Patrian phalanx, and harassed on the flanks by the less regular forces of the Ætolians; and the blood that was shed, and the sufferings that were inflicted at Callion, were avenged, for not half of the perpetrators escaped to rejoin their countrymen in Thessaly.

Meantime the Gauls had opened Thermopylæ. By the track which the Persians had used to a like purpose against Leonidas and his band, a division of forty thousand men under Brennus now crossed the mountains to place itself on the rear of the Greeks. The resistance of the Phocians, who guarded the pass, gave time for their allies to escape by sea; they were safely embarked in the ships of the Athenians, and then dispersed to their several homes. The pass was clear; but Brennus and his followers not waiting for their fellows pressed on towards Delphi, in the hope to engross the rich plunder of the temple.

Alarmed at their approach, the Delphians consulted the oracle; and they were answered, as before, when the temple was threatened by the Persians, that they should not fear, for the god would protect his own. The townsmen had been joined by the rest of the Phocians, by the Amphisians, and by some of the Ætolians, the greater part of whom had gone against the main body of the invaders: they were animated by religious zeal as well as patriotism, and further encouraged by thunders, lightnings, and various phenomena which they considered as signs that Heaven was fighting on their side. The Gauls were beaten back. In the following night they suffered dreadfully by the cold and the fall of snow: and at day-break they were attacked in front by the main body of the Greeks, while the Phocians profited by their knowledge of the mountains to come

round upon their rear. They were driven to flight, and it was not till night-fall that they halted and encamped. The impiety of their enterprise, which struck the Greeks with horror, was probably not without its effect on the imagination of the barbarians: for in most forms of ancient heathenism there was a striking likeness of character, and every people acknowledged divinity in the gods of other nations, even in those whom it did not worship.* The consciousness of guilt, brought home to them by unexpected and overwhelming calamity, made them feel as men devoted to destruction. In the dead of the night a few of them thought that they heard a horse-tramp, as of an approaching enemy: the alarm soon spread, and the whole camp was in commotion. They thought the Greeks were among them; and so wild were they with terror, that they slew each other, not distinguishing their native language and habit. Encouraged by this new disaster of their enemies, the Phocians pressed them closer, and famine soon followed to complete their miseries. In the battles against the Greeks but six thousand Gauls had fallen; but upwards of ten thousand are said to have perished in the stormy night, and in the panic terror, and as many more in the succeeding famine.

The miserable remnant of the army under Brennus arrived at last in the encampment of their countrymen; when their leader, who had been dangerously

* The nations of Canaan allowed that the God of Israel was a great divinity, but they trusted that their own would prevail against him. When they were defeated in the hills, "The God of Israel," they said, "is a God of the hills:" and if they fought in the valleys they hoped for victory. Again, when the ark had been taken by the Philistines, and placed in the temple of Dagon; "When they of Ashdod arose early on the morrow, behold Dagon was fallen" upon his face to the earth before the ark of the Lord. —But the head of the Lord was heavy upon them of Ashdod, and he destroyed them, and smote them with emerods, even Ashdod and the coasts thereof. And when the men of Ashdod saw that it was so, they said, The ark of the God of Israel shall not abide with us; for his hand is sore upon us, and upon Dagon our god." 1 Sam. v. 3-7. Accordingly, after carrying it to other cities with a like result, the Philistines sent it back to the children of Israel with a trespass-offering; but still Dagon, and not the God of Israel, continued to be the object of their ordinary worship. Nebuchadnezzar also did not renounce his belief in the deities of the Babylonians, when he was convinced that the God of Shadrach, Meshach, and Abed-nego was mightier than they. "Therefore I make a decree, that every people, nation, and language, which speak any thing amiss against the God of Shadrach, Meshach, and Abed-nego, shall be cut in pieces, and their houses shall be made a dunghill; because there is no other god that can deliver after this sort." Dan. iii. 29. The Persians form the only exception to the general willingness to acknowledge the gods of other nations.

wounded, is said to have wilfully hastened his death through shame. Diminished and disheartened by the ruin of their detachments, the Gauls now commenced their retreat: but they were harassed by the reassembled forces of the Greeks, especially by the Ætolians; and on reaching the river Spercheius, they found the passage beset by the Thessalians and Malians. They are said to have been here cut off to a man, in the second year of the invasion. (B. C. 278.) By their utter destruction, and by the defeat of another division in Macedonia, through a stratagem practised by Antigonus, their countrymen were deterred from any further attempt on Greece: but a body soon after crossed into Asia, invited by Nicomedes, king of Bithynia, and made themselves masters of the province which was called from them Galatia. (From Galatai, the Greek form of their national appellation.)

For three years after the death of Ptolemy Ceraunus, the Macedonian diadem was disputed by various pretenders. It finally remained with Antigonus, the son of Demetrius, or Antigonus Gonatas, as he is frequently called, from the town of Goni, in Thessaly, where he was brought up. But before proceeding, we must shortly touch on the affairs of Sicily.

There was quiet in Syracuse for many years after its tranquillisation by Timoleon: but at length the commonwealth became disordered, and a revolution took place, which established oligarchy. Among those who fled at the time of the change was Agathocles, a young man originally so poor that he lived by the trade of a potter; but his personal accomplishments won him a patron, who enriched him and procured him a military command; and he quickly made himself considerable by ability in war and fluent boldness in the assembly of the people. Provoked by a personal wrong, he had warned the Syracusans against Sosistratus, who headed the party of the Few: he could not, therefore, safely tarry in Syracuse after the revolution, but he went to Italy, and there subsisted as a soldier of fortune. Another change re-established democracy in Syracuse; and Sosistratus, with his friends, being driven into banishment, Agathocles was enabled to return. The Carthaginians took up the cause of the exiles, and a war ensued, in which Agathocles distinguished himself eminently both in subordinate and principal

commands, till his conduct giving rise to a suspicion that he was aiming at the tyranny, he was again obliged to quit the city. The exiled friends of Sosistratus were readmitted into Syracuse, while Agathocles remaining in banishment gathered an army which made him formidable both to Carthage and to Syracuse. The fear of his power procured his recall, and he returned under an oath that he would not injure the democracy: after which he professed himself the champion of the Many, and courted them so dexterously, that he was chosen general and guardian of the public tranquillity, till the lately discordant factions now united in the city should be brought to dwell together in harmony and confidence. He still wanted a force more subservient to his purposes than the body of armed citizens. Having, therefore, obtained a commission to levy troops according to his discretion, he embodied the soldiers who had followed him in his last exile, men devoted to himself, and hostile alike to the Syracusan Many and the Few; and he added such of the poorer citizens, as were embittered by envy or made desperate by want, so as readily to join with any adventurer, or take part in any revolution, if they might thereby better their own condition, without regard to the form of government to be established or overthrown.

Six hundred principal Syracusans had shared in the oligarchy established by Sosistratus; and against these the attack was first directed. Agathocles invited their leaders to a conference, arrested them and tried them before his army, alleging that the six hundred had plotted to seize him because of his zeal for the popular cause. The multitude cried out that he should straightway punish the offenders, and he gave the word to march to Syracuse, to slay the guilty and plunder the houses of the six hundred and their adherents. The thing was done, and the city given up to bloodshed and pillage. Unprepared for attack and unconscious of provocation, many were killed when running out unarmed to learn the cause of the disturbance. The slaughter was not confined to those against whom it was professedly directed, but avarice and private hatred ranged at will, and where riches were to be gained, the plunderers made little distinction between friend and foe. For two days the Syracusans endured, in the bosom of peace, and at the hands of fel-

low-citizens, or of soldiers employed by the state, the worst that could have been inflicted by enemies exasperated with a wearisome siege and a perilous assault. Four thousand persons were murdered, a thousand escaped by flight; and on those who fled, the cruelty of their enemies was satiated by brutal ill usage of their wives and children. When the wholesale butchery was over, Agathocles collected the prisoners, and putting to death the most hostile to him, drove the rest into banishment.

The author of these horrors now calling an assembly of the people inveighed against the Six Hundred, and against the oligarchy which they had formerly established; declared that he had cleared the city of all who aimed at power beyond the laws, and entirely secured the freedom of the people; and professing that he wished to rest from his labours, and to be 'as a private individual, he threw off the ensigns of military command and retired from the assembly. He well knew that his hearers were mostly deep in blood, and that the continuance of his power was their only safeguard against retribution; while those who had been unwilling spectators of the massacre would be silenced by fear. Being loudly pressed, as he expected, to retain his office, he consented on the condition that none should be joined with him in command. On these terms he was appointed general auto-crator, and thenceforward he exercised the power of a monarch; though without assuming the external state. His usurpation was effected in the year B. C. 317.

Agathocles had risen as the champion of the poor; and as such he had promised what he now fulfilled, the abolition of outstanding debts, and a distribution of lands. In ordinary cases his rule was mild as well as able; and by benefits done to many, and affable behaviour to all, he grew widely popular in spite of his crimes, till fresh jealousies and difficulties drove him to fresh executions, which made him hated by all. Unlike most other tyrants, he kept no guards about him, and was easy of access. But his ambition was the scourge of Sicily, and to further it he spared neither treachery nor blood: nor could his grasping spirit be satisfied with less than the dominion of the island.

The power of the Syracusan tyrant spread daily wider, till all the Sicilian Greeks were brought to own it, except the subjects of Carthage. But their

obedience rested on fear, and was unstable through hatred; and when large reinforcements from Africa had enabled the Carthaginians to defeat him with great slaughter, his unwilling subjects gladly revolted, and Agathocles was obliged to defend himself in Syracuse, while the rest of the island submitted to Carthage. In this extremity he boldly resolved to attack his enemies at home; and in the year after his defeat (B. C. 310) he passed into Africa. But money was first to be raised, and provision to be made against the danger of revolution; and these things he managed with his usual mixture of ability and wickedness. From every suspected family a brother or a son was chosen to accompany him, to be a pledge for the fidelity of the rest. Knowing well that the rich were mostly his enemies, he professed to pity the sufferings of the citizens, and proclaimed that any who shrunk from the hardships of a siege should quit the place with all their property. The wealthiest men, and those most hostile to the tyrant, availed themselves of this permission; but Agathocles sent his mercenaries to slay them, and to seize their goods. By this abominable treachery he gained the needful treasures, and cut off those whom he most feared to leave behind him.

Agathocles played out his desperate game with suitable desperation. He crossed the sea, eluding the enemy, whose fleet was far superior; and on landing he burnt his vessels, that his soldiers might place all their hopes in victory only, and that his small force might not be weakened by the necessity of guarding the ships. For a while he was almost uniformly victorious against an immense disparity of force; and he commanded the country, and captured the towns of the Carthaginians, his successes being aided by the hatred which the subject provinces bore to their harsh and arbitrary rulers. Meantime the Syracusans defeated the besieging army by a well-planned ambuscade, and the commander, being taken, was cruelly tortured and put to death. The loss of the general caused dissension in the besieging camp; for the Syracusan exiles and other Greeks, being numerous in the host, proposed their own leader to succeed him, in opposition to the Carthaginian who had been second in command. Nevertheless, the blockade was continued, and the besieged were suffering both by famine and by political

disorders; for so insecure was the government of Agathocles, or so jealous the temper of those whom he had left in authority, that the latter had recently deemed it necessary to make another clearance of their enemies; and driven from the city eight thousand of those whom they considered as friends of the exiles. Encouraged, by the exhaustion both of the Carthaginians and Syracusans, the people of Agragas (or Agrigentum) offered themselves as leaders to the Sicilians, inviting them to freedom from the dominion of both. The call was gladly answered, and many cities revolted from the Carthaginians; while the Agragantine army actively helped them to expel the garrisons which had held them in awe, and protected their lands against ravage by the forces whether of Carthage or of Syracuse.

In this state were matters, when Agathocles quitted his victorious army, and returned to look after his interests in Sicily. He arrived as his generals had just defeated the Agragantines, and immediately proceeded against divers of the cities which had asserted independence. Several quickly yielded; but the rest united their forces under the command of Deinocrates, a Syracusan exile, who had led the Greeks in the Carthaginian army; and the confederate army was too strong for Agathocles, though he found an opportunity of separately defeating the Agragantine forces. In returning to Africa, he was obliged to leave his Sicilian enemies unsubdued; and as he feared that the Syracusan people in his absence might call in Deinocrates and the exiles, he endeavoured to prevent the danger by another massacre of five hundred persons. Not long before at a public rejoicing he had mingled with the crowd, and drunk and jested unreservedly, being gifted by nature with a singular talent for pleasantry. In this he was partly prompted by the wish for popularity; but he had also a deeper and darker purpose, for, when all hearts were opened by wine and merriment he had been diligently noting who appeared to be his enemies; and all those who were of any consideration perished in the massacre.

The affairs of the Carthaginians had recovered in great measure while Agathocles was away, nor could his return effectually arrest the current of their fortune. The revolted subjects of Carthage, who had swelled his forces, all returned to their original allegiance; he

saw that to preserve his conquests was impossible, and he, therefore, determined to abandon Africa. But he wanted vessels to transport his army, and if he had possessed them, the enemy commanded the sea: to force a passage was hopeless, and he despaired of obtaining one on any moderate terms of capitulation. He fled secretly, deserting his soldiers, who revenged themselves by killing his sons who were left behind: a cruelty which Agathocles most bloodily retaliated, by slaughtering all the kindred of all those who had served with him in Africa. (B. C. 307.) This event happened nearly four years after he sailed for Africa.

Agathocles found, on returning to Sicily, that his principal general had revolted to Deinocrates with the troops and the cities entrusted to his care. His dismay was such that he offered to recall the exiles and resign the tyranny. But the proposal came to nothing through the intrigues of Deinocrates, who coveted monarchical power, and hoped that in the confusion of war he might attain it; while, in the mean time he preferred his present situation to that of a private citizen under a democracy in Syracuse. Agathocles accused Deinocrates to the exiles, as having been the obstacle to the liberation of their country; and then made peace with the Carthaginians, allowing them to hold whatever they had possessed before the war. Being freed from their hostility, he pursued the war against the exiles, defeated them, and treacherously slaughtered seven thousand, who had laid down their arms under assurance of safety. After this he received Deinocrates into friendship, and appointing him his general continued his favour to him to the end: a wonderful thing in one who was commonly as jealous as he was faithless, but who now put all trust in a reconciled enemy, and that a man of no integrity.

Agathocles soon reconquered most of Sicily; after which he warred in various regions, and fully maintained the character of an eminent, prosperous, and powerful scourge of mankind. A daughter of his was married to Demetrius Poliorcetes. In his latter years his chief ambition was to make his kingdom a first-rate maritime power; and this was nearly accomplished, when he was poisoned by Mænon one of his intimates, in concert with his grandson, (B. C. 289.) The Syracusans forthwith re-established democracy, confiscated their tyrant's property, and over-

threw his statues. Meanwhile Mænon aspiring to sovereign power, assassinated the grandson of Agathocles, gained the mercenaries to his interest, and with them made war on the Syracusans. The Carthaginians aided Mænon, and the Syracusans were obliged to receive the mercenaries into their commonwealth; but fresh quarrels arose between the old citizens and the mercenaries, and it was finally settled that the latter should sell their property and quit the island. The departing mercenaries arrived at Messene; where being received as friends in the houses of the inhabitants, they conspired to murder their hosts and seize their wives and their possessions. Democracy endured not long in Syracuse, but both this and the other cities fell again under tyrants; and shortly afterwards the unhappy island became a battle field for the Carthaginians and the Romans.

CHAPTER XI.

Of the rise of the Achaian League; and of the affairs of Greece from the invasion by the Gauls to the end of the war between the Achaïans and Cleomenes, King of Lacedæmon.

SECT. I.—THE Achaïans were early distinguished among the Greeks for probity and good faith. So generally was this acknowledged, that at a time when the Grecian cities of Italy were full of bloody tumults and revolutions, the Achaïans were called in, by common consent, to settle all quarrels, and appoint the terms of a general peace; and again, in certain disputes which arose after the battle of Leuctra, the Thebans and the Lacedæmonians agreed to abide by their arbitration. But the character of the Achaïan states was unambitious, and they were surrounded with neighbours stronger than themselves; and hence, though widely respected for peaceful virtues, they are little conspicuous in history till the latter times, when the good fortune of Greece brought them forward to take the lead.

The constitution of the Achaïan cities was by law democratical, and it is highly praised by the judicious historian Polybius, as affording freedom of speech and action, and equal justice to all. While they were under the Lacedæmonian supremacy the commonwealth was administered by a privileged class of wealthy men; but the temper of the Achaïans was quiet and orderly, and their attach-

ment strong to their ancient institutions; and it is probable that the ruling few, for the most part, confined themselves to the functions of administration, without encroaching on the civil rights of individuals, or on the authority of the popular assemblies to regulate, and of the popular tribunals to ascertain and enforce them. The cities of the province were twelve; and they acknowledged some degree of political union, having common sacrifices in a common temple, and congresses assembled at intervals from all the states to consult for the good of the Achaïan nation. It is worth remarking that a similar connexion existed in early times between the Achaïan colonies in Italy, Croton, Sybaris, and Mesapontum. But the bond of confederacy was slight, for we occasionally find particular states engaging in wars when the rest were neutral; and instances are not wanting in which different Achaïan cities were battling against each other either as auxiliaries or as principals.

After Alexander's death the Achaïan league was broken up, and the cities became disunited and internally disordered. Most were garrisoned either by Demetrius or Cassander, and afterwards by Antigonus, the son of Demetrius, who succeeded at once to his father's ascendancy in Greece, and, finally, as we have seen, recovered his sovereignty of Macedonia. Some had tyrants, especially those under the power of Antigonus, whose favourite policy was to establish a petty monarch in every state. But at the era when Ptolemy, Lysimachus, and Seleucus, the last surviving princes bred in the school of Alexander, were swept from the stage, a brave attempt was begun for the freedom and union of Achaïa.

In the year B. C. 280, the inhabitants of Patræ, (the modern Patrás,) Dyme, Tritæa, and Pharæ, combined for the purposes of reciprocal defence and common regulation. Nearly five years after, the citizens of Ægium expelled their Macedonian garrison, and those of Boura killed their tyrant, not without assistance from the Achaïan states already associated. Both of these were forthwith received into the league. The next admitted were the men of Carynia, whose tyrant Isæas took warning from the fate of the tyrant of Boura, and on receiving an assurance of safety from the Achaïans, voluntarily gave up the sovereignty, and brought his people into

the confederacy. During a considerable period the union comprehended these seven cities only. The common concerns of the league were administered by two generals and a secretary, elected yearly, and taken from all the cities in rotation. But in the twenty-fifth year of the confederation it was resolved that the presiding authority should thenceforward be entrusted to a single general. In the fourth year after this change (B. C. 231,) the Achæians were joined by the important state of Sicyon, a city not belonging to the province, but far exceeding all the proper Achæian towns in riches, extent, and population.

The Sicyonian commonwealth had long been unsettled, and tyrants were continually rising and falling there; the power which was cemented with blood being commonly ended by violence, to make way for another equally oppressive. Shortly before the union with the Achæians, Nicocles was tyrant of Syracuse; but Aratus, a noble youth, whose father had been murdered in a former usurpation, was living an exile in Argos, and cherishing the hope to liberate his country. A few fellow exiles concurred in his purpose, and he was meditating the seizure of some strong hold in the Sicyonian territory, when a recent fugitive from Sicyon told him of a place where he might scale the walls of the city itself. The attempt was made with singular boldness and address. Aratus and his little band passed the ramparts undiscovered, and going straight to the tyrant's palace, surprised and made prisoners his guard. Notice was sent to the friends of Aratus, who thronged to him from all quarters, while the rest of the citizens gathered in the theatre, full of anxiety as to the occasion of the tumult. But proclamation being made that Aratus the son of Cleinias offered liberty to the people, they joyfully crowded to fire the gates of the tyrant. The palace was plundered, while its master fled by secret passages. Such was the good fortune attending the enterprize, that not a drop of blood was shed in it, whether of friend or foe.

In ordering the commonwealth, Aratus, at the age of twenty, displayed wisdom not inferior to his ability and daring in the surprise. He established a democracy on the Achæian model, which had been the object of his early admiration: and he provided a safeguard against attacks from without and revolutions with-

in, by bringing Sicyon into the Achæian league. He restored almost six hundred exiles; but as their lands had mostly been given to others, his hardest task was to settle the disputes between the old and new proprietors. Fortunately the king of Egypt was his friend, and sent him large sums of money, which enabled him to settle the business with little distress to either party; and being appointed arbitrator, he adjudged matters to general satisfaction, and brought back peace and mutual good-will to the distracted city.

The Acrocorinthus, or citadel of Corinth, one of the strongest fortresses in Greece, was the most important of all to any seeker of empire, being set on a lofty mountain in the Isthmus; which gave to its possessor not only the command of the rich and populous Corinth, but also the power of interrupting or impeding all land-passage between the peninsula and continent of Greece. Antigonus had long coveted, and finally gained it; but in the eighth year after the deliverance of Sicyon, Aratus being, for the second time, chosen general by the Achæians, undertook to win it from him by a nightly surprize. The plot was managed ably and boldly, and succeeded by singular good fortune; and by day-break he was master of the fortress, though not without great difficulty and danger. The Achæian army now approaching the city was joyfully admitted by the Corinthians, and Aratus came down from the citadel to the theatre, to address the Corinthian people there assembled. He delivered to them the keys of their gates, which had been long kept from them by their tyrants, and proposed to them to join the Achæian confederacy, which they gladly did. He garrisoned the citadel with four hundred soldiers. He gained Lechæum, the port of Corinth, and in it he took twenty-five ships and five hundred horses belonging to Antigonus. Before the expiration of his office he had prevailed on the Megarians also to associate themselves with the Achæians: the Træzenians and Epidaurians soon followed the example; and the confederacy was further strengthened by alliance with the king of Egypt.

The Athenians were then under the power of Antigonus. He had invaded their territory and besieged their city: and though they were succoured by an Egyptian fleet, and an army under Areus, the king of Lacedæmon, of the race of Eurysthenes, yet no effectual

relief was given. They still held out for a considerable time after Areus had withdrawn his forces: but they were at length obliged to receive a garrison within the city, which Antigonus, however, soon after withdrew, conceiving, probably, that he could retain them in obedience less offensively by garrisons which he seems to have held in Peiræus, and other important posts. Aratus, after his success at Corinth, turned his views to Athens. He displayed the power of the Achæians by plundering Salamis, and endeavoured to conciliate the Athenians by setting free, without ransom, all his Athenian prisoners: but nothing important immediately followed.

Henceforward Aratus was chosen general of the Achæians as often as the law allowed, and even when out of office he guided their counsels. His aim was to put down all the tyrants in Peloponnesus, to exclude from the peninsula the Macedonians who supported them, and to unite all the Peloponnesian cities in one great confederation, such as that of the Achæians. In this he was continually opposed by Antigonus Gonatas, and his son Demetrius; and very often by the Ætolians, a rude, but numerous and warlike people. The struggle of the Achæians with the power of Macedonia continued till after the death of Demetrius, and then gave way to a contest with Cleomenes, king of Lacedæmon, assisted by the Ætolians.

SECT. II.—Cleonymus, the uncle of Areus, king of Lacedæmon, had opposed his nephew unsuccessfully as a rival claimant of the throne; and subordinate honours and commands, which were largely bestowed on him, could not satisfy his ambition or quiet his craving for vengeance. In the thirty-seventh year of the reign of Areus (B. C. 272,) Pyrrhus returned from Italy. In his first campaigns there he had commonly been victorious, but never without considerable difficulty and loss. The war was resolutely maintained against him, and every battle weakened his army, while that of Rome was inexhaustibly recruited from a warlike people. Unsteady and impatient, he was easily wearied with a protracted struggle where the prospect of success was daily becoming more distant; and being invited by the Syracusans and other Sicilian Greeks, to assist them against the Carthaginians, he gladly caught at the hope of speedier victory on a new scene

of action. His success in Sicily was at first most brilliant, and he had nearly expelled the Carthaginians from the island, when his tyrannical conduct provoked revolt in the Grecian cities, and finally united them against him. Driven out of Sicily, he returned to Tarentum, and resumed his war against the Romans: but he was defeated, and obliged to quit the country; and straightway, returning to Epirus, he made war upon Antigonus Gonatas, won a great battle, and nearly mastered all Macedonia. Cleonymus now saw in the restless character of the victor the means of glutting his ambition and revenge; and he asked for aid to place him on the throne of Lacedæmon, which Pyrrhus willingly granted, beholding in the proposal an opening to the conquest of Peloponnesus. He invaded the peninsula, pretending that he came to free the cities from the yoke of Antigonus; but he soon gave the lie to his professions of upright intention, by ravaging Laconia unprovoked, and without declaration of war. He next advanced against the city. The Lacedæmonians were taken at great disadvantage, for the best of their strength was absent with Areus, who was warring in Crete; but those who remained were diligent and resolute in preparation for defence under the command of Acrotatus, the son of Areus. It was resolved to send the women into Crete, but they remonstrated against it; and the queen Archidamia,* being appointed to speak for the rest went into the council hall, with a sword in her hand, and said, "That they did their wives great wrong, if they thought them so faint-hearted as to live after Sparta were destroyed." In the night before the assault the approaches to the city were fortified with trenches, and with waggons set fast by the wheels, which were sunk in the ground. The women, with the old men, laboured on the works, while the young men rested to prepare themselves for battle; and when the encounter was begun, the women were active in bringing arms and refreshments to such as needed them, and in carrying off the wounded. The struggle lasted through two days, though small hope remained for the third, so many were the slain, and so few were those unhurt in the action; but in the course of the night

* She seems to have been wife to Archidamus, one of the Præleid line, who was already reigning twenty-three years before. He was probably now dead, and his son a minor; for, otherwise, Acrotatus would hardly have held the chief command.

the defenders were reinforced by a body of mercenaries in the service of Antigonus, and also by Areus, who arrived from Crete with two thousand Lacedæmonians. The women and old men now retired to their houses. On the morrow Pyrrhus was beaten off, and soon after went to Argos, being invited by one of two leaders, who were there contending for superiority. He was here opposed by Antigonus and the Lacedæmonians. The Argians wished to be neutral, and requested that neither monarch would enter their city. Antigonus, being the weaker, consented, and gave hostages; Pyrrhus professed compliance, but refused all pledges to ensure the fulfilment of his word, which, indeed, he did not mean to keep. A gate being opened by the friends of Pyrrhus, he entered the city, and Antigonus was called in to oppose him; the troops of Pyrrhus were overmatched and broken, and in endeavouring to cover their retreat he was killed by a tile from a house-top; thrown, as it is said, by a poor and aged Argian woman, who saw her son in combat with him, and almost overcome.

Areus, falling in some obscure war, before Corinth, left the kingdom to his son Acrotatus, who had been mainly instrumental to the repulse of Pyrrhus. Acrotatus died in battle against Aristodemus, the tyrant of Argos; and Leonidas, the son of Cleonymus, governed as protector, in the name of the late king's infant son, for eight years, at the end of which the infant died, and Leonidas became king.

The manners and government of Lacedæmon had long departed widely from the pattern set by Lycurgus. The equality which he established among all the members of his commonwealth had been early confined within a privileged class, who engrossed all public honours, and claimed, as exclusively their own, the name of Spartans. (See page 92.) At the battle of Platæa, in a Lacedæmonian army of ten thousand soldiers, the Spartans had formed one-half; but in the time of Agesilaus their number was comparatively small, and in that of which we are now treating there remained not above seven hundred Spartan families. This change had been unforeseen, and unprovided for by the lawgiver; but another had taken place yet more repugnant to the spirit of his institutions. Expensive wars, and various intercourse with strangers, had

banished the old severity of manners, and brought back the idolatry of gold. Those disorders had revived which the laws of Lycurgus had been chiefly directed to eradicate. The poor were burdened with debt—the rich were living in luxury and pomp; discontent and envy were ranged on the one side, and pride and licentiousness on the other; the influence of wealth was completely restored, and that influence was centred in about one hundred of the seven hundred Spartan heads of families.

Among the most determined contempters of the institutions of Lycurgus, was the king Leonidas, whose habits had been formed in the court of Seleucus. His colleague Agis was of a different stamp. From boyhood upwards he had endeavoured to emulate the ancient plainness and austerity of life; and when he became king he forthwith undertook to reform the commonwealth according to the model of Lycurgus. As the departure of the state from its original principles was entire, it was necessary that its return should be effected by changes proportionably sweeping and violent; and the measures adopted by Agis to this end were the abolition of all debts, and the equal division of landed property, two of Lycurgus's measures, but probably even more difficult to carry into execution now, than when Lycurgus succeeded in introducing them.

On sounding the people to determine the chances of success, Agis found that the younger and poorer would be mostly on his side. The honest hoped to reform the commonwealth; the needy and profligate to cancel their debts and repair their losses; and the extreme concentration of property had so much lessened the number of those who were interested to defend it, that the revolutionary party were sure to be victorious, if it should come to a trial of force. Having ascertained his strength, Agis proposed his intended laws to the council of elders. His purpose was to abolish the distinction between the Spartans and the common Lacedæmonians, retaining that between the Lacedæmonians and the Periwæci, or people of the towns. The number of the citizens was to be filled up from the Periwæci and from strangers, and all these, as well as the original Lacedæmonians, were to be trained in the strictest discipline of Lycurgus; and among the citizens was to be distributed the proper territory

of Sparta, being divided into four thousand five hundred equal parts, while the remaining territory belonging to the state was to be divided into fifteen thousand parts, and distributed among the Peræci. When the proposal had been broached in the senate, and warmly contested, the Ephor Lysander assembled the people, and laid it before them. He was followed by other favourers of the measure; and Agis, rising last, addressed the assembly, and said, that he would himself contribute largely to the reformation of the commonwealth; for he would make common all his lands, and add six hundred talents in money; and so should his mother, grandmother, kinsmen, and friends, all of whom were the wealthiest in Sparta. The offer was warmly applauded by the multitude; but it was opposed by the rich men, with Leonidas at their head. The previous approbation of the senate was necessary to the validity of any decree which might be passed by the people; and Leonidas and his party prevailed so far that, by a single vote, that approbation was withheld.

An ancient law forbade that any of the race of Hercules should marry a stranger, or should dwell in a strange land. Leonidas had done both; and being now accused by Lysander, he fled to a sanctuary. As he did not appear when he was cited, he was deposed, and his son-in-law, Cleombrotus, being also of the royal race, was made king. Meantime Lysander's office expired, and the new Ephori, taking part with Leonidas, accused Lysander and his friends of overthrowing the laws. The reforming party now despaired of carrying their point by peaceable measures; and Agis and Cleombrotus going with their friends into the place of assembly, plucked the Ephori from their seats, and put others in their room. They armed their younger partisans, and opened the prisons; their enemies feared that a massacre would follow, but no man had any hurt. Leonidas fled to Tegea. Agesilaus, the uncle of Agis, had laid men in wait to kill Leonidas on the way; but Agis hearing of it sent some trusty persons to accompany him, who brought him safely to his place of refuge.

The reformers now had the mastery, and their scheme of government might probably have been established, had all its supporters been sincere. But Agesilaus being a great landholder and deeply

indebted, his wish was to cancel his debts but keep his land. Accordingly he persuaded Agis that he could not carry all at once without a violent commotion; but that if he first won the land proprietors by annulling their debts, they then would easily and willingly agree to the division of the lands. If the landholders would allow of the spoliation of others, but would not sacrifice to the common good any interest of their own, it surely argued gross credulity to imagine that such corrupt and selfish persons would consent to a change injurious to themselves, in consideration of one already made which was beneficial. The bait was swallowed, however. It was first decreed that all debts should be cancelled, and accordingly every bond and obligation was publicly burnt. But when the people called for the division of lands, Agesilaus still found some pretext for delay, till king Agis was sent on a military expedition to aid the Achæians against an Ætolian invasion.

The host of Agis was principally composed of the poorer sort, who were gainers by the revolution, and who naturally felt a strong attachment to its author; and Agis was the better enabled to preserve strict discipline without impairing his popularity, since every rule which he enforced upon others was rigidly observed by himself. No soldier could for shame be disorderly or luxurious, when his commander lived more regularly and fared more plainly than any in the camp. The army recovered its old temper of exact and cheerful obedience; and though the over caution of Aratus allowed no opportunity for brilliant achievement, the conduct of the Lacedæmonian troops inspired in the allies an unwonted respect both towards their leader and his commonwealth. But on returning to Sparta he found that his work had gone to ruin during his absence. Agesilaus being one of the Ephori, while none was present whose authority could control him, had abused his power to every purpose of extortion and oppression. To prevent all danger from private revenge or general insurrection, he went always strongly guarded by soldiers. He openly professed to make no account of king Cleombrotus, and to pay respect to Agis less for his office than because he was his kinsman; and he gave out that he would be Ephor the next year, as well as the present.

The Many were disgusted at the ex-

cesses of Agesilaus, and angry that the lands had not been divided according to promise; and hence they willingly suffered the enemies of Agis to recall Leonidas and to reinstate him in the kingdom. Agis fled to the Brazen House, Cleombrotus to the Temple of Neptune; and Leonidas being more especially offended with Cleombrotus went first against him. He sharply taunted him that, being his son-in-law, he had conspired to depose him and drive him from his country. Cleombrotus made no answer: but his wife Chelonis, the daughter of Leonidas, who had quitted him on account of the injury done to her father, and had gone to serve the latter in his adversity, now became a humble suitor in his favour.* At her intercession Leonidas spared his life, but banished him from the city. He removed the Ephors, and substituted others; and then he plotted to get Agis into his power. First he urged him to quit the sanctuary, and to take his part in the regal authority; and declared that the citizens had forgiven him all

* The details of this transaction, as given by Plutarch, are too interesting to be altogether omitted, though they do not rest on the highest authority. The scene, however, having taken place in public, many of its particulars may have been recorded at the time; and hence we may reasonably give more credit to the biographer on this, than on many other occasions, when he professes to give a minute account of things spoken or acted in darkness and privacy. The extracts are taken from the old translation by Sir Thomas North, whose language is livelier, and better expresses the character of the original, than any modern English version. Chelonis, we are told, sat down by her husband, and embraced him, having her two little sons on either side: "All men wondering, and weeping for pity to see the goodness and natural love of this lady, who shewing her mourning apparel, and hair of her head flaring about her eyes, bare-headed, she spake in this manner to her father:—
'O father mine, this sorrowful garment and countenance is not for pity of Cleombrotus, but hath long remained with me, lamenting sore your former misery and exile; but now which of the two should I rather choose, either to continue a mourner in this pitiful state, seeing you again restored to your kingdom, having overcome your enemies; or else putting on my princely apparel to see my husband alive, unto whom you married me a maid? who, if he cannot move you to take compassion on him by the tears of his wife and children, he shall then abide more bitter pains of his evil counsel than that which you intend to make him suffer. For he shall see his wife die before him, whom he loved more dearly than anything in the world. Also with what face can I look on other ladies, when I could never bring my father to pity by any intercession I could make for my husband, neither my husband intreat him for my father; and that my hap is to be born a daughter and a wife most unfortunate and despised of my own? Wherefore Leonidas commanded Cleombrotus to get him thence, and to leave the city as an exile; and prayed his daughter for his sake to remain with him, and not to forsake her father, that did so dearly love her, that for her sake he had saved her husband's life. This notwithstanding, she would not yield to his request, but rising up with her husband, gave him one of her sons, and herself took the other in her arms; and then making her prayer before the altar of the goddesses, she went as a banished woman away with her husband.'

that was past, well knowing that he had acted from patriotism and honourable ambition, but had been deceived and misled by the craft of Agesilaus. Agis was not deceived by this, but he was afterwards entrapped, and thrown into prison. There came Leonidas incontinently with a great number of soldiers that were strangers, (mercenaries) and beset the prison round about. The Ephors went into the prison, and sent unto some of the senate to come to them, whom they knew to be of their mind: then they commanded Agis, as if it had been judicially, to account of the alteration he had made in the commonwealth. The young man laughed at their hypocrisy. But Amphares (one of the Ephors) told him that it was no laughing sport, and that he should pay for his folly. Then another of the Ephors seeming to shew him a way how he might escape the condemnation for his fault, asked him if he had not been enticed unto it by Agesilaus and Lysander. Agis answered that no man compelled him, but that he only did it to follow the steps of the ancient Lycurgus, to bring the commonwealth unto the former estate of his grave ordinance and institution."—(*North's Plutarch.*) Being asked again if he did not repent of it, he answered that though he should die for it he would never repent of so wise and virtuous an enterprise. He was condemned to death, and hastily executed, lest he should be rescued by the people; and he was the last Spartan king who was put to death by order of the Ephors. His mother and grandmother were also strangled. The latter was that Archidamia, who had already played a distinguished part when Pyrrhus besieged the city. His brother Archidamus only saved himself by a hasty flight: his widow was forcibly taken by Leonidas out of her house, and married against her will to his son Cleomenes, though he was yet in extreme youth, (B. C. 240.)

Four years after the death of Agis, Leonidas died, and Cleomenes became king. He caught from his wife's conversation a love for the memory of Agis, and a strong desire to effect his attempted reforms. Cleomenes exceeded Agis in ability and daring, but his ambition was greater and less purely patriotic; and far from hazarding his success, like Agis, by impolitic mildness, he was rather willing to fulfil his project by whatever methods seemed the most effectual, and to trust that any violence

would be excused by his need and his good meaning. His ambition was turned to military fame, no less than to that of a reformer; and his wish to play a leading part in Peloponnesus was quickened by the hope that the power and glory thus acquired would promote his purposes at home. Accordingly he undertook to wrest from the Achæians and restore to the Lacedæmonians the lead in the peninsula. About the tenth year of his reign (B. C. 226,) he commenced the war; and shortly afterwards he found the means of accomplishing his political changes.

He deluded his banished colleague Archidamus by the promise of reconciliation, induced him to return to Sparta, and treacherously murdered him: either fearing that he would be an instrument in the hands of the party adverse to reform, or through mere ambition, and the wish to rule without a rival. In this matter Cleomenes acted in concert with the Ephori; but he secretly intended their destruction, and it was not long before he effected it. Having found a pretext to leave the Lacedæmonians of his army encamped in Arcadia, he went suddenly to Sparta with the mercenaries. He surprised the Ephori at supper, killed four of them, and wounded the fifth; and several persons besides were slain, who attempted to defend them: but those who stirred not were not harmed, nor was any one hindered from leaving the city. The next morning Cleomenes banished eighty citizens by sound of trumpet; and then assembled the people, and declared what he had done. He said that Lycurgus had entrusted the government to the king, and to the senate, and that the paramount authority which the Ephori had exercised was a mere usurpation. He proclaimed the abolition of debts and the equal division of lands; and he first gave up his possessions to the public, and was followed by all his friends. The division was then made, and Cleomenes directed that a share should be assigned to each of the men whom he had banished, declaring that he would receive them into the city as soon as the government was settled. The race of Procles was not extinct by the death of Archidamus, who had left two children; but their rights could not resist the power of Cleomenes, who took his brother Euclides for his colleague, so as nominally to preserve the double royalty, without substantially clogging

his own authority. He increased the number of the citizens; improved their arms and military training; and fully re-established the discipline framed by Lycurgus to regulate the education of youth and the diet and habits of men. His own life was plain and temperate, his conversation pleasant, his manners courteous and dignified; and the influence of his personal qualities combined with the feeling, that his measures had invigorated the commonwealth, to make him highly popular in spite of his violence and ambition.

SECT. III.—The Achæians had withstood the attacks of Antigonus Gonatas though assisted by the Ætolians, and had given protection to the Ætolians themselves against Demetrius, his son. Their power had extended far beyond the limits of the province. While Demetrius was living, Lysias, the tyrant of Megalopolis, had voluntarily given up the dominion of that city, and had brought it into the Achæian league; and his abdication being made, whether through policy or public spirit, at least at a time when there was no immediate terror to constrain him, he was rewarded with the highest popular favour, and with frequent election to the chief offices of the confederacy. In the year B. C. 229, after a reign of ten years, Demetrius died; and now the prop was removed which had mainly supported the tyrants of Peloponnesus against the Achæians. Many yielded to the time, and followed the example of Lysias; and among those who did so was Aristomachus, the lord of the powerful city of Argos.

When the war with Cleomenes began, the Achæians had received into their association all the states of Peloponnesus, except the Lacedæmonians, the Eleians, and some of the Arcadians. The war was boldly and ably conducted on the part of the Spartan king, and his first campaigns were very generally successful. He defeated the Achæians near the mountain Lycæum, in Arcadia, and again in the territory of Megalopolis. In this latter battle Lysias was killed; and it was shortly after that Cleomenes accomplished the revolution in Lacedæmon. He then won a third and a more decisive victory near Dyme; after which he ranged for a while unopposed, persuading some, and compelling others to revolt from the Achæians to himself. He thus became master of Argos, and of most of the cities recently admitted into the hostile confederacy; and his

career of conquest did not stop till Corinth was added to the number of his allies.

The Lacedæmonian arms were now decidedly superior, and their preponderance was likely to be increased by union with the forces of Ætolia. Some foreign aid was necessary to the Achæians; and Aratus had foreseen this emergency, and provided to meet it. He now considered Grecian liberty to be threatened less by Macedonia than by Lacedæmon; and instead of further seeking to depress the Macedonians, he wished to use them as a balance to the more formidable power. He had, therefore, secretly smoothed the way to reconciliation with Antigonus, who was regent of Macedonia, in behalf of Philip, the infant son of Demetrius; but he was himself unwilling to appear in the business; for he feared to break the courage of the Achæians, if he seemed so far to despair of conquering unaided, as to fly for succour to the ancient enemies of the commonwealth.

The Arcadian chiefs of the Theban party, who presided at the founding of Megalopolis, had chosen its situation with a view to make it an effectual check on Lacedæmon. It commanded the principal roads by which an army could be marched from Laconia into Arcadia or Messenia; and hence in war its possession was most desirable both to Lacedæmon and its enemies. This circumstance, together with that of their proximity to the adversary, had thrown on the Megalopolitans far more than their share in the burden of this war. They had ancient friendship with the Macedonian government; and it was, therefore, thought that a negotiation undertaken by them with Antigonus, under the pressure of their own particular sufferings, would not be liable to the same objections as if it came from the general administration: for it would not imply the same distrust as to the issue of the war, nor hazard the reputation of the confederacy in case of failure; and if it should yet appear that the Achæians were able to change the fortune of the contest by their own exertions, they would not be pledged to invite the interference of Macedonia, though the application of the Megalopolitans should be favourably received.

Aratus dealt with two of the friends whom he most trusted in Megalopolis, that they should propose to send an embassy to Antigonus, provided the assent of the Achæians could be obtained.

The decree was passed, and the movers were appointed to go as ambassadors, first to the congress of the allies, and then, having got permission, to the regent of Macedonia. Permission was given, and the ambassadors proceeded on their errand. When they came before Antigonus, they briefly executed their commission, as directed by the Megalopolitans, and then laid open the views of Aratus, and showed the dangers to be apprehended both by Greece and Macedonia, should the rapacity of the Ætolians be united with the ambition of Cleomenes. As long, they said, as the Ætolians were quiet, the Achæians would maintain the war against Cleomenes; but if success went against them, and their enemies were joined by the Ætolians, there would be need of Macedonian assistance; and Aratus would point out the proper season to give succour, and would suggest such assurances, as should satisfy both parties, of a grateful return for the benefit conferred. The proposals were favourably received, and Antigonus wrote to the people of Megalopolis, to the effect that he would come to their assistance if it should be agreeable to the wish of the Achæians.

In the next meeting of the confederates the Megalopolitans proposed to call in Antigonus, and the suggestion was generally well received. Aratus then rising commended the conduct of the embassy, and expressed his pleasure in hearing the favourable disposition of the Macedonian ruler: but before proceeding in the business, he advised the Achæians to make further trial of their strength, and not to ask the help of their friends, till they had lost the hope of otherwise prevailing. His opinion was approved, and the matter rested till the Achæians were determined by their defeat near Dyme to apply forthwith to Antigonus. One obstacle existed to the conclusion of any treaty; which was, that the Acrocorinthus had been taken from the Macedonians, and was guarded by a body of Achæian troops. Antigonus required that the fortress should be restored, which could not be done without a breach of faith pledged to the people of Corinth. The Corinthians, however, removed the difficulty, by revolting to Cleomenes; and the Achæians then gave up the citadel to Antigonus.

Cleomenes, on hearing that the Achæians had obtained the alliance of Macedonia, took a position on the Isthmus, intending to dispute the passage. The

Ætolians also declared to Antigonus that if he came within Thermopylæ they would oppose them by arms; but he nevertheless advanced through Thessaly and Eubœa to the Isthmus. Meanwhile Aristoteles, an Argian leader of the party friendly to the Achæians, made insurrection against the friends of Cleomenes, who were then in possession of the government. The Achæians sent an army to Argos to support him, and Cleomenes also quitted his encampment on the Isthmus, to go to the succour of his partisans. An obstinate struggle took place within the city, but Cleomenes was in the end obliged to retire, and he then returned to Sparta. The Argians were re-admitted into the Achæian confederacy. Aristomachus, their former tyrant, on resigning the sovereignty, had been received into the highest favour by the Achæians, and had been chosen their general. But his abdication had been caused by fear; and the rise of Cleomenes giving him the hope of recovering his power, he had been the chief mover in the defection of the city. At the counter-revolution he was taken by the Achæians, and his infidelity was punished with death; but no other execution seems to have taken place.

Antigonus advanced unopposed to Argos, and thence into Arcadia, where he took several places garrisoned by Cleomenes, and delivered them to the Megalopolitans. He then went to Ægium to confer with the congress of the Achæians, and was chosen by them commander-in-chief of the confederate army. He now laid up his troops in winter-quarters; but at the coming of spring he invested Tegea, and reduced it to surrender, after which he invaded Laconia. Some slight skirmishes had taken place between his troops and those of Cleomenes, which were posted for the defence of the country against him, when he heard that the forces of Orchomenus, in Arcadia, were newly come to the Lacedæmonian camp. He straightway led his army to Orchomenus, and took it by assault; and then he laid close siege to Mantinea. Before the present war this city had revolted from the Achæians, and allied itself with the Ætolians, and afterwards with Cleomenes. Since that it had been surprised and taken by Aratus: who, as soon as he was master of the place, issued an order to restrain his soldiers from plunder, and calling together the Mantineians in assembly, declared that their goods and persons were

safe, and that all he required was their re-union with the Achæians, on the same footing as before. The unexpected capture of the city, exposing it to pillage and ruin, together with its no less unexpected release from danger by the humanity of the victor, must have raised a strange conflict of passions in the breasts of the inhabitants; but neither fear nor gratitude could permanently keep down the favours of the Ætolians, nor those of Lacedæmon. The ruling party requested a garrison of the Achæians, to strengthen them against their enemies both within and without; the garrison was sent, but it could not hinder a party-contest from arising, in which the Lacedæmonians came in, and gave the victory to their adherents. The conquering faction slaughtered all the Achæians in the city; and this bloody deed, when Mantinea was besieged by the Achæians under Antigonus, provoked a degree of severity, which would else have been little consistent with the character of that people or of their leader. The siege was pushed till the inhabitants were reduced to an unconditional surrender, and all were sold for slaves.

After the taking of Mantinea, Antigonus broke up his army, retaining with him the mercenaries, but dismissing the Macedonians to winter at home. Cleomenes took advantage of the respite thus allowed him for the surprisal of Megalopolis. That city was difficult to defend, being large and thinly peopled; for the Megalopolitans had suffered greatly in the former battles of this war, in which they had ever been the most forward. The gates were opened to Cleomenes in the night by some Messenian exiles living in the place, whom he had bribed. At day-break the citizens heard of his entrance, and immediately flew to arms. Three months before this he had gained admittance into Megalopolis, but had been driven out, and had narrowly escaped the ruin of his army. The resistance of the townsmen was now no less determined; but they were greatly outnumbered, and the most commanding situations were preoccupied by the assailants. Driven out from their homes, they retired into Messenia; and hither Cleomenes sent messengers with the offer, that, if they would henceforth be his allies, their city should be restored to them unharmed. They, nevertheless, continued steadfast in their engagements to the Achæians; and Cleomenes, finding that he could not win them, razed

Megalopolis to the ground. It was, however, afterwards restored under the patronage of Antigonus.

At the approach of spring Cleomenes took the field, and approaching towards Argos, where Antigonus had wintered, ravaged the country under the walls. He hoped that his adversary would be compelled by the clamours of the people to fight at a disadvantage; or if not, that his credit would be lowered by suffering the property of his allies to be wasted before his face. The Argians demanded battle, and reviled Antigonus, who steadily refused to lead them out; and Cleomenes returned in safety to Laconia, with his army highly gratified and laden with spoil. But as the season advanced, Antigonus, having gathered from their several homes, remote and near, the Achæans and Macedonians, was once more in a condition to take the field with superior force. He advanced to the frontier of Laconia, where he found Cleomenes posted at Sellasia to defend the pass. The battle which ensued was obstinately contested, with great skill and courage shown on both sides; but at length the Lacedæmonians were irrecoverably broken and put to rout. Cleomenes now gave up all thought of further maintaining the war. He fled to Sparta, and thence to Gythium, where he embarked for Alexandria; while Antigonus advanced from the field of battle to Sparta, and took possession of it unopposed. Thus the war of the Achæans with Cleomenes was ended, three years after its commencement. (B. C. 222.)

Antigonus used his victory with liberality and moderation. He contented himself with restoring the Lacedæmonian government to the state in which it existed before the changes made by Cleomenes; and having done this, he left the people independent. From Sparta he went to Tegea, and settled that commonwealth according to its ancient constitution; and thence he pursued his way by Argos towards Macedonia, whither he had been called by the news of an Illyrian invasion. He came to Argos during the Nemean festival, and was welcomed with joy and thanks unbounded; and the highest honours were voted to him, as well by the general congress of the Achæans, as by the people of each particular state. On arriving in Macedonia, he found the Illyrians still in the country, and defeated them; but in the course

of the fight, while eagerly cheering and exhorting his soldiers, he broke a blood-vessel, in consequence of which he sickened and died. He was much regretted by the friends of Macedonia; for he was generally thought to have given fair promise, not only of ability in the field, but of prudence and benevolence.

CHAPTER XII.

Of the first War maintained by the Ætolians against Philip, king of Macedonia, together with the Achæans.

SECT. I.—THE peace which followed the victory of Antigonus was grievous to the Ætolians. This people, though numerous and brave, had ever been, powerless through ignorance, poverty, and disunion, till the time when the political system of Greece was broken up by the Macedonian kings and leaders. It was then that the Ætolian tribes united in a league, which soon became a formidable power, and one of a spirit new to Greece. The Ætolian warrior usually aimed less at empire than at plunder, and looked for his reward to the continuance of war, and not to its termination. His victories led to the gathering of booty, which was quickly consumed, and only whetted his appetite for more; and not to the acquisition of permanent sources of revenue, which would have flowed with riches in time of peace, but which war would have interrupted and put to hazard. The law had ever been weak, the people rude; robbery, the vice of uncivilized nations, had prevailed unrestrained: and the effect of the union was not to destroy the predatory habits of the Ætolians, but simply to make them hunt in concert, instead of preying on each other. Since their harvest time was the time of trouble, they little valued the provisions agreed on by civilized nations to abridge and soften war, and give security to peace; they were therefore careless of the laws of arms, and the sanctity of covenants: and they were bloody as well as faithless, their moral sensibilities being coarse and dull, as their views of expediency were narrow.

The growing riches of the Achæan confederacy had moved the envy and tempted the rapacity of the Ætolians: its rising power alarmed their jealousy, and the more as its conduct was generally favourable to peace and order, and adverse to that predatory warfare in

which they delighted. They were therefore always ripe for hostility to the Achæans, except when they needed their help against more dangerous foes. Accordingly it was not difficult to bring them into combination with Antigonus Gonatas for the destruction of the league. The joint attack was repulsed; and after the death of Antigonus, when the Ætolians were in danger from Demetrius his son, the Achæans were not prevented by the wrongs received from effectually aiding them. Nevertheless, the Ætolians retained their ill will; and after the death of Demetrius they eagerly took part with Cleomenes against the Achæans.

After the defeat of Cleomenes there was an interval of quiet, which the Ætolians did not venture to disturb, as long as they were awed by the power and ability of the third Antigonus. His death emboldened them again to follow their habitual propensity to war and rapine: for they set at nought the unripe age of Philip, the young king of Macedonia, and they deemed themselves a match for the Achæans single-handed.

Dorimachus, a bold and turbulent young man of Ætolia, had been sent by his nation to Phigalea, on the Messenian border, professedly to govern and defend the city, which was a subordinate ally of theirs. He had gathered about him robbers and pirates, whom in the general peace he knew not how to support or employ: he therefore suffered them to plunder the Messenians, though friendship subsisted between them and the Ætolians. At first the plunderers confined their depredations to the flocks and herds that fed about the border; but as they grew bolder, they advanced into the country, and lightly pillaged and destroyed farm-houses. Dorimachus shared in the spoil, and disregarded all remonstrances, till they came so thick that he could not wholly pass them by; and then he said that he would go to Messene, to satisfy the complainants. He went accordingly; but when the injured persons came before him, he laughed at some, and others he threatened and reviled.

While Dorimachus was in Messene, the pirates attacked a house close by the city, killed all who resisted, and binding the rest of the servants led them away, together with the cattle. The Ephori, who were the principal magistrates of the Messenians, summoned Dorimachus, and reprimanded him for his conduct; and Sciron,

an Ephor, and a man of high character and influence, advised that he should be detained in the city till the Achæans should be restored, and his crimes atoned for, by giving up the guilty to justice. The proposal being generally approved, Dorimachus took fire. He exclaimed that they were insulting, not himself, but the Ætolian community, and that they should suffer accordingly; and he behaved so arrogantly, that Sciron was provoked to call him by the name of Babyrtas, a Messenian of the vilest character, whom he singularly resembled in person. The taunt was never forgiven: Dorimachus yielded for the present; to necessity, promised satisfaction, and was released, but the insult of Sciron deeply determined him to do all in his power to kindle a war.

Dorimachus could not propose to the Ætolians to go to war for a word of contempt addressed to himself by an individual, and in the original quarrel he had been evidently and grossly in the wrong. But he hoped to gain his end through his kinsman Scopas, who chiefly directed the administration of the commonwealth. He reminded him that little was to be feared from the Macedonians, who had now a boy for their ruler; that the Lacedæmonians were always enemies to Messene, and the Eleians friends of Ætolia; and that the Messenian territory, having remained unmolested throughout the war of Cleomenes, was rich in every kind of booty, so that the war would certainly be gratifying to the Many. It was made the pretext of hostility, that the Messenians had entered into alliance with the Achæans and Macedonians—a strange subject of complaint on the part of a nation at peace with both. The arguments of Dorimachus were addressed to a spirit as restless as his own; and so great was the eagerness of Scopas for the war, that he commenced it on his own authority, without awaiting the sanction of the people.

The Ætolian leaders first sent out corsairs, who did not confine their attack to the Messenians, but captured a vessel belonging to Macedonia, and ravaged the coasts of Acarnania and Epirus. This took place while Timoxenus was general of the Achæans; and at the end of his administration Dorimachus and Scopas undertook the invasion of Messene, considering this to be the period when the Achæans were least likely to oppose them, while Timoxenus was on the point of going out of office, and

his successor had not entered it. The Ætolians passed through the territories of the Achaian cities Patre, Pliare, and Tritæ. Their generals professed that they meant no wrong to the Achaians; but the cupidity of the soldiers could not be restrained when booty was in view, and they pillaged the country in passing through it, till they came to Phigalea. From Phigalea they entered the Messenian territory, and ravaged it in safety, since the Messenians did not venture to take the field.

At the next general meeting of the Achaians, the deputies of Patre and Pliare complained of the ravages committed in their country, and the Messenian embassy requested aid against the unprovoked and most unjust attack of the Ætolians on a people allied with them from of old. The assembly took part in the particular wrongs of the complainants, and all were likewise indignant on behalf of the confederacy, that the Ætolians should have presumed to violate its territory by marching an army across it without leave. It was voted that help should be given to the Messenians; that the general should assemble the Achaians in arms; and that when so assembled they should determine what was to be done. Timoxenus the general was slack in preparation: for he feared misfortune, considering that the Achaians, since the peace, had neglected exercise in arms. But Aratus, who was appointed to succeed him, was enraged at the presumption of the Ætolians: wherefore he urged on the levy by all means in his power; and receiving the public seal from Timoxenus five days before the legal time, he wrote to the cities, and collected the youth in arms at Megalopolis.

When here assembled, the Achaians were met by ambassadors from Messene, who requested admission into the alliance which had been formed, with the Macedonians and others, during the war of Cleomenes. The Achaians answered that this could not be done without the consent of the rest: but that they would succour the Messenians, only requiring hostages that the Messenians would not make peace with the Ætolians without their consent. Aratus then sent to require of the Ætolians that they should withdraw from Messenia without trespassing on Aetolia; and Scopas and Dorimachus, knowing that the forces of the Achaians were collected, prepared to

do so, and passed into the territory of Elis, their nearest ally.

Aratus, trusting that the Ætolians would depart in the vessels which had been sent from home to convey them, broke up his army, and only kept with him three thousand Achaian foot, and three hundred horse, with the soldiers of Taurion, who commanded a Macedonian garrison in Orthonomida. With these he watched the Ætolians. Too weak to bind them by fear to their engagements, he was just strong enough to raise in their jealous minds the suspicion that no faith was purposed: and Dorimachus and Scopas, partly fearing that they might be attacked in embarking, and partly wishing at any rate to kindle war, put their booty on shipboard, but instead of accompanying it, they led their forces against the band that remained with Aratus. An action took place near Caphysæ in Arcadia; in which, Aratus very unskilfully omitting to join battle while their opponents were crossing the plain, the fight commenced on steep and broken ground, which impeded the Achaian phalanx, and favoured the more desultory forces of the Ætolians. The Achaians were defeated, and the Ætolians retiring unmolested through the midst of Peloponnesus, made an attempt on Pellene, and ravaged the territory of Sicyon.

At the next congress of the Achaians, the Many were loud against Aratus. He had gone into office before his time to take the conduct of a campaign, though in the open field he was known to be neither fortunate nor skilful. He had dismissed his army while the Ætolians were in Peloponnesus, though he knew the turbulent character of Scopas and Dorimachus; he had needlessly given battle with a scanty force, when he might have waited and reassembled the Achaians; and in the action itself he had let slip the opportunity of fighting on the most favourable ground, and had engaged on that which was most disadvantageous. Aratus endeavoured to show that the late disaster had not been suffered by his fault, and begged that, if in any thing he had erred, he might be censured with forbearance for human infirmity. The faults of his conduct could not be denied; but his remembered merits and services overcame them; he was quit from blame and continued to hold the leading influence among his people.

The Achæians resolved that ambassadors should be sent to their allies, to require assistance according to the treaty, and to propose that the Messenians should be admitted into the alliance. That they might be ready to succour the Messenians, if necessary, they voted a levy of five thousand foot and five hundred horse; and they directed the general to settle with the Lacedæmonians and Messenians how many troops they should severally furnish to the confederate army. Each state was rated at half the contingent of the Achæians; so that the whole amounted to eleven thousand horse and foot. On hearing this, the Ætolians were anxious to throw division among their enemies; and with this view, in their next assembly, they came to a most extraordinary decree. Their original quarrel was with the Messenians, not with the Achæians; and they had before been allied with both; yet they voted themselves friends of the Lacedæmonians and Messenians, but enemies of the Achæians, unless they would renounce the Messenian alliance.

The Epirots, and Philip, king of Macedonia, who were among the chief allies of the Achæians, having heard the Achæian ambassadors, consented to receive the Messenians into the league. "They were little surprised," Polybius observes, "at the conduct of the Ætolians, who had done nothing unexpected, but only acted after their usual manner. Wherefore also, they were not much enraged, but voted to remain at peace with them: so much more easily is pardon given to habitual injustice, than to unusual and unexpected delinquency." Meanwhile the Lacedæmonians, notwithstanding the liberality with which they had been treated by Antigonus and the Achæians, were secretly negotiating to revolt from their alliance, and to join with the Ætolians. Skerdilaidas also, an Illyrian chief, who commanded forty piratical vessels, agreed with the Ætolians, for half the spoil, to join them in an invasion of Achæia; and the business was managed, and the expedition conducted, by Dorimachus and Scopas, while Ariston, the nominal general, remained at home, pretending ignorance, and professing to be at peace with the Achæians.

Cynætha, in Arcadia, had long been troubled with great and inextinguishable seditions, full of mutual expulsions,

bloodshed, pillage, confiscation, and division of lands. The friends of the Achæians had at length prevailed, and held the city, under the protection of an Achæian garrison and general; when the exiles sent an embassy to supplicate reconciliation and re-admission into the city. The prevailing party took compassion on them, and requested the consent of the Achæians to their restoration, which was readily granted. The garrison was withdrawn, and the exiles returned; but the solemn oaths which confirmed their reconciliation were scarcely out of their mouths, when they began to plot the ruin of their restorers, by calling in the Ætolians. Dorimachus and Skerdilaidas, having entered Peloponnesus, came before Cynætha; and some of the principal military officers of the city, who had been chosen from among the exiles, opened the gates to them by night. These traitors were duly rewarded for their ingratitude; for the Ætolians, on entering, slew them first, and then carried pillage and slaughter through the city. They next proceeded to a wealthy temple near, which was only ransomed from plunder by a heavy contribution—and hence departing, they encamped before the city of Cleitor. They invited the Cleitorians to revolt from the Achæian league to their own: but their overtures were rejected, and the attack which followed was gallantly repelled. After this defeat they prepared to quit Peloponnesus. They offered Cynætha to the Eleians, who declined to receive it; and the Ætolians then determined to hold it for themselves. But hearing that an army was on its way from Macedonia, they gave up this project, and burnt the town; and then, returning to the Corinthian gulf, they passed into Ætolia. Meantime Philip arriving at Corinth, but too late for enterprise against them, sent messengers to summon a congress of the allies; and while they were assembling, he led his forces towards Tegea, with the purpose of settling some violent dissensions which had arisen among the Lacedæmonians.

This people, long accustomed to the regal authority, had been without a king since the expulsion of Cleomenes; and the frame of their government had been in a great measure disjointed by the loss of its chief magistrate. The Ephori were paramount, but they were at variance among themselves. Two had hitherto left their party uncertain; the

other three were favourers of the Ætolians, and had shared in all their recent counsels, fully trusting that no effectual opposition could be made by so young a ruler as Philip. Their views were changed by his approach, and by the retreat of the Ætolians. They distrusted Adeimantus, one of their two colleagues, who had been privy to all their intrigues, and was little satisfied with them; and fearing that when Philip came near he might disclose the whole, they resolved to cut him off beforehand. They called together the people in arms, as if the Macedonians were coming against the city. Adeimantus remonstrated that the time for such a summons had been at the coming of their enemies, the Ætolians, and not at that of the Macedonians, their friends and saviours. While he was yet speaking, he was attacked and slain, with many of his supporters, by some young men who had been tutored for that purpose. The massacre proceeded to a considerable extent, and many who feared to be involved in it fled to Philip.

The authors of the slaughter immediately sent to the king of Macedonia, to accuse the murdered persons, to pray that Philip would delay his visit till they had restored tranquillity to the city, and to assure him that their meaning towards him was peaceful and friendly. He answered that he would make his encampment at Tegea, and bid them send thither commissioners to treat with him: and ten persons were accordingly sent, who laid the late commotions to the charge of Adeimantus and his friends, and promised on behalf of their employers that they should faithfully and actively perform all the duties of allies. It was much suspected that Adeimantus had perished for his friendship to Macedonia, and that the Lacedæmonians had secretly been tampering with the Ætolians. Some of Philip's counsellors advised that he should treat them as Alexander had treated the Thebans; others that he should content himself with punishing the guilty persons, and placing the administration in the hands of his friends. The answer given to the ambassadors, Polybius thinks, was dictated by Aristotle: it cannot probably be supposed to have been framed by the king himself, who was scarcely come to the age of seventeen. It imported that wrongs done within a confederate state by one party to another, could not properly be the subject of forcible interference on the part of the

league; and that since the Lacedæmonians had not flagrantly violated the common alliance, and now were willing to fulfil its duties, no great severity ought to be used against them. Accordingly the oaths of alliance were renewed with the Lacedæmonians, and Philip returned with his forces to Corinth, where the representatives of the confederate states were now assembled.

The call for war was universal, for all had been outraged. A vote was passed by the assembled deputies, in which, after reciting the injuries of their several constituents, they agreed to co-operate in recovering whatever cities or territories the Ætolians had taken from any of the allies since the death of Demetrius the father of Philip; and further, in restoring to those states, which had been forced into union with the Ætolians, independence, freedom from tribute, and the undisturbed enjoyment of their ancient constitution. Philip then wrote a letter to the offending people, inviting them even yet, if they had any plea to justify their conduct, to a peaceable meeting for the purpose of discussion. Their leaders fixed a day and a place for such a meeting, thinking Philip would not attend it; but when they found that he came, they excused themselves on the ground that they could settle nothing till authorized by the approaching assembly of the nation. The intention of hostility was still disavowed;—with how much sincerity, became apparent by the next election of a general; for the choice fell on Scopas, the chief author of every violence.

After the congress at Corinth, ministers had been sent to every community included in the league, to procure from its general assembly the confirmation of the decree already voted by the representatives of all. The Achæians ratified it without hesitation, and declared war against the Ætolians; and when Philip came to their great council to consult with them on the common interests, they received him very favourably, and renewed with him the friendship which they had maintained with Antigonus. By the other allies the decree was variously received. It was approved and firmly supported by the Acarnanians, though, as neighbours of the Ætolians, and far inferior to them in strength, they were liable to, and had recently experienced, the greatest sufferings from their hostility. The Epirotes played a double part, for they promised war to the ambassadors

of the allies, and neutrality to those of the Ætolians. The Messenians were especially bound to be hearty in a war that was chiefly waged for their protection, and the people in general wished to fulfil the obligation; but the government was in the hands of a timid and selfish minority, unused to hazard any thing for honour or for duty; and their caution, overruling the more generous movement of the multitude, the ambassadors were told that the Messenians would not venture to take part in the war, as long as the Ætolians held the town of Phigalea on their border.

The Lacedæmonians could not agree on an answer to be given to the ambassadors of the allies, and at last they sent them away without any. The authors of the late massacre were still active, and still pursuing the same objects as before. They procured that an envoy should be sent by the Ætolians to Lacedæmon: they pressed the Ephori to grant him a hearing before the assembly of the people. They also demanded the appointment of a king, that they might be governed according to the custom of their fathers: and the Ephori, disliking both proposals, yet fearing altogether to oppose them, put off to another occasion the question of the re-establishment of royalty, but admitted the ambassador to a hearing. He filled the popular ear with praises of his countrymen, and extravagant invective against the Macedonians. His cause had many warm supporters; but some of the elder citizens, reminding the rest of their liberal treatment by Antigonus, and contrasting it with former injurious conduct on the part of the Ætolians, prevailed on them to maintain their alliance with Philip, so that the ambassador departed without success.

The defeated party now resolved to carry their purpose by violence; and they effected it by the ministry of some young men, who fell on the Ephori, while engaged in a sacrifice, and shed their blood upon the altar. They then proceeded to clear the senate of all who were adverse to the Ætolians, putting some to death, and banishing the rest. After this they easily procured a decree to exchange the alliance of the Achæians for that of their enemies: a measure to which they were partly moved by regret for Cleomenes, who had perished of those who had contributed to his fall.

Cleomenes had passed three years as a banished man at the court of Egypt, expecting aid to re-establish him on his

hereditary throne, which the king was bound, as his ally, to uphold. That period had been marked with the death of the prince who had contracted the alliance; and his son, who succeeded him, looked coldly on the claims of the banished exile. Meanwhile the death of Antigonus, the quarrel between the Achæians and Ætolians, the increasing disposition of the Lacedæmonians to league themselves according to his own original policy, with the latter, all seemed to offer him the fairest hopes of success in his enterprise. Accordingly he pressed the king to send him, out with the requisite supplies of men and provisions; and this request being disregarded, he next began to be dismissed with his servants only. But his talents and daring temper were formidable to the administration. If they sent him out with fit equipments and supplies, they feared that he might become the lord of Greece, and a too powerful rival of their master. If they dismissed him unattended, he might possibly even then be successful in his enterprise; and, if he were so, he would be not only a rival, but an enemy. By detaining him in Alexandria these dangers were avoided; but another not less serious was incurred: for all the Grecian mercenaries in the Egyptian service were known to be at his beck, and it was feared that he might use them to overthrow the government, being provoked by ill usage, and emboldened by contempt for the weakness of the monarch. As the safest course, it was resolved to destroy him.

There was then in Alexandria, Nicias, of Messene, an hereditary friend of Archidamus, king of Lacedæmon, and his entertainer during his banishment: who had forwarded the treaty of reconciliation between him and Cleomenes, had become a surety to it, and had accompanied him on his return. After the murder of Archidamus, Nicias had professed himself thankful that his own life, and those of his companions, had been spared, but he secretly cherished an abiding desire of vengeance for the perfidy which had made him the unwelcome betrayer of his friend; and though his resentment had been grounded on honourable feelings, he was now ready to gratify it by the most dishonourable means. Cleomenes had welcomed him on his landing as a friend, and had vented to him, in terms of bitter satire, his disgust at the effeminate and profligate manners of the court. These expressions he reported to Sosibius, the chief minister,

who was received in this manner, and urged him on with gifts and promises to the ruin of his enemy. It was agreed that Nicagoras should write to Bombylus, and accuse Cleomenes of plotting an insurrection, and that his demands of aid were not complied with. The minister received the letter, and laid it before the king, and Cleomenes, in consequence, was shut up, and closely guarded in a house which was given him to inhabit. Having now no hope from the friendship of the government, he resolved to strike a blow against it; yet less with the expectation of any prosperous result, than with that of a death becoming his courage, and conducive to his renown. He lulled to sleep the vigilance of his guards, and sitting at the head of his few friends, he rose and made prisoner the governor of the city. He ranged the streets inviting the multitude to liberty, but no man answered to his call; he then endeavoured to break open the public prison, but found it too strongly guarded, and too well made fast. This last hope having failed, both he and his companions immediately slew themselves. Thus perished, says the nearly contemporary historian, Polybius, who was not his friend, "a man of most agreeable conversation, of great ability in the conduct of affairs, and altogether elder-like and kingly in his nature." To this may be added the praise of a patriotism, which, though not untainted with more vulgar ambition, was yet mainly directed to real reform in government and public morals. But on the other hand it must be owned that the fame of Cleomenes is blotted with many a stain of blood, and some of treachery.

The memory of Cleomenes was fondly cherished by the people whom he had governed, and while he lived they never gave up the hope of his return, nor admitted the thought of appointing another to be king in his room. About the time of the last mentioned commotions, they were assured of his death; and they then proceeded to the choice of two kings. One of these was the lawful heir of the Eurystholid house, Agesipolis, the grandson of that Cleombrotus, who had been made king when Leonidas was banished. Of the Eurysthid house there were many living, among whom were two sons of Archidamus; but all these were placed over to make room for Lysagorgus, a stranger to their blood, who, by giving to each of the Ephori a

talent, became a descendant of Heracles, and king of Sparta. — Polybius.

Machatas, the late Ætolian ambassador, now returned to Lacedæmon, and exhorted the kings and the Ephori to immediate hostility against the Achæians, as the only means of dispelling the powers of disunion between his people and their own. His advice was followed; Lysagorgus entered the territory of Argos, and took several towns the more easily, as his attack was unexpected. The Eleians also were persuaded by Machatas to declare against the Achæians; and the Ætolians were now full of confidence, the Achæians of anxiety—for Philip was engaged in preparation, the Epirots were diffident, and the Messenians quite inactive. But before beginning the story of the war, we will shortly advert to some important transactions which took place about the time of its breaking out.

Byzantium was so placed on the narrow channel, by which the Euxine sea communicates with the Propontis and the Ægean; that a vessel could hardly make the passage without being carried by the current to its port. Its situation was most advantageous for its traffic with either, as well as for the protection or hinderance of the trade which the Greeks carried on with the countries round the Euxine for various necessities, especially grain, which their country produced very insufficiently. As a set-off against the maritime advantages of its position, it was entirely hemmed in on the landward side by hordes of fierce barbarians, from whom its inhabitants were obliged to suffer an unceasing predatory war, or to buy a doubtful peace by heavy payments. Almost worn out by the ceaseless struggle, they had craved assistance from the states of Greece, but unsuccessfully, though it was important to all that Byzantium should be held by a Grecian people. The Byzantines then availed themselves of their commanding situation to take the relief which their petitions had failed to procure. They levied a heavy toll on every vessel which passed the straits. Loud complaints were made; the Rhodians were called on to redress the grievance, as the leading maritime power of the age; their ambassadors went to Byzantium to remonstrate against the impost, accompanied by ministers from their allies; but the Byzantines maintained their claim as just and reasonable, and war broke out between the states. The Rhodians were the stronger,

and they were assisted by Prusias, king of Bithynia; while the hopes were disappointed which their adversaries had placed in some other potentates of Asia. The Byzantines, therefore, were soon obliged to submit; and peace was granted to them on the condition that they should cease to levy the offensive tolls.

About this period some violent and bloody commotions took place in Crete, once the cradle of Grecian civilization, but long since distinguished only as the dwelling-place of a lawless and faithless people, or as a wasp's nest of freebooters and mercenary soldiers. Two cities, Cnossus and Gortyna, had combined for the subjugation of the rest, and had brought under their dominion all save Lyttus, which they attacked with the determination of destroying it altogether, that it might serve for a warning and terror to the disobedient. The Lyttians were besieged by an army gathered from all the states of the island, when dissension arose in the leaguer from some trifle, as Polyhius observes, "according to the manner of the Cretans," and several townships suddenly revolted from the Cnossians to their enemies. Even in Gortyna itself, while the elder citizens clove to the Cnossian alliance, the younger part were mostly favourable to the Lyttians. To aid in recovering their ascendancy, the Cnossians procured a thousand auxiliaries from Ætolia. The elder Gortynians occupied the citadel, introduced into it the Cnossians and Ætolians, killed some and banished others of the young men, and placed the city at the disposal of the Cnossians.

Soon afterwards, hearing that the people of Lyttus had gone out with all their forces to the war, the Cnossians surprised the unguarded city, and burnt and wholly demolished it, carrying away with them the women and children. The returning Lyttians saw the ruin, and could not bear to come within the circuit of their desolated home. They marched all round it with bitter wailings, then turned their backs on it, and went to Lampe, a city allied with them, where they were most hospitably received. Converted in one day from citizens to sojourners, they still made war upon the Cnossians, and perhaps more actively, as they had more to avenge. As the Cnossians had strengthened themselves by alliance with the Ætolians, the

Lampeans and their confederates applied to the Achæians, and obtained an auxiliary force. Thus assisted, they were able to compel the revolt of several towns from the hostile confederacy. They then in their turn sent five hundred men to the assistance of the Achæians. The Cnossians had already sent a thousand to the Ætolians; and to the end of the war both parties were strengthened by troops from Crete.

SECT. II.—The quarrel between the Ætolians and the Achæians had ripened from a tissue of desultory hostility and intricate negotiation to a regular war, in which each party knew on whom it might reckon both for friends and enemies. Philip now advanced through Thessaly and Epirus, with the purpose of invading Ætolia. Meantime a plot was laid by Dorimachus and another Ætolian leader, to surprise the Achæian city of Ægeira on the Corinthian gulf. The Ætolians crossed the gulf by night, and landed near the place. Twenty men went before with a deserter from the garrison, who led them over crags and along a watercourse into the city. They seized a postern, slew the watch, and opened the gate to their countrymen, who poured in eagerly, and straightway fell to plunder. This indiscreet avidity saved the town; for while they were scattered confusedly through the houses, the inhabitants gathered in force on a height which, though unfortified, served the purpose of a citadel. Dorimachus went against them, and a desperate struggle ensued, the townsmen fighting for their homes and children, the intruders for their lives. At length the Ætolians began to give way, while their opponents increasing in confidence pressed on them yet harder, till they drove them precipitately down the hill. Many fell by the sword, many perished trodden down in the throng and struggle round the gates; many who escaped this danger were tumbled from precipices in the hurry of their flight. A scanty remnant gained the ships, and these dishonoured by losing their arms; and the fleet set sail to recross the gulf in discomfiture and disgrace.

About the same time Megalopolis was attacked by Lycurgus, king of Lacedæmon; and Euripides, who commanded for the Ætolians in Elis, ravaged the lands of Dyme, Phære, and Tritæa. He was attacked on his return by the united forces of these states, but he de-

rested them and re-entered the territory of Dyme. The three towns then applied for succour to the Achaian general, the younger Aratus, son to the deliverer of Sicyon; but their message found him in an embarrassing situation. In consequence of a failure on the part of the Achaians to pay to their mercenaries all that was due for their service in the last war, he was now unable to raise a body sufficient for the present need. This difficulty being added to considerable sluggishness and timidity which he shewed in conducting operations, his distressed confederates remained without relief, till they were driven to a measure of very pernicious example. They agreed to withhold their contributions from the league, though they had been among its original promoters, and to employ the money in supporting a body of mercenaries, to be used for their own protection.

As soon as Philip entered Epirus, he was joined by all the forces of that country. If he had advanced forthwith into the land of the Ætoliens, without allowing them time for preparation, he might probably have ended the war: but he suffered himself to be diverted from this by the persuasions of the Epirots, who wished him first to besiege a fortress, by gaining which they hoped to be enabled to recover Ambracia from the Ætoliens. Meanwhile Scopas assembled the forces of his countrymen, and led them through Thessaly into Macedonia. They ravaged the country widely, and coming to the town of Dium, which the inhabitants abandoned at their approach, they burnt and destroyed it, not sparing even the buildings or ornaments of the temples, or the erections for the convenience of the worshippers who assembled there in great numbers at the periodical festivals. They went home triumphant, laden with spoil, and confident that no one would hazard the invasion of their country: but Philip, having taken and delivered to the Epirots the place which he was besieging, pursued his march into Ætolia. He was reinforced by the Acarnanians in passing through their territory; after which, encamping near the river Achelous, he wasted the lands of the enemy unopposed. Ambassadors now came to him from the Achaians, to request his presence and aid in Peloponnesus: but he, replying that he would consider on their wishes, detained them with him, while he led his army deeper into Ætolia. He there took and demolished several

towns and strongholds, and lastly mastered the important city of Ctenada, at the mouth of the Achelous. This place he carefully fortified for a naval arsenal, and a port from which to pass into the peninsula. While he was engaged in these works, there came news from Macedonia that the Dardaniens, a neighbouring barbarous people, were preparing for an irroad. He hastened home; the Dardaniens, hearing that he had returned, broke up their army, though they were already on the frontiers; and Philip, when he found that the danger was over, dismissed the Macedonians to gather in the harvest.

The time now came for the annual election of a general by the Ætoliens, which took place near the autumnal equinox. Dorimachus was chosen, who went out forthwith on an irroad into Epirus, in which he not only ravaged the country in a manner more than usually destructive, but flagrantly outraged all that his age deemed holy, by burning the oracular grove and temple of Dodona, one of the oldest and most venerated seats of Grecian religion.

The Ætoliens had returned to their homes, and winter had set in, when Philip suddenly arrived in Corinth, at the season when friends and enemies least expected him. The city gates were shut, the ways were guarded, while messengers were sent to the Achaian states to appoint a rendezvous; and so well was the purpose of these precautions answered, that Philip, in advancing towards the place of meeting, fell in with and entirely defeated the Ætolian general, Euripides, who was entering the Sicyonian territory, with a considerable body of Eleians and mercenaries, in perfect ignorance that a Macedonian army was so near. After this success he joined the Achaians, who increased his forces to ten thousand. Several towns were taken by the confederate powers, all which Philip gave up to the Achaians; and the army being led into the country of the Eleians, enriched itself with the plunder of a region unrivalled for the perfection of its culture: for the lot of this people had fallen in a naturally goodly, fruitful, and pleasant land; and they had enjoyed it for many ages undisturbed by war, under the protection of their sacred character, as the servants of Olympian Jove, and managers of his festival. Thus ensured against aggression, instead of fixing their dwellings, like the other Greeks, in the shelter of a

town, they lived among their fields, and spent their incomes in embellishing their country-houses, and improving their estates: inasmuch, that there were wealthy families among them, which, for two or three successive generations, had never set foot within the city. The sacredness of their territory was infringed, as we have seen, in a quarrel with the Arcadians, in the course of which the presidency of the Olympian festival became itself a subject of dispute by arms. The immunities then violated they never attempted to recover; madly preferring, as it should seem, the hazard and the excitement of war, to the safe enjoyments of tranquillity. But their rural attachments and habits still continued, though deprived of the security which had nursed them; and the losses to which they were liable from invasion were therefore peculiarly great.

Philip's behaviour as general of the confederate army had hitherto been moderate and popular; and by these qualities as well as by the military talent which he had shewn, he had placed himself high in the good opinion of the Peloponnesians. He had, however, advisers who prompted him to a different line of conduct; among whom was Apelles, lately one of his guardians, and still his most favoured and trusted friend. He wished to reduce the Achæians to the same condition with the Thessalians, who were governed indeed in outward show as an independent people, but in fact as subjects of Macedonia. To bend them gradually to the yoke, he began by treating them on all occasions as inferior to the Macedonians, whom he suffered to take what quarters they would, even though they pitched on those already occupied by Achæian soldiers; and, more than that, to take from their allies the booty which they had gathered. He next directed his attendants for trifling causes to lay hands on the Achæians, and punish them with stripes, though none but their own officers had legal authority to arrest or chastise them; and if any complained of the injury, or defended the injured persons, he came in person, and led him away to prison. This was speedily checked: some young men of the Achæians made complaint against Apelles to Aratus (the father), who brought them to Philip; and he, on receiving their remonstrance, assured them that these things should not be repeated, and charged Apelles to lay no com-

mand upon the Achæians unless with the approval of their general.

Philip next invaded Triphylia, a maritime district, bordering on Messenia and Eleia. He was here opposed by an Eleian army, with an auxiliary body recently sent by the Ætolians, the whole being under Philidas, the Ætolian commander. This leader, at first divided his forces, to defend the several towns; but when one of the strongest of these had been taken by Philip, he resolved to gather all together in the city of Lepreum. In abandoning the town which he had himself undertaken to defend, he plundered several of his own friends before he quitted it; and this may probably have completed the rising dislike of the Ætolians, as oppressive masters and faithless allies, which seems to have co-operated with the terror of the Macedonian arms in moving all the Triphylians to renounce them. Even the Lepreates themselves, though they had in their city nearly three thousand soldiers, including mercenaries, of the Ætolians, Eleians, and Lacedæmonians, resolved to quit their present confederates, and join themselves with the Achæians. They took up a position in the city, and required the garrison to depart. Philidas refused at first, confiding in his force, and in the possession of the citadel; but when he found that the townsmen adhered to their determination, and the Macedonians were near, he consented to withdraw in peace with his followers. The Lepreates then submitted to Philip. Their example was followed by the remaining towns of the province, and Philip, after reducing all Triphylia in six days, went to Megalopolis, and thence to Argos, where he passed the remainder of the winter.

About the same time a considerable commotion took place in Lacedæmon. Chilon, a Spartan of royal blood, and the rightful heir, as he conceived, to the sceptre of Procles, could not endure that his claim should have been disregarded in favour of a stranger such as Lycurgus. He therefore planned a revolution, to be effected by the favour of the multitude, to whom he held out the hopes of a division of lands. Having communicated with his friends, and obtained about two hundred associates in the plot, he began by attempting to assassinate Lycurgus, and the Ephori, who had placed him on the throne. The Ephori were surprised at supper, and slain; but Lycurgus, the most important

victim with difficulty escaped. Chilon entered the market-place, attacked his enemies, and his friends made proclamation to the multitude; till, finding no success, he saw that his cause was hopeless, and secretly fled into the Achaian territory.

Apelles still retained his purpose of bringing the Achaians into subjection; and seeing that the chief bar to his success was the influence of Aratus both among his countrymen and with Philip, he endeavoured to undermine that influence by all the means in his power. He cultivated an interest among the party enemies of Aratus, encouraged them to go on, introduced and recommended them to the king. "For if," he told him, "you attend to Aratus, you must use the Achaians as is written in the treaty; but if you chuse such friends as I am bringing you, you may use all the Peloponnesians as you will." He thus prevailed on Philip to countenance his designs, one of which was to interfere at the coming election of a general, in such a manner as to throw the choice on an opponent of Aratus. The election arrived; the Macedonian host was led near the scene of it under the pretext of passing into Eleia; Apelles canvassed actively, persuading some and threatening others, till, by great exertions, he obtained the appointment of Iperatus, the candidate he favoured. The army then proceeded on an inroad into Eleia, and gathered there great spoil.

Apelles now brought into play a fresh engine against Aratus. Amphidamus, an Eleian general, being made prisoner by the Macedonians, had undertaken to bring his countrymen into their alliance: and Philip had dismissed him unransomed, and directed him to offer that their prisoners should be freely restored, their territory defended against all attack, and that they should enjoy their possessions in perfect independence, without receiving garrisons or paying tribute. These proposals, though very tempting to men who had been chief sufferers in the war, were notwithstanding rejected; and Apelles laid it to the charge of Aratus and his friends that they had secretly dissuaded Amphidamus from doing them, by predicting danger to all Peloponnesians should the Eleians be brought under the influence of Philip. The king at first gave ear to the slander; he suspected that Aratus and his princi-

pal associates should be called, and bid Apelles repeat his accusations in their presence. He did so; and added that the king, having found them so unthankful, would return into Macedonia, having stated to the Achaians his reason for forsaking them. Aratus deprecated a hasty decision, and prayed that the matter might be more accurately examined; and Philip granted time, and promised attention to the inquiry. In the days which followed no proof was given by Apelles of his charge; while a lucky occurrence supplied to Aratus the most satisfactory means of vindication. Amphidamus being suspected of unfaithfulness by the Eleians, was about to be arrested and sent into Ætolia, when he fled to the Macedonian camp. The accused Achaian leaders, hearing of his arrival, requested Philip to examine him. His answers proved them innocent, and the result of the whole was to place them higher and to sink Apelles in the king's esteem and favour.

Philip was now in want of supplies for his forces, which could only be obtained from the general assembly of the Achaians. He found on the meeting of the Assembly that the friends of Aratus no longer exerted their authority in his favour, being disgusted that, at the late election of a general, Apelles should have interfered to overawe the voters and throw out their candidate. Eperatus, who had been chosen through the influence of the Macedonians, was weak in ability and low in estimation: and Philip, therefore, deeming it best to recur to the Achaians, came to an explanation with both of them, in which he laid on Apelles all the blame of whatever he had done amiss, and prayed them still to be his friends, as before. His conciliatory overtures were readily accepted, and the Achaians now supported his wishes: so that his present needs were largely supplied by the Achaians, and permanent provision made for the future. He then resolved to bring the war to a speedier decision by raising a navy. The remainder of the winter was spent in making seamen of his Macedonians, who proved themselves ready learners, and soon became as fit for service by sea as by land. But in the execution of this plan he met with difficulties, arising from fresh and still more criminal intrigues of Apelles.

Antigonus at his death had carefully provided lest the interests of his ward should suffer during his minority, or

the peace of the kingdom should be disturbed. To cut off as far as possible all occasion of cabal, he had filled up all the principal offices both civil and military, and directed that those whom he chose should continue to hold them till the king should be of age. He appointed Apelles to be one of the king's guardians; Leontius to command the targeteers; Megaleas to keep the records; Taurion to manage affairs in Peloponnesus, and Alexander to lead the royal guards. But Apelles was dissatisfied with the measure of power allotted to him as a guardian by Antigonus, and continued to him afterwards by Philip as a confidential adviser and a person to whose opinion he had been accustomed to bow. He bent his mind to overthrow an arrangement which gave him so many partners in authority. Leontius and Megaleas were absolutely at his bidding, but not so the other two; and these he therefore endeavoured on all occasions to disparage. Against Taurion he did not venture to proceed by open expressions of blame, but he endeavoured, by faint and guarded praises of his soldiery, to hint a doubt of his political capacity. His arts might probably have been crowned with success, had he not at the same time incurred a disgraceful failure by his attack on Aratus. As it was, his credit sunk daily lower, till disappointed ambition drove him to treason. He agreed with Leontius and Megaleas to hinder the royal service by all means in their power: and it was settled that they, remaining with the army, should be sure to fail in the time of need, while Apelles would fix himself in Chalcis, and prevent the sending of provisions and supplies.

At the coming of Spring, Philip sailed from Corinth with his own fleet and with that of his allies to conquer Cephallenia, an island valuable to either party in the war, as well for its fruitfulness as for its situation. It had hitherto been chiefly by the shipping of the Cephallenians that the Ætolians had passed into Peloponnesus, or had ravaged the coasts of Acarnania and Epirus; and Philip wished to deprive them of this resource, and himself to occupy a position which commanded both the Ælian shores and those of Ætolia. He landed on the island, invested Pale, one of its chief cities, and, as the works being diligently and skilfully and on by the Macedonians, a

breach was soon made in the walls. The besieged still refused to surrender, and the targeteers under Leontius were ordered to the assault. Three times they were on the point of passing the breach, when they were checked in their advance by their treacherous leader, seconded by many of those in subordinate commands, whom he had previously corrupted. They were roughly handled and beaten back, though fully capable of winning the place; and Philip, seeing the losses of his troops and the misconduct of his officers, gave up the siege.

At the time when Philip conquered Triphylia, the neighbouring people of Phigalia had risen in arms against the Ætolians who garrisoned their city, and compelled them to depart. Thus relieved from the fear which had kept them inactive, the Messenians now took part in the war, and they had contributed their portion to the armament in Cephallenia. During the siege of Pale, their country was invaded by the Lacedæmonians under Lyncurgus, while Dorimachus about the same time entered Thessaly with half the forces of his nation: and Philip at once received ambassadors from the Messenians and Acarnanians, the first requesting him to come to their protection against Lyncurgus, the other to take this so favourable opportunity for ravaging all Ætolia. It was during the prevalence of the Etesian, as they were called, or annual winds, which blew from Cephallenia directly towards Messenia; and the Messenians suggested to Philip that his fleet might make the passage in one day, and he would thus be enabled to fall on Lyncurgus unperceived and unprepared. Leontius eagerly supported the views of the Messenians; for he considered that the same winds which carried the armament to their shores would effectually hinder its return; and that thus after driving Lyncurgus out of their country, it must waste the remainder of the summer in inaction, while the Ætolians might work their will on Thessaly and Epirus. The opinion of the Acarnanians was supported by Aratus, and Philip was the more readily persuaded to adopt it, because the repulse at Pale had opened his eyes to the unfaithful dealing of Leontius. He prepared forthwith for the invasion of Ætolia; but that the Messenians might not be altogether unassisted, he wrote to Eperatus, and requested

him to succour them with the forces of Achaia.

As soon as Philip landed on the continent he was joined by all the Acarnanians who were capable of bearing arms. They had previously suffered many grievous calamities at the hands of their dangerous neighbours; and so eagerly did they embrace the opportunity of taking vengeance by the help of the Macedonians, that there came to the muster not only those whom the law required, but many whose age exempted them from the call. Like causes had produced like feelings in the Epirots; but their gathering was delayed by the extent of their country, and the unexpectedness of Philip's arrival, so that the Macedonians and Acarnanians entered Ætolia without them.

The leading city of the Ætolians was Thermum. It was the place where their national assemblies were convened and their magistrates elected; where fairs were held and festivals celebrated; where the people met whenever brought together for business or pleasure. It naturally followed that their wealth and splendour should be mainly gathered within its walls, especially since it bore the character of great security as well as convenience, being situate in a most rugged district, hitherto untouched by the foot of an enemy. Against this important place Philip directed his march. The suddenness of his arrival, the rapidity of his advance, the present weakness of the Ætolians, while half their young men were with Dorimachus in Thessaly; their confidence that none would ever venture into the difficult passes leading to their capital, in the face of a people eminently formidable in mountain warfare; all these, it was calculated, would secure his progress from interruption, if he gave no time to learn his purpose and prepare for opposition. Aratus, therefore, called for the utmost celerity of movement; and it was in vain that Leontius demanded delays, to refresh the soldiers, as he said, but really to give time for the Ætolians to gather.

The army proceeded by forced marches, which were executed with the greatest alacrity and vigour, and wasted all the lands in its way, till it came to a tract of thickly-wooded highlands, through which it was necessary to defile with caution and compactness, as well as with celerity. It passed them safely, and advanced towards Thermum by a

rugged, steep, and narrow road, with deep precipices on each side. The Ætolians were taken quite unprepared; the troops advanced without opposition; the towns were abandoned at their approach, and nothing delayed them but the necessary precaution of garrisoning posts at either outlet of the most perilous defiles, to protect their return. Philip gave up to plunder the town of Themum, the surrounding villages, and the fruitful plain below; and the booty amassed by the soldiers was enormous, as may easily be inferred from the considerations that the country had long flourished in uninterrupted tranquillity; and that the city, besides that it was the capital of Ætolia, was also, in general belief, the safest repository for whatever possessions were most precious, and most liable to hostile spoliation. Of the furniture, arms, and other moveables, the most valuable and easiest of carriage were selected, the remainder piled up and burnt; and thus far Philip had not exceeded a severe application of the acknowledged rights of war. But it is truly said by Polybius that he made himself the imitator rather than the avenger of crime, when, in retaliation for the impieties which the Ætolians had committed at Dium and Dodona, he demolished the temples, overthrew the statues; and thus, by acts in no wise diminishing the military resources of his adversaries, waged war with the religion of his country, and with the arts which minister to liberal enjoyment.

Philip returned to his ships by the same road by which he had come from them, successfully repelling two attacks upon his rear, which were made by different bands of the Ætolians. On arriving at the encampment he invited his officers to a feast, in honour of the successful completion of a hazardous, and what had hitherto been deemed a desperate enterprise. Leontius and Megaleas were present with the rest. Amidst the general rejoicing, their troubled visages confirmed the suspicions that hung on them before; and as the revel went on, their disgrace was completed by a fit of drunken fury, in which they searched the camp for Aratus with a party of their friends, and, having found him, began by reviling him, and then assailed him with stones. Assistants flocked to either party, and the riot increased till, Philip hearing it, sent to part the fray, and to learn its cause.

Leontius slipped away in the tumult, but Megaleas was brought before the king, who severely reprimanded him. But he, far from expressing contrition for his fault, declared himself determined to persist till he should have given Aratus his due. At this the king took fire, and cast him into prison, till security should be offered for his paying a fine of twenty talents (upwards of 4,000*l.*) Leontius hearing it, came to Philip with some of his targeteers, in the hope that on account of his youth he might be easily intimidated. He asked him who had dared to carry Megaleas to prison; but when the king replied with firmness that he had ordered it, his courage failed, and he went away full of rage and fear. Megaleas was brought to trial; and proof being produced by Aratus of his evil practices with Leontius and Apelles, he was condemned and heavily fined. Leontius, however, who was not proved to have been an actor in the tumult which was the immediate cause of his punishment, becoming his security for the payment, he continued at large.

About this time Lycurgus returned from his expedition into Messenia, without having effected anything worthy of notice; and afterwards went against Tegea with the like success. Dorimachus also returned from his inroad into Thessaly. He had undertaken it in the hope of withdrawing Philip from the siege of Pale, and of finding an undefended country and an easy booty. Instead of that, he found the officers of Philip ready to oppose him in the field; and while he was watching them from the mountains, and did not venture to descend into the plain, he was called home by the news that Philip was ravaging Ætolia. He returned in haste to the defence of his country, but found himself too late, for the Macedonians, after effecting the purpose of the expedition, had retreated in safety.

Philip returned to Corinth, and thence proceeded to Tegea. He joined his army with such of the Achæians as were there assembled, and forthwith advanced into the territory of Lacedæmon, scarce twelve days after he had quitted Ætolia. The terror inspired by his late successes was increased by the rapidity of his movements and the suddenness of his coming. He passed through the country unopposed from the mountains to the sea, and wasted it at his pleasure. Meanwhile the Me-

senians, who had been summoned to meet him at Tegea, arrived there after his departure, and boldly resolved that they would endeavour to join him in the enemy's country. They were surprised by Lycurgus and driven from their camp, with the loss of their horses and their baggage: and this success encouraged the Lacedæmonian rulers to prepare for a general battle with the Macedonians, who were now at Amyclæ, near to Sparta. It was necessary for Philip to pass between the city and a hill upon the river-side, which Lycurgus had occupied with a strong detachment; and this movement had been rendered more dangerous by the Lacedæmonians, who had narrowed the passage by damming up the river, and thus flooding some of its bank. But Philip first dislodged Lycurgus from his post, and then advanced, successfully repelling an attack which was made from the city. He crossed the river, and encamping in a safe and convenient situation, he began to prepare for his return to Tegea. He quitted Laconia unmolested, and proceeded to Tegea, and thence to Corinth.

While Philip remained in the neighbourhood of Corinth, to conduct some negotiations in Phocis, Leontius and Megaleas made another attempt to bring him under their influence by intimidation. For this purpose they circulated rumours among the soldiers, importing that their proper share of booty was denied them. A violent mutiny ensued; but at the appearance of Philip it was quickly suppressed. The king well knew by whom the tumult had been kindled, though at that moment he did not venture to proclaim his knowledge. Meanwhile Leontius, at length despairing of success to be gained by his own exertions, was earnestly pressing Apelles to return from Chalcis. He had acted there in such a manner as entirely to overshadow the authority of the king, whom he described as a mere boy, and entirely under his direction. Accordingly the magistrates and officers in Macedonia and Thessaly were in the habit of accounting to him; and even in complimentary decrees and addresses from the citizens of Greece, his name was more conspicuous than that of the monarch. At the summons of Leontius he hastened to Corinth, fully confident of obtaining whatever he wished, as soon as he came into Philip's presence. He

made a splendid entry into the city, attended by a multitude of soldiers, and by many officers of rank, who had gone out to meet him. He proceeded at once to the royal apartments, and was entering them as he had been accustomed, when he was stopped by a warder, who told him that the king was not at leisure. After standing awhile in astonishment he silently departed; his train immediately melted away, and he entered his quarters unaccompanied, except by his own family. He was now admitted to festive meetings, but not to those which were held for the transaction of business. On seeing his unfavourable reception Megaleas fled, and left Leontius to answer for his fine. Then Philip cast Leontius into prison, having first sent away the targeteers whom he commanded, under pretence of an expedition into Triphylia. But the soldiers heard of their leader's imprisonment in time to send a deputation to the king. They declared that if Leontius were imprisoned for the fine, they would raise the money among themselves to pay it; but if for any other matter, they requested that the trial might not take place in their absence, for if it did, they should hold themselves greatly slighted. Such freedom as this, Polybius observes, the Macedonians were ever wont to use towards their princes. In the present case, however, their intercession only exasperated Philip, and induced him to send Leontius to execution more hastily than he had intended.

At Philip's arrival in Corinth, he had found there an embassy sent by the Rhodians and Chians to mediate a peace. He had answered that he was then and ever desirous of accommodation, and had sent them on to make their proposals to the Ætolians. They now returned with the news that the Ætolians wished for peace, and had consented to an immediate suspension of arms for thirty days; and they named a day on which they requested that Philip and his allies would meet the Ætolians at Rhium, and promised that the latter would agree to every thing that was necessary to a fair and equal peace. Philip consented, and went to Patra, to be ready for the meeting; and here there were brought to him some intercepted letters of Megaleas to the Ætolians, in which he exhorted them to persevere in the war, assured them that Philip's affairs were nearly ruined for want of sufficient supplies, and spoke

of the king himself in terms of great reproach and contempt. Upon this Philip, who considered Apelles as the chief mover in every mischief, arrested him, with his son, and sent them to Corinth; and they shortly after perished, the historian informs us, implying apparently that they were put to death in prison without form of trial. Megaleas was at Thebes, whither he had gone for refuge after an unsuccessful attempt to obtain admission at Athens; and an officer was sent to sue him in the Theban courts for the fine he had incurred. Despairing now of safety, he slew himself, without awaiting judgment.

The Ætolians had willingly listened to the proposal of peace, to be freed from a war in which their success had been very different from what they had expected; but when they heard of the disturbances in the Macedonian army, and of the fate of Apelles and Leontius, they put off the appointed meeting, with the hope that some great and dangerous convulsion might ensue among the Macedonians, and that they might so be enabled to recover the superiority in the war. Philip gladly seized on this as a pretence for breaking off the negotiation; for he was not more sincere than they in his anxiety for peace, and he was confident of success if the war were continued. He exhorted his allies to pursue the war with vigour, and returned to Corinth, after which he dismissed his Macedonians to winter at home, and himself soon followed. About this time, Eurycles fled from Sparta into Ætolia, through fear of the Ephori, to whom he had been accused of meditating a revolution; but shortly after, finding the charge to have been false, they recalled him, and reinstated him in his office.

During the absence of Philip, the Achæians were almost defenceless through the incapacity of their general, Eperatus. The armed citizens held him cheap, the mercenaries entirely disregarded him; his commands were not obeyed, and nothing was ready for the protection of the country. This encouraged Pyrrhias, the Ætolian general, to invade Achæia, and he ravaged the greater part of it unopposed. The cities finding no aid from the league grew slack in contributing to its support; the pay of the soldiers fell short, which increased their insubordination and consequent inefficiency; and these evils mutually exasperated each other. In this state were

when the period of Eperatus's

command expired. The elder Aratus was chosen to succeed him, and immediately put forth all his energy in providing means to carry on the war, in restoring order to the general administration, and discipline and activity to the army.

A plan had been arranged between Lycurgus and Pyrrhias for a simultaneous irruption into Messenia, from the Laconian side, and from that towards Elis. Aratus being informed of it led his forces to Megalopolis to oppose them. But the advance of Pyrrhias was stopped on the border by the people of Cyparissus; and Lycurgus, who had entered Messenia, being thus disappointed of the expected co-operation, and thinking himself not a match for the Achæians without it, retreated to Sparta. Aratus then agreed with the Messenians, and with Taurion, the Macedonian, that each should furnish five hundred foot, and fifty horse, to defend the Messenian, Megalopolitan, Tegean, and Argian frontier. A permanent protection was thus assured to those states which had to bear the brunt of Lacedæmonian hostility; while Aratus himself undertook with the forces of the Achæians to defend the sides that were open to the Ætolians and Eleians.

Megalopolis, as we have seen, had been taken by Cleomenes, and demolished because of the resolute fidelity of its inhabitants to their allies. The defeat of their enemy had enabled them to return, unbroken in spirit, but miserably crippled in resources. The state was disorganised; the common burdens pressed on all with intolerable weight, but the manner of their apportionment was a subject of dispute: all discussions were embittered by the irritability of wretchedness, so that the place was full of strife and angry passions. They first disputed as to the walling of the city. One party maintained that the circuit should be lessened, so that their numbers might suffice to man the whole; for the former capture, they said, had been occasioned by its too great extent, and the inadequacy of their small numbers to its defence. They further deemed it right that the great proprietors should contribute a third of their possessions, to be assigned for the support of a body of new citizens, with whom the state should forthwith be strengthened. Others would neither agree to contract the city, nor to give up a third of their estates. Another subject of dissension was found in the laws com-

posed for them by Prytanis, a Peripatetic philosopher, whom Antigonus had sent to them for a legislator. Aratus settled all their differences, and re-established harmony among them; but the historian has not stated the terms of reconciliation.

Aratus now returned to the congress of the Achæians, leaving the command of the mercenaries to Lycus of Phære; who met and defeated the Eleians, under the Ætolian general Euripides, by whom Pyrrhias had, at their request, been superseded. Many were slain or made prisoners, and all the baggage was captured. By sea, too, many prizes were taken; and all the booty being sold together raised a considerable sum, which cheered the soldiery by assuring them of their pay, and the citizens by the hope of lighter taxation. In the course of the summer the Eleians were again defeated; while part of the Ætolian coast was ravaged by the fleet, and the inhabitants were twice discomfited in attempting to protect their lands. The Ætolians ravaged Acarnania; and the Acarnanians undertook to retaliate the invasion, but their purpose was frustrated by a panic terror which seized their army.

Meanwhile Philip occupied Byzantium, the chief city of Pæonia, and a post of great importance to the protection of his kingdom against the Dardanians, since it commanded the chief passes from their country into Macedonia. Proceeding thence he was joined at Edessa by the forces of Upper Macedonia; he came on the sixth day to Larissa in Thessaly; and thence he made a night-march to surprise the town of Meliteia, an attempt which only failed through the neglecting to provide ladders long enough. But the chief object of the expedition was a city on the borders of Thessaly and Magnesia, which was called the Phthian Thebes, to distinguish it from its more celebrated namesake in Bœotia. This place was now in possession of the Ætolians, and from it they were wont to issue continually for plunder and ravage, to their own great profit, and to the exceeding injury of the neighbouring Thessalians. Philip commenced the siege, and pressed it vigorously. His army was powerful, and very abundantly provided with warlike engines; and in spite of a resolute defence the approaches were soon completed, and a breach was made in the wall. All was ready for the assault, when the garrison surren-

dered. With the cruelty too usual in Grecian warfare, Philip sold all the inhabitants for slaves, and peopled the city with Macedonians. At the same time he changed its name from Thebes to Philippopolis, the city of Philip; as if the annihilation of a community, the enslaving of its citizens, and the transfer of their national inheritance to strangers, had been glorious deeds, and worthy of being commemorated to the enduring honour of their author.

The Macedonian prince next turned his attention to the chastisement of his hired auxiliary, the Illyrian Skerdilaidas. He, considering that he had not received the full reward of his services according to agreement, had resolved to pay himself by treachery or force. He sent fifteen of the light vessels used by his countrymen to the port of Leucas, where they were received as friends without suspicion; and suddenly attacking four ships belonging to the squadron of Taurion, they took them, and sent them with the crews to Skerdilaidas. From Leucas, they sailed to the promontory of Malea, and cruised about it, plundering indiscriminately all the traders whom they met; and thither Philip went in pursuit of them, but finding that they were gone, he directed his fleet to sail round the peninsula, and meet him at Lechæum, and went in the meantime into the territory of Argos, to be present at the Nemean festival. Here news was brought to him which entirely changed his plans and inclinations, and made him at length sincerely desirous of peace with the Ætolians.

After defeating Pyrrhus, the Romans had soon made themselves undisputed lords of all Italy south of the Po. They had then passed into Sicily, to dispute its empire with the Carthaginians, who had already mastered the greater part of it. (B. C. 263.) In twenty-four years of war ensuing between these two ambitious commonwealths, there perished on both sides in battle and by the waves, twelve hundred ships of the largest size then usual in war. Hence the waste of human life may be partly estimated, when it is considered that the war was carried on with no less activity by land than by sea. The contest was terminated with a treaty, whereby the Carthaginians agreed to give up Sicily, to free their Roman prisoners without ransom, and to pay a large sum of money.

The calamities of Carthage ended

not here. To the wild and profligate passion for universal dominion, in which that people equalled the Romans themselves, they added the fatal policy of carrying on their wars very principally by the hands of foreign mercenaries, and of levies raised by compulsion from the subject nations. This was apparently unavoidable when vast projects of conquest were undertaken by the people of a single commercial city; for they could not afford on ordinary occasions to withdraw any large proportion of their citizens from those channels of productive industry by which the state had attained its greatness. At the close of the war the exhausted treasury was unable to supply the full arrears of pay which were due to the soldiers. Disputes arose, which ended in the mercenaries taking up arms against their employers. The African subjects of Carthage, generally estranged from her by the harshness of her sway, were ready to band themselves with the rebellious soldiery; and a most bloody and savagely conducted war ensued, in which the state was saved, when upon the brink of destruction, by the energy and talents of its general Hamilcar. It was then that the Romans, taking advantage of the weakness to which their rivals were reduced, most ungenerously and faithlessly wrested from them the island of Sardinia, and obliged them to pay an additional tribute for having even meditated resistance.

As soon as the Carthaginians had settled their affairs at home, they sent Hamilcar to command in Spain; and the greater part of that country was brought under their rule by him and by Asdrubal and Hannibal, who followed him, the first being his son-in-law, the second his son. At nine years of age the latter, on accompanying his father into Spain, had been led by him to an altar, and made to swear inextinguishable hatred to Rome. He was a very young man when Asdrubal died; but he had already given so many proofs of spirit and ability, that he was chosen to succeed him. After completely establishing the authority of Carthage over the Spanish tribes that were unconnected with the Romans, he proceeded to attack the city of Saguntum, their ally. His act was maintained by the government of his country, and the Romans declared war. Hannibal took Saguntum, and then prepared to strike at the enemy's heart by invading

Italy. He made his way through Gaul to the Alps, partly by force and partly by negotiation; he succeeded in effecting the difficult and dangerous passage of those mountains; and descending from them, he was joined by the Gauls of northern Italy, the perpetual foes of Rome. He pursued the war with the greatest boldness, ability, and success; won several great battles without experiencing any important reverse; and reduced the hostile commonwealth to an apparently desperate condition, in which nothing but the most unyielding resolution could have preserved it from subjugation.

It was the news of Hannibal's successes in Italy that made Philip desirous of peace with the Ætolians; for he believed himself already sure of the leading influence in Greece, and he thought that now, when Rome was brought low, he might extend his power over Italy and Illyria. Aratus, too, was not unwilling to make peace at a time when it was evident that the Achæians had the better in the war; and Philip was encouraged to commence a private negotiation, before the ambassadors of the cities could be assembled to treat regularly on behalf of the confederacy. The agent employed was Cleonæus of Naupactus, a public guest of the Achæians, who had been taken by their fleet in a descent on the Ætolian coast; but who, in consideration of the bond of hospitality, had been excepted at the sale of the prisoners, and was in the end set free unransomed. Meanwhile, that he might not seem too anxious for peace, he prepared for an inroad into Eleia. But Cleonæus, after going and returning twice or thrice, brought an earnest request on the part of the Ætolians that the king would enter into treaty; and he then suspended his operations, and summoned forthwith a congress of his allies.

When the deputies were met together, Philip sent Aratus and Taurion with some others to the general assembly of the Ætolians at Naupactus. They were accompanied on their return by Ætolian ambassadors, who proposed that he should come with his forces into their country, to the end that all might more speedily be settled by means of frequent personal conference. On this he set sail, and landed at a port in the territory of Naupactus, where he pitched his camp. The Ætolian multitude came unarmed, and assembled at

the distance of two furlongs; and the treaty was soon commenced on the footing that each party should retain what it then possessed. It was much promoted by the arguments of Agelaus the Naupactian, who forcibly urged the necessity of union, to enable the Greeks to defend their independence against Rome or Carthage, whichever should be victorious. Peace was soon concluded, and the delegates returned to their several homes. (B. C. 217.)

During the period of quiet which followed, the Peloponnesians employed themselves in repairing the damage which their property had suffered during the war, in carefully cultivating their fields, and in restoring the old religious and festive meetings, which continual warfare had drawn into disuse and almost into oblivion. The Ætolians too rejoiced at first in the peace, and showed their satisfaction by choosing for their general Agelaus, who was thought to have contributed most to its conclusion. But their native turbulence and rapacity could not long remain inactive, and they soon began to blame him, because by making peace with all the Greeks, and not with some only, he had cut them off from present plunder and from the hope of future conquests. The general, however, was not to be diverted from maintaining the treaty, and they were obliged against their nature to continue at rest.

As soon as the peace was concluded, Philip returned to Macedonia, where Skerdilædas had taken several cities. All these he soon recovered, and established besides them some other garrisons on the Illyrian frontier. He then dismissed his army for the winter, which he spent in preparing means for his passage into Italy; an enterprise which now engrossed his waking thoughts and nightly dreams, so completely had his fancy been fired by the promptings of Demetrius of Pharos, an Illyrian chief expelled by the Romans. He needed a fleet, but deemed it impossible to provide one sufficient to cope with that of Rome; and, therefore, resolving to make it such as should be fittest for speedy transportation of soldiers, and ready escape from superior strength, he caused a hundred light vessels to be built on the Illyrian construction. In the spring he rounded Peloponnesus, and came to Cephalonia and Leucas. Being informed that the Roman fleet was at Lilybæum, the farthest western headland of Sicily, he

sailed on confidently towards Apollonia, on the Illyrian coast. But when he was just arriving, a report was brought to him that a Roman squadron had been seen at Rhegium, and that it was bound for Apollonia to assist Skerdilakdas. He immediately put out to sea in alarm and disorder, and returned with the utmost haste to Cephalonia. It was afterwards found that the squadron seen at Rhegium was only a detachment of ten ships from the fleet at Lilybæum, which Philip, had he remained at Apollonia, might probably have taken; and that by his inconsiderate flight he had lost the first opportunity of effecting all his purposes in Illyria, while the efforts of the Romans were engrossed by their defence against Hannibal. About two years after this failure, he concluded an alliance, offensive and defensive, with the Carthaginian general, and with his commonwealth. In the following year he subdued most part of Illyria, the conquest of which he regarded as necessary to the attainment of his other designs; but the Romans, as we shall hereafter see, prevented him from joining Hannibal in Italy, by stirring up enemies to him in Greece.

Hitherto, Philip had shown himself, in most instances, an excellent prince, at least according to the notions of his time. He was indeed ambitious, and ready to barter the blood of his people for his personal aggrandizement; but this great wickedness was common to him with the most admired of ancient warriors, and carried with it neither guilt nor shame in the eyes of his contemporaries. He had displayed a capacity beyond his years for the management of men, and the direction of military operations; had maintained the character of a faithful ally, a just and liberal ruler, and a common benefactor to all connected with him; and these substantial merits being set off to the multitude by remarkable comeliness of person, and majesty of demeanour, he was loved and honoured throughout Greece, both by subjects and allies. Of this a striking instance was afforded by the Cretans, who, having at length, after many bloody struggles, effected an union among themselves, chose Philip voluntarily for the head of their confederacy. But the time was now come when he discarded the counsels of Aratus, and gave himself up to those of Demetrius, the Pharian. The first blow that was aimed at the independence of his confederates caused distrust between him and his better ad-

viser, and drew him closer to the worse. One step in iniquity led to another, till the infamy was irretrievable; and Philip sunk from a popular prince to a hated tyrant.

Dissension had arisen in the commonwealth of Messene between the oligarchical and democratical parties; and Philip, hoping by this means to bring the city into dependence on himself, approached it under pretence of effecting a reconciliation, but secretly tampered with the leaders of both to exasperate their quarrels. The result was a bloody struggle, in which the commonalty were victorious, and nearly two hundred of the nobles and their adherents were massacred. In the measures which led to this catastrophe the king was guided by the counsels of Demetrius; and it is the opinion of Polybius that had Aratus arrived in Messene before the slaughter, as he did on the following day, his influence over Philip was still sufficient to have hindered an act which blasted his character, and changed the complexion of all his after life.

The habit of being guided by Aratus still struggled with the vicious propensities which were flattered by the suggestions of Demetrius, and shame restrained him from approving in the presence of the former those proposals which he knew would fall under his censure. At a solemn sacrifice he was admitted into Ithome, the citadel of the Messenians: and taking the entrails of the victim into his hands, to examine what omens could be drawn from them, he asked those around him whether the auguries directed him to quit the citadel, or to seize it. Demetrius answered, "To quit it, indeed, if your views be those of a soothsayer; but if of an able monarch, to retain it, lest, having slighted one opportunity, you should afterwards wish for another; for thus," he said, "holding both the horns, you may keep the ox under control;" implying Peloponnesus by the ox, and by the horns the two commanding and almost impregnable fortresses, Ithome and Acrocorinthus. Philip liked the counsel, but could not refrain from asking Aratus whether he concurred in it. "I should," he replied, "could you seize the place without breach of faith to the Messenians; but if by garrisoning this with soldiers, you are likely to lose all the other citadels, which were garrisoned for you by Antigonus with the confidence of the allies, look whether it be not better to withdraw the

troops, and leave the fortress in the keeping of confidence." The king was checked for the moment, but did not permanently give up his projects of treacherous ambition; and finding that the Messenians could not be brought to resign their independence, he made war on them and ravaged their country. About the same time, to rid himself of a troublesome monitor, and a man from whom he probably apprehended effectual opposition to his newly adopted courses, he basely procured the death of Aratus, by means of a slow poison. The crime, however, could not be hid, and the murderer was generally detested. The burial place of Aratus was a subject of contention between Sicyon, his native city, and Ægium, where he died. The honour was adjudged to the former, and his remains were carried thither in solemn procession.* He was venerated as a hero by the Achæians, and by the Sicyonians in particular as founder, father, and saviour of their city; and the biographer (Plutarch) observes with much apparent satisfaction, that there was issue of Aratus still existing in his time, after nearly three centuries had elapsed, while the race of his murderer became extinct in the following generation*.

CHAPTER XIII.

Of the Wars between the Romans and Philip; the rise of Roman influence in Greece; and the general transactions of that country, as far as the end of what was called by the Romans the first Macedonian war.

SECT. I.—THE time now came when war was to be rekindled throughout Greece, and a power to appear upon the stage, which was destined to overwhelm its national independence. In the eighth year of the peace (B. C. 210) Marcus Valerius Lævinus, the Roman officer appointed to act against Philip, having sounded the disposition of the Ætolians by private conferences with their leaders, attended a general meeting held to receive proposals of alliance with Rome. The lures held out were the depression of the Macedonians, and the compulsory re-union of Acarnania with the Ætolian confederacy, of which the Ætolians maintained that it had anciently been a member; though whenever, on former occasions, the name of

the Acarnanians has occurred in Grecian history, it has been as a separate and generally a hostile people. The alliance was concluded, and the Ætolians straightway went to war with Macedonia. Lævinus mastered the island of Zacynthus, and took Cœniadæ and Nasus, cities of the Acarnanians: all which he gave up to his new allies, according to previous agreement, by which the conquered cities and territories were to fall to the Ætolians, and the booty to the Romans. He then withdrew to Corcyra, fully trusting that he had provided employment for Philip, which would keep him out of Italy.

These tidings were brought to the Macedonian prince when he was wintering at Pella. He resolved to march into Greece with the beginning of spring, but first to strike a terror into the neighbouring barbarians, which he hoped would secure the quiet of Macedonia during his absence. He seems to have been thus occupied rather longer than he had expected; and in the mean time Scopas, who was general of the Ætolians, prepared to invade Acarnania with all his forces. The Acarnanians were far too weak in numbers for defence against so formidable an enemy: but they were strong in desperate resolution and deep abhorrence of Ætolian dominion. They sent into Epirus their women and children, and the men of more than sixty years of age; but all the males between the ages of fifteen and sixty remained behind, and bound themselves by a solemn oath that they would not return alive from the war, except as conquerors. If the battle were lost, and any escaped from it, they laid a heavy curse on every countryman who should receive the fugitives to his house or board, or even within his city; and they solemnly intreated their friends and allies that they would use the like severity. Finally, they craved of the Epirots that they would bury in one sepulchre all those who fell upon their side in the encounter, and would write above them—"Here are laid the Acarnanians who died fighting for their country against the violence and injustice of the Ætolians." Thus prepared in mind, they pitched their camp on the very border of their country. Pressing messages were sent to Philip, to call for aid without delay; and he interrupted a prosperous campaign in Thrace to hasten to their support. But the Ætolians had heard of the despe-

* This is not strictly true. Perseus, the son of Philip, had made issue, who died in obscurity at Rome.

rate extremities to which their adversaries had bound themselves to proceed; the news had abated their ardour, and slackened their preparations; and they were not ready to commence the intended inroad, before the approach of Philip secured the Acarnanians. They then retreated into the heart of their territory. The Macedonian, when he found that his allies were out of danger, did not pursue his march, but returned to Pella. These things took place before the close of winter. In the early spring Lævinus, with the Ætolians, took Anticyra on the coast of Locris; after which Lævinus was called home to take the consulship, the chief magistracy of Rome, which was filled by two persons annually elected.

Besides the Romans, the Ætolians were assisted by Lacedæmon, ever friendly to the enemies of the Achæians, and by Attalus, king of Pergum in Asia Minor, who was partly moved by jealousy of Philip, and partly by the compliment which the Ætolians had paid him by electing him nominally their chief magistrate. Hostilities were carried on by land and sea with various success, till Philip met the Ætolians and their allies near Lamia in Thessaly, defeated them in two pitched battles, and obliged them to keep themselves within the city. Ambassadors now came from the king of Egypt, from the Athenians, Rhodians, and Chians, to mediate a peace. A day was named for a meeting of the Achæians to consider the matter, and a truce was made for thirty days. Meanwhile Attalus arrived with his fleet at Ægina, and a Roman squadron at Naupactus. This put an end to all desire of peace in the minds of the Ætolians; and their ministers, when brought before the assembly of the Achæians in presence of the ambassadors sent by the mediating states, demanded terms which they well knew must appear to their opponents, in the relative state of the two parties, extravagant and intolerable: so that the treaty was broken off in mutual displeasure.

It was shortly after this, that Philip, when occupied with the Nemean festival at Argos, was informed that the Romans had landed from their ships, and were wasting the fruitful plain between Sicyon and Corinth. He issued from Argos with his cavalry, bidding the infantry to follow, fell unexpectedly upon the plunderers, and chased them to their vessels.

The joy of the festival was heightened by this victory; and Philip, to add to his popularity, laid aside his diadem and his purple, and mingled among the citizens, wearing a habit like the rest. But, at the very time when he was thus affecting democratical equality, he outraged, by the most tyrannical licentiousness, the people whose favour he was courting. Already infamous for covert adulteries, he now went on without shame or fear to gratify his appetites by open violence. His change of garb, he thought, would render his excesses less conspicuous, while the knowledge of his station would deter the injured from resistance or revenge. If any woman pleased his fancy, he sent and commanded her to come to him; if she did not readily comply, he broke into the house with a party of his profligate boon companions; and any determined resistance was sure to be visited on her parents, husband, or children, by some frivolous and ill-grounded accusation. By such conduct as this he quickly lost the small remains of his popularity among the Achæians; but they were obliged for a while to bear with him, for they were hemmed in by enemies on every side, and without the aid of Macedonia it was hopeless to stand up against so powerful a league as that which was formed against them.

Philip led his army and that of the Achæians into the Eleian territory. He received a check near the river Larissus from the Ætolian, Eleian, and Roman forces; but on the following day he made up for his loss by the capture of a fort, to which many of the country people had fled with their cattle. While he was dividing the spoil, he was suddenly recalled by tidings of trouble in Macedonia. In chasing the Roman foragers near Sicyon, his horse had carried him under a tree, which had broken off one of the horns with which his helmet was ornamented. An Ætolian had picked it up, and spread a report of his death. This encouraged the Dardaniâns to invade Macedonia, and some of Philip's officers were corrupted so as to join them. He repelled the invasion, and wintered in Macedonia. The Roman fleet and that of Attalus wintered at Ægina.

At the beginning of spring Philip descended into Thessaly, where he was met by pressing calls for aid from all his allies. The maritime states were in fear of the Romans and of Attalus,

the inland of the Ætoliæ; and the Achaïans in particular had both their frontiers to defend,—the one against the Ætoliæ, the other against Lacedæmon. Macedonia was threatened by the Illyrian Skerdilaidas, and by Pleuratus, a Thracian prince allied with the Ætoliæ, both of whom were ready to attack it, as soon as the king should engage himself in any distant expedition. Besides, to prevent him from moving southward, the Ætoliæ had fortified and strongly garrisoned the pass of Thermopylæ. However, he manfully confronted his difficulties, sent away the ambassadors with a promise that he would do his best for all, and prepared to give active succour wherever it should be needed. He sent reinforcements to every place that was in danger from the hostile fleet, and made a counter movement to every movement of the enemy. Between his head-quarters and the places most liable to attack he established lines of signal-stations, along which notice of any thing important was transmitted by means of torches variously arranged according to agreement. Polybius observes, how inadequate this mode of communication must be to the variety and complexity of the accidents occurring in politics and war, and suggests, as admitting of more universal application, a method of his own very similar in principle to the modern system of telegraphic signals.

At last the hostile forces landed at Oreus in Eubœa, and invested the place. An assault was made, and vigorously resisted; but while the struggle was warmest, the Macedonian governor treacherously opened a gate to the Romans, and the city was taken. The victorious squadron then proceeded to Chalcis. That city was protected by strong fortifications, by a numerous garrison, under leaders of approved fidelity, and by the waters of the Euripus, ever dangerous to shipping from their rapid and uncertain currents, and from the frequency of sudden squalls. The attempt was not pursued; the fleet proceeded to Opus, the chief town of the eastern Locrians; and the place being taken with little resistance, was given up to Attalus, the spoils of Oreus having fallen entirely to the lot of the Romans. Meanwhile Philip had routed the Ætoliæ at Thermopylæ, and was proceeding by forced marches towards Chalcis, when he learnt that it was out of danger, and the enemy was at Opus.

He hastened thither: the Romans were gone, and Attalus, little thinking of his danger, was employed in extorting money from the principal inhabitants. An accident only saved him from captivity, the approaching army being descried by some stragglers from his camp. He fled unarmed and in disorder to his ships, and had scarcely embarked when his enemy came upon the shore. He escaped, however, and rejoined the Romans at Oreus. He thence returned into Asia, hearing that his kingdom was invaded by Prusias, king of Bithynia, an ally of Philip. The Romans also returned to Ægina. Philip gained some further successes, and then went home to make war on the Dardanians, leaving his allies much relieved by his timely aid, and by the departure of Attalus. He also undertook to build a hundred ships of war in the course of the ensuing winter; for he hoped, with the help of a squadron already sent to him by the Carthaginians, to dispute with his enemies the command of the sea.

Little is known of the revolutions which took place in Lacedæmon during the period of which we are treating. Before the war began Machanidas had made himself its ruler. He was destitute of hereditary title to the sceptre, like his predecessor Lyeurgus; but in this they differed, that Lyeurgus, though irregularly elevated, exercised his power under the control of the Ephori, and in some measure according to the ancient laws of Sparta; whereas Machanidas appears to have governed according to his arbitrary pleasure, and to have supported his dominion by a mercenary force. He therefore is always mentioned as the tyrant of Lacedæmon, while the other, in spite of his defective title, is described as king. But whatever may have been the character of his internal government, he seems to have been an active and troublesome enemy to the Achaïans, till his career was stopped by their great commander Philopœmen.

This distinguished person was a native of Megalopolis, and born of one of the noblest families in all Arcadia. In his youth he had courted the Society and instructions of Ecdemus and Demophanes, disciples of the philosopher Arcesilas, and noted enemies to the tyrants who then governed most of the Peloponnesian states. They had delivered Megalopolis from its tyrant Aris-

to demus, and had taken part with Aratus in the liberation of Sicyon: and their political wisdom seems to have been as high in repute as their boldness and address, for they were afterwards sent for by the people of Cyrene in Africa, to preside over their commonwealth, and secure their liberty by proper regulations. Under their directions he had been remarkable for daring and endurance in the chase and in military exercises, for plainness of garb and temperance in diet. He passed with the greatest honour through every station in the army. He led a troop of horse at the battle of Sellasia: and there he won high praises from Antigonus, by venturing, without orders, to make a decisive charge at a critical moment, which contributed much to the defeat of Cleomenes. During the ensuing peace, to improve his military knowledge and talents, he engaged in the intestine wars of Crete as a captain of mercenaries: a hateful occupation, but one which was then, as it has been too commonly, regarded with such very undue respect and favour, that the blame of his adopting it is rather due to the perverted state of popular opinion than to individual depravity. War soon broke out afresh in Peloponnesus, and Philopœmen returning home was afterwards made general of the Achaian cavalry. This body, then undisciplined and disorderly through the corrupt neglect or indiscreet exertions of its officers, and spirit-quelled by frequent defeat and conscious inferiority, he converted into the best cavalry in Greece. He soon rose high in the confidence of his countrymen, as their ablest military leader: and he was enabled to reform the arms and discipline of the infantry, by lengthening their spears, improving their defensive armour, and teaching them to preserve a closer and firmer array. A strict observer of discipline himself, he was no less strict in enforcing it on others. Austere in habits, simple in manners, plain, short, and pithy in speech, and undeviating in his adherence to truth, his character, as well as his abilities, was such as to make him entirely trusted and respected. In less perilous times, his proud and hasty temper might have damped his popularity: but now his country, if once assured of a prop that could support her, was not inclined to quarrel with it because it might be a rugged one.

• In the year after the departure of Attalus (B. C. 207) Philopœmen being general of the Achæians, prepared for a decisive contest with Machanidas. He laid his views before the general assembly, where they were received with entire approbation; and then going round to all the cities, he stirred them up to zeal and activity, and amended whatever was amiss in their military arrangements. In about eight months from the first proposal of the enterprise, he gathered his forces at Mantinea, full of courage, cheerfulness, obedience, and confidence in their commander. Machanidas advanced against him from Tegea, where his army was then lying, and the battle took place between Tegea and Mantinea. The engagement was begun on each side by the mercenaries. Polybius observes that such troops would generally fight more resolutely in the service of a tyrant than in that of a free state: for the tyrant, depending chiefly on their support against domestic enemies as well as foreign, would retain them permanently, and make them sharers in his prosperity; whereas, in serving a commonwealth, they could look to nothing more than their pay during the war and their dismissal at the end of it. In the present case the mercenaries of Machanidas entirely routed those of the Achæians, and pursued them towards Mantinea. Their chief joined with them in chasing the fugitives, instead of leading them against the standing enemy; while Philopœmen, not dismayed by the retreat of his mercenaries, prepared to recover all by the firmness of his Achæian phalanx. He shifted his position so as to outflank the enemy, and awaited the attack. The Lacedæmonians advanced as men already victorious; but their ranks were broken in crossing a ditch, which Philopœmen had placed in front of his lines, and the Achæians then advancing in good order completed their confusion. They were entirely discomfited, and great numbers slain. Philopœmen then directed his attention to intercepting the return of Machanidas and the mercenaries. He set guards on the bridge and at all the passages over the ditch, and commanded that no quarter should be given; "For these," he said, "are they who maintain all the tyrannies in Sparta." He himself proceeded in pursuit of Machanidas, who was riding along the ditch, and seeking opportunity to cross it; the tyrant at length spurred

his horse to the leap, and was slain in the act by Philopœmen. The Achæians now advanced to Tegea, which submitted at their approach; and on the following day they encamped on the Eurotas, and ravaged Laconia unresisted, though before this battle they had long been unable to keep the enemy from their own gates.

Since the departure of Attalus, the Romans, being occupied with Hannibal, had neglected their confederates in Greece. Deserted by two of their most powerful allies, and deprived of the third by the victory of Philopœmen, which had reduced the Lacedæmonians to inaction, the Ætolians, who hitherto had frustrated all overtures of peace, were driven to sue for it on such terms as they could obtain. The treaty was just concluded, when a Roman general arrived on the coast, and vainly endeavoured to unsettle it. Philip offered him battle, which he declined; and a short interval of languid hostility was followed by a general pacification. (B.C. 208.)

SECT. II.—The ambition of Philip now turned towards the east. He secretly stirred up Crete against the Rhodians, of whose naval power he was jealous. The kingdom of Egypt having descended to an infant, he conspired with Antiochus, king of Syria to divide it; though both had professed the warmest friendship towards Ptolemy Philopator, the father of the child. But the first occasion for war was furnished by Prusias, king of Bithynia, who had leagued himself with Philip through common enmity to Attalus, and had tightened the bond by taking his daughter to wife.

Prusias coveted Cios, a Grecian town of Asia, which was rich and conveniently situated for him; and though he had no claim on it, nor just matter of quarrel against it, Philip undertook to win it and give it him. While he lay before it, ambassadors came from Rhodes and other states, intreating him to forbear. He spoke them fairly, promised compliance, and kept them with him till he took the town, then sacked it in their presence, making slaves of all who escaped the sword. The iniquity of this deed raised general indignation, which was embittered in the breasts of the intercessors by the sense of mockery and insult. The Rhodians especially were stung to the quick, for even when the Macedonian envoy was boasting of his master's magnanimity, and saying that, though able to win the town at pleasure,

he had yet forbore in friendship to them, at that moment came a messenger with tidings of the capture and attending cruelties. The Ætolians felt it as a wrong to themselves, for the Cians were their allies, and had received from them a garrison and governor; and this was the third city which Philip had withdrawn from their confederacy since the peace. Even Prusias was not satisfied at receiving, instead of a flourishing city, a desolate spot and a heap of ruins.

The first to act against Philip was Attalus, and the Rhodians readily joined him. A great sea fight took place near Chios, between their fleets and that of Macedonia: both parties claimed the honour of the day, but the advantage rested with the allies. Philip nevertheless took some towns in Caria: but his enemies were too strong for him at sea, and he was obliged to retire to Macedonia.

Attalus had confidently reckoned on help from the Ætolians, who, besides the indignity with which they had been treated by his rival, owed himself some return for benefits rendered during the former war. But they were now enduring distresses, which had quelled their restless spirit. In a long and generally unprosperous struggle their resources had been exhausted, till most of the citizens were deep in debt. This was, from causes which have already been indicated (p. 12,) a prevailing evil in the states of Greece, and a frequent cause of civil contests and revolutions. In the present case the debtors called for a change in the laws to relieve them; and the business was committed to Scopas and Dorimachus, men prone to innovation, and deeply indebted themselves. The nature of the settlement they effected is not known, but Scopas seems to have founded on it some further schemes of ambition, in which being foiled, he went to seek his fortune at the court of Alexandria. He was there placed high in trust and favour, and liberally paid; but his covetous temper still craved for more, and his rapacity being found more troublesome to the administration than his services were valuable, they rid themselves of him by taking his life.

It is long since we have lost sight of Athens, which, though still the favourite seat of philosophy and art, had become insignificant in Grecian politics. The character of human an-

nals is too generally such, that the less a state is mentioned in them, the less matter it has for shame and for repentance. But the inaction of the Athenians did not proceed from love of peace, nor was it coupled with the peaceful virtues. The restless spirit of their ancestors was strong in them, though they had lost all their energy and courage, and though the acuteness of mind which still remained, was chiefly displayed in more ingenious methods of degradation. Their empire was gone, their commerce had decayed, and they had nothing but the narrow territory of Attica, to support a numerous people nursed in habits of idleness and luxury. Some relief was found in large donations of money, corn, and other necessary articles, which were made by many of Alexander's successors to purchase the good word of a people so renowned, and still so much distinguished for intelligence and accomplishment. All favours so conferred were repaid by unbounded adulation; and the leaders of the multitude, instead of exhorting them to seek for manlier methods of support, and to recruit their finances by economy, self-denial, and laborious exertion, only vied with each other in devising new compliments to the potentates who would barter gifts for praises, and thus obtaining means to gratify the crowd at no expense but that of character. The Ptolemies were of all the Macedonian dynasties the most liberal in their donations to Athens; and they were repaid by flatteries the most extravagant. Attalus had followed their example, and met with a like return. But circumstances arose which connected them with him more closely; and though little aid could be expected from their arms, to be able to join his cause with theirs was not without advantage.

It happened that two young men of Acarnania inadvertently entered the temple of Ceres at Eleusis, during the celebration of the Mysteries. This was a great profanation, since the rites were directed to be performed in the strictest secrecy; and though there was reason to believe the trespass unintended, the intruders were nevertheless put to death. Their countrymen at home were much offended, and sought to revenge themselves by war: they procured assistance from Macedonia, and entering Attica, wasted the lands and carried thence a large booty. The Athenians now were full of resentment, and looked to foreign

power for redress, which they wanted power and courage to take for themselves. In the former war they had been numbered among the allies of the Romans; and to Rome, accordingly, they applied for assistance against Philip. A like application had already been made by Attalus and by the Rhodians; and the senate, which now had triumphed over the Carthaginians, and completely broken and ruined their power, was easily persuaded to embark in a war for which it only wanted a pretext. Attalus came to Athens at the invitation of the people, and brought with him ambassadors from Rhodes. The citizens went out to meet him in solemn procession, with their wives and children, and the priests with the ensigns of their function. An assembly was held, in which high honours were voted to Attalus and the Rhodians: and a new ward (*phyle*) was added to those already existing, and was called after the name of the Pergamenian monarch. We have already seen this compliment paid to the first Antigonos and his son. Attalus thanked them, promised further services, and exhorted them to declare against the Macedonian, for which little intreaty was necessary. There were Roman ministers already present, and alliance was quickly concluded among all the parties.

Philip's courage did not fail when Rome was added to a league which he had already found well nigh too strong for him. While Attalus and the Rhodians were engaged in their negotiation with Athens, and in an unsuccessful attempt to rouse the Ætolians to arms, he took the field in Thrace, and recovered from his enemies many towns which had embraced their cause. After this he crossed into Asia and besieged Abydos. The townsmen held out beyond their strength, supported by the hope of aid from Attalus and from Rhodes; but the king only sent them three hundred soldiers, and the Rhodians a single ship. Thus unaccountably neglected by their powerful allies, the besieged were soon reduced to extremity; but not till the wall was breached and mines were carried to the inner rampart did they offer to surrender. They then proposed to capitulate for the safe dismissal of the soldiers of Attalus and the Rhodian galley, with its crew, and leave for each inhabitant to depart with a single garment. Philip required them to surrender at

discretion. This answer filled the city with rage and desperation. A vote was passed that all the matrons should be shut up together in the temple of Diana, and the boys and girls, and infants with their nurses in a public place of exercise; that the gold and silver, and valuable furniture, should be heaped in the market-place or lodged in the ships; that priests and victims should be brought and altars erected; that a number of persons should be chosen, who, as soon as they had witnessed the destruction of their countrymen who fought in the breach, should slay the matrons and children, throw the collected riches into the sea, and set fire both to public and private buildings in as many places as they could; that these should bind themselves to perform their task by a solemn form of execration; and that the rest should swear that they would not quit the battle alive except as victors. The combatants well performed their part, for so obstinately did they fight, that when night was approaching, the assailants were glad to withdraw from the contest. But the principal persons, who had been trusted with the more revolting business of the massacre, when they saw that there were few survivors from the battle, and those weary and sore wounded, resolved to surrender the city, and sent the priests to Philip for that purpose. The gold and silver was accordingly given up to him, when a sudden fury fell upon the people. They exclaimed that those were betrayed who had fallen in the battle; reproached themselves and their leaders with perjury, but especially the priests, who after devoting them to death, had themselves been the agents of surrender; they ran wildly about, and slaughtered the women, the children, and themselves. Philip viewed the whole with astonishment, but without pity. He forbade his soldiers to enter the town, observing coldly that he would grant the Aphydenes three days to die in. It is said that not a man fell alive into his hands, unless through some unavoidable accident.

About the end of autumn, a Roman armament arrived on the coast of Epirus, under Publius Sulpicius Galba, one of the consuls. He quartered his land forces for the winter at Apollonia, and stationed his fleet at Corcyra. Twenty triremes were detached to the assistance of the Athenians, whose lands continually wasted by inroads from Co-

rinth, and whose coast was infested by cruisers from Chalcis. The squadron was further strengthened by the arrival of three Rhodian galleys of a larger size; and three open vessels were added by the Athenians, being all which now remained of their once powerful navy. But the forces assembled in Athens were more than sufficient to keep the plunderers at rest both by land and sea; and fortune offered to the Roman commander an opportunity of more important action.

There came to him some Chalcidian exiles of the party hostile to Macedonia, who reported that the town was negligently guarded; for the inhabitants trusted to the Macedonian garrison, and gave themselves no trouble about it, and the soldiers of the garrison were equally careless, having no enemy near enough, as they thought, to be dangerous. On this he founded a plan of surprisal. He sailed to Sunium, but kept his ships concealed behind the promontory till night fall; then crossed the Euripus, and landed at Chalcis undiscovered a little before the dawn. A few of his soldiers scaled the wall in places where the sentinels were absent or sleeping; they admitted their companions, and the city was taken almost without resistance. It was pillaged and partly burnt: and though the cruelty of the soldiery had not here the palliation of passions heated by a wearisome blockade or a perilous assault, a general slaughter was made of the townsmen, whether they fought or fled. The large and well-stored arsenal and granaries were burnt; the booty was carried to the ships: and the prison, which Philip had selected as a place of safest keeping for his most important captives, was broken open by Rhodians. To keep the town would have been most desirable, since it commanded the Euripus, the readiest passage between Thessaly and southern Greece: but the Roman force was inadequate to the protection both of Chalcis and Athens, and it was therefore necessary to abandon the former.

As soon as Philip heard that Chalcis was taken, he hastened to the spot in the hope of revenge; but he found the town destroyed, and the destroyers gone. He then pressed his march towards Athens to retaliate in kind. Sleep and negligence, which had ruined Chalcis, were equally prevalent there: and the city was only saved from a similar surprisal by a runner, who outstripped the

royal army, and arrived about midnight with tidings of its approach. The walls were hastily manned, and all made ready for defence. Philip arrived before day-break, and, seeing that his first intention had been frustrated, he resolved to try an open assault. The Athenians, together with the auxiliaries furnished by Attalus, gave him battle. He bade his men take example by him, and charged at the head of a few horse. His boldness roused the spirit of his soldiers, and struck terror into his enemies; he broke their ranks, slew several men with his own hand, and chased them into the city. After this they kept their walls, and Philip ravaged the country unopposed. He bore an especial hatred towards the Athenians, and he showed it by defacing whatever was beautiful or sacred, not sparing even the tombs. On the following day, the city was secured by the arrival of the Romans. Philip unsuccessfully attempted Eleusis, and then retired to Corinth. From thence he went to Argos, where the Achaian congress was assembled.

Upon the death of Machanidas, the Lacedæmonians had fallen under the dominion of Nabis, a man surpassing all former tyrants in the monstrous and unheard of wickedness of his rule. From the first he deliberately grounded his power on a regular system of bloodshed and rapine; he slew or banished all in Sparta who were distinguished either for birth or fortune, and distributed their wives and their estates among his mercenaries, to whom he entirely trusted for his support. These were chiefly made up of robbers and murderers, and other criminals of the blackest description, who entered his service as their only refuge from the hatred of mankind. Such instruments were the fittest for the work in which he employed them: for not content, like common tyrants, with banishments and executions, he hunted out his enemies with assassins in the cities whither they fled for refuge. His extortions were boundless, and death with torture was the penalty of refusal. No source of gain was too mean for him or too iniquitous. He partook in the piracies of the Cretans, who were infamous for that practice; and he maintained a sort of alliance with the most noted thieves and assassins in Peloponnesus, on the condition that they should admit him to a share in their gains, while he should give them refuge and protection in Sparta, whenever they needed it.

As soon as he deemed his power secure in Lacedæmon, he sought to enlarge it by war, and he soon found an occasion of quarrelling with the Megalopolitans. A favourite horse of his had been stolen at the instigation of two Bœotian travellers. The culprits were pursued to Megalopolis, and arrested in the city. They protested against this violent proceeding, and demanded to be carried before the magistrates of the state; and no attention being paid to their remonstrances, they called for help, and were rescued by the people. No injury was done to the emissaries of Nabis, nor were they prevented from carrying with them either the horse or the groom who had stolen it: but the rescue of the Bœotians was provocation enough for the unscrupulous tyrant of Lacedæmon, who had long been seeking a pretext for hostility, and now commenced it by driving cattle from the lands of the Megalopolitans. Such was the beginning of war between Nabis and the Achæians, in the fourth year of the general peace. (B. C. 204.)

Messene first experienced the danger of the tyrant's hostility, being surprized by night, and all but the acropolis being taken. But on the following day, Philopœmen came with an army to its relief, and the Lacedæmonian troops were glad to capitulate for permission to withdraw. At this time, according to Plutarch, he was a private individual without authority, save that which arose from his renown and from his talents: and the army which accompanied him to Messene was composed of volunteers, who readily obeyed the call of Philopœmen when their proper general had refused to lead them out. The account of Pausanias on the other hand implies that he was general of the Achæians. In the following year, however, not being chosen to any of the principal commands, he accepted an invitation from the Gortynians, and again passed over to Crete. For this he was generally blamed by his countrymen, and probably with justice; for it is difficult to conceive a motive which could palliate his abandoning his country in the time of peril to draw a venal sword in the service of strangers. So deeply was his conduct resented by the Megalopolitans, that they would have passed a vote of banishment against him, had not the general congress interceded in his favour: but the intended severity rankled in his haughty and violent mind, and in-

duced him afterwards to take an unworthy revenge, by tampering with several dependant townships to make them disown the supremacy of Megalopolis.

During Philopœmen's absence, Nabis was generally successful against the less able commanders who were then opposed to him. He ravaged the country and threatened the cities; and the Achæians were deliberating on measures of resistance, when Philip appeared among them, and offered not only to protect their territory, but to carry the war altogether into that of Lacedæmon. The promise was received with vast applause; but when he proceeded to require that, while his forces were thus employed, the Achæians should garrison his towns of Chalcis, Oreus, and Corinth, the assembly perceived that the purpose of his liberality was to entangle them in his war with Rome. Cycliadas, the general, alleged a law which forbade the treating of other matters than those for which the meeting was called; not thinking it expedient to show that he had fathomed the drift of the proposal. A vote was passed to raise an army against Nabis; the assembly was dismissed, and Cycliadas, who was a friend to the king, and had been reputed a flatterer, stood henceforth clear from the charge of undistinguishing subserviency.

Philip then proceeded to Attica, and after vainly attempting Eleusis, Peiræus, and Athens itself, he proceeded in the same savage and brutal spirit of hostility which he had already shown, to destroy the monuments of art and pious magnificence which had before escaped. Every village had its temple and its separate religious observances; and the beauty of the edifices every where bore witness to the taste and skill of the people, favoured as they were by the plentiful supply of native marble. Philip broke the statues, demolished the temples, and even shattered the blocks of stone; and only quitted the hostile territory when nothing was left which he could destroy. He then retired into Bœotia on his way to his own dominions.

Meantime the Roman consul Sulpicius had gained some successes, little important in themselves, but such as encouraged the barbarous tribes which bordered on Macedonia to flock to him with offers of assistance. He now exerted himself to the utmost in preparation to wage the war more vigorously: he sent to Attalus, and to the Rhodians,

to require their active co-operation; and his efforts were met by corresponding diligence on the part of the Macedonian. But the point to which all eyes were turned with the greatest anxiety was the approaching general meeting of the Ætolians, to whom Sulpicius had sent ambassadors requiring them to unite their arms with those of Rome.

The assembly met, and the first to address it was the Macedonian ambassador. They ought, he said, to maintain the peace, for the same causes still existed which had determined them to make it. "He prayed them to consider how the Romans had made show, as if their war in Greece tended only to the defence of the Ætolians; and yet notwithstanding had been angry that the Ætolians, by making peace with Philip, had no longer need of such their patronage. What might it be that made them so busy in obtruding their protection upon those that needed it not? Surely, it was even the general hatred which these barbarians bore unto the Greeks." (Sir W. Raleigh.) He alleged many instances both in Sicily and Italy, where the specious pretence of Roman protection had prepared the way to a galling servitude; and he added, "That in like sort it would happen to the Ætolians: who, if they drew such masters into Greece, must not look hereafter to hold, as now, free parliaments of their own, wherein to consult about war and peace: the Romans would ease them of this care, and send them such a moderator as went every year from Rome to Syracuse. Wherefore he concluded that it was best for them, whilst yet they might, to continue in their league with Philip: with whom, if at any time, upon light occasion, they happened to fall out, they might as lightly be reconciled: and with whom they had made the peace which still continued; although the very same Romans were against it who sought to break it now."

The Romans felt the force of these objections: and before undertaking to answer them, they endeavoured to weaken their effect, by putting forward the Athenians. They justly complained of the cruel wrongs which they had suffered, and called in the name of all the Gods for vengeance on the destroyer of their sanctuaries. "Then spake the Romans: who excusing, as well as they could, their own oppression of all those, in whose defence they had heretofore taken arms, went roundly to the point in hand.

They said that they had of late made war in the Ætoliens' behalf, and that the Ætoliens had, without their consent, made peace: whereof since the Ætoliens must excuse themselves, by alleging that the Romans being busied with Carthage, wanted leisure to give them aid convenient; so this excuse being now taken away, and the Romans only bent against their common enemy, it concerned the Ætoliens to take part with them in their war and victory, unless they had rather perish with Philip."

"It might easily be perceived," says the eminent person whose words we have been using, "that they which were so vehement in offering their help ere it was desired, were themselves carried unto the war by more urgent motives than a simple desire to help their friends, with whom they had no great acquaintance." He might have added, that to suffer their allies to be driven by their neglect to a separate treaty as their only hope of safety; and then, as soon as it suited their convenience to renew the war, to expect that those allies would be ready to disown the engagements so contracted, betokened but slight regard to their own obligations, and still less to the pledged faith of others. Such may probably have been the thoughts of Damocritus, the Ætolian general, when he shifted them off with a dilatory answer: for haste, he said, was an enemy to good counsel, and they must further deliberate before they could conclude. To his countrymen he said that he had well provided both for safety and for profit: for now they might watch the turn of events, and take part with the stronger side. The only measure actually taken was the passing a decree, whereby the general was empowered at his discretion to summon assemblies for the purpose of deliberating on peace and war, questions ordinarily reserved by law for the great council of the Ætoliens, when regularly called together at certain stated periods.

The consul quitted Apollonia, and advanced towards Macedonia through the country of the Dassaretians. Philip went to meet him, and some skirmishes took place to the advantage of the Romans. Meantime news was brought that Macedonia had been invaded by a vast host of Thracians and Dardaniens: on which the king decamped by night, and hastened to repel this new attack. The Romans advanced without opposition, till they came to a narrow and

thickly wooded mountain passage, which Philip had fortified in the hope that it would stop them. But the strength of the Macedonian infantry lay in its impenetrable hedge of spears: and on a path which wound through rocks and thickets, the close array could not be kept, nor the cumbrous weapons wielded. The Romans fought in looser order, and principally depended on the sword; and this enabled them to force the passage with an ease which surprised them. Sulpicius then ravaged much of the neighbouring country, and fortified a post which lay conveniently for future inroads into Macedonia. Having effected thus much, he returned to Apollonia.

When Philip had arrived in Macedonia he found the Dardaniens retiring, and sent a strong detachment of horse and light infantry to harass their retreat, which was done to their no small annoyance and loss. His own attention was demanded by a more pressing occasion. The successful opening of the campaign on the part of the Romans; the rising of so many among the barbarous border-tribes of Macedonia; the arrival of the Roman fleet on the coast of Euboea, which was now announced to have taken place, and which threatened that kingdom with a maritime blockade, in addition to the dangers which surrounded it by land; all these things concurring had overcome the hesitation of the Ætoliens, and induced them to engage in the war. They had taken many towns belonging to allies or subjects of Philip, and now were ravaging the fruitful plains of Thessaly as confidently and carelessly as if they had no enemy to fear. Their camp was pitched without choice of ground, wherever chance would have it; little watch was kept; and some of the soldiers were wandering about half armed in quest of plunder, others passing day and night alike in alternate drunkenness and sleep, when Philip came upon them. A sally was made in such hurry and alarm, that some of the horsemen went out without their swords, and most without their breastplates. They were easily routed and chased to the camp by the cavalry of Philip; who prepared to assault the entrenchments as soon as his infantry came up. The troops arrived, and advanced to the assault; but the Ætoliens fled through the opposite gate to the camp of the Athamanians, a neighbouring tribe who had accompanied them in the enterprise, but had encamped sepa-

rately, and preserved a greater show of discipline. The day was too far gone for a second assault, and Philip rested for the night near the trenches of the Athamanians, which he proposed to assault on the morrow. But a second terror seized the Ætoliens; they fled from this encampment, as they had from their own, and returned to their homes with shame and loss.

These successes ended all present danger from Ætolian hostility, especially as the fighting men of the nation were soon afterwards much diminished in number, through the return of Scopas from Egypt to levy mercenaries for Ptolemy. He brought large sums of gold, with which he raised a force of 6000 infantry, and horsemen in proportion: and the Ætolian character is strongly displayed by the assertion of Livy, that but for the exertions of the general Damocritus so large a proportion of the youth would have engaged for hire in the service of the stranger, as to leave their homes almost without defence, against the powerful enemy so recently provoked.

Meantime the Roman fleet, having joined with that of Attalus, entirely commanded the Ægean sea. The hope of present succour now emboldened the Athenians to give free vent to their hatred of Philip, which fear had hitherto suppressed. Their method of attacking him was easy at least, if it was neither dignified nor effectual. They voted that his statues, and those of his ancestors, should be overthrown, and their names effaced from all honorary inscriptions: that the holidays and sacrifices should be abolished, and all the observances, in which religious rites had been prostituted for the purpose of flattering them: that the priests, whenever they prayed for the Athenian people, and their allies, should pray for curses on Philip and his posterity, on his kingdom, his forces by land and sea, on the whole race and name of the Macedonians. If any man should propose an additional insult, they declared that they would pass it, whatever it might be; and that the man might be justly slain who spoke against it. They concluded by saying that whatever had formerly been voted against the Peisistratidæ, the same should now hold good against Philip. Shortly afterwards Attalus and the Romans came to Peiræus, and honours were decreed to them no less extravagant than the expressions of hostility to Philip. From

Peiræus they sailed to the island of Andros, which they conquered; they ravaged many parts of Philip's dominions, and took the city of Oreus in Eubœa. They then returned about the autumnal equinox to Peiræus: whence Attalus went home, and the Romans to Coreyra.

In the ensuing year little important was done in the war: but when leisure was given by the coming of winter, Philip seeing that the contest would be long and perilous, applied himself to conciliate his subjects and allies, and guard against the danger of defection. He promised to the Achæians the restoration of some cities which he held from them: and he quieted the discontents of the Macedonians in the usual manner of tyrannical rulers, by sacrificing his instrument. Heracleides, his minister, was thrown into prison, and accused as the author of every unpopular measure: to the joy of the multitude, which gladly believed that the king, when freed from danger, would not renew his course of tyranny, or would not find subordinate agents as readily as before.

The next year was marked with greater exertions on the part of Rome. A large reinforcement was sent to the army in Epirus, under Titus Quinticius Flaminius, one of the new consuls. Ambassadors arriving from Attalus to say that he was ready to give aid, by land and sea, according to his ability, wherever and however the consuls should direct, but that he could not do this unless his kingdom were protected against Antiochus, king of Syria, who had invaded it, the senate gave an answer exemplifying the tone of superiority which that body already assumed towards all foreign princes. They declared that they would send an embassy to Antiochus, requiring him to forbear all hostility towards Attalus, while his ships and soldiers were employed in their service: for it was fit that kings allied with Rome should live at peace among themselves.

As soon as Flaminius arrived in his province, he moved his army towards Macedonia. A difficult defile in his line of march had been fortified by Philip, and was occupied by him with a powerful army. Rather than pursue the circuitous route which had been taken by Sulpicius, he resolved, if possible, to force it: but how to do this was not obvious; and forty days were spent in sight of the enemy before an attempt was made to dislodge him. This continued inaction encouraged the king to make

overtures of treaty, which proved abortive. On the following day his position was attacked, but unsuccessfully. Such was the state of things when a shepherd was brought to the consul, who engaged to lead a detachment of his troops by secret paths to the heights above the Macedonians. A picked body of men was accordingly sent forward in the night, and took the required position undiscovered. A general attack was made in the morning, and at the time when the contest was hottest in front, the detachment fell suddenly on the rear of the Macedonians, and they were entirely routed. Effectual pursuit was prevented, however, by the difficulties of the ground; and Philip easily re-assembled his scattered forces, and retreated with them into Thessaly.

In such parts of that province as were most exposed to immediate occupation by the conquerors, Philip removed the inhabitants, destroyed the towns, and wasted the country. After taking these cruel precautions, he retired into Macedonia. The unhappy Thessalians were at the same time invaded by the Ætolians and Athamanians, both of whom considered that they might plunder in security since the victory of their allies. The Romans lastly entered Thessaly, and took several towns by assault or capitulation; while the king, unable to face them in the field, sat down beyond the valley of Tempe, the principal pass which led to Macedonia; and thence he sent assistance to each place which was threatened with attack. At Atrox, on the Peneus, the consul met with an unexpected repulse. His engines had effected a breach in the wall, by which he thought he had ensured an easy capture of the place. But those within were brave, and they were now in a situation suitable to their weapons and mode of fighting. Their phalanx filled the breach; the standing walls protected the flanks, so that they could not be attacked except in front; and no movements were to be made which could disorder their array. The unarmed finger might as well attempt to thrust itself between the bristles of a hedge-hog, as the Romans to pierce the barrier of spears, or reach with their swords the men who bore them. At length Flaminius unwillingly gave up the attempt, and entered Phocis. He there took several towns, and was besieging Elateia, when his attention was drawn by the hope of a more important advantage.

Cycliadas had been banished by the Achæians, and their present general Aristæus was friendly to Rome. The Roman fleet, under Lucius Quinctius, the consul's brother, with the squadrons of Attalus and of the Rhodians, after taking Eretria and Carystus in Eubœa, had come to Cenchreæ, and was now preparing for the siege of Corinth. Before engaging in it, ambassadors were sent to the great council of the Achæians, empowered by the consul to offer Corinth as the price of their alliance. The minds of that people were variously affected. They suffered daily from the hostility of Lacedæmon, and that of Rome was still more formidable; they were bound by favours, both old and recent, to the royal house of Macedonia; but they held the present king in suspicion for his faithlessness and cruelty, which they rightly deemed would become more intolerable when victory should have rendered conciliation unnecessary. Thus divided in feeling they gave audience to the ambassadors. The Roman spoke first, then those of Attalus and of the Rhodians: the Macedonian envoys then replied, and were answered in their turn by a violent invective from the minister of Athens, after which the meeting was adjourned.

On the following day proclamation was made in the usual form, that any who wished might address the assembly. Dead silence followed, which was broken at last by the general Aristæus. He set forth the dangers of their present situation, the weakness of Macedonia, the strength of the Romans, the ever troublesome hostility of Nabis. He dwelt on Philip's various misdeeds, especially those committed in Peloponnesus; on the injuries of the Messenians, the murder of Aratus, the outrage perpetrated against virgins and matrons in friendly cities. These and other crimes, he contended, had cancelled every debt of alliance and gratitude. He bid them second those who were ready to free them from the tyranny of Philip; and rather earn a merit with the Romans while their services could be useful, than wait to be treated as time-serving neutrals, or perhaps as enemies.

Vehement murmurs followed of applause and disapprobation. Altercation was universal, and extended even to the ten presiding magistrates, five of whom declared that they would put the Roman ambassadors to the vote, while the rest main-

tained that the law forbade to treat of any thing contrary to the league with Macedonia. This day was spent in stormy dispute, and but one remained of three prescribed by law as the period of the meeting. Men's minds were now so heated, that parents scarce withheld their hands from the blood of their children. A Pellenian deputy, whose son was one of those presiding magistrates that refused to put the question, besought him long that he would not ruin his country by his obstinacy. Finding all was vain, he declared that he would slay him, and would hold him not as a son but as an enemy: and by this threat he prevailed on him to change his side, which turned the scale in favour of proposing the decree. It was proposed, and approved by the majority, among the representatives of every state, excepting those of Dyme and Megalopolis. The latter city had been restored by Antigonos after its capture by Cleomenes; the former had in the late war been taken by the Romans, and its inhabitants made slaves; but Philip had redeemed them wherever they were to be found, had set them free, and re-established them in their country. When their deputies saw the turn the current was taking, they quitted the assembly, all around approving their fidelity. Their example was followed by some, but not by all, of the Argian delegates. The question was put; alliance was voted with Attalus and with the Rhodians; with Rome it was deferred till the return of ambassadors, who were sent to procure the consent of the people, without which no treaty could stand good. Meantime ambassadors were sent to L. Quinctius, and the Achaian forces joined the army before Corinth. The besiegers had hoped that strife would arise between the citizens and the Macedonian garrison, but they found them united in mind, and equally zealous in defence,—a proof that in that city, at least, the Macedonian commander had respected the laws, and kept order among his soldiers. They effected a breach in the wall, but were driven back when they attempted to pass it, and were in the end obliged to give up the siege, on the arrival of the royal general Philocles, with a reinforcement to the garrison. Attalus retreated to Peiræus, the Romans to Corcyra. About the same time Elateia was taken by the consul.

Soon after Argos was recovered for Philip. That state was attached to the Macedonian kings, whose race was believed to be originally Argian; and most of the chief citizens were also bound to Philip by personal friendship. It was customary for the generals in opening the proceedings of the assembly, to invoke the names of Jupiter, Apollo, and Hercules; and to these, by one of those extravagant flatteries, now so disgracefully common in Greece, the name of Philip had by law been added. After the alliance with Rome, his name was omitted; at which a murmur first arose among the multitude, then a shout demanding its recital, and, at last, the name was proclaimed in the customary form with vast applause. Encouraged by this proof of the popular disposition, Philocles came by night, and occupied a hill above the city. At daybreak he advanced in order of battle towards the market-place. There was in the city an Achaian garrison of five hundred picked men from all the states. Philocles sent a messenger to Ænesidamus, the commander, to warn him to retire; for even without the Macedonians, he said, he would be overmatched by the townsmen who were on their side. Both the leader and his men were unmoved, till they saw a large body of Argians coming on armed; and then, to save so choice a body of the Achaian youth from certain destruction, Ænesidamus agreed with Philocles for their safe retreat. Himself remained in arms on the spot where he stood, with a few of his own dependents; and when the Macedonian sent to inquire what he wanted, he said that he would die in keeping the city intrusted to him. He was slain accordingly, with all those about him.

The Romans went into winter-quarters in Phocis and Locris, after which Philip requested a conference with their leader. A place was chosen on the shore of the Malian Gulf, whither the consul repaired, attended by the generals of the Achæians and Ætolians, and by some other principal persons among his allies. Philip came by sea, and refused to quit his galley. Flamininus asked what he feared:—"I fear nothing," he answered, "except the gods; but I cannot trust to all around you, and least of all to the Ætolians." The other replied that the danger was common: "But the reward of treachery," said Philip, "is unequal, for the Ætolians may better replace their general

than the Macedonians their king." They then proceeded to the business of the meeting, and Philip sought to know the terms of peace. The consul answered that he must withdraw all his garrisons from Greece, deliver up all prisoners and deserters, restore to the Romans what he had taken in Illyria since the former treaty, and to Ptolemy the cities he had occupied in Egypt. He then gave way to the ambassadors of Attalus, who craved reparation for losses and injuries in the war. The Rhodians called for the restitution of several places to themselves or their allies, the relinquishment of Sestos and Abydos, and of all towns and ports in Asia. The Achæians demanded Argos and Corinth. The Ætolians required the entire abandonment of Greece, and the restitution of all cities taken from themselves: and they strongly censured Philip's proceedings both in the war itself and in the transactions which led to it. The king replied to them, defending some of his worst measures on the plea of necessity, and others by alleging their own example; he exclaimed against their insolence in requiring him to relinquish all connexion with Greece; a demand which sounded harshly from the Romans, but which from them was quite intolerable. To Attalus and the Rhodians he answered that reparation was rather due from them, as aggressors, than from him: but yet he would yield to much of what they required. He closed with bitter complaints of Achæian ingratitude, but said that he would give up Argos, and would consult with the Roman general with respect to Corinth. The Achæians and Ætolians were preparing to reply, when night came on. The conference ended with a curious specimen of Roman pleasantry. In the course of the debate Philip had often assumed a tone of irony and sarcasm, to which he was very prone. At the end of it, he requested to have the proposals of the Romans in writing, that he might consult on them with his friends, since he was now alone: whereupon Flamininus, by way of shewing, says Polybius, that he, too, could be satirical, replied, "You may well say that you are alone, since you have killed all your best advisers."

On the following day Philip came not till evening, and then requested a private conference with the consul. This was declined at first, but afterwards granted with the consent of the allies,

Flamininus reported that the king would restore to the Ætolians Larissa and Pharsalus, but not the Phthian Thebes: to the Achæians both Argos and Corinth; to the Rhodians some, but not the whole, of his conquests in Asia: to Attalus, his captured ships and sailors: to the Romans, the places taken in Illyria, with the prisoners and deserters. But all exclaimed against accepting any partial concession while the Macedonian held one garrison in Greece: the discussion was again adjourned; and on the morrow it was agreed, at Philip's suggestion, that he should send an embassy to Rome, and either persuade the senate to grant his terms, or submit to such as they should dictate.

In consenting to this, the consul did not expect that peace would follow; but he was glad to ascertain the wishes of the senate; and it cost him little to suspend his operations at a season which would necessarily have slackened them. He granted a truce for two months, on the condition that the Macedonian garrisons in Phocis and Locris should straightway be withdrawn. Ambassadors were sent to Rome both from Philip and from his enemies. The latter were first heard by the senate. They brought very heavy charges against the Macedonians, but their most prevailing argument was drawn from the commanding position of the three strong holds, Demetrias in Thessaly, Chalcis, and Corinth, which Philip was wont to call the fetters of Greece. The royal ambassadors being then admitted, were beginning to speak at large, when they were cut short with the question, whether their master would relinquish those three cities, and sent away, upon their answering that they had no specific instructions on that head. The command of Flamininus was continued to him, after the expiration of the year, with the title of proconsul, which signifies an officer with consular authority.

The negotiation having failed, Philip sought to concentrate his forces for a decisive struggle, and for that end to diminish the number of his distant garrisons. Of these, Argos was among the remotest, and the most exposed to attack: and the method he took to escape at once from the charge of keeping and the danger of losing it, is worth the consideration of all who put their trust in princes. The Argians had struggled for ages against Lacedæmon, and losses

and sufferings had only embittered their abhorrence of her dominion, even when it would have been exercised by hands less odious than those of Nabis. Yet when for Philip's sake they had revolted from the Achæians, and he found it no longer convenient to keep them, lest they should return to the allies whom they had abandoned for him, he betrayed them to their worst enemy, the tyrant of Lacedæmon. Nabis refused at first to receive the city, unless invited by decree of the people. Such a decree was proposed, and rejected with expressions of scorn and detestation; all which the tyrant treasured up as pretexts for rapine. He then signified to Philocles, the chief agent in this wickedness, that he was ready to take possession. His troops were introduced by night; all commanding posts were occupied, and the gates were shut. A few of the leading citizens escaped,* whose estates were forthwith given up to pillage. Those who remained were stripped of all their gold and silver, and heavy contributions levied from them besides; and if any were suspected of concealing the amount of his property, he was cruelly tortured. An assembly was then called, and Nabis proposed a general abolition of debts and a distribution of lands; which were to serve as bribes to the poor, to prevent them from opposing the spoliation of the rich.

In resigning Argos, Philip had stipulated that if he were victorious, it should be restored to him. If he trusted to this assurance, he little considered the character of the man with whom he had to deal. The first thought of Nabis was to join the Romans, and thus preclude all demands of restitution. This was scandalous perfidy, but yet not worse than Philip's conduct towards the Argians; and it is a strong instance of the natural proneness of mankind to rely entirely on the assurances of their fellows, that he should have trusted to the promise of a man so infamous, even at the very moment when himself was trampling under foot all bonds of faith to a people who had hazarded their all for his sake. The Roman general gladly listened to the overtures of the tyrant, and offered him friendship on the condition that he should make peace with the Achæians, and should send an auxiliary force to act against Philip. He promised to send the troops; and, instead of a permanent peace, he made a

truce with the Achæians during the Macedonian war; and on these terms the treaty was concluded.

A dispute arose about Argos, which Attalus said that Nabis had gained by treachery, and now held by violence, while the tyrant asserted that the citizens had called him in for their defence. The king required that an assembly should be summoned, to ascertain whether this were true; the tyrant did not refuse; but, to the further demand, that the Lacedæmonian soldiers should be withdrawn, so that the assembly might be unmixed with foreigners, and free to declare, without fear, the real wishes of the citizens, he denied his consent, and there the matter rested. On his return to Lacedæmon, he sent his wife, Apega, to Argos, to plunder the women, as he had plundered the men. This she did with cruelty surpassing even that of her husband. She sent for them sometimes singly, sometimes in families, and inflicted on them every kind of indignity and torture; and thus she extorted from them all their golden ornaments, and even the most costly of their garments.

These transactions took place in the winter of the year B.C. 198. In the following year, the Roman chief undertook to secure the adherence of the Bœotians, whose affections were much divided. This he effected by a trick, in which, though no express covenant may have been palpably broken, he certainly acted in a spirit very opposite to good faith. He pitched his camp five miles from Thebes: ambassadors came from every side: he set out for the city with them and with Attalus, attended only by a handful of soldiers; but two thousand more had orders to follow at the distance of a mile. The general of the Bœotians met him half way; but few armed men being seen about him, and those who followed being hid by the inequalities of the ground, no foul play was apprehended; and as he neared the gates, the citizens crowded out to do him honour. Under pretence of receiving and returning their welcomes, he loitered to let his followers come up, still carefully keeping all the townsmen before him, so that his own company might screen from their view the armed body in the rear. The fraud was not discovered till he came to his lodging. It was then apparent that there could be no freedom of debate for the assembly of the Bœotians, which was appointed for the morrow; but complaint was sup-

pressed by the conviction that it was vain and might be dangerous.

The first who spoke in the assembly was Attalus. He began with his own merits towards Greece and towards the Bœotians; but he was too old and too infirm for the exertion of speaking, and a stroke of palsy cut him short. When he had been carried out, Aristæus addressed to the Bœotians the same arguments by which he had already prevailed with the Achæians. Then followed Quinctius himself, who praised not so much the power of his countrymen as their good faith. His words were probably unquestioned; for the recent fact, which proved them false, had made it perilous to contradict them. The Roman alliance was voted with the unanimity of fear; and the proconsul quitted the scene of his ill-gotten success, to turn his whole attention towards the war with Philip.

That monarch also was not slack in preparation: but warfare unceasing for many generations had wasted the flower of the Macedonian youth, and the army which was to fight for the national independence was filled up with boys and old men. Wars so constant and extensive as to lead to this result can seldom be without great blame to the people or its rulers; and the weakness thence arising may perhaps be considered at once as a natural consequence of ambitious turbulence, and as a wise provision to limit and punish it. The late war had ended with a safe and honourable peace. If Philip then, instead of pursuing unjust aggrandisement in Asia, had quietly employed himself in recruiting the exhausted resources of his country, he might not have escaped attack from Roman ambition; but his cause would have been clearer, his enemies fewer, his friends more numerous; the brave men who fell in, unprofitable battles against Attalus and the Rhodians would have been standing armed to repel the invader; and the boys who feebly filled their places, and perished immaturely in unequal contest, would have grown up under their protection to the strength of manhood. Even thus the Macedonians would perhaps have been overcome by the superior military system of their adversaries; but they would at least have maintained a long, hard, doubtful struggle, with the approving witness of conscience, and the wishes of all good men. By doing otherwise, Philip converted

allies into neutrals; and neutrals into enemies; gave his foes a pretext for attacking him; made the friends of Grecian freedom doubt which party to support, and through the same acts by which he forfeited all aid from without, he broke the strength of his own kingdom, and lavished its best blood before the time of need.

The crisis soon came. The Roman forces entered Thessaly, where those of Macedonia were already stationed to defend the province. After various movements, which it is needless to detail, the two armies came together near Phæræ. In number, they were nearly equal: but the Romans, with their allies, were superior in horse, and they had elephants, which Philip had not. Several skirmishes took place between the cavalry and light troops, whom each sent out to discover the position and movements of the enemy. At length, the armies confronted each other, divided only by some hills called Cynoscephalæ (Dog's heads). So thick a fog then prevailed, that neither knew of the other's approach till the outposts were engaged. The skirmish grew hotter, reinforcements arriving to either party when it seemed to be the weaker; and the contest ended in a general engagement, to the great disadvantage of Philip, who, not expecting it, had sent out many of his troops on foraging parties.

In the beginning of the battle, the Macedonians seemed to be superior. Their light troops had driven those of the Romans from the top of the intervening hill, and the heavy-armed of the right wing quickly following, had formed undisturbedly on the ridge, and were now descending in perfect order, and with a weight and force too great to be withstood by the looser array and shorter weapons of their adversaries. Whatever opposed them was overborne, and either destroyed or forced to retreat; till the proconsul, seeing that here defeat seemed unavoidable, recovered the fortune of the day by a vigorous attack on the left of the Macedonians. Unexpectedly tempted to make a general attack, Philip had been unable to bring his forces simultaneously into action; the greater part were still on the way to join their victorious companions, and the Romans found them in order of march, and not of battle. To make their confusion more complete, there was no commanding officer on the spot, and the ground was such as rendered it difficult to form in

phalanx. To be attacked at such a moment was certain discomfiture, and they broke and fled at the approach of the elephants, without awaiting the onset of the infantry which followed them. The Romans generally were hot in pursuit: but one officer saw that the time was come for more important service, and quitting the beaten enemy, he hastened down the hill with a few hundred soldiers to fall on the rear of the conquering right wing. Unable suddenly to change their front, and unfitly armed for a mingled scuffle, the Macedonians had no defence against this unlooked-for attack. They were helplessly slaughtered till they fled, and then they were pursued not only by those in the rear, but by the men whom they had just been driving before them. The rout was complete and ruinous, eight thousand Macedonians being slain and five thousand taken, while the Romans only lost about seven hundred men.

The king retired from the field to Tempe. He stopped there for one day to collect the stragglers of his army, and sent a messenger to Larissa to destroy his memoranda which were lying there, lest falling into the hands of the Romans they should injure himself or endanger his friends. He then proceeded on his way into Macedonia. Flaminius arrived in Larissa, where he was met by a Macedonian herald, sent avowedly to ask a truce for the burial of the dead, but commissioned also to obtain permission that ambassadors should be sent to treat of peace. The proposal was favourably received; a truce for fifteen days was granted, and ambassadors came from Philip, one of whom was the Achaian exile, Cyliadas.

The conduct of the Roman general in this matter was not without reason displeasing to the Ætolians. Before the victory every thing had been done in concert with the allies; but in the answer given to Philip's messenger, and in most things that had happened since the battle, the proconsul had acted on his own opinion, advising only with those about his person, and had studiously slighted the Ætolians in particular. The causes assigned by the historians are these:—he was offended with them for plundering the Macedonian camp while the Romans were engaged in the pursuit, and thus depriving the latter of their due share in the booty; he was determined that he would not, after expelling Philip, leave them lords of Greece

in his place; and he resented their boasts of superior valour, and the large part which they claimed in the credit of the victory. These pleas were pretexts rather than motives, and even as pretexts they were insufficient. If the Ætolians had defrauded his soldiers, he might complain, might threaten, might enforce redress; but he had not a right to acquiesce in the particular injury, and then repay himself by assuming unlimited authority in the general conduct of the war, to the injury not only of the offenders but of the other allies. The vaunts of the Ætolians were a matter too insignificant for serious complaint. They may have overstepped the bounds both of truth and modesty; but their services had really been eminent, especially those of the cavalry; and there is reason to think that the real ground of offence was not the falsehood of their pretensions, but their daring, whether justly or unjustly, to place their military merit in comparison with that of the Romans. These things are trifling; but the whole proceeding may be explained from the second pretext, when compared with the uniform course of Roman policy. The Ætolians were not to be lords of Greece; they had been courted as long as Macedonia was formidable, but now that they had helped to win the battle, themselves would probably be the next attacked. The other allies, who dreaded and hated them, would gladly contribute to their downfall, and in so doing, would accustom themselves to follow the lead of the Romans. These professing to defend the liberty of Greece, and to protect the weak against the strong, would successively bring low all the greater states, and habituate the rest to unlimited obedience. When the nation was irrecoverably divided and weakened, they would begin to exercise a more arbitrary power; and would either break its spirit gradually to the yoke, or would goad it to insurrection, and then punish its imputed ill faith and ingratitude by reducing it to a subject province.

It is not here meant that all these views existed fully developed in the mind of Flaminius; but his conduct steadily tended towards them, and the prospect opened as he proceeded; while the same system of policy was so uniformly pursued by his successors, and by Roman generals elsewhere, as to prove that its principles were common to all, and only wanted occasion and circumstance to embody them. A day was appointed

for the conference with Philip, and the deputies of the confederate states being assembled at Tempe, the proconsul called on each for his opinion upon the terms to be granted. The Ætolians declared that they could be satisfied with nothing short of Philip's expulsion from Macedonia. This demand, unreasonable in itself, was very unwelcome to the Romans, who foresaw that he should want that kingdom as a balance to the Ætolians. Besides, the custom of his commonwealth was not to push its successes to the utmost; but rather, by granting peace on easy terms, at once to make sure what had been won, and to attract the praise of generosity, secure that either by the progressive extension of protection and control, or by war renewed at greater disadvantage, the weaker state must ultimately fall under the dominion of the stronger. He resisted the wishes of the Ætolians, as well on the ground of becoming liberality, as on that of the utility of Macedonia as a barrier against the Thracians and Gauls. His conduct here was right, and his reasons sound; but he betrayed the lurking spirit of ambition and encroachment by the haughty and angry manner in which he interrupted the Ætolian Phœneas, who still asserted that Greece could only be secured by the overthrow of Philip; as if it were an offence against Rome for any of her allies to persist in an opinion which her officer had condemned.

The king arrived on the following day, and came on the third into the meeting. He said that he consented to all which the Romans and their allies had previously required, and would willingly refer all other questions to the decision of the senate. The Ætolians demanded several cities of Thessaly which they had lost; and he answered that they might freely take them. But here Flamininus interfered: the Phthian Thebes, he said, should be theirs, since it had refused to yield, when summoned by the Romans; but not the other towns, which had surrendered. The Ætolians were highly indignant, the other allies proportionably gratified. The treaty, however, proceeded: a truce was made for four months, during which the conditions of a lasting peace were to be settled by the senate; and it was agreed that Philip should pay forthwith two hundred talents into the hands of the proconsul, and should give as hostages his son De-

metrius, and others of his friends, on condition that both the money and the hostages should be restored if the negotiation were not successful.

While the main issue of the war was determined in Thessaly, transactions not without importance took place elsewhere. The Achæians, after suffering grievously from the powerful garrison of Corinth, judiciously profited by their over-confidence to give them a decisive defeat. A deeper interest belongs to the dangers which now threatened the Acarnanians, a nation too weak to be often mentioned in history, but whose name, when it occurs, is worth a welcome; for it seldom fails to relieve the gloomy cast of the general narrative with some instance of courageous honesty, justice, or moderation. Before the battle of Cynoscephalæ, when they alone, of all the Greeks, clung firmly to Macedonia, the Roman admiral L. Quincius undertook to gain them, and persuaded many of their leaders to concur with him. A national congress was held at Leucas, and a decree of alliance with Rome was proposed. Many cities had no representatives at the meeting, and those who came were much divided in opinion; but the chiefs and magistrates who favoured the change prevailed on a majority to approve it. This decree, when known, excited general indignation, as a breach of faith towards Macedonia. It was quickly reversed; Archelaus and Bianor, the proposers, were condemned as traitors; and the general Zeuxidas was deprived of his office, for putting such a question to the vote. The men condemned were advised to fly to the Romans at Coreyra; but, strong in conscious purity of motive, they resolved to trust their fate to their fellow-citizens. They entered the assembled congress. A wondering murmur first arose, which was hushed by respect for their former character, and pity for their fortune. They were patiently heard, while, after beginning in a supplicating strain, they went on to defend their proceeding, and finally ventured to complain that they had been harshly judged, and cruelly sentenced. The experiment was bold, and without a parallel in Greece; but the issue showed that they had rightly estimated their countrymen. Every vote against them was repealed; but the nation adhered, notwithstanding, to its old engagements, a sufficient proof that they were acquitted through the

candour of those who disagreed with them, and not through the renewed superiority of their partisans.

These tidings being brought to L. Quinctius, he immediately prepared for the siege of Leucas. The place was open to attack by land and sea, and the walls were quickly sapped or shaken in many places. But the want of natural advantages for defence was supplied by the courage and industry of the besieged, who were daily and nightly employed in repairing the tottering ramparts, filling up the breaches, and making good with their weapons every passage which was opened for assault. The defence was maintained, till the citadel was betrayed to the Romans by some Italian exiles living in the town. The Leucadians formed in battle order in the marketplace, and long withstood the soldiers who poured down upon them from the hill; but in the meantime the walls were scaled in many places, and the Roman general entering the city with the main body of his army, they were quickly surranded, and either slain or obliged to surrender. Soon after this the news arrived of the decisive battle in Thessaly, and all the states of Acarnania now submitted to the conquerors. About the same time the Rhodians defeated a Macedonian army, and recovered *Perræa*, a tract on the opposite coast of Asia, which had formerly been theirs, and the occupation of which by Philip had been a principal subject of their quarrel with him.

The weak condition of Macedonia now encouraged the Dardaniens to invade and ravage it: but Philip, though every where unfortunate, was not so broken in spirit as patiently to endure this last insult. He hastily collected an army, and falling on them unawares, when scattered for plunder, cut to pieces a large portion of them almost without resistance. The rest fled to their own country, and the king led back his soldiers, cheered by this unwonted gleam of success.

Flaminius had listened the more willingly to proposals of peace, because he feared that a new ally might come to Philip. In the preceding summer, Antiochus, king of Syria, had won the province of *Cœlesyria* from Ptolemy, and now he had gathered forces by land and sea, at once to wrest from the same potentate the cities he possessed in Cilicia and *Caria*, and to aid the

Macedonian monarch in his contest with the Romans. The Rhodians hearing of his levy, sent an embassy to warn him that they would forcibly oppose his fleet, if it passed the headland of *Nepheleis*, in Cilicia, not, they said, from any hostile feeling towards him, but to prevent him from impeding the liberation of Greece. The king replied that he would send ambassadors to renew his ancient friendship with the Rhodians, and that they need not fear lest his coming should injure themselves or their allies, for his good disposition towards Rome had been proved by a recent embassy to the senate, which had been most favourably received. His envoys were at Rhodes when the tidings of the battle at *Cynoscephalæ* arrived there. The Rhodians did not proceed against him, but they took measures to secure the cities allied with Egypt, and many states, among which were *Samos* and *Halicarnassus*, were indebted to them for safety and freedom.

Before the return of the Macedonian and other ambassadors from Rome, the *Bœotians* asked and obtained from the proconsul the restoration of such of their citizens as had been taken fighting for Philip. As soon as they turned, *Brachyllas*, the chief of them, was elected *Bœotarch*; and the friends of Philip were generally honoured and advanced to leading situations, as before the commonwealth had been forced into alliance with Rome. For this perhaps the *Bœotians* may be excused, though it were to be wished that their independence could have been otherwise asserted, than by means of a favour obtained for the purpose of crossing the intentions of the grantor. Their next act was one of unqualified meanness; for in order to take from the Roman general the credit of the obligation, they sent an embassy of thanks to Philip, as if it had been conferred through his intercession.

These proceedings gave alarm to the partisans of Rome; for they saw that their opponents were superior even now, and would carry all before them as soon as the controlling army was withdrawn. To avoid the humiliating and dangerous condition of a depressed faction in a Grecian state, they were ready to take the most violent measures. They sent a deputation to Flaminius, which bitterly inveighed against the ingratitude of the multitude, and finished by saying

that there could be no security for the friend of Rome after the departure of the army, unless Brachyllas were removed out of the way, and the people intimidated by his fate. The proconsul replied that he would not be concerned in such a matter; but having quieted his conscience by the pitiful subterfuge of refusing direct participation, he bid them consult with Alexamenes, the Ætolian general. The latter made no scruple of selecting fit ruffians for the purpose, being six in number, three of his countrymen and three Italians. As Brachyllas was returning drunk from a feast, they fell on him and slew him, and escaped in the tumult.

At break of day an assembly was called to inquire into this dark transaction. The first who were openly accused of the murder were some men of abandoned character, who had been with Brachyllas at the moment; but far stronger suspicions were secretly attached to Zeuxippus and Peisistratus, the heads of the Roman party, and the real authors of the deed. Zeuxippus endeavoured to outface his accusers, by arguing against the supposition that such a violence had been committed by persons so effeminate as the accused; and he succeeded in persuading many of his innocence, for they found it hard to believe that, if conscious of guilt, he would have put himself heedlessly forward in the discussion, or laboured to remove the imputation from others. Meantime the companions of Brachyllas had been racked, and had named Zeuxippus and Peisistratus as the contrivers of the murder. They were privy to nothing, and had only spoken at random, in compliance with what they knew to be the popular opinion; but nevertheless the heart of Zeuxippus failed him, and he fled. Peisistratus remained at Thebes, not fearing discovery, except from an accomplice; but as Zeuxippus had a confidential servant, who had managed the whole transaction, he sent a letter advising that he should be removed. The success of this precaution was such as it deserved. The letter fell into the hands of the servant, who straightway fled to Thebes; and on his evidence Peisistratus was convicted and executed.

This deed most justly exasperated the Bœotians against the Romans; but wanting strength for open war, they pursued their revenge by more dishonourable means. If any soldiers quitted

the camp, they were cut off by lurking assassins, or decoyed into deserted halting places, and there murdered. Five hundred men were thus destroyed; and when the proconsul demanded reparation of the states, they denied that these outrages were authorized, but gave no further satisfaction. He then commenced hostilities against them, and quickly made them sue for peace. At first, he refused to receive their ambassadors; but the Achæians and Athenians interceded for them, and at their instance peace was granted, on condition that the Bœotians should deliver up the guilty persons, and should pay a fine of thirty talents.

Ten Roman commissioners now arrived to settle the affairs of Greece, and brought with them the decree of the senate, granting peace to Philip. It provided that all the Greeks not subject to Philip both in Asia and in Europe should be independent; that Philip should deliver to the Romans the Greek cities subject to him, or in which he had garrisons, excepting several in Thrace and Asia which were named, and were to be left forthwith to themselves; that Flamininus should write to Prusias for the liberation of the Cians; that Philip should restore all Roman prisoners and deserters, surrender all his decked vessels of war, excepting five of such as were commonly used, and one huge galley with sixteen banks of oars, which was only kept for parade, and pay a thousand talents, half forthwith, and the rest within ten years.

This decree was generally well received; the Ætolians alone expressed dissatisfaction. They said that there were two articles about the cities held by Philip; that those named were to be independent, which were mostly towns of Asia, but the rest would remain in the hands of the Romans. Now these were the strong cities of European Greece, Oreus, Eretria, Chalcis, Demetrias, Corinth. It was evident then that the Romans were succeeding Philip in his hold upon the fetters of Greece, and that the nation had but changed its masters. These complaints were not ill founded; for the senate had intentionally left to the discretion of the commissioners the disposal of Chalcis, Demetrias, and Corinth; and when Flamininus advised them to make those cities independent, and thus rebut the charges of the Ætolians, they only complied with respect to Corinth, which they re-

stored to the Achaian league. Even this, to which they were bound by treaty with the Achaians, they executed imperfectly, retaining a garrison in the Acrocorinthus. When these things are considered, the reader will perhaps be of opinion that the mistrust of the Ætolians, however condemned by the Roman writers, was not less reasonable than the boundless confidence and gratitude of the other allies.

The Isthmian festival soon came, (B.C. 196) at which it was expected that the intentions of the Romans would be made known; and the scene which ensued is one which cannot be viewed without gratification, even by those who have learnt how large a proportion of history is occupied by fair professions unfulfilled, and hopes unworthily disappointed. The spectators were assembled, and busy in conjecture as to the conduct likely to be followed by the new arbiters of Greece, when the trumpet sounded, and proclamation was made to this effect:—"The Roman senate and T. Quinctius the præconsul, having overcome King Philip and the Macedonians, leave free, ungarrisoned, unburdened with tribute, the Corinthians, Phocias, Thessalians, and others," specifying all the Greeks who had been subject to Philip. The voice of the crier was drowned in acclamations, so that many failed to hear the full purport of the proclamation; and others thought that what they heard must be spoken in a dream, so far did it exceed their expectations. The crier was called back, and the same words being repeated were followed by loud and reiterated shouts of applause: after which the various shows and trials of skill proceeded unregarded, the minds of the spectators being too full to heed them. When all these were finished, a general rush was made towards the Roman commander; and it is said that, had he not been a man in the full prime and vigour of youth, his life might have been endangered by the multitude of those who thronged to see him, to address him as a saviour, to take him by the hand, or to throw garlands upon him. "It was glorious that a state should exist in the world, which had will to contend for Grecian freedom, and power and fortune to achieve it." Such a praise may have been partly due to the present conduct of the Romans, perhaps to most of the administration of Flamininus. But woe to the people

whose liberty depends on the continued forbearance of an over mighty protector!

CHAPTER XIV.

Of the war of Antiochus and the Ætolians against the Romans and their Allies: and of the affairs of Greece until the Roman conquest of Macedonia.

SECT. I.—ANTIOCHUS, in the course of an expedition mainly directed to bring under his dominion all the coasts of Asia Minor, had come to the Hellespont, and received the submission of many towns on the European, as well as on the Asiatic side. Arriving at the ruins of Lysimacheia in the Chersonese, which had been destroyed a few years since by the Thracians, he suspended the pursuit of fame and aggrandisement by the beaten path of blood and ravage, to seek it by works of benevolent reparation. He began to rebuild the city walls, to redeem such of the inhabitants as were in slavery, and diligently to search for all who were scattered about the countries round the Hellespont.

While he was thus engaged, an embassy came from the Romans, who had temporised while there was danger from Philip, but who now assumed a haughtier tone. Their ambassadors required him to give up all that had been taken from Ptolemy, and to abstain from attacking any of the independent cities, or of those which had been subject to Philip. For the Romans, they said, having conquered the Macedonian, it would be hard that Antiochus should forestall their winnings; nor could they guess with what object, save hostility towards Rome, he had entered Europe with so great a force.

The king replied that he knew not what concern the Romans had in Asia, and craved that they would not meddle there, more than he did in Italy. He had crossed into Europe to recover the territories which his ancestor Seleucus had conquered from Lysimachus. To the other points he answered in a manner no less calculated to exclude all controul of his proceedings. The conference ended in mutual dissatisfaction. A false report arriving of Ptolemy's death, Antiochus hastened towards Egypt, and on learning the truth went to winter in his Syrian capital of Antioch.

When the ten commissioners returned,

from Greece to Rome, they assured the senate that a dangerous war was impending on the part of Antiochus, but advised that, while it was delayed, they should take an advantage of the interval to settle the state of Greece more firmly, and increase their claims of gratitude from the nation by putting down the tyranny of Nabis. The proposal was warmly canvassed, but at last it was referred to the discretion of the proconsul. He had made himself generally esteemed and beloved, except among the Ætolians, not less for moderation and liberality after victory than for able conduct in the war. He gladly embraced so fair an opportunity of extending and confirming his popularity; and summoning a meeting of the allies at Corinth, he spoke to this effect. "In the war against Philip, the Romans and the Greeks had each their peculiar motives of action; but that on which I now consult you only affects yourselves. I ask you whether you are willing that Argos should remain under the dominion of Nabis, or whether you think it but reasonable, that one of the noblest and most ancient Grecian cities should be restored to that freedom which the rest are enjoying. This question in no wise touches the welfare of the Romans. Your interests only are at stake, and I will be wholly guided by your opinion."

The Athenians praised the high deserts of the Romans towards Greece, and complained of some who detracted from the past by speaking mistrustfully of the future. This called up the Ætolian Alexander. The Athenians, he said, once the champions of liberty, were now the servile flatterers of power. The Achæians had supported Philip, and had only changed with his fortune; yet they had Corinth, and looked for Argos, while the Ætolians, the original allies of Rome, were cheated of Pharsalus and Echinus. He would not trust the Romans, while they held Demetrias and Chalcis; for they had ever maintained to Philip that Greece could not be free while those places were garrisoned. This matter of Nabis was but a pretence for keeping their army in Greece. Let that be withdrawn; and the Ætolians would bring him to reason.

This vaunt aroused Aristæus, the general of the Achæians. He prayed heaven that Argos might never be so miserable, as to be the prize of a contest between a Lacedæmonian tyrant and

Ætolian robbers; and begged Flamininus not only to recover that city from the one, but also to provide for the security of Greece against the rapacity of the others. The general voice of the assembly was against the Ætolians; and Flamininus, therefore, deemed it needless to answer them. He put the question of war with Nabis, unless Argos were restored to the Achæians; and the decree was passed without opposition.

The Roman army having quitted its quarters at Elateia, and entered Peloponnesus, was soon joined by the Achæians; and the united forces pitched their camp within four miles of Argos. Pythagoras, the tyrant's son-in-law, who commanded in the place, was diligent in preparation, but he could not altogether conceal his fears as to the issue. There was danger within, as well as without, for a plot had been laid for the expulsion of the garrison; but it was betrayed to the governor before it was ripe for execution. The conspirators flew to arms, when they knew that they were discovered, but they found no support, and soon perished in unequal combat. Many persons were arrested and put to death; and many on the following night let themselves down by ropes from the wall, and joined the Romans.

At the persuasion of the refugees, who expected that his approach would be the signal of immediate insurrection, the Roman general led his army to the gates. Nothing stirred within, and he called a council to determine whether to besiege the place. The Grecian leaders generally recommended the siege; Aristæus only opposed it, and the proconsul agreed with him. He was warning, he said, against the tyrant for the benefit of the Argians: he would therefore attack, not Argos, but Lacedæmon. He proceeded towards Laconia, but waited on the border for provision, and for the forces of some of his allies. Among others who came were fifteen hundred Macedonians from Philip. The camp was full of Lacedæmonian exiles, driven out at different times by the several tyrants. Among these was Agesipolis, the grandson of Cleombrotus, who had been declared king after the death of Cleomenes, but whom, being then an infant, Lycurgus had expelled. Great forces were assembled by sea, as well as by land; for L. Quinctius coming from Leucas with forty ships was joined

by the Rhodians with eighteen; and ten decked gallees, with a crowd of smaller craft, were brought by Eumenes, the son and successor of Attalus, who had died about the close of the late war.

Meanwhile Nabis was increasing his army and strengthening the defences of the city; and to guard against internal revolt, well knowing that he had not the good will of the citizens, he endeavoured to work upon their fears. He called a meeting of the people, and surrounded it with armed mercenaries. Excusing his present harsh proceeding by the danger of the time, and promising, when that was over, to dismiss the arrested persons, he summoned by name about eighty the most distinguished of the youth, and those whom he most feared. Each as he answered was arrested; and that night they were all slain. Some Helots being charged with attempting desertion were whipped through the streets and put to death. These examples were effectual in quieting the multitude by terror. But he kept his forces within the city, for he neither deemed himself a match for the Romans in the field, nor dared to leave the people uncontrolled by his presence.

The confederate army entered Laconia, and passed under the walls of Sparta. Two warm attacks were made upon it from the town on two successive days; but both were repulsed, and with these exceptions the march was unmolested. After ravaging part of the country, the Roman general sat down before Gythium, the naval arsenal of Lacedæmon. He was there met by the fleet, which had already brought most of the maritime towns to submission. The siege of Gythium was vigorously commenced, and the works were pushed with great rapidity, by the aid of a multitude of hands from the shipping. The place was strong and well defended, but it was in the end obliged to submit.

Nabis now requested a conference with Flamininus. When they met he complained that he was attacked in violation of existing treaty, and craved to know what provocation he had given. The Roman alleged his oppressions and cruelties, and various acts of aggression towards the neighbouring states, together with his own obligations as an ally of the Achæians, and as the professed deliverer of Greece. But he would not clear himself from the charge of inconsistency, for the principal acts of which he complained, and particularly the oc-

cupation of Argos, were prior to the treaty of alliance which he had concluded with Nabis against Philip. The tyrant finally consented to give up Argos; and requested that, if any thing further were required, he might have it in writing, to consult on it with his friends. They parted therefore, and Flamininus deliberated with his allies on the terms which were to be given. The greater part advised that war should be continued till the tyrant were deposed. The proconsul wished for peace. Their hopes, he said, could only be realized by besieging Lacedæmon; and it would be rash to embark in so difficult an undertaking at a time when hostility was much apprehended from Antiochus. Besides this reason, which he publicly urged, he had a secret motive of his own, which often influenced the conduct of Roman leaders; the fear that he might be superseded by one of the consuls, and thus deprived of the glory of finishing the war. His arguments did not at first produce conviction, but he reached his object by a different road. Professing to come round to the opinion of his allies, he began to state the exertions and sacrifices which would be necessary to the attainment of their wishes: and these appeared so great to all, considering the general poverty and inward disorders of the states, that they bade him do what he deemed best for Rome and for her confederates.

Having gained their consent he prescribed the terms of peace, taking counsel as to the particulars with his officers only. He required that Nabis should give up Argos and its dependencies, with all slaves belonging to the state or to individuals: that he should restore all the ships he had taken from the maritime states, and should keep but two galleys of not more than sixteen oars each. To all the states allied with Rome he was to restore their prisoners and deserters; to the Messenians all such articles of property as the owners could identify; to the Lacedæmonian exiles their effects, their children, and their wives, or such of them at least as wished to follow them into banishment. He was forbidden to make war, to build new fortresses, and to contract alliances; and specially precluded from all connection with Crete, the great market for mercenary soldiers. All the cities which had already submitted to the Romans were to remain independent and unmolested. For the performance of these

conditions, he was to give five hostages, to be chosen by the Roman general, and among them his own son: and he was to pay a hundred talents of silver forthwith, and fifty annually for eight years.

The only thing in these conditions satisfactory to Nabis was, that nothing was said about restoring the exiles. On the other hand he was very unwilling to surrender his fleet, and to resign the dominion of the maritime towns. With the first he had increased his revenues by piracy; from the second he had drawn the best recruits for his army. He was inclined upon the whole to reject the demands, and to this he was encouraged by most of his adherents, great part of whom, besides the general hardness of the terms, were personally touched by some particular conditions. Those who had taken the wives or the property of exiles were displeased with the call for restitution; and the emancipated slaves of Argian masters were with reason averse from returning to them. The mercenaries in general, whose harvest time was in war, were of course unwilling to hear of peace; and the more as any, who were dismissed from the service of Nabis, might have found it unsafe to return to their homes, since the hatred of the tyrant, which prevailed throughout Greece, extended to his instruments. When Nabis saw the temper of his followers, he summoned an assembly, and laying before them the proposals of the Romans, with suitable comments on their exorbitance, he finally asked what answer he should make. Make none, was the cry, but continue the war; and the war was accordingly continued. Some skirmishes took place, in the last of which the Lacedæmonians were roughly handled and driven to their walls. They did not venture any further sallies, and nothing remained but to besiege the city.

Sparta, unwall'd, according to the command of Lycurgus, during the period of its strength, had, in after times, been fortified at the most accessible points. Flamininus prepared to assault it on all sides, having increased his force to fifty thousand men by the aid of the sailors from the fleet. He thus hoped to confound and bewilder the besieged, and prevent them from concentrating their forces on the principal points of attack. This plan was not without effect. The tyrant himself was so distracted and dismayed, as to be unable to direct the defence: but

his place was filled by Pythagoras, his son-in-law. At length a passage was forced against all opposition, and the town would unavoidably have been taken, had not Pythagoras ordered that the houses adjoining should be fired. This effectually stopped the Romans, and obliged them to retreat. Flamininus renewed the attack in various manners on the three following days, though his hope of success was chiefly grounded on the fear which he had inspired in the defenders. At length Pythagoras was sent to sue for peace. At first he was commanded to depart from the camp; but by supplications he obtained a hearing, and peace was made on the same conditions which had before been offered and refused.

The Argians had already been emboldened by the danger of Lacedæmon, by the absence of Pythagoras with the best of his forces, and by the weakness of those who remained, to rise in arms and expel the garrison. They spared the life of the commanding officer, because he had ruled them mildly. During the general rejoicing Flamininus arrived, with the news that peace was made; and the people then proceeded to celebrate the Nemean festival, which had been delayed beyond the usual time. Great joy was caused by the return of the citizens who had been driven into banishment by Nabis and Pythagoras. The Roman general, as the author of their liberty, was requested to preside at the solemnity. The only circumstance which damped the exultation of the Argians and Achæians, was that Lacedæmon still remained under the power of the tyrant; and of this the Ætolians availed themselves as a handle for complaint against the Romans.

After the festival was over, the Roman army was led back to Elateia, to be quartered there for the winter: and the general spent that season, according to Livy, in doing justice within the states, and reversing the arbitrary acts committed by Philip and his officers to strengthen the hands of their friends and deprive their enemies of their rights. These transactions would doubtless have assumed an opposite complexion in the mouth of a writer friendly to Macedonia, who would have represented Philip as protecting the laws, and Flamininus as overruling them. The simple fact is, probably, that each established and maintained his own party in power; which the Roman may

perhaps have done with less violence, since his habitual conduct seems to have been milder, and his superiority was less disputed.

In the beginning of spring, before quitting the province, the proconsul summoned a meeting at Corinth. Here related the acts of his predecessors and his own, all of which were heard with great applause, till he came to the mention of Nabis; whose escape from destruction was evidently a general cause of dissatisfaction. He excused himself by arguing that the tyrant could not have been overthrown, except with the ruin of Lacedæmon. He then declared his intention of sailing for Italy, and carrying with him all his army. In ten days the garrisons should be withdrawn from Demetrias and Chalcis, and the Acrocorinthus should immediately be delivered to the Achæians; so that all might see the good faith of the Romans and the falsehood of the Ætolians. He impressed on his hearers the necessity of concord, moderation, and firmness: by these virtues they must keep the liberty which had been given to them, and prove the benefits of Rome not ill bestowed. His words were interrupted by the tears and applauses of the assembly; but when the tumult was hushed he went on to request that they would search out and redeem the Roman citizens who were in slavery among them. These were prisoners sold by Hannibal, and their number was very great. The hearers promised compliance, and thanked him for reminding him of so sacred a duty. Before the assembly broke up, the garrison was seen descending from the Acrocorinthus; and the general departed with them, amidst the acclamations of all present. He fulfilled his pledge with respect to Chalcis and Demetrias, and then proceeded to settle the affairs of Thessaly, which was much torn with continual seditions, by distributing the powers of government in every state according to a scale of property. He finally returned to Rome, and was honoured with a triumphal procession, the highest honour the commonwealth could bestow on a successful commander.

Flaminius appears to have been really solicitous for the welfare of the Greeks, and even for their liberty, as long as it did not clash with the pride or interest of Rome. In its immediate effect, his administration was beneficial; for he left the country unusually

tranquil, and many cities free which had lately been oppressed. Yet more arbitrary conduct might in the end have been better for the Greeks, if it had weaned them from asking Rome to interfere in their quarrels, and united them, ere it was too late, in the determination to resist that interference if obtruded on them forcibly. To affect moderation and disinterestedness till a footing should be gained was a not unfrequent art of Roman ambition; and such a policy was never so likely to succeed, as when the person chosen to carry it into effect was partly sincere in his professions. Flaminius, though not a man of nice or elevated morality, was an ardent lover of popularity, and one who coveted the fame of beneficence, as well as of talent and power. His character suited the purpose of his commonwealth, as long as opinion was to be courted; and sterner agents enough were to be found, when the times were ripe for violence.

SECT. II.—The discontent of the Ætolians did not slumber. Their ambassadors were busy wherever there was hope of stirring up enemies to the Romans, and their views extended to a coalition with Nabis, Philip, and Antiochus. They urged upon the first the weakness to which he had been reduced by losing the maritime cities; and suggested that he might never again have so fair an opportunity for their recovery, since no Roman army was now in Greece, and it was not likely that fresh legions should be sent on their account. To Philip they spoke of his present humiliation, contrasting it with the triumphs of his predecessors, and asking whether he, who had so long alone withstood the Romans and Ætolians combined, might not now defy the Romans, when he had both the Ætolians and Antiochus on his side. To Antiochus they magnified their own forces and the advantages of their situation, and assured him of support both from Philip and from Nabis. These promises appear to have been unauthorised, though the latter was verified in the event.

Nabis immediately began to stir up dissension in all the maritime towns of Laconia; he won some of the leaders to his interest by bribes, and procured the murder of others. The Achæians sent ambassadors to remind him of the treaty, and others to Rome, with the news of its violation; and as Gythium

was already besieged, they sent troops to assist in its defence. The Roman senate, on receiving their complaint, equipped a fleet for their assistance, under Aulus Atilius, one of the prætors, officers next in rank to the consuls. Flaminius and three others were appointed commissioners to take care of the Roman interest in Greece; and as the negotiations with Antiochus were continually assuming a more unfriendly complexion, preparations were made in case it should be necessary to engage in war on a larger scale.

Meantime Nabis pressed the siege of Gythium, and wasted the lands of the Achæians, in revenge for the succours which they had thrown into the place. Still they did not venture to engage unreservedly in the war, until the return of their ambassadors from Rome; a fact which illustrates the nature of that independence which the Romans professed to have given to the states of Greece. The ambassadors returned, and the Roman commissioners with them; and then the Achæians assembled their great council at Sicyon, and sent to Flaminius for advice. The voice of the assembly was for immediate war; but some delay and doubt was caused by the letters of Flaminius, who recommended waiting for the Roman prætor and his fleet. The multitude called for the opinion of Philopœmen, who was then chief magistrate. He replied that it was a wise enactment of the Ætolians, that the general should not give an opinion on any question of peace or war. It belonged to them to make their choice; and whatever they decreed he would endeavour to execute in such a manner that they should have no occasion to repent of it. The impression of the assembly was, that his judgment was for war, and it carried the greater weight from his unwillingness to express it in a case where he might have been biassed by personal feelings. War was voted, and the time and manner of waging it left to the discretion of the general. He thought it would have been better to wait for the Romans, if the time had admitted it; but fearing that Gythium might be lost in the interval, he resolved to make an effort for its rescue.

Nabis, at the end of the late war, had surrendered his fleet to the Romans, according to treaty; but he had since collected three-decked gallees, and many smaller vessels, and these he was daily

employing for his expeditions. His success in excluding all relief by sea. Philopœmen went against him with the ships of the Achæians; but this great commander, born and bred in the inland province of Arcadia, was a mere novice in naval warfare. He had taken for his own an old and rotten vessel, which went to pieces at the first shock. Philopœmen escaped in a skiff, but his crew were made prisoners, and on seeing the fate of the leading ship, the others took to flight. This failure on an element where he knew himself unskilful, did not discourage the Achæian general, but only made him more eager to prove his superiority on the land. The tyrant had detached a portion of his forces to occupy a post commanding the way by which, if the siege were to be raised, the relieving army would probably advance. The soldiers had, for the most part, constructed their huts with reeds and branches. Philopœmen, having secretly collected a number of small vessels on the Argian coast, embarked with a body of troops, chiefly light armed, and came in the night to the encampment. Before his arrival was known to Nabis, he had fired the huts on every side, and the flames and the sword did their work so effectually, that but few escaped to the camp before Gythium.

Having thus effaced whatever discouragement had been occasioned among his soldiers by his maritime disaster, Philopœmen advanced with his army to Tegea, where he had appointed a meeting of the Achæians, and their allies. He stated to them his purpose of advancing against Sparta, as the only method of removing the besiegers from Gythium. But the place was taken on the very day on which he entered Laconia, and Nabis immediately quitted it to take a position for the protection of Sparta. On the following day, as Philopœmen was advancing, in ignorance that Gythium was lost, he unexpectedly came upon the Lacedæmonian army, strongly posted in the way by which he intended to proceed. The surprise was not without danger; for his forces were extended through a distance of five miles, on account of the narrowness of the way; while the ground was such that light troops only could act with effect, and most of the light troops, as well as the cavalry, were in the rear. But Philopœmen had been accustomed in travelling, whenever he came to any

difficult defile, to speculate on the manner in which, if passing through it with an army, he would repel every attack which could be made, expected or unexpected, in front, or flank, or rear. He had exercised himself with such problems, till hardly any possible combination of circumstances could take him altogether unprepared. He now quickly threw his host into such an arrangement, as gave it all the security which the case would allow. But darkness came on in time to prevent any considerable collision between the armies, and they passed the night within five hundred paces of each other, but separated by a river.

On the morrow an engagement took place between the horse and light troops on each side, and those of Nabis were drawn into an ambush, and defeated. Philopœmen knew that his antagonist was fearful, and resolved to practise on his terrors while the impression of his discomfiture was fresh. He sent a soldier into his camp under the pretence of deserting, who persuaded him that the Achæians were about to cut him off from the city. On the following day the tyrant hastily retreated. The way was narrow, steep, and rugged; and the enemy attacked him vigorously in the rear: his troops were entirely routed, and the pursuit did not cease till three-fourths of them were slain or taken. Nabis escaped into the city; and Philopœmen ravaged Laconia for thirty days, and then led home his forces.

While these things passed in Peloponnesus, the Roman commissioners were visiting the cities of their allies, lest the Ætolians should have prevailed on any to favour Antiochus. They went first to Athens, then to Chalcis, then into Thessaly: and having addressed the great council of the Thessalians, they proceeded to Demetrias, the capital of the Magnes. They had here a more difficult game to play, for some of the Magnesite leaders were decidedly alienated from the Romans on account of a prevailing suspicion that they meant to restore Demetrias to Philip. The commissioners wished to quiet the apprehensions of the Magnesites, without destroying the hopes of Philip; and accordingly they framed their language so as to convey the idea that Demetrias was to continue independent, but carefully avoided giving any positive pledge of their intention. Upon this Eurylochus, the chief magistrate of the Magnesites, plainly stated the current report, de-

clared that all extremities were to be endured before Demetrias should be surrendered to the Macedonian, and went so far as to say that even now it was but nominally free, since all was done in it according to the pleasure of the Romans. This last sally provoked Flamininus to anger, to which he may perhaps have yielded the more readily for the sake of avoiding to answer the suspicion alleged. He spread his hands towards heaven, and called the gods to witness Magnesian perfidy and ingratitude. All present were alarmed at this expression of indignation, and Zenon, a man of authority, and a constant friend to the Romans, besought him not to impute to the nation the madness of an individual. The multitude concurred in the request; and Eurylochus privately withdrew, and fled to the Ætolians.

This nation was daily more and more decided in hostility to Rome. Thoas, its leading man, had just returned from a mission to Antiochus, bringing with him Menippus as ambassador from the king; who promised to aid them largely with ships and men, foot, horse, and elephants, and, what moved them most of all, with abundance of gold. The meeting of the Ætolians was at hand, at which Menippus was to have his audience; and Flamininus requested of the Athenians that it might be attended by ambassadors from them. When the day arrived, Menippus, being introduced into the assembly, lamented that his master had not been able to come to Greece till by Philip's defeat it had fallen altogether under the power of the Romans. He trusted, however, that with the aid of the Ætolians Antiochus would be able to restore the ancient dignity of Greece; which consisted in freedom maintained by arms, and not enjoyed during the pleasure of foreigners. The Athenian ambassadors, who followed, made no mention of the king, but simply reminded the assembly of their alliance with Rome, and of the obligations of all Greece to Flamininus; and advised them, before they declared against the Romans, at least to hear their officers, who were not far off. Thus much was obtained by the authority of the principal elders, though even this was against the inclination of the multitude. A vote was passed that the Romans should be admitted, to a hearing, and Flamininus accordingly went into Ætolia. But he could not withstand the influence of Thoas and his party, or

prevent a decree from being carried in his presence, which invited Antiochus to liberate Greece, and settle the differences between the Ætolians and Romans. To this the general Damocritus added an insult of his own; for when Flamininus asked for a copy of the decree, he replied that he had then more pressing business, but he would shortly give it him in Italy, in his camp on the banks of the Tiber.

The Roman commissioners returned to Corinth, and the Ætolian leaders employed themselves in devising some bold stroke for the beginning of the war. The result of their deliberations was, indeed, such as showed a more than usual audacity; for they undertook at once to occupy Demetrias, Chalcis, and Lacedæmon. The first of these projects was committed to Diocles, the commander of the cavalry; and Eurylochus the Magneæ assisted him, in the hope of restoration. The part of Eurylochus, in this affair, was marked with scandalous treachery. He directed his kinsmen and partisans to bring before the assembly his wife and children in mourning habits with the ensigns of suppliants, and to beseech those present each and all that they would not suffer a man, unconquered and guileless, to grow old in exile. The multitude was moved, and the general voice was in favour of his recall. He set out towards Demetrias, attended by Diocles with all his cavalry. When they came within six miles of the city, Diocles chose three troops to go forward with himself, and commanded the rest to follow at a distance. He left one troop at the gates, to secure an entrance for their comrades; with the others he advanced through the streets leading Eurylochus by the hand, while all his friends were thronging to welcome him. Meanwhile the horsemen filled the city, and occupied all commanding posts; and when this was done, persons were sent into the houses to murder the leaders of the adverse party. Thus Demetrias came into the hands of the Ætolians, by a trick not, unlike to that which had made the Romans masters of Thebes.

To gain Lacedæmon it was considered that no force need be put on the wishes of the citizens, who would gladly join in friendship with any that should rid them of their tyrant. Nabis was continually urging the Ætolians to send him aid in a war, in which they had mainly prevailed on him to engage. Alexamenus was

sent with a thousand foot, and thirty chosen horsemen; and these latter were charged by Damocritus in the secret Council of State, as an institution apparently peculiar to the Ætolians, that they should not think that they were sent for war with the Achæans, or for any end which they could possibly guess; but that whatever Alexamenus should do, however rash, however unexpected, they should undoubtedly concur in it, as if they knew it to be the special purpose of their mission. Alexamenus came with his soldiers to Nabis, and filled him with joy by his assurances of further support. At his suggestion the Lacedæmonian army was more frequently reviewed. At such times the tyrant's guards were posted in the middle of the line, and he himself was wont to ride about the field and visit the different divisions, attended only by two or three horsemen, one of whom was commonly Alexamenus. That chief, on the day which he had chosen for the execution of his plot, after riding awhile with the tyrant, returned to the right, where the Ætolians were posted. "Now," he said to his thirty horsemen, "the deed is to be done, which you are commanded to execute under my direction. Prepare your hearts and hands, and do as I do. Who hesitates, can never return home." The tyrant approached. "Be ready with your spears," said Alexamenus, and "look on me." He paused to collect himself, then dashing forward killed the horse of Nabis, and threw the rider to the ground, where his followers dispatched him.

Alexamenus hastened to occupy the palace, with all the Ætolians, both those who had come with him, and others who had previously been engaged in the service of Nabis. If they had grounded their arms and called an assembly of the Lacedæmonians, and their leader had spoken to the people as suited the occasion, the happiness of the deliverance might have covered the foulness of the treason, so that no one would have stirred to avenge it. Instead of this, Alexamenus remained shut up in the palace, searching the treasury of the tyrant, while his followers fell to plunder, as if they had taken the city. This was too much, and the Lacedæmonians flew to arms. They set a boy of the royal race on horseback at their head, and going through the streets slaughtered all the Ætolians whom they met with. They then forced the gates of the palace, and killed Alexamenus, and the few

about him, who resisted to the last. The rest of the Ætolians assembled, for the most part, about the Brazen House. They were here attacked on every side, and most of them were slain: but a few escaped to Tegea and Megalopolis, where they were sold for slaves.

Philopœmen, when he heard that the tyrant was dead, immediately hastened to Lacedæmon, and calling together the principal men, addressed them in such language as Alexamenus ought to have used. He persuaded them to join in alliance with the Achæians, the more easily because at that very time Atilius came with his fleet to Gythium. Thus shame and loss were all the portion of those who plotted the treachery, while the benefits of it were reaped by their enemies.

About this time Thoas attempted Chalcis, having prepared a party among the citizens to favour the enterprise, by means of Euthymidas, an exiled Chalcidian leader, and Herodorus, a Cîan merchant, who had gained by his riches great influence in the place. The plot was suspected by Micion and Xenocleides, the chiefs of the Roman party. At first they were so much dismayed as to think of nothing but flight; but afterwards taking courage, they procured assistance from the neighbouring towns of Eretria and Carystus, and then, leaving the walls in the care of the auxiliaries, led out the citizens to meet the Ætolians. When the latter approached, they sent messengers to ask what offence in word or act the Chalcidians had given, that the Ætolians, their friends and allies, should come to attack them. Thoas replied that they came not to attack them, but to free them from the Romans: the Chalcidians denied that they were under any constraint; and Thoas retired without attempting any thing further, since his force had been calculated only for surprisal, and not for a campaign or a siege.

SECT. III.—Antiochus was now on the point of commencing the war, after a long time spent in preparing for it, and deliberating on the manner of conducting it. Among his counsellors was Hannibal, who was an exile at his court. Three years before he had been chief magistrate of Carthage. The state was then oppressed by the order of judges, a standing oligarchy, who held men's lives and fortunes at their mercy. They had hitherto been appointed for life; but Hannibal broke their power by carrying

a law to make their office annual. The public revenues had been wasted through remissness, or pillaged through corruption: he adopted a rigorous system of accounting, which enabled him at once to lighten the taxes, and amply to provide for the service of the commonwealth. But by these reforms he added, to his enemies, all those whose pride had exulted in power beyond the laws, or whose avarice had fattened on the public spoils. It was stated in letters to Rome that he corresponded with Antiochus. The Roman government, which hated and feared him, unworthily profited by the malice of his enemies, and without further inquiry sent ambassadors to Carthage to arraign him. But as soon as they came he suspected their object, and secretly escaping from Carthage he took refuge with Antiochus.

Hannibal advised that he should be sent with a fleet and army first to Africa, in the hope of stirring his countrymen to revolt; and then should go to Italy, and once more attack the Romans in the sources of their strength. Antiochus was nearly persuaded to comply, when his purpose was shaken by the envious suggestions of Thoas the Ætolian. It was dangerous, he said, to trust an exile; and the military fame by which Hannibal was recommended was in fact too great for a royal general. If Hannibal lost a fleet or an army, the damage would fall upon the king; if he gained a victory, the glory would be all his own; but if he conquered the Romans in the main issue of the war, the throne itself would not be safe from his ambition. Antiochus was prevailed on, unhappily for himself, to give up the attempts on Africa and Italy, and to make no use of Hannibal's abilities, except sometimes as an adviser.

Near the end of the year B. C. 194, Antiochus sailed for Greece, and landed at Demetrias. The Ætolians forthwith passed a decree inviting him to come to them, and when he came he was welcomed by the crowd with shouts, and with every mark of joy and favour. When he was brought into the great council, he began by excusing the small force which he had brought with him, which was but of ten thousand foot, six hundred horse, and six elephants. But, he said, it was the strongest proof of his good-will, that he had complied at once with the summons of their ambassadors, without waiting till his preparations were completed. In the following spring, as soon

as the season favoured navigation, he would cover the land with his armies, and the sea with his fleets. In the meantime he requested that plenty of corn might be provided, and all other necessities supplied to his soldiers at a moderate rate.

When the king had quitted the assembly, a dispute arose between Phæneas and Thoas, the two leaders of the nation. The former, who was the existing chief magistrate, was of opinion that Antiochus should rather be employed as a mediator, to settle their differences with the Romans, than as their leader in the war. His name might probably, Phæneas thought, be more serviceable than his arms; and much might be conceded to avoid a war, which could not be gained if the war were begun. Thoas maintained that all peaceful methods had already been tried, both by embassies to Rome, and by conference with Flaminius; that nothing fair or just was to be thus obtained; and that therefore they should not lose the opportunity which now presented itself of enforcing their claims by arms. This opinion prevailed; the Ætolians voted that Antiochus should be their commander, and appointed a committee of thirty, with whom he should consult.

The first measure adopted by Antiochus and the Ætolians was an unsuccessful attempt to draw the people of Chalcis to their interest. They then sent ambassadors to the Achæians and Bœotians. The latter replied that, when the king arrived in Bœotia, they would then consider his proposals. In the Achæian assembly the envoy of Antiochus was first admitted to a hearing. He magnified his master's power and riches, and declared that, though he had come from the furthest east to liberate Greece, he did not call on the Achæians for any thing contrary to the faith which they had pledged to the Romans, but only for their neutrality. His request was supported by the Ætolian ambassador, who, moreover, enlarged in invective against the Romans, disparaging their part in the victory over Philip, and exaggerating that of his own countrymen. Flaminius followed in answer to both; the question was put, and the assembly determined without hesitation to support the Romans, and voted five hundred troops to be sent to Chalcis, and five hundred to Peiræus. The latter vote was occasioned by an attempt which had been made to win the Athenians

for Antiochus. The Roman party had, however, prevailed; they had sent for Flaminius; and had accused the proposer of the revolt, and procured his banishment.

The Achæian troops arrived at Chalcis, with some from Eumenes of Pergamus. Five hundred Romans, who were afterwards sent, found the ways beset, and stopped at Delium. The war had not been formally declared, nor had any actual hostility yet been committed; and the soldiers, not expecting to be attacked, were wandering about the temple and the neighbouring shore, when they were suddenly charged by one of the king's generals, Menippus, and most of them killed or taken. Antiochus then led his army to Aulis, and sent ambassadors again to Chalcis, with better success than before. The people opened the gates to his army, and the friends of Rome went into exile. The Achæians, who were garrisoning a fort on the continent, capitulated for permission to depart; and the leading city of Eubœa being won, the others readily submitted.

Antiochus passed the winter at Chalcis, and employed it in opening negotiations with some states, and receiving overtures from others. The Eleians, being constant allies of the Ætolians, expected attack from the Achæians; and sending ambassadors, they obtained from the king a thousand troops to assist in their defence. The Epirots sent an embassy to ask that he would not rashly draw them into the contest, since they would be, in consequence of their position, the first to feel the hostility of Rome. If he, they said, had force enough to protect them, they would gladly receive him in their cities and ports; if not, they prayed him to excuse their inaction. Antiochus answered that he would send ambassadors to consult with them further, and then he went into Bœotia.

The Bœotians, in spite of all their natural advantages, had become a weak and degraded people. Long since, during the reign of Antigonus Gonatas, or of his son, they had suffered a great overthrow from the Ætolians. In their most flourishing times they had been less distinguished for intellectual activity, than for their easy, careless temper, and the homely plenty of their living. Illiterate opulence is apt to be beset by intemperance and sloth; and these constitutional tendencies had recently been little counteracted by the political organ-

ization of the province, disordered by repeated revolutions. These considerations may partly reconcile our understandings to a change, which loses much of its strangeness when viewed as the consummation to which a course of degeneracy had been gradually tending; but which otherwise it might be difficult to believe, even on the authority of Polybius. So broken, he says, was the spirit of the Bœotians by that one unfortunate battle, that thenceforth they never ventured to contend for any honourable prize, but gave themselves up to feasting and drunkenness, to the ruin alike of their bodies and their minds.

Immediately after their discomfiture they abandoned the Achaian alliance, and joined themselves with the Ætolians. They adhered to their new engagements till war arose with Demetrius, the father of Philip; but when the Macedonian forces entered their country, they submitted with scarcely an attempt at resistance. From this time the government was in the hands of a faction supported by Macedonia, while the opposing party was just strong enough to make it necessary for the Macedonian kings to attend to the interest of their friends. In other respects the state of the commonwealth was as bad as possible. For twenty-five years, Polybius declares, there had been no administration of justice, the sittings of the courts having been continually interrupted by the summons of the magistrates to engage in military expeditions, more or less considerable. That the cause alleged was adequate to the effect, will easily be understood by those who remember that, in the popularly constituted communities of Greece, the judicial body was always a numerous assembly of citizens. Many of the generals were ever making largesses from the public treasury to the multitude; and by this, and by the suspension of legal proceedings, they made active partisans of all who profited by the distributions, and of all who had debts or offences to answer for. The disorders of the commonwealth were increased by a fashion then prevailing among individuals, who, dying childless, left their fortunes, and sometimes the greater part even when they had children, to be employed in the establishment and maintenance of convivial clubs among their associates; inso-much that many of the Bœotians, the historian declares, had more suppers in the month than there were days in it. Disgust at the public customs and pri-

vate manners of the Bœotians induced the Megarians to depart from their confederacy, and reunite themselves to the Achæians, whom they had formerly quitted by their own advice, when Cleomenes, by occupying the Isthmus, prevented free communication with them. The Bœotians marched out in high wrath with all their forces, and finding that the Megarians disregarded their arrival, they undertook to besiege and assault the city; but a panic fear arising among them, and a report that Philipœmen and the Achæians were coming, they fled to their own country, leaving their ladders before the walls.

Notwithstanding the political disorders of the Bœotians, their fortune had hitherto carried them safely through a very critical period. Antiochus now sought to engage them in war with the Romans, and his purpose was favoured by the resentment, which had rankled in their minds since the murder of Brachylas, and the invasion of their country by Flamininus. He was received into their city with every mark of welcome, and he easily persuaded them to join in alliance with him.

Antiochus consulted with the Ætolians about the manner of gaining the Thessalians; and now, after a long intermission, he asked the opinion of Hannibal. The Carthaginian replied that it was needless to concern himself about those who were ready to join the prevailing party, and who brought no real strength to either. He had always thought that the alliance to be courted was that of Philip, whose power was great and for whom, if once he engaged in the contest, there could be no safety in retreat. The Ætolians, he proceeded, had repeatedly declared that Philip's hostility to Rome was only waiting for opportunity to show itself; that opportunity should immediately be given. His own sentiments with respect to the general conduct of the war were already known: he still held the same opinions, and urged the king to engage in it at once with all his forces, and to send an army into Italy.

The advice of Hannibal was approved and neglected. Ambassadors were sent to the great council of the Thessalians at Larissa, and a day was appointed for the Ætolian forces, and those of Amynander, king of the Athamanians, who had also joined the league, to meet the king at Pheræ. While waiting for them, Antiochus sent a party to collect the

bones of the Macedonians slain at Cynoscephalæ. This was probably designed to court the favour of the Macedonian people at the expense of their own king, who had omitted to do it. It failed to gratify them, and gave deep offence to Philip, who immediately sent to Marcus Bæbius, the Roman commander in Greece, to inform him that Antiochus was in Thessaly, and to offer service against him.

The Thessalians adhered to their alliance with Rome, and Antiochus with his allies laid siege to Pheræ, which after a vigorous defence was obliged to surrender. Several towns were gained by force or by capitulation, and the army advanced to Larissa. The inhabitants persevered in resistance; and the king was doubting whether to besiege them, when he was alarmed by the news of an approaching Roman army. It was really but a detachment sent to garrison Larissa: but the commander, by enlarging his encampment and kindling unnecessary fires, had caused his troops to be mistaken for the whole Roman host, together with that of Philip. This needless apprehension determined the allies to raise the siege. Amyntander and the Ætolians returned to their homes, Antiochus to Demetrias, and thence to Chalcis. He there fell in love with a maiden of the city, and prevailed on her father to give her to him in marriage, though much disliking so unequal an alliance. Forgetful of the arduous task he had undertaken, the driving the Romans out of Greece, he gave all his thoughts during the rest of the winter to the festivities of his wedding: and the disordered state of his army at the opening of the next campaign showed that officers and soldiers had too faithfully copied the negligence and self-indulgence of their chief.

The first important transaction of the spring was an attempt on Acarnania, conducted through Mnesilochus, a leading man in the province, and Clytus, the then chief magistrate. Mnesilochus suggested in the national congress that the inland parts of Acarnania, especially the towns of Medeon and Thyrium, were in danger from Antiochus and from the Ætolians, and that it was time for all the people to take arms in their defence. Other persons were prepared to say that a general expedition was needless, for the places might be secured by reinforcing them with five hundred men. Three hundred were accordingly sent

to Medeon, and two hundred to Thyrium: all of whom Mnesilochus intended should come into the power of Antiochus, and serve as hostages for the conduct of their countrymen. About that time ambassadors came to Medeon from the king, and the question arose what answer should be given. Some were anxious not to swerve from their engagements with the Romans, while others maintained that the friendship of Antiochus was not to be slighted: but a middle course was agreed on at the suggestion of Clytus, which was that an embassy should be sent to ask permission for the Medeonians to consult the great council of the nation. Care was taken that among the ambassadors should be Mnesilochus and others of his faction; and they found excuses for delaying their departure, till just after they quitted the city, Antiochus having been secretly summoned came with his army to the gates. While those ignorant of the plot were calling to arms in hurry and confusion, he was quietly introduced into the city by Clytus and Mnesilochus. His friends all thronged to him in good will, his enemies through fear; and he gave to the latter such assurances as were fittest to quiet their apprehensions. Some less important places then submitted, but Thyrium held out against him, and the friends of Rome were encouraged by the arrival of a Roman squadron and a body of troops. It was moreover reported that a Roman consul had crossed the sea and entered Thessaly; and this induced Antiochus to return to Chalcis.

The consul Manius Acilius Glabrio had actually come with fresh legions into Thessaly. He had found there Philip and M. Bæbius, who had already recovered many of the conquests of Antiochus: and when they were joined by the new comers, they found nothing which could resist them. Among the prisoners who came into the power of Philip were many of the Athamanians, all of whom he treated with the utmost kindness, and set free, in the hope of winning the affections of their countrymen. He then led his army into Athamania, Amyntander had fled from the country, in fear of Philip and the Romans: and the people, prepossessed in favour of the Macedonian by the liberated prisoners, readily submitted. Meantime the consul refreshed his army, and reduced to submission whatever was yet hostile in Thessaly.

Antiochus was beginning to repent having trusted to the promises of the Ætolians, and to wish that he had acted through the war on the counsels of Hannibal. He sent to call for a general levy of the Ætolian youth: but the chiefs only came with a few of their dependents, and said, that they had vainly laboured to rouse the multitude to arms. He was moreover disappointed in the amount of his own forces: for in spite of messengers sent into Asia to quicken the preparations of his officers, no further reinforcements yet had reached him than filled up his numbers to the original ten thousand foot and five hundred horse. Too weak to contend in open field with the Romans, he intrenched himself in the pass of Thermopylæ, in the hope of preventing their advance. The Ætolians were sent forward to the defence of Hypata and Heracleia. Being unable to hinder the ravage of the fields, they shut themselves up in the latter place.

The consul encamped at the mouth of the pass. Antiochus, fearing that his flank might be turned, as had been done by the Persians against Leonidas, sent a message to the Ætolians requesting them to occupy the heights. They were divided among themselves whether to comply or refuse, and finally half of them did as they were required, the rest remained at Heracleia. Acilius advanced to force the pass: but he met with a determined resistance from the Syrian Macedonians, the descendants of those who had conquered under Alexander. They were, indeed, borne back by superior numbers to their intrenchments, but they formed behind them, and their pikes and close array presented an impenetrable barrier. Meantime a detachment commanded by Marcus Cato, (who had already been consul and was afterwards censor) had surprised and cut to pieces one division of the Ætolians on the ridge. Their appearance on the flank put the Macedonians to the rout. The king escaped to Chalcis with about five hundred men: the rest were mostly slain or taken.

Acilius advanced through Phocis and Bœotia. At the gates of every city to which he came, he was met by the inhabitants in the guise of suppliants, for they feared to be given up to pillage in consequence of their revolt. He proceeded, however, as in a friendly territory, till he came to Coroneia. Here his anger was kindled at seeing a statue

of Antiochus in the temple of Minerva, and he gave his soldiers permission to plunder the country. Soon afterwards he recalled the order, remembering that the statue had been erected by the common decree of the Bœotians, and that their act ought not to be visited on the Coroneians in particular. He contented himself with rebuking the ingratitude of the Bœotians, and went on to Chalcis, which opened its gates on his arrival, Antiochus having sailed for Asia. After receiving the submission of all Eubœa, he led back his army to Thermopylæ.

A message was sent to the Ætolians in Heracleia, offering pardon to themselves and to their nation for their revolt, if they would immediately submit. They refused, and the consul laid siege to the town. The Ætolians, unprovided with defensive engines, had no means of checking the operations of the besiegers, except by sallies to interrupt and destroy their works, which they executed with great activity and boldness. But they being few were soon worn out with fatigue, while the Romans had always fresh men to send into action. The consul kept up a continued attack for four and twenty days and nights: he then adopted the custom of suspending it for several hours after midnight. The Ætolians gladly availed themselves of the opportunity to rest, and kept but little watch during the interval: and of this the consul availed himself to make a sudden attack, and pass the walls while they were undefended. The Ætolians fled into the citadel, which they were soon obliged to surrender. The Romans were gratified by finding among the prisoners Damocritus, whose arrogant answer to Flamininus has already been mentioned. During the siege of Heracleia, Philip had been, by agreement with Acilius, besieging Iamia, and had nearly reduced it to surrender: but now that Heracleia was taken, the Roman general imperiously required him to relinquish the siege, on the ground that, since his soldiers had fought the battle with the Ætolians, it was just that they should enjoy the fruits of victory.

The capture of Heracleia determined the Ætolian government to sue for peace. Ambassadors were sent to Acilius, who said that he was not then at leisure to attend to them, but he granted a truce for ten days, during which they might confer with Lucius Valerius Flaccus, one of his officers. In the discussions

which ensued the Ætolians were beginning to speak of their former merits towards the Romans: but they were cut short by Flaccus, who told them that such pleas were out of date, since they had cancelled all claims of friendship by their revolt. He advised them to give up all arguments on the score of justice, and simply to beg for mercy. They at length resolved to refer the whole question to the consul, and commit themselves to the faith of the Romans: "not knowing," Polybius observes, "the effect of this, but being misled by the word faith, as if on this account they would meet with milder treatment. Whereas with the Romans to commit one's self to their faith is the same thing as to surrender one's self to the pleasure of the victor."

The vote of surrender having been past by the secret council, Phæneas and some others were sent to announce it to the consul. They pleaded to him the cause of their country, and ended by saying that the Ætolians had resolved to throw themselves on the faith of the Romans. Acilius asked whether this was really so: and being assured of it, he said, that no Ætolian should be allowed to go into Asia, whether privately or in a public capacity, and further demanded that several persons, among whom was king Amynder, should be delivered to the Romans. "But this," said Phæneas, "is neither just, nor according to Grecian manners." "Do you talk," Acilius exclaimed, "of justice and of Grecian manners, who have committed yourselves to my faith? you, whom I, if it seem good to me, will carry away in bonds." He ordered chains to be brought, and an iron collar to be put on the neck of each. The Ætolians stood in mute astonishment: but Flaccus and some other officers begged their general to remember that the men before him were ambassadors. Phæneas then said that his commands should be executed, as far as depended on the secret council: but the consent of the people was also necessary to their fulfilment. The truce was prolonged for ten days more, and Phæneas returned to the secret council. It was there determined that an assembly should be summoned: but when the particulars of the conference became generally known, the indignation of the people rose so high that they would not even meet to deliberate on submission. The truce expired; they gathered their forces at Naupac-

tus; and the Roman general proceeded thither and laid siege to the place.

About this time Messene was besieged by the Æchaïans. This and Elis were the only states in Peloponnesus that were not included in the Æchaïan league; and both of them had in this war taken part with the Ætolians. After the defeat and departure of Antiochus, the Æchaïans had sent ambassadors to both, to invite them into their confederacy. The Eleians replied that they would consider what was to be done, and afterwards they complied; the Messenians returned no answer; upon which the Æchaïans ravaged their lands and encamped before their walls. The Messenians sent to Flamininus, and informed him that they would willingly open their gates to the Romans, but not to the Æchaïans. He straightway required the Æchaïan general Diophanes to withdraw his army from the siege, and come to him. Diophanes obeyed; and the Roman, after gently rebuking him for engaging without his sanction in so important a transaction, bade him dismiss his army. He then required the Messenians to recal their exiles, and unite themselves with the Æchaïans, which they accordingly did. He moreover craved a meeting of the Æchaïans, to hear his complaint that they had occupied Zacynthus (Zante), to the injury of the Romans, to whom it properly belonged. The meeting was called. Diophanes defended the claims of his commonwealth: but the assembly agreed to leave the matter in the hands of Flamininus, and when he maintained the claim of Rome, and supported it by arguments both of right and expediency, they voted with one consent that it should be given up to him.

Meantime Philip, having obtained the consent of Acilius to his recovering the cities which had revolted from the Roman alliance, led his forces to Demetrias. The inhabitants, he knew, were in the greatest alarm, having now no hope of protection from Antiochus or from the Ætolians, and expecting daily to be attacked either by Philip, or by the Romans, whom they dreaded more, having more deeply offended them. The place was full of the soldiers of Antiochus; but a large proportion of these were unarmed fugitives; and when Philip sent to summon them to surrender, the gates were opened to him. The soldiers of Antiochus were sent to Lysimachia, with a guard of Macedonians to protect

them; and some ships of war, which were in the harbour, were suffered to depart. Philip then reduced to submission Dolopia, Aperantia, and some cities of Perrhæbia.

Two months had been spent in the siege of Naupactus; the place was nearly reduced to extremity; and it seemed that, if it were taken by assault, the Ætolian nation would be utterly destroyed. The consul appears to have intended that this catastrophe should follow; but Flamininus determined, if possible, to prevent it. He repaired to the Roman leaguer, and beginning to walk before the walls he was quickly recognised by the hostile sentinels. The report that it was he quickly spread through the town, and the Ætolians crowded to the walls, and stretching out their hands, and calling on him by name, besought him to help and preserve them. He signified with his hand that he could not assist them. He went, however, to the consul, and asked him whether he had considered, that he had spent his time in besieging two cities, till his year of command was verging to its close, while Philip had been adding whole nations to his Kingdom. The consul was moved by the suggestion, but, having begun the siege, he was unwilling to abandon it; he agreed, however, to leave the matter in the hands of Flamininus, who then returned to the lines, and, when the Ætolians renewed their supplications, bade some of them come out to him. Phæteas and some other chiefs approached, and fell at his feet. He reminded them that he had foretold what would happen, and that they had neglected his warnings. He advised them, however, to send to the consul, and request a truce, during which they might send an embassy to Rome, and submit themselves to the pleasure of the senate; and he promised that he would support their petition. They did as he directed; the truce was granted; and the Roman army was withdrawn into Phocis. About the same time the Roman fleet had crossed the sea to the coast of Ionia; and, being joined by that of Eumenes, had won a great victory over the fleet of Antiochus.

The Ætolian ambassadors arrived at Rome, but they found there little mercy. After much debate, the choice was offered them, whether to place themselves altogether at the free disposal of the senate, or to pay at once a thousand talents (upwards of 200,000*l.*) and to

have the same friends and enemies as the Romans. They requested that the questions might be specified, with respect to which the senate required the unlimited power of decision; the specification was refused, and the ambassadors were sent back bootless. The war was recommenced. The Ætolians prevented the Roman general from returning to the siege of Naupactus, by occupying a difficult pass which lay upon the way; but suddenly attacking Lamia, he took it by assault, and then proceeding to Amphissa, laid siege to that place by regular approaches. He was here superseded in command by the new consul, Lucius Scipio, the brother of Publius Scipio Africanus, the conqueror of Carthage in the second Punic war. Africanus accompanied his brother as his lieutenant; by offering which he had determined the senate to assign to him the province of Greece, and the war with Antiochus.

The Scipios wished as soon as possible to finish the Ætolian war, in order that they might be at liberty to pass into Asia against Antiochus. They therefore gladly received an Athenian embassy, which was sent to intercede for peace, and bade them go forward, and try the temper of the Ætolians. They readily caught at any hope of accommodation, and sent ambassadors, who communicated first with Africanus. He received them kindly, reminding them of the various proofs which he had given in Spain and Africa of clemency towards the vanquished, and bidding them place themselves in his hands, and trust in him. This filled them with hope; but their disappointment was extreme, when the consul, upon their asking on what terms peace would be granted, repeated the two alternatives which had already been proposed at Rome. They returned, however, to consult the nation. The thousand talents were more than the Ætolians could raise, and they feared to commit themselves to the discretion of the Romans, for they remembered how they had been treated by Acilius. The ambassadors returned, and requested, either that the sum should be diminished, or that the persons of the citizens should be excepted from the surrender: but the consul replied, that he had no authority to abate the demands of the senate, and they again returned without effecting an agreement. The Athenians now advised them to apply for a six-months' truce, during

which they might negotiate with the senate; for time, at least, would be gained, and something might happen in the interval to better their condition, which nothing could, possibly make worse. The suggestion was adopted; it suited the purpose of the Scipios, and Lucius was persuaded by his brother to comply.

The Roman army then proceeded into Thessaly, the intention of its leaders being to pass into Asia through Macedonia and Thrace. This route was scarcely practicable without the consent of Philip, or even without his active assistance, by providing markets, making roads and bridges, and the like. All these services, however, he readily performed, and after giving the Scipios a royal welcome in Macedonia, he accompanied them to the Hellespont.

In the naval victory obtained in the preceding summer by the Romans over Antiochus, no Rhodian squadron had been present: and they now sent out thirty-six ships in the beginning of spring, intending to make up for their then remissness by their present promptitude. The principal naval commander of Antiochus was Polyxenidas, a Rhodian exile; and he, hearing that Pausistratus, the Rhodian admiral, had spoken of him slightly, was entirely occupied with devising some great stroke to be made against him. He communicated secretly with him, and offered to betray the royal fleet into his hands, if he might be rewarded with restoration to his country. Pausistratus would not trust him till he had received a written assurance of his intention; but then he thought that, had he meant to continue in the service of Antiochus, he would never have given so dangerous a document. Polyxenidas promised that his ships should be ill manned, and unprepared for action; that some should be scattered to neighbouring ports, and others drawn up for repairs, and that then he would send information when to attack them. He made some show of executing his promise, but secretly kept all his seamen in readiness, while Pausistratus, thinking that no danger was at hand, neglected all the customary precautions. One night he sailed from Ephesus to the neighbouring haven of Panormus, where the Rhodians were lying. He beset the mouth of the harbour with his ships, while a party which he had landed attacked the enemy upon the shore. The surprise was complete.

Pausistratus perished, fighting bravely in the attempt to force a passage out of the port, an attempt in which seven ships succeeded, but all the rest were taken.

The grief of the Rhodians was enhanced by the loss of many young men of their most illustrious families, whom the high character of Pausistratus had induced to accompany him; and it was combined with anger that they should have suffered this calamity through fraud, and at the hands of a countryman. They sent out, however, twenty ships without delay, which joined the Roman fleet. The summer was spent in active naval warfare, and the Romans and their allies were almost uniformly successful. The Rhodians separately gained one considerable victory, and their services were eminent in others that were won by the confederate fleet.

Antiochus, having lost by the last of these battles all hope of further disputing the command of the sea, determined to withdraw his garrison from Lysimachia, which he saw that he was no longer able to succour. This resolution was an unwise one. The place would probably have held out through the winter, and the besiegers would have suffered great distress; whereas now, after their toilsome march through Thrace, they found an open city, convenient quarters, and a plentiful market; and after stopping to refresh themselves, and collect their sick men and their baggage, they were ready at once to enter Asia. All necessary preparations had been made by Eumenes, and the army crossed the Hellespont unopposed. After a fruitless attempt to obtain peace, on any tolerable conditions, Antiochus met the Romans in battle, and was defeated with great slaughter. He then sued for peace on whatever terms. It was granted, according to a practice not uncommon with the Romans, on conditions little differing from those which the Romans had offered before the battle, the most important being, that the king should give up all Asia within Mount Taurus. (B. c. 191.)

It remained for the Romans to determine what was to be done with the conquered countries. An embassy came from the Rhodians, requesting the liberty of all the Asiatic Greeks; while Eumenes craved that they should rather be made tributary to him, in reward for his services and sufferings in the war, in which he had nearly lost his kingdom, and had

been besieged in his capital of Pergamus. The senate assigned to Eumenes all that they had taken in Asia from Antiochus, excepting part of Lycia and Caria, which they gave to the Rhodians, and such of the Grecian cities as had not been subject to Attalus, which they declared independent.

The Ætolians, during the truce with Rome, had been at war with Philip. Since the conquest of Athamania, the Macedonian governors had ruled that country in such a manner as to make the inhabitants regret their native prince. Letters were sent to him in Ætolia, which gave him the hope of recovering his kingdom; he answered that, if he were assured of support from the people, he would return into Athamania, and that the Ætolian government would assist him with troops. All was secretly arranged, so that on the appointed day the insurrection broke out in four places simultaneously, and Amynder entered the country with a thousand Ætolians. The Macedonian garrisons were every where driven out; and Philip, who, as soon as he heard of the revolt, had hastened to quell it, was obliged to retreat with loss. The Ætolians then recovered Amphilochia, which had formerly been theirs, with the good will of the people. Dolopia also had submitted through fear; but in the midst of these successes they were alarmed by the news that peace was denied them at Rome, and that the new consul, Marcus Fulvius, had crossed the sea with his army. On hearing this, they resolved to send another embassy to Rome, and moreover to solicit the intercession of the Rhodians and Athenians.

The consul formed the siege of Ambracia. The place was strong, and vigorously defended, both by engines and by arms; but it was evident that it must ultimately fall, unless the siege could be interrupted from without. At the same time the Ætolian coast was wasted by hostile fleets, and Dolopia and Amphilochia were invaded by Perseus, the son of Philip. Utterly unable to make head against so many different attacks, the Ætolians, after many attempts to soften the inflexibility of their enemies, resolved to submit to whatever conditions might be imposed. The Athenians and Rhodians interceded in their favour; Amynder also acted as a mediator, having previously made his peace with the Romans; and their prayer was supported by the consul's half brother,

Caius Valerius Laevinus, the son of Marcus, who had negotiated their original alliance with Rome. He considered himself as called on, according to a custom prevalent among the Romans, to act in a manner as the patron of a people whom his father had united in friendship with Rome; and his influence with the consul was not small. Peace was granted at length by Fulvius, and confirmed by the senate and the people, on the terms that the Ætolians should hold, as friends and enemies, the friends and enemies of the Romans, and assist the Romans in all their wars; that they should pay forthwith two hundred talents of silver, and fifty, annually, for six years; that they should give forty hostages; and that neither the Cephallenians, nor any city which had submitted to the Romans since the consulship of Flaminius, should be included in their community. (B. C. 190.)

CHAPTER XV.

Of Greece, from the submission of the Ætolians to Rome, till the Roman conquest of Macedonia.

SECT. I.—THE Achaian congress had, ever since its first institution, been usually held at Ægium. Philopœmen wished to break this custom, and to obtain a law by which it should meet at every city in rotation. Being general at the time, he tried the experiment of summoning it at Argos. His summons was generally obeyed; but the discussion of the change which he wished to make was delayed by a quarrel with Lacedæmon. At the defeat of Nabis, that state had been deprived of all the maritime towns of Laconia, many of which were now peopled in great measure with Lacedæmonian exiles, inveterately hostile to their countrymen in the city. The latter, suffering no small inconvenience through their entire exclusion from the sea, attempted the recovery of one of these towns. They surprised it by night, but in the ensuing day they were driven out. The attempt, however, raised a general terror in the people of the coast, especially in the exiles; and they sent to the Achæians to complain and ask for succour.

Philopœmen was ever friendly to the exiles, and jealous of the city Lacedæmonians; and he moved and carried a decree, That since the Romans had en-

trusted the maritime towns of Laconia to the protection of the Achaïans, and the Lacedæmonians had assaulted one of those towns, which they were bound by treaty not to injure, unless the authors of that measure were given up to the Achaïans, they would consider the treaty as broken. Ambassadors were sent to demand the persons in question. This harsh and haughty requisition fired the Lacedæmonians with anger, and the more as they suspected that Philopœmen intended, by repeated arbitrary acts, to inure them to submission, and finally to place the city in the power of the exiles. They inflicted death on thirty persons suspected to be friends of Philopœmen and the exiles; renounced the alliance of the Achaïans; and sent to the Roman consul, entreating him to take them under the protection of his commonwealth as dependent allies.

War was declared by the Achaïans, but winter hindered decisive action. The consul came into Peloponnesus, and at his desire a meeting was held at Elis, at which the Lacedæmonians were invited to attend. A warm debate ensued, which Fulvius ended by requiring that the war should be suspended, till each party should have sent ambassadors to Rome. The heads of the Achaïan embassy were Diophanes and Lycortas, the latter the father of Polybius the historian. Both were eminent men, and both of Megalopolis; but their political sentiments were different, and they disagreed in the conduct of their mission. Diophanes offered to refer the question to the judgment of the senate; while Lycortas required, as he had been instructed by Philopœmen, that the liberty of the Achaïans should not be invaded, but they should be allowed to execute their lawful decrees. The senate gave an ambiguous answer, which the Achaïans understood as leaving them unfettered.

Philopœmen was continued for another year in office; and in the beginning of spring he encamped on the Lacedæmonian border, and sent to demand that the authors of the revolt should be surrendered. Those who were demanded by name declared that they would go, under the assurance that they should suffer nothing without trial; and some others of the principal citizens went with them to plead their cause. On no other occasion had the Achaïans ever brought with them the Lacedæmonian exiles, when they entered the territory of Lacedæmon:

but now the van of the army was chiefly composed of them. At the sight of their enemies their resentment broke out in all the violence of Grecian party rage: they began with railing, and went on to strike and stone them; the tumult increased, and many of the Achaïans were prevailed on by the exiles to join with them; and in spite of all which the general and the ambassadors could do, seventeen of the Lacedæmonians were killed. The rest, in number sixty-three, were saved from the violence of the crowd by the exertions of Philopœmen. To this his faith was pledged, and this was the only favour he was inclined to show them. On the following day they were brought to plead their cause before the multitude: the little they spoke was unfavourably heard, and they were condemned and led to execution.

After this bloody act of revenge and intimidation, the Achaïans prescribed the terms of peace. These were that the walls of Lacedæmon should be demolished; that all foreign mercenaries should quit the country, as well as all the slaves who had been liberated by the tyrants; that any of the latter who remained might be seized and sold by the Achaïans; that the laws of Lycurgus should be abolished, and those of the Achaïans adopted in their room. A decree was passed at Tegea in the great council of the Achaïans, that the exiles should be restored; the most galling of all injunctions to those in the city. Information being brought that the liberated slaves had quitted the city, but remained dispersed about the country, Philopœmen was sent with a body of light troops to seize them. Many were caught and sold; and the price of them was applied to the rebuilding of a portico in Megalopolis, which had been destroyed by the Lacedæmonians.

Thus, in the year B. C. 189, the laws of Lycurgus came to an end, after seven centuries of existence. During most of that period they had maintained Lacedæmon at the highest pitch of power, and carried her onward with unflinching energy in the career of what the world calls glory. How far they promoted real excellence of character, we have often had occasion to remark. Before the times of Agis and Cleomenes, they had long been verging to decay. The vigorous measures of the latter reformer seemed to promise their entire renovation: but his ambition provoked a

host of enemies, who drove him into exile before he had time to consolidate his work; and by his violences, and the changes which followed his expulsion, the state was left more unsettled than before. Usurpers rose and fell, each more lawless than his predecessor, and little remained of the ancient constitution, long before it was formally abolished. In all these revolutions the Lacedæmonians appear as a people little capable of governing itself; and their incorporation with the Achæans, however galling to their national pride, appears to have furnished the best method of rescuing them from anarchy.

The Lacedæmonians sent ambassadors to Rome to complain of the harshness with which they had been treated: and the Romans were ready to listen to any complaint which gave them an opportunity of breaking the independent spirit of the Achæans. Achæan ministers, however, were sent to defend their government; and they reported on returning that the senate was manifestly dissatisfied, but had not actually demanded the reversal of any of their proceedings. This report was made in a congress held at Megalopolis, when Aristænus was general, in the third year after the submission of Lacedæmon.

Among other embassies received at the same congress, was one from Eumenes, to renew the alliance contracted with his father, and to offer a gift of 120 talents, from the interest of which a salary might be provided for the representatives of the Achæan states in their great council. Apollonidas, of Sicyon, dissuaded the assembly from accepting it: for each man, whether a magistrate or a private individual, was forbidden by law to take gifts from princes; but here the wages of subserviency were openly proffered to all in common: and yet, he said, the feelings and interests of monarchs are naturally opposed to those of democracies; so that if we take the money of Eumenes, we shall risk to be unavoidably either servile or unthankful. He was followed by Cassander of Ægina, who reminded the assembly that his native city had been taken, in consequence of its adherence to their league, by the Roman general Sulpicius; that all the inhabitants had been made slaves, and the island given up, according to agreement, to the Ætolians, who had sold it to Attalus. He called on Eumenes, if he really wished to merit thanks from the Achæans, to restore to

them Ægina; and on the Achæans, not to cut off all hopes from the unhappy Ægiæans, by accepting a favour which would for ever preclude all endeavours for their deliverance. So great was the effect of these speeches on the meeting, that the gift was refused by general acclamation, and no man ventured to recommend its acceptance.

Soon after, during the Nemean festival, Aristænus summoned the men in authority to meet in council at Argos. Quintus Cæcilius Metellus had arrived there, on his return from Macedonia, whither he had been sent on an embassy by the Romans: he came into the council, complained that they had treated the Lacedæmonians with undue severity, and exhorted them to repair their error. It plainly appeared by the silence of Aristænus, that he agreed in sentiment with the speaker; and Diophanes even suggested fresh accusations against the government of his country: but Philopœmen and Lycortas answered at length, maintaining the justice and expediency of what had been done, and the impossibility of alteration. The council resolved that nothing should be changed. Metellus then demanded a general congress. They asked to see his commission from the senate: and when he made no answer, they declared that the laws did not allow a meeting to be held for the reception of an ambassador, unless he brought written credentials, stating the object of his coming. The pride of the Roman took fire at this repulse, and he went away without receiving the answer of the council. Aristænus and Diophanes became popularly suspected of having, by intrigues with the Romans, contributed to the dangers which threatened Achæan independence; the first through a strong attachment to their interest, which he had manifested from the beginning; the second through enmity to Philopœmen.

Apollonidas and others were sent to Rome, to repel the expected complaints of Metellus, and the charges of the Lacedæmonian ambassadors. These were Areus and Alcibiades, exiles restored by the Achæans, who were now foremost in petitioning against their restorers. After hearing all parties, the senate decreed to send an embassy into Peloponnesus. Before it came, the Achæans were assembled, to prepare for the discussion. Lycortas, who was general, complained that the Lacedæmonians had been converted from adversaries into accusers,

and were now more dangerous than before their conquest. He proceeded to comment on the ingratitude of Areus and Alcibiades; the multitude broke out into vehement indignation; and a hasty vote was passed, condemning both to death.

The Roman ambassadors arrived a few days after. A congress was called, and they appeared attended by the men whom the preceding assembly had condemned. Appius Claudius, the leader, declared that the senate was displeased with the acts of which the Lacedæmonians complained; with the tumultuous massacre and the subsequent executions, the demolition of the walls, and the abrogation of the laws. Lycortas replied to each particular. "You charge us, Romans, with the death of those whom Philopœmen, when general, demanded for trial. This complaint befits not you to make, nor even to receive. Your treaty provided that the maritime towns should not be molested by Lacedæmon. Attacked when you were far away, to whom should they fly for aid, unless to us, your allies, whom they had seen giving succour to Gythium, and co-operating with you in the siege of Lacedæmon? We conquered for you in a righteous war: why question what the laws of war entitled us to do? Yet much of these charges, concerns not us. We brought the authors of the wrong to trial; but that some of them were slain in entering the camp, this, Areus and Alcibiades, was not our deed, but yours and that of your fellow exiles.

"We razed, they say, the walls of Sparta, and abolished the institutions of Lycurgus. Those walls, expressly forbidden by Lycurgus, were built by the tyrants for their own defence and the coercion of the citizens, who ought to have been foremost in effacing those unseemly scars of former bondage. But we abolished the laws. I say those laws were already abolished by their tyrants: we could not abrogate them, but we gave our own.

"I know that this is not the language of allies or freemen, but of servants pleading with their lords. For if force be in treaties, or meaning in your assurances of liberty to Greece, why should you demand account of our conduct towards Lacedæmon, and we not ask about your conquests in Italy? Grant that we have put some men to death: did you not execute the senators

of Capua*? We demolished ramparts: you took to yourselves the city and the lands. The treaty, you will say, is equal in seeming; but really there is power on the one side, and on the other such liberty as it pleases the powerful to allow. I feel it, Appius, and, if patience be fitting, I am patient: yet let not your enemies be more favoured than your allies. We made them equals by giving them our laws: but that which satisfied the victors is too little for the vanquished. They bid us cancel decrees which we have sanctioned with oaths, and engraven on columns† for an everlasting memorial. We respect you, Romans; if you will, we even fear you: but we more respect and fear the immortal gods."

Lycortas was heard with general approbation, and all considered that he had spoken in a manner becoming the dignity of his office: so that the credit of Rome, it was easily seen, could not be upheld by gentle proceedings. Thus says the Roman historian Livy, in the spirit of his country: as if it could be necessary to the credit of a state to display its power by trampling on rights which it had repeatedly and solemnly pledged itself to maintain. The ambassador was fitly chosen for his mission, being one of a family always remarkable for overbearing pride. He strongly advised the Achæans, he said, to merit favour by doing freely what they would otherwise have to do against their wills. All heard these words with inward groaning, but they did not hazard further resistance. They annulled the condemnation of Areus and Alcibiades. With respect to the Lacedæmonians, they begged that the Romans would themselves make what changes they thought proper, and would not impose on the Achæans the reversal of acts which they had sworn to maintain.

* When a treaty was made between two Grecian states, the most usual and most solemn method of recording it was by engraving it on pillars erected for the purpose. These pillars were invested with a character of sacredness: and it was often agreed that they should be erected not only in the contracting cities, but also for the sake of giving to the treaty at once additional publicity and additional solemnity, at some of the great resorts for religious festivities, especially Olympia.

† In the second Punic war, the city of Capua, having revolted from the Romans and joined itself with Hannibal, was obliged to surrender to its former masters. The Roman general put to death fifty-three of its senators, most probably all whom he found in the place: and afterwards, by a decree of the Roman people, the citizens of Capua were entirely removed from their dwellings, and their lands and houses assigned to Roman colonists.

The negotiations continued at Rome, and among the embassies there assembled, were no less than four from different parties among the Lacedæmonians. One was from those who had been exiles, who sought to be restored to the full enjoyment of all their possessions, as before their expulsion. Another, headed by Areus and Alcibiades, recommended that restitution should be made to an amount not exceeding a talent to each, and that the remainder should be employed in recruiting the diminished people, by assigning portions for the maintenance of such as might seem to deserve admission to the rights of citizens. The third was from those who wished the commonwealth to remain on the footing on which it had been settled by the Achæians. The fourth from those whom the Achæians had expelled or condemned to death; who craved their own recall and a change in the government. The senate appointed Flamininus, Metellus, and Appius Claudius, as a committee to hear and decide on the various demands. They agreed that the exiles should be restored, and that Lacedæmon should still belong to the Achæian federation: on the other points they could not agree, but they made their award with respect to those which they had decided, and called on the Achæian ambassadors to say whether they consented. They were placed by this in some perplexity. The part of the award relating to the exiles was against the decrees of the Achæians, and against the inscription on the pillar which they had erected; yet on the whole they were not dissatisfied with the decision, since it retained Lacedæmon in union with them; and partly in embarrassment, and partly in fear, they finally put their seal to it.

About this time Messene had revolted from the Achæians, and sent an embassy to Rome to justify it. Deinocrates, the leader, was a personal friend of Flamininus: and he thought his work was done, when he found that Flamininus was going on an embassy to Prusias, king of Bithynia, since, through friendship to him and enmity to Philipœmen, he would use all his influence in his support. The Roman entered into all his counsels, and they went together into Greece. On arriving at Naupactus, Flamininus wrote to Philipœmen, and requested him to call a meeting of the Achæians. Philipœmen well knew that he had no instructions from the senate with respect to the affairs of Pelopon-

nesus, and he replied that he would summon the Achæians, if the other would state on what subject he intended to address them. This he did not venture to do, and so the hopes of Deinocrates were frustrated.

A war took place between the Achæians and Messenians, in which the former were altogether superior, when their prosperity was turned into mourning by a great and most unexpected disaster. Philipœmen was surprised by the enemy, when passing with a small party of cavalry through a difficult defile. It was thought that he might have escaped by the aid of some light-armed Thracians and Cretans in his band: but he would not quit the horsemen, whom he had recently selected from the noblest of the Achæians; and while he was bringing up the rear and bravely covering the retreat, his horse fell with him. He was seventy years old, and weakened by recent sickness; and he lay stunned and motionless under his horse, till he was found by the Messenians, who raised him from the ground with as much respect, as if he had been their own commander, and carried him to the city, sending before them the news that the war was finished, for Philipœmen was taken. The first impression of those who heard, was that the messenger was mad: but when others coming after, confirmed the statement, men, women, and children, freemen, and slaves, all crowded to see. So great was the throng, that the gates could scarcely be opened; and as the greater part could not see the prisoner, there was a general cry that he should be brought into the theatre close by. The magistrate showed him there for a moment, and then hastily removed him, for they feared the effects which might be produced by pity and reverence for so great a man, and gratitude for his merits. They then assembled in council, to deliberate how to dispose of him.

It grew late, and in addition to their other perplexities, they knew not where to keep him for the night. They would not take on themselves the responsibility of guarding him, nor trust it to any individual. At last they were reminded of a treasure chamber, underground, and walled on all sides with hewn stone. Into this they put him, and closed the entrance with a stone that could only be moved by a very powerful engine. On the morrow, the people were assembled, and remembering that their commonwealth had formerly received im-

portant benefits at his hands, the general sentiment was that he should be kindly treated, and the hope was expressed that by his means they might be extricated from their difficulties. But any hope, which looked towards reconciliation, was only a subject of fresh alarm to the authors of the revolt, in whose hands were all the principal magistracies. They were secretly consulting to a very different purpose; for it was unanimously resolved that Philopœmen should die. The only question was, whether his fate should be hastened or deferred, and on this point the more impatient prevailed. A cup of poison was sent into the dungeon. It is said, that Philopœmen asked the bearer, whether Lycortas and the horsemen had escaped; and when told that they had, he said, it is well, and calmly drank the poison. His eulogy is summed up by Polybius, with the words, that in forty years, during which he played a distinguished part in a democratical community, he never incurred the enmity of the people, though he spoke and acted freely and boldly, nor ever courted popular favour by compliance.

He was soon avenged. Lycortas being general, pressed the war, till the distress of the Messenians overcame their fear of the men in administration, and they began to talk of treating. Deinocrates and the other rulers yielded to the crisis, and retired to their houses: and the people were persuaded by the older men, and by some Boœtian ambassadors who chanced to be in the city, to sue for mercy to the Achæians. Lycortas answered, that the only conditions on which peace would be granted, were, that they should straightway give up to him the authors of the revolt, and the murderers of Philopœmen; should submit themselves entirely in all other points to the discretion of the Achæians; and should forthwith receive a garrison into their citadel. His answer was reported to the Messenians. Some had long been exasperated against the authors of the war, and were ready and even glad to deliver them to punishment: some, believing that they were safe in the hands of the Achæians, consented willingly to give up all to their discretion; but all submitted without hesitation, for they felt that they had no alternative. Lycortas occupied the citadel, and then entering the city, he assembled the multitude, and assured them that they should not repent having trusted to the

Achæians. The general settlement was referred to the great council of the nation, which just at that time was held at Megalopolis. Of those who had been delivered up to him as liable to punishment, he commanded that all who had been concerned in the murder of Philopœmen, should immediately put an end to their lives. The Achæian congress then readmitted Messene into their fellowship on the same terms as before.

The account which the Achæians gave at Rome of their difference with the Messenians, had been in the first instance unfavourably received; but when the Romans found that the war had been pursued and brought to an honourable ending, they gave a fresh answer to the same ambassadors, and told them they had provided that no arms or provisions should be carried from Italy to Messene. It seems they did not like that any important transaction should appear to have been successfully managed in Greece, without their participation. The ambassadors returned home, bringing with them the answer concerning Lacedæmon: and Lycortas called the Achæians together at Sicyon to receive it, soon after they had settled the affairs of Messene.

It appears that, since the union of Lacedæmon with the Achæians, some struggles of faction and consequent expulsions had taken place within that city; and that the principal sufferers had been among those of the old exiles, who had turned against their restorers. The present rulers wished to be in league with the Achæians; and Lycortas advised his countrymen to close with the offer, and thus at once to receive into fellowship those who had kept faith with them throughout, and, by confirming their acts, to be rid of those who had required evil for the greatest benefits. Diophanes and some others pleaded for the exiles, and contended that all should not be sacrificed for the fault of a few; and it was finally agreed that the city should be received into the league, and that those of the exiles should be restored who had not offended against the Achæians. On these terms the Lacedæmonians were again associated with the Achæians, and a pillar was solemnly erected for a record of the transaction.

SECT. II.—While these events took place in Peloponnesus, there were alterations going on between Philip and the Romans, which visibly boded a rupture. The king had been offended by

the consul Acilius, when he employed him in the siege of Lamia, and then forbade him to take it. His anger had been softened by permission to master Athamania, and the cities possessed by the Ætolians in Thessaly, and afterwards Demetrias and the Magnes: but he still applied his whole attention to the increase of his resources, that he might be prepared for a quarrel whenever it should arise; and among other measures to repair the waste of war in the population of his kingdom, he gave settlements to a great multitude of Thracians. Fresh matter of offence soon came. The Thessalians and Perrhæbians complained to Rome of his holding towns in their countries: ambassadors from Eumenes alleged that he had occupied certain cities in Thrace; accusations poured in from various quarters, and the Romans evinced an uniform determination to decide against him, whatever might be the merits of the case. The last of these decisions, which related to Ænus and Maroneia, towns of Thrace, that he had occupied and was required to give up, inflamed him to a pitch of savage ferocity, which he vented on the unfortunate Maronites, since he could not on the Romans. He sent directions to one of his officers that he should cut off the chiefs of the adverse party; and a body of Thracians being introduced by night, made great slaughter in the town. To the Roman ambassadors he said that the massacre had taken place in a sedition among the townsmen; not doubting that no one living in the place would dare to contradict him. They replied, that they were well informed as to the slaughter and its author, and required him to send to be examined by the senate, the two officers whom report accused as the chief instruments of it. He sent the one who had actually directed the execution: but to prevent his babbling, he poisoned him on the way.

Philip was now more than ever incensed against the Romans; but he wished to have further time for preparation before the commencement of war. He had two sons, Perseus and Demetrius. Demetrius, the younger, had been taken as a hostage by the Romans, at the conclusion of peace, and had since been sent back to him, as a proof of satisfaction with his conduct during the war with Antiochus and the Ætolians. The young man, while at Rome, had been treated by the senate with great consideration; probably as well from

views of policy, as from real regard to his pleasing manners and promising talents. He was now deputed by his father to plead his cause before that body, and to answer the existing charges, as well as those which were constantly springing up, now that every complaint was seen to be acceptable.

The discussion went off amicably for the present, but care was taken by the senate to show that, if any thing was yielded to Philip, it was not on account of the justice of his claims, but as a favour to Demetrius. This indiscreet manifestation of friendship was very disastrous to its object, and to all the royal house of Macedonia, through the guilty ambition which it fostered in Demetrius, and the jealousy of Perseus and Philip. There were some, indeed, in the senate, whose conduct was liable to heavier charges than indiscretion. One leading man* at least held secret conference with Demetrius, and encouraged him to hope that the Romans would make him king. The policy of this is easily fathomed. If the hope were fulfilled, the new made king would be bound both by gratitude and by the necessity of support, to comply with the power that had raised him; and thus the liberty of his country might be made the price of his elevation. In any case the kingdom would be weakened by strife and mutual distrust in the royal family; and in the event of a Roman war, the foreign enemy might perhaps be supported by a Macedonian faction, with a son of Philip at its head.

Demetrius on his return was welcomed by the Macedonians with the strongest marks of favour, as well on account of his personal qualities, in which he far excelled his brother, as because they deemed him to have saved them from war with Rome. This exasperated the jealousy of his father and brother: but the former concealed his displeasure, while the latter bent all his efforts to the destruction of his rival. Meantime Philip, in preparing for war, used some measures of such desperate and reckless violence, that Polybius accounts for them, after the manner of his country, by supposing him possessed with furies sent by avenging justice to punish his many impieties and cruelties. He removed from all the principal maritime towns, the citizens, with

* There is reason to think that the person here hinted at by Polybius was Flaminius.

their wives and children, and planted Thracians in their stead, to whom he thought he could better trust in a Roman war. In order to secure himself against private revenge, he commanded that all the sons and daughters of all whom he had slain should be thrown into prison, where many were put to death. These actions filled the kingdom with mourning: the third tragedy was in his own family, where his sons were plotting against and accusing each other; and he was racked night and day with the horrible doubt which of them he should put to death on the evidence of the other, and which he should preserve to be an object of terror for the remainder of his life.

Here Polybius fails us: and the details of the sequel must be found in Livy, who tells them, however, with an evident partiality towards the favourite of Rome. Demetrius was charged by Perseus with an attempt upon his life: and Philip, after hearing the accusation and the defence, professed himself unable to decide on the truth or falsehood of the complaint. He was, however, prejudiced against Demetrius, on account of his attachment to the Romans, and his favour among them: while Perseus, who shared in his hostility against them, was trusted and admitted to his counsels. Demetrius being left in Macedonia while his father and brother were engaged in a military expedition, and seeing himself to be an object of suspicion, meditated flight to the Romans. His purpose was betrayed by one of his chief intimates, who, like many others of his household, had been seduced by Perseus. At the same time letters arrived from Rome, professing to be from Flamininus, which asked the pardon of Demetrius, for any talk imprudently held with the writer touching the Macedonian crown. These letters, when combined with the project of flight, convinced the king that his younger son was guilty of treason: and fearing to put him openly to death, lest it should prematurely disclose his hostility to Rome, he procured that he should be poisoned.

The short remainder of Philip's life was full of misery. He was full of regret for the son whom he had slain, and of misgivings as to the justice of the sentence: and he was also subject to continual mortifications from the survivor, who being now assured of the succession in his own and in the general

opinion, assumed little less than regal authority, and was more feared and followed than the actual monarch. Philip had a kinsman, Antigonus, whom Perseus hated because he could not mould him to his purposes. He, seeing little hope of safety to himself under the dominion of his enemy, undertook, if possible, to hinder his accession, and with that view to unravel his intrigues against his brother. According to Livy, he succeeded in proving, by the confession of the agents, that the letters of Flamininus, which led to the death of Demetrius, were a forgery. These confessions were however partly, or, according to some accounts, entirely drawn forth by torture: and there were authors who stated that one of those accused as agents could not be brought by torture to confession. Even without this latter statement, the value of the confessions which were made would be much diminished by the means of obtaining them: though the ancients appear, most strangely and unreasonably, to have deemed examination by torture the surest method of arriving at truth.

Though now convinced that Perseus was guilty, Philip found him too powerful to be punished. He only took care to keep at a distance, from his father, that he might be safe from any sudden violence. The king endeavoured to change the succession, and to make Antigonus his heir, but his life did not continue long enough to allow of his effecting his purpose. He died of a disease occasioned by remorse and continual agony of mind: and Perseus, having received the earliest intelligence of his danger, was on the spot to take advantage of his decease before it was generally known. He mounted the throne without opposition; and one of his first acts was to put Antigonus to death. (B. C. 180.)

Among other measures adopted by Philip with a view to war with Rome, was the invitation of the Bastarnæ, a barbarous nation from beyond the Danube. He intended that they should extirpate the Dardanians, a people always hostile to Macedonia; and then should proceed to the attack of Italy, leaving their families in the Dardanian country. In this case, if they were destroyed by the Romans, he hoped to enter unopposed into the possession of Dardania: but if they were successful, they would occupy the Romans, and he meanwhile would recover all his lost dominion in Greece. For these rea-

sons he had invited them, had engaged for their safe passage through Thrace, and had prevailed on the princes of that country to let them proceed, and to provide markets for their use.

They entered Thrace in a peaceful manner: but as soon as Philip's death was known, both nations began to fail in their engagements, the Thracians to withhold the necessary supplies, and the Bastarnæ to straggle and plunder. Mutual injuries soon led to avowed hostility. The Bastarnæ at first prevailed; the Thracians were obliged to seek a refuge on one lofty mountain, and here they were attacked. But besides the advantage resulting from their position, they were further aided by a violent storm, which greatly distressed and confounded the assailants. The Bastarnæ were repulsed. When they were again assembled in their camp, they disputed whether to advance or return. About thirty thousand went on, and reached Dardania: the rest returned across the Danube to their homes. A war ensued between the Dardanians, and those of the Bastarnæ who persevered, in which the invaders were victorious at first, but were finally expelled.

Perseus began his reign by sending an embassy to Rome, which was honourably received, and assurances of friendship were mutually given with equal sincerity. He set himself to seek the good opinion of the Greeks, by acts which might win him the reputation of humanity, and place his character in advantageous contrast with that of his father. He dismissed state prisoners, remitted debts which were due to the treasury, and recalled all those who had been driven from Macedonia by charges of treason, or by debts or fines which they were unable to pay. He was dignified in manners, diligent and able in discharging the ordinary duties of his station; and he observed, and enforced on all about him, a sobriety and temperance in pleasures very different from the habits of Philip. All these things tended to make him popular, and to assist the negotiations by which he endeavoured to engage the states of Greece in his interest.

In the fifth year of his reign, some of the Dolopians having revolted from him and appealed to Rome, he attacked and subdued them. He then went to Delphi to consult the oracle. His sudden appearance in the midst of Greece caused some alarm; but after three

days' stay he returned through Thessaly, without committing any injury in the country. He moreover sent ambassadors, not only to the states through which he passed, but to many others, and craved that all their quarrels with his father might be ended with his life. But above all he desired reconciliation with the Achæians, whose enmity to Philip had been such, that a decree existed, forbidding the entrance of any Macedonian on their soil. The Achæians in consequence could not venture into Macedonia, which was hence a refuge to their fugitive slaves. All these Perseus collected as far as he could, and sent them back with letters, importing that it belonged to the Achæians to see that the mischief should not recur.

Among the most active speakers in the Achæian assembly, was one Calliocrates. After the last-mentioned settlement of affairs in Lacedæmon, the exiles had continued to solicit the Romans, and the Romans to urge their recall. Lycortas advised that the act should be maintained, and the senate informed that its reversal was precluded by the laws, and by all the mutual obligations of the confederate states. Calliocrates contended that nothing should hinder obedience to Rome: but the assembly agreed with Lycortas, and sent an embassy with such instructions as he recommended. Unfortunately Calliocrates was sent upon this mission; and he, instead of doing his errand, incited the senate to invade the independence of his country. He said that they encouraged the Greeks to disobedience, by not supporting the party, which maintained that laws, and oaths, and graven pillars, should yield to the will of the Romans. While left to themselves, the Achæians would favour those who professed to stand up for law and liberty: but if the senate marked its preference of the men who upheld its unlimited authority, it would easily make the leaders its own, and the Many would be deterred from opposition. He reminded them of the war with Messene, which the Achæians had waged and brought to an end without consulting them: though the Romans had never yet made this a subject of complaint. He recalled to them how often they had required the Achæians to restore the Lacedæmonian exiles: instead of which they had pledged themselves anew to those in the city not to do it

These suggestions were too alluring for Roman integrity to withstand. The senate wrote not only to the Achaïans, that they should enforce the restoration of the exiles, but to the Ætolians, Epirots, Athenians, Bœotians, and Acarnanians, to request their utmost exertions in the cause. In their letters to the Achaïans, they expressed their wish that all Achaïan statesmen should be like Callicrates: and the traitor returned in triumph to his countrymen, who little guessed what public service had merited this praise.

Henceforward, Callicrates was the leader of a party which always recommended entire obedience to Rome. His influence was supported by the belief that he stood high in the good opinion of the senate, and that his favour with that body might be a protection to the commonwealth. He was chosen general, in which capacity he restored the Messenian and Lacedæmonian exiles: and in his after conduct he was ever ready to do whatever he deemed agreeable to the Romans. In the present instance, when Xenarchus the general had read the letters of Perseus to the Achaïans, and many were inclined to receive them favourably, Callicrates expressed an opposite opinion. A way, he said, was sought for introducing alliance with Macedonia, to the detriment of that connexion which existed with Rome. He made use of various arguments to show that a war was impending between the Romans and Perseus, and especially dwelt on the conquest of Dolopia, and the coming of the Macedonian king to Delphi. "If now," he said, "we repeal the decree which excludes the Macedonians from Peloponnesus, we shall again have royal ambassadors in the country, and interchange of hospitality between them and our chief men, and finally armies, and the king himself, crossing the gulf from Delphi; and thus we shall be mingled with Macedonians arming against Rome. I advise that nothing should be changed till we know whether our fears be just or not. If peace remain inviolate between the Macedonians and the Romans, we may then have friendship and intercourse with the former."

Archon, the brother of the general, spoke next. Callicrates, he said, had assumed to be acquainted with the intentions of Perseus and of the Romans. The Achaïans, however, knew not these, nor did it concern them to inquire: it

was enough for them that peace existed, and assurances of friendship had been mutually given. When Rome herself was at peace with Macedonia, why should the Achaïans cherish interminable hatred? And if the offences of Philip were to be remembered against his son, why should the many benefits formerly received from the Macedonian kings, be entirely forgotten? No new alliance was now proposed, nor any breach of friendship with the Romans, but simply the repeal of an unsocial interdiction, injurious to private interests, and offensive to human feelings. If war broke out, not Perseus doubted their adherence to the Romans: but if peace could not put an end to hatred, it ought at least to suspend it. The arguments of Archon were extensively approved; but some of the leaders procured the postponement of the question, by suggesting that the dignity of the nation would suffer, if they listened to an overture made to them by letter, when the more respectful course would have been to send an embassy. An embassy afterwards came from the king, at a subsequent meeting of the Achaïans: but those who called themselves more especially the friends of Rome, succeeded in preventing its reception.

About this time the Ætolians were torn with bloody struggles of faction, chiefly arising from the debts with which the many were burdened. Wearied out with war, both parties sent ambassadors to Rome, and began to treat for reconciliation with each other: but a new and most atrocious violence broke off the negotiation. The exiles of Hypata had been invited to return, the faith of the state was pledged to their safety, and the people went out to welcome them at their approach with every appearance of good will. Scarcely had they entered the gates, when eighty men, the chief of them, were slaughtered; and anger and distrust being thus revived, the war was rekindled with added violence throughout Ætolia. Some attempts were made unsuccessfully by the Romans to settle these disputes. In the following year, however, both parties appeared at Delphi, to defend themselves, and arraign their adversaries, before the Roman commissioner Marcellus. He declined to give sentence in favour of either, but prevailed on both to be mutually reconciled; and hostages being given by each party, were placed in custody at Corinth. In Thessaly and

Perrhæbia, also, where like causes had led to like convulsions, tranquillity was restored by Appius Claudius Cætho,* another Roman commissioner, who effected a compromise between the debtors and the creditors.

Marcellus went from Delphi into Peloponnesus, and made manifest the enmity of his commonwealth towards Perseus, by commending the Achæians for retaining the decree of exclusion against the Macedonians. The breaking out of war was hastened by Eumenes, who went to Rome to stimulate the senate. He made use of various arguments to show that Perseus was already a dangerous enemy to Rome; that his hostile disposition had been abundantly shown, and his power was daily increasing. These exhortations well accorded with the previous opinions and feelings of the Romans, and they were further exasperated by the Macedonian ambassador sent to Rome to justify his master, who spoke in language very different from that which they were accustomed to hear from their allies. His king, he said, had earnestly sought to clear his faith from suspicion: but if cause for quarrel were obstinately sought, he would defend himself with courage. The honours bestowed on Eumenes were such as showed that his counsels as well as his person were acceptable to the senate: and the envoy of Perseus returned in haste to his master, and announced that the preparations for war had not actually been commenced, but that it was evident they would not be long delayed.

Perseus was now in full readiness for war; but before commencing it, he plotted the death of Eumenes, whom he both hated and feared. It was known that this prince, in returning from Italy would visit Delphi; and in going thither he was waylaid by assassins, who stunned him with stones thrown upon him from above, and left him for dead upon the ground. The assassins escaped, but enough transpired to throw upon Perseus a strong suspicion of having employed them. Eumenes was taken up and embarked for Corinth, and again for Ægina; and thence, after a tedious and uncertain convalescence, he returned into Asia.

SECT. III.—About the beginning of the year B. C. 172, war was declared by the

Roman senate and people against Macedonia, and an army was ordered to be levied under the consul Publius Licinius. Ambassadors arriving from Perseus to express their master's surprise at the preparations making, and his desire of peace, were sent out of Italy, and informed that all communications were thenceforth to be made through the consul. Commissioners were sent into Greece, to exhort the allies of Rome to be faithful and active. The heart of Perseus failed at the sight of the approaching struggle, though it was the point to which his plans and those of his father had long been tending. He had a hereditary connexion of hospitality with Quintus Marcius, the first of the Roman commissioners; and this encouraged the hope that through him terms of peace might be obtained. The wily Roman gave countenance to this hope; for his commonwealth was at the moment unprepared for war, while all the preparations of Perseus were complete. A conference took place between them. At the king's entreaty Marcius consented to a truce, during which ambassadors might be sent from Macedonia to Rome; a step from which he knew that no result could be expected, except delay; and thus by the indiscreet timidity of Perseus he was enabled to assume the appearance of reluctantly granting, to urgent solicitation, the thing which he most wished to bring to pass, as very convenient to Rome and useless to her adversary. During the period of truce, various negotiations were carried on among the Grecian states, especially the Bœotians.

At the end of the war between the Romans and Antiochus, the administration of justice had been partly renewed among the Bœotians, after an intermission, as we may remember, of nearly twenty-five years. This was not done without great opposition, for there were many who profited by the continuance of disorder. About the same time Flamininus, in consideration for services received from Zeuxippus in the wars with Philip and with Antiochus, persuaded the Roman senate to write to the Bœotians, and require them to recall him and his fellow exiles. This they were loth to do, lest they should be withdrawn from the friendship of Macedonia. As soon as they heard the purpose of the senate, they published two judgments which had passed against Zeuxippus and the rest for sacrilege and for the murder of Brachyllas. They then, on receiving the

* He was not the Appius Claudius who is mentioned above (p. 237) as ambassador to the Achæians.

letters, sent ministers to Rome, to say that they could not annul a sentence legally pronounced; whereupon the senate wrote to the Achæians and Ætolians, to enforce the restoration of Zeuxippus. The Achæians did not resort to arms, but sent an embassy to persuade the Bœotians to consent, and also requested that, as they had restored the administration of justice between their own citizens, they should restore it likewise in cases touching the Achæians. They promised compliance, but afterwards neglected it. Upon this Philopoemen, being general of the Achæians, gave leave to all that had been injured by the Bœotians, to make forcible reprisals. An attempt being made to drive away some cattle from Bœotia, a skirmish took place, and war was all but commenced. The senate, however, did not repeat the demand that Zeuxippus should be recalled, and the Achæian reprisals having been stopped at the intercession of the Megarians, the war was prevented.

The good will of the Bœotians toward the Macedonian princes still continuing, induced them to form a new alliance with Perseus. This did not take place without some struggles, in the course of which many persons were driven into banishment. When Quintus Marcius and his colleagues came into Greece, these exiles flocked to them, throwing the blame of the alliance on Ismenias, a chief of the adverse party, and affirming that several of the Bœotian towns had been forced into it much against their will. Marcius declared that this should be tried, for he would secure to each the exercise of its own independent judgment. When he had made the truce with Perseus, he entered Bœotia. Ambassadors came from many of the towns, to submit their several communities to the pleasure of the Romans. All these he directed to follow him to Chalcis: and thither also came Ismenias from Thebes, to make a like surrender in the name of the whole Bœotian nation. The envoys from the towns were received with favour: for their errand suited the purpose of the commissioners, who were determined to break up the Bœotian confederacy. Ismenias was neglected and scornfully treated: And the party hatred of the exiles, encouraged by this, broke out in an attempt to stone him, from which he was only saved by taking refuge in the tribunal* of the Romans.

* Tribunal, a raised seat of a particular form, on which the Roman magistrates sat to administer justice.

Meantime there was strife in Thebes. The men of Coroneia and Haliartus, who were devoted to Perseus, had gathered in the capital, and were earnestly supporting the Macedonian alliance. For some time the parties were equally matched: but at length the leader of the Coroneians changed his opinion, and then the tide set strongly towards submission to Rome. A fresh embassy was sent forthwith to Marcius, to excuse the alliance with Perseus. The multitude then proceeding to the house of Neon, the head of the Macedonian party, and to those of his principal followers, and angrily calling them to account for their acts, made them think it prudent to go into banishment. After this they returned to the place of assembly, where they voted high honours to the Romans, and sent ambassadors to surrender the city to them and recall the exiles.

The arrival of the Theban ministers at Chalcis interrupted a warm discussion, in which the exiles were passionately arraigning Ismenias, Neon, and their friends. Marcius commended the Theban people, and advised that the ambassadors should conduct the exiles home, and then that every city should send ministers to Rome, to make its own particular surrender. Neon escaped into Macedonia, but Ismenias and some others were thrown into prison, where they slew themselves. "Thus the Bœotian nation, after long preserving its union, and unexpectedly outliving many critical seasons, was broken up and resolved into its several states, through inconsiderate haste in league with Perseus, and vain and childish timidity, in suddenly shrinking from him."—POLYBIUS.

Among the states whose support would be important to either party in the war, the Rhodians held a foremost place. At the end of the war with Antiochus, the Romans had bestowed upon them part of Lycia and Caria. But upon the arrival of the ten commissioners whom the senate appointed to settle the affairs of Asia, the Ilians interceded with them for the freedom of the Lycians. The name of Ilium had belonged to ancient Troy; and the town which now bore it had been built upon the territory of the fallen city. The intercession of its inhabitants carried weight as from the successors of the Trojans, from whom the Romans loved to think themselves descended: though the Ilians were really an Æolian colony, and in no wise of kin to the ancient occupiers of their territory. The

Roman delegates, unwilling to disoblige either their pretended kinsmen or their valuable allies, gave a doubtful answer, which each understood as favourable to themselves. The Ilians sent to the Lycian cities, and said that they had procured them liberty: and the Lycians sent ambassadors to Rhodes to treat of alliance, when the Rhodians were appointing commissioners to settle the affairs of Lycia and Caria. The difference of intention did not immediately appear: but when the Lycians, being introduced into the assembly, began to speak of alliance, and the Rhodian chief magistrate plainly required their subjection, they declared that they would brave all dangers rather than do the bidding of the Rhodians.

A war ensued, in which the Lycians were reduced to submission. But before their subjugation they had sent an embassy to Rome, to complain of the harshness used by the Rhodians: and the senate chose ambassadors to tell the Rhodians that the Lycians had been assigned to them as friends and allies, and not as a free gift. Before the coming of the embassy the Rhodians had considered that they had settled the matter according to their wish: but now, on this fresh encouragement, they saw the Lycians again in commotion, and ready to hazard everything for independence. A suspicion arose that the Romans wished to waste their strength and treasure in unprofitable contests. The reign of Perseus was begun in Macedonia, and the new king had married the daughter of Seleucus king of Syria, the son and successor of Antiochus. The Rhodians had transported the bride into Macedonia, and had taken this occasion to make a trial and a display of their maritime strength, by accompanying her with all their navy magnificently equipped. This courtesy had been returned by Perseus with largesses to the rowers, and a supply of ship-timber to the state. There was nothing here with which the Romans could reasonably be offended: but yet it was thought that their jealousy might have been excited both by the display of power and wealth, and also by the proof of readiness to cultivate independent relations of friendship with others than themselves. Whatever might be surmised with respect to their intention, the Rhodians gave no sign of suspicion or anger. The arrangements with respect to Lycia stood unchanged, but ambassadors were sent to Rome to instruct the senate better in those points in which the Lycians had deceived

them; and there the matter rested, all further prosecution of it being interrupted by the breaking out of the Macedonian war. Ambassadors then were sent from Rome to exhort the Rhodians to fidelity: but they found on their arrival that exhortation was needless, for the people already, foreseeing the war, had refitted forty ships to be prepared for the service of the Romans. This aid was afterwards offered to the Roman admiral in the Grecian seas, but was declined by him as unnecessary.

Letters were sent by Perseus to the Grecian states, with an account of his conference with Marcius, and those to Rhodes were accompanied by ambassadors. These requested of the Rhodians that they would be neutrals and peace-makers; "for this," they said, "was good for all, and becoming to the Rhodians, who, professing to value freedom of speech and to maintain the common liberty of Greece, ought especially to avoid being drawn into any action contrary to these objects." These arguments were not without effect upon the Rhodians, but their minds were still pre-occupied with attachment to Rome, in spite of some particular reasons for displeasure; and they declined doing aught to compromise her friendship. They expressed however, in other respects, great good will towards the ambassadors and their master.

Another Macedonian embassy was sent into Boeotia. The only cities where it could hope for success were Thebes, Haliartus, and Coroneia: it was repulsed at Thebes, but welcomed at the other two. Ambassadors then were sent to Perseus from Haliartus and Coroneia, to ask succour for those states which embraced his interest against the Thebans, who were troublesome neighbours to all that would not league themselves with Rome. The king replied that he could not then aid them, on account of the truce: but he advised them to defend themselves as well as they could against the Thebans, and to avoid giving occasion of hostility to the Romans.

The time of truce ran out; the Macedonian ambassadors were haughtily repulsed by the senate, and ordered to depart from Rome forthwith, and within thirty days from Italy; and the consul P. Licinius crossed the sea with his army. Perseus now assembled his forces for the war, to which they seemed not inadequate. Five-and-twenty years had passed since the peace with the

Romans: and during all that period the kingdom had been recruiting its population and resources, undisturbed by wars, excepting some trifling contests with the bordering nations, which had kept the soldiers in exercise. The army was numerous, disciplined and well appointed, and warlike stores and implements of every kind were abundantly provided. Thus prepared, Perseus advanced into Thessaly. Several of the smaller towns submitted at his approach, and Mylæ holding out was taken and sacked, after a desperate resistance. The king then fixed his head-quarters upon the roots of Ossa, and near the opening of the pass of Tempe; and from hence he sent out detachments to annoy and plunder the allies of Rome.

Meanwhile the consul advanced through Epirus and Athamania into Thessaly. His way was through a very difficult country, and if he had been attacked in emerging from it, while his men were yet fatigued and disordered, he might have been easily overthrown. But Perseus did not inherit the military talents of his father, and this opportunity was suffered to pass by. The consul advanced to Larissa, where he was joined by Eumenes with 4000 foot and 1000 horse, and by succours, mostly very scanty, from his Grecian allies. Perseus attempted to draw him to a distance from his camp, by sending troops to ravage the lands of Phœæ: but Licinius did not hazard the attempt to protect them. Encouraged by this, the king repeatedly approached the hostile camp, and offered battle. An engagement of cavalry took place, in which the Romans were defeated: and it was thought that their army might have been destroyed, if Perseus had followed up his success with an attack on their camp. So fully was their general convinced of his danger, that in the ensuing night he silently transported his forces to the farther bank of the river Peneus.

Perseus was now advised by many of his friends to offer peace on the same terms on which it had been made with his father. If it were accepted, the war would be honourably terminated with a victory, and the Romans would have received a lesson, which would make them less ready to encroach on the rights of the Macedonians: if it were refused, he would have gods and men to witness his moderation, and the obstinate pride of his enemies. The king agreed, and an embassy was sent. The

consul called a council of war, and all unanimously resolved that the answer should be as harsh as possible. "For this," Polybius observes, "is a custom peculiar to the Romans, to be haughty and obstinate in reverses, but moderate in success. That this is honourable, all will allow: but whether it be always practicable may be doubted." It is doubtless honourable to a state, when unjustly attacked, to suffer all things rather than compromise its character or its independence: but in a war of ambition, to sacrifice its armies, and perhaps to hazard its national existence, rather than confess a failure and retire from the contest without an extension of empire, has more of obstinate perverseness than of magnanimity. If the Roman principle were acted on universally, no war could end, except by the destruction of one of the parties: and for a state to propound one rule of honour for itself and another for all with whom it comes into contact, is a common insult to mankind. The boast of moderation in success is of a better kind, though the claim of the Romans to it may well be disputed. It is true that they often granted terms far easier than those which they might probably have enforced; but it is no less true that those terms were frequently ill kept, and that peace was the beginning of systematic encroachment on the rights of the vanquished people: and in all such cases, the apparent liberality can have been little better than crooked policy or vain ostentation. This at least is an inference which we may reasonably draw with respect to the general conduct of a people, among whom such instances are continually recurring: though exceptions are sometimes to be made in favour of an individual commander, and even in favour of the nation itself, to the extent of a real, though transitory good intention, at the moment of contracting some particular engagement.

The message of Perseus was answered by a demand that he should surrender himself and his kingdom to the disposal of the senate. This insolence filled his counsellors with resentment; and they advised him to negotiate no more. But he was the more alarmed by the apparent confidence of his enemies: and he continued to tempt them with higher offers, till he was at length induced by repeated failure, and by the indignation of his friends, to desist.

The Roman arms were more successful

in Boeotia. The prætor Caius Lucretius, who had been sent with a fleet into the Grecian seas shortly before the setting out of the consul, had landed his forces and besieged Haliartus. The townsmen defended themselves with determined resolution, but with inadequate resources: the place was stormed, and all the inhabitants were either slaughtered or sold for slaves. The pictures, statues, and other valuable spoils having been carried to the ships, the city was razed to its foundations; and the Romans then, if the copies of Livy are correct, proceeded to Thebes. If so, there must have been some fresh revolt of the Thebans not mentioned by the historian. The people submitted at the approach of the prætor, who made over the city to the exiles and other friends of Rome, and sold the slaves and all the effects of the Macedonian party. He then returned to his ships.

Perseus attempted unsuccessfully to fire the encampment of the Romans. A few days after he led out a party to cut off their foragers and surprise their outpost. In this he partly succeeded: but the soldiers of the outpost having formed upon a hill, defended themselves, though with difficulty, till aid arrived from the camp; and then the king was overmatched and obliged to retire, with some loss and with great hazard. This action partly restored the confidence of the Romans. It was the last of the season, for the king immediately went into winter quarters in Macedonia, and the consul soon after in Boeotia.

The next year's transactions are imperfectly recorded; but they seem to have extended the influence of Perseus in Greece, an end that was much promoted by the cruelty and avarice of the Roman commanders, especially the consul Licinius, and the prætors, Lucretius and his successor Hortensius. The last demanded from the people of Abdera a large supply of corn and money; they asked him for time to send to the then consul Aulus Hostilius, and to Rome; but scarcely had their envoys reached the consul, when they heard that Hortensius had taken their city, beheaded the chiefs, and sold the other inhabitants. The senate ordered that all who had been sold should be sought out and released. The Chalcidians complained of both the prætors: and the urgency of their necessity was testified by the appearance of Miction as their principal ambassador, who had come to Rome

for that purpose, though he was disabled in all his limbs, and was obliged to be carried into the senate house in a litter. He declared that to shut the gates against Lucretius and Hortensius was safer than to admit them: for those towns were for the most part unharmed, which had excluded them; while at Chalcis, where they had been received, all the temples were pillaged. Lucretius had freighted his ships with the spoils of sacrilege, and had carried freemen into slavery: and both he and Hortensius had quartered their seamen summer and winter in the houses of the citizens, and exposed their wives and children to the insolence of rude and profligate men, who cared not what they said or did. The senate sent orders to Hortensius to redress as far as possible, and not to repeat the wrongs complained of: and Lucretius being accused before the assembly of the commons, was condemned by all the tribes, and heavily fined.

These outrages were imputable to particular magistrates, and not to the state, which condemned and punished them: there were other faults on which a different verdict must be given. Such was the disposition, already seen in the case of Callicrates and the Achæians, to favour those who flattered Rome by betraying the liberty of their country, and to encourage their slanders against better men than themselves. Of this subservient crew was the Ætolian Lyciscus, on whose evidence Eupolemus, Nicander, and others of his countrymen, were transported to Rome, under a frivolous charge of treacherously causing the defeat of the Roman cavalry by Perseus. Another was the Epirot Charops. He set all engines to work against Antinous and Cephalus, the men most respected in his nation, who had earnestly wished that peace might continue, but who, since it was broken, advised the people to do their duty faithfully as allies of Rome, but without unbecoming subserviency, or forwardness beyond their covenant. Whatever they did in any wise contrary to the wishes of the Romans, Charops imputed to infidelity. At first they despised the slander: but when they saw the credit given by the Romans to like accusations made by Lyciscus, they foresaw that they too might be summoned to Rome without a trial. They were thus induced for their own safety really to entertain the purpose of revolt: and by this and similar conduct, as

Polybius observes on another occasion, the Romans became rich in flatterers, but poor in true friends. In the present instance the defection of Cephalus carried with it that of Epirus.

Early in the following year Hostilius, from his winter quarters in Thessaly, sent Caius Popillius and Cnæus Octavius to visit the states of Greece. They carried with them a decree of the senate, that none of the allies should be required to furnish any supplies to the Roman officers, unless the demand had been sanctioned by the senate. They vaunted the kindness of the decree in each city of Peloponnesus, and went on to say that they knew the men who were not hearty in the cause of Rome, and to express as much displeasure towards them as towards their avowed opponents. It was believed that they meant to accuse Lycortas, his son Polybius, and Archon, in the great council of the Achaians: but failing to find any decent pretext for so doing, when the assembly met, they only addressed to it some words of compliment and exhortation, and then went into Ætolia.

Their object here was to take hostages from the nation, and it was supported by Lyciscus. The Romans, he said, had done well in removing the chief conspirators against them, meaning Eupolemus and Nicander; but these had left accomplices, who ought to be similarly treated, unless they gave their children as pledges for good behaviour. The persons chiefly hinted at were Archidamus and Pantaleon, the latter of whom being with Eumenes, when the attempt to murder him was made, was the only one who had courage to stand by him and defend him. Pantaleon rising, shortly rebuked the sycophancy of Lyciscus, and then turned to Thoas, whom he deemed his more accredited calumniator, from the absence of known enmity between them. He called to his mind the war of Antiochus, which he had kindled against the people whom he now unworthily flattered. He reproached him with ingratitude towards Nicander and himself, who, when he was given up to the Romans by treaty, had gone as ambassadors to Rome, and obtained his pardon. The indignation of the crowd broke out against Thoas: they would not hear him speak, and began to pelt him. It was now no time to talk of hostages, and after slightly reproving them for pelting Thoas, the Romans departed.

They went next into Acarnania, where they were advised by their warmest partisans to put garrisons into the towns, and so to guard against the attempts of the Macedonian faction. The independent party protested against this, as the treatment due to conquered enemies, and not to allies who had committed no offence. It was manifest that the popular opinion went with the latter speakers; wherefore the ambassadors thought it most prudent to agree with them, and after expressing themselves to that effect, they returned to Hostilius at Larissa.

These transactions caused the Achaian leaders to deliberate on the line of conduct fittest for the times. Lycortas maintained, as he had done from the beginning, that they should not aid either Perseus or the Romans: for the power of the victor would certainly be too great for the freedom of Greece, and it therefore was not the part of a patriot to concur in building it up. At the same time he advised them not to thwart the Romans, for that would be too dangerous, especially to those whose independent conduct made many powerful enemies among them. Apollonidas dissuaded direct opposition to Rome, but said that they should fearlessly check and censure those domestic traitors, who courted the Romans by sacrificing the liberties, laws, and common interests of the state. But the majority fell in with Archon, who recommended that they should yield to the times, and carefully avoid giving to their enemies any handle for slander, lest they should suffer the lot of Nicander and his fellows. It was agreed that Archon should be proposed for chief magistrate, and Polybius for general of the cavalry; and they were elected accordingly.

Perseus, secure at present against attack from the Romans, since the intervening mountains were impassable by reason of the snows, resolved to break the strength of the neighbouring Illyrians, lest they should ravage his borders when he was occupied elsewhere. This was not all: he had long sought the alliance of Gentius, who ruled over most of Illyria; and this display of power, he thought, might determine that prince to join him. His arms were every where prosperous: but Gentius answered his ambassadors that he was too poor to go to war with Rome, unless he received a large supply of money. This the Macedonian refused to furnish: and although he continued to solicit

Gentius by repeated embassies, he could not overcome his own habitually penurious disposition so far as to consent to the only terms on which the Illyrian could be induced to aid him.

Spring came; Hostilius gave up his command to the new consul Q. Marcius, and with it an army which he had weaned from great disorder and licentiousness, and trained to vigilance, obedience, and inoffensive conduct in quarters. Marcius advanced into Macedônia, over heights which seemed insurmountable to an army. An active enemy might have ruined him: but Perseus let him pass with slight opposition, and then in blind terror retired to Pydna, leaving open the rich city of Diium, with the strong defile which he commanded, the only passage for the Romans from the narrow plain under the mountains into the open country of Macedônia. The consul took possession of Diium, and advanced a little beyond it: but finding it difficult to supply his army at a distance from Thessaly, he soon retired within the pass, and suffered Perseus to reoccupy the city. The summer was spent in attempts on various places by the consul, and by the co-operating fleet of the Romans and of Eumenes. The towns were well defended by the Macedonians, and commonly with success; and the army went into winter quarters, after a campaign in which little had been won, except an entrance into Macedônia.

The Achaians had decreed, at the suggestion of Archon, that they would aid the Romans with all their forces. Polybius and others being sent to the consul to signify their resolution, arrived when he was about to cross the mountains, and shared in the dangers of the passage. They then declared their errand to Marcius, who thanked the Achaians for their good will, but said that he had no present need of putting them to such expense and inconvenience. The ambassadors returned to Achaia, all except Polybius, who continued with the army; till the consul, hearing that Appius Cenchus, who was then commanding a body of troops in Epirus, had asked five thousand soldiers of the Achaians to assist his operations, sent Polybius back to frustrate his request, declaring that there was no necessity for the reinforcement, and that the Achaians ought not to be burdened with it. Whether this was done for the sake of the Achaians, or in jealousy of Appius, Polybius considered as, very

doubtful. However, he undertook the commission, and was placed by it in some perplexity. He had no written instructions from Marcius to bear him out, and without them he felt it dangerous to oppose the wishes of Appius. He made use, however, of the decree of the senate, which relieved the allies from compliance with any demands of its officers, not authorized by itself. He procured a vote that the matter should be referred to the consul; and by this he saved the nation from a heavy expense, but gave great offence to Appius.

Perseus continued his endeavours to engage the Rhodians in his cause, and the city was full of contention between his favourers and those of Rome. When the decree of the senate arrived there, which relieved the allies from obedience to the unauthorized commands of the Roman officers, this act was kindly taken by the multitude: and the leaders friendly to Rome, availing themselves gladly of the existing impression, persuaded them to send ambassadors to the senate, to the consul, and to the prætor who commanded the fleet. The ambassadors to Rome were instructed to ask permission for a purchase of corn in Sicily; and all had orders to defend their commonwealth against the charge of disaffection, and to renew all its engagements of friendship. Each of these missions was favourably received. The consul, moreover, privately conferred with the leader of the embassy sent to him, and wondered that the Rhodians did not endeavour to make peace between Perseus and the Romans. His purpose in this is not ascertained. A war had broken out between Ptolemy Philometor, king of Egypt, and Antiochus Epiphanes, king of Syria, on account of Cœlesyria, which the former Antiochus, the present king's father, had wrested from Egypt. The consul may perhaps have feared the power of the Syrian, should he be enabled to conquer Egypt while the Romans were engaged with Perseus: he may have wished to stimulate the Rhodians to do something which the Romans might consider as a pretext for attacking their independence, when the Macedonian war should be ended. Polybius thought that the latter motive was the true one; he certainly deemed such crooked policy not inconsistent with the consul's character, and we shall hereafter find that the event at least corresponded with such a suspicion.

The return of the ambassadors filled all parties with joy. Some exulted in the friendship of the Romans, others in their weakness, which they thought to be proved by their unusual earnestness in demonstrations of good will, and especially by the suggestion that the Rhodians should mediate between Perseus and the Romans. The people were easily persuaded to undertake the mediation of peace. They voted an embassy to each of the belligerents, to declare that they could no longer endure the evils arising from the war, and that if either party refused to put an end to it on equitable terms, the Rhodians would consider what was to be done against him. Such a message was little fitted to conciliate the haughty spirit of the Romans. The bearers of it were roughly answered, and they parted from the senate in mutual anger.

Perseus had at length concluded an alliance with Gentius, under the condition of giving him three hundred talents. He defrauded him, however: for when he had paid but ten talents, the Illyrian was induced to offend the Romans irretrievably by imprisoning their ambassadors, and Perseus then withheld the rest of the money. The two monarchs jointly sent an embassy to Rhodes, to engage that state as far as possible in their cause: and the hopes of their partisans were supported by the success of a fleet sent by Perseus to the coast of Asia, which dispersed a squadron of transports belonging to Eumenes, and slew or made prisoners a thousand Gallic horse*, whom that prince had dispatched as a reinforcement to the Pergamenian troops, that were acting under his brother Attalus as auxiliaries to the Roman army. The Rhodians received the embassy with favour, again declared that they would make peace, and exhorted the two kings to throw no obstacles in the way. While these things were passing, the new consul Lucius Æmilius-Paulus arrived in Macedonia: and the prætor, L. Anicius, entering Illyria, soon put an end to all the hopes which had rested on Gentius, by reducing him within thirty days to surrender his kingdom and himself.

The consul Æmilius was a warrior of tried ability. His coming filled his soldiers with confidence and his enemies with alarm, both of which were increased

by the result of the Illyrian war. Still his task was not an easy one, for he had before him a gallant army, in a strong and a carefully fortified position on the rugged banks of the Enipeus. Some skirmishes took place in the bed of the river, rather to the advantage of the Macedonians: but in the meantime a detachment sent by Æmilius had opened a passage over Mount Olympus, and surprised and cut to pieces the Macedonian guard. The king now quitted his position, and hastily retreated to Pydna: the consul followed, and found him ready for battle, and drawn up on ground which favoured the action of the phalanx. Both armies were eager to fight, but they were restrained by the caution of their leaders, who wished to receive rather than to make the attack. Late on the second day an accident brought on the engagement. At first the power of the phalanx bore down every thing that opposed it: but it could not long preserve the perfection of its array, and the Romans, penetrating between the pikes wherever an opening was given, disordered and finally defeated it. In the battle itself, and in the butchery which followed it, 20,000 Macedonians are said to have been slain. (B. c. 169.)

An eclipse of the moon had taken place on the eve of the battle. Such appearances were then superstitiously believed to be ominous of ill to states and kingdoms. C. Sulpicius Gallus, a Roman officer, had science enough to know their nature and foretell their occurrence: and he, lest the soldiers should be disheartened by the eclipse, called them together, declared that it would happen, and explained its cause. This changed the fear, which might otherwise have arisen, into wonder at the knowledge of Gallus: while in the Macedonian camp the appearance was apprehended by many to portend the extinction of the kingdom. This feeling, however, does not appear to have prevailed to such a degree as materially to diminish their readiness for battle.

Within a few days after the victory, all Macedonia submitted to the consul. That this should have been the effect of a single battle, seems to mark that the monarch was generally unpopular, and may add some credit to the crimes and weaknesses here recorded of Perseus, and to the many others which are imputed to him by the Roman historians. His fate was a wretched one. After many

* Probably for Galatia in Asia.

wanderings, he was obliged to put himself into the hands of Æmilius. He entered the camp in a mourning habit, and would have thrown himself at his conqueror's feet. The consul made him sit down, and then asked on what provocation he had so violently attacked the Roman people, which had faithfully kept its treaty with his father. The boast was as false as the insult was ungenerous: but a bolder man than Perseus might have been deterred from reply. Æmilius then, if Livy is to be trusted, declared, that the often tried clemency of the Roman people gave to the conquered monarch almost an assurance of safety. After this he carried him to Rome, and exhibited him to all the people as a captive in his triumph. That brutal ceremony commonly finished with the death of the prisoners who were led in it. Perseus was not executed: but he was thrown into prison, where his life was shortened, according to some by his own despair, according to others by the cruelty of his treatment.

While these things passed in Greece and Macedonia, some important events took place in Egypt. Antiochus had overrun that country, and obliged the king to shut himself up in Alexandria. There were several Grecian embassies at the court of Ptolemy, from the Achæians, Athenians, and other states; and these he sent to Antiochus to plead in his behalf. The Syrian received them kindly, heard and replied to their arguments, and promised to give his final answer upon the return of an embassy which he had sent to Ptolemy: for he wished, he said, that the Greeks should be witnesses of all his proceedings. Whatever may have been the further progress of the negotiation, it did not lead to peace: on the contrary, the Egyptian monarch ventured a battle, was defeated, and taken. Hereupon the Alexandrians declared his younger brother king, who also bore the name of Ptolemy, according to the custom of the Macedonian princes of Egypt, but was distinguished by the addition of Physcon. •

Antiochus made peace with his prisoner, and carried on the war against the Egyptians under pretence of reinstating their rightful monarch. He won a victory at sea, took the strong city of Pelusium, at one of the mouths of the Nile, and laid siege to Alexandria. A Rhodian embassy arriving to mediate,

received for answer, that Antiochus was fully determined to restore the diadem to its proper wearer. Finding, however, that there was little hope of speedy success against Alexandria, he resolved to leave the brothers to fight it out, expecting that, when they had weakened each other, the victor would fall an easy prey. He established Ptolemy Philometor as king in the ancient capital of Memphis, and gave up to him all Egypt, except Pelusium, where he kept a garrison, that he might be sure of a ready entrance into the kingdom which he pretended to restore. But Ptolemy, well aware of his protector's insincerity, straightway opened a negotiation with his brother, which, by the common apprehensions of both, and the good offices of their sister Cleopatra, was soon brought to a conclusion. It was agreed that both should reign conjointly, and the elder Ptolemy was re-admitted into Alexandria. But Antiochus, instead of rejoicing that the end was attained, for which alone he professed to war, now prepared for fiercer hostilities against the two. He sent a fleet to Cyprus, and himself proceeded towards Egypt. On his march he was met by ambassadors, who thanked him, in the name of Ptolemy Philometor, for his recovered inheritance, and prayed him not to cancel his bounty, but rather to speak his wishes as a friend, than proceed by violence as an enemy. Antiochus answered, that he would not cease from war, unless Cyprus, and Pelusium, with the country round it, were yielded to him. These demands were not complied with, and he advanced into Egypt.

The Achæians were bound to the house of the Ptolemies by alliance, by old friendship, and by benefits received. These princes in their present difficulties had asked them for a thousand foot and two hundred horse, with Lycortas as leader, and Polybius to command the cavalry. Callicrates and Diophanes opposed the grant, on the ground that the consul Marcius was wintering in Macedonia, and the decision of the war was now at hand, and therefore the Achæians should keep in readiness, in case the Romans should want their help. To this it was replied, that Marcius, a year before, had declined their offered aid as unnecessary. It therefore appeared, said the friends of Lycortas, that the mention of the Romans was a mere pretence for persuading the Achæians to desert their benefactors in their utmost need, in con-

CHAPTER XVI.

témp' of obligations, imposed by gratitude, and bound upon them by the faith of treaties and the sanctity of oaths. The voice of the multitude was loudly in favour of sending the succour required: but Callicrates procured the adjournment of the question, by alleging that a meeting, such as was then convened, was not legally competent to decide upon it. At the next meeting, which was a more general one, it was again brought forward. Lycortas and Polybius again proposed the sending troops: Callicrates, the sending ambassadors to mediate. The sense of the people was manifestly with Lycortas; but Callicrates carried his point by means of a letter from Marcius, recommending his proposal.

Fortunately for the Ptolemies, a more powerful mediation came into play. Before the reconciliation of the brothers, while Physcon and his sister were besieged by Antiochus, they had prevailed on the Romans to interfere in their favour. One embassy had been sent, which effected nothing: but a second followed, headed by C. Popilius, and bearing an express requisition on the part of the senate, that all prosecution of the war should be forthwith given up. The conquest of Macedonia had now been completed, and the increase of power thence resulting to the Romans was more than matched by the increase of their pride. Antiochus, after compelling the rest of Egypt to submission, was on his march towards Alexandria, when Popilius met him within four miles of the city. The king saluted him, and offered his hand; the ambassador bid him first read the decree of the senate. He read it, and said he would take counsel with his friends: Popilius drew a circle round him with his stick, and required his answer before he stepped beyond it. Antiochus hesitated a while, and then said he would obey: whereupon the Roman took his hand, and hailed him as a friend. Antiochus withdrew his troops from Egypt, according to the mandate of the senate: and the ambassador, after visiting the Ptolemies in Alexandria, went to Cyprus, which the Syrian generals had well nigh conquered, but were now obliged to abandon.

Of Greece, from the Conquest of Macedonia to the Conquest of Achaia, by the Romans.

WHEN the senate heard of the defeat of Perseus, they sent for the Rhodian ambassadors, who had not quitted Rome. Polybius seems to intimate that they had not before been admitted to a hearing; but this is not expressed with precision enough to warrant us in setting aside the positive assertion of Livy. They said that their commonwealth had sent them to mediate a peace, considering the war as burdensome to the Greeks and chargeable to the Romans; but now that it was ended as the Rhodians most wished, they shared in the joy of their friends. The senate replied that it well knew the Rhodians to have acted neither from good will to Greece nor to Rome, but merely from the wish to rescue Perseus from his fate; and that therefore they must not expect the language nor the treatment due to friends.

This repulse was hardly needed to increase the terror which had already driven the Rhodians to acts unworthy of themselves. The master-work of tyranny is to make its victims accomplices in their own degradation, and thus to render unmerited suffering no longer respectable. We may better bear to see a gallant struggle unsuccessfully maintained, for the pity due to suffering is absorbed in the higher sympathy with moral greatness. But to see a brave, a wise, a once free-spirited people, reduced to kiss the foot that spurns them without cause, and by tame and even by criminal submissions, to sue for pardon where no wrong has been committed, this is indeed a painful spectacle, and not more painful than humiliating. The Rhodians hearing that C. Popilius was passing near their island on his way to the king of Syria, sent a deputation that with difficulty persuaded him to visit them. He came, but only to increase their fears and exaggerate their offences. His colleague Decimius, says Livy, spoke more moderately. He advised the Rhodians to save themselves from punishment, by turning it on the heads of their evil counsellors. Accordingly they voted death to all who had ever spoken in favour of Perseus or against the Romans. Some had al-

ready escaped, others slew themselves, but the decree was executed against the rest. Such was the mild atonement exacted for a few haughty words and suspected wishes, by those same tender-hearted Romans, who had been so much shocked, as we may remember, at the cruelty of the Achæians, in putting to death some principal Lacedæmonians for a flagrant breach of treaty and a massacre.

Even after this propitiation the senate would hardly listen to the ambassadors whom the Rhodians sent to plead for their pardon. The temper of the leading men was generally unfriendly, and one of the prætors went so far as publicly to harangue the people, and exhort them to war. The ambassadors put on mourning attire, and besought forgiveness with prayers and tears; but the greatest favour which they could obtain was an answer relieving them from the apprehension of war, but bitterly reproaching their several delinquencies, and declaring that but for a few tried friends of Rome, especially the ambassadors themselves, the senate well knew how they ought to be treated. On receiving the answer, the Rhodians voted to the senate a present of ten thousand gold pieces in the form of a crown, and sued to be admitted into confederacy, which they had hitherto avoided. For the Rhodians, trusting in their strength, like the ancient Coryræans, had ever declined such engagements as could entangle them against their will in the quarrels of others, or prevent them from assisting any state where they saw cause. They were now reduced to beg for that which they would not formerly have accepted; but that a decree might not exist among their records to shame them if they were refused, the mission was entrusted to their admiral, as the only person legally empowered to engage in any negotiation without being authorized by a popular vote. A year or more passed before their request was granted. During the interval, the senate decreed the independence of those Lycians and Carians whom it had consigned to the Rhodians after the conquest of Antiochus.

If the Romans were unjust and cruel towards the Rhodians, it is yet to be seen whether their conduct in Greece deserves a more favourable report. After the conquest of Illyria, Anicius led his forces into Epirus. Four towns alone held out against him under An-

tinous, Cephalus, and other leaders in the revolt: but these, soon feeling the hopelessness of resistance, threw themselves on the Roman outposts and died fighting; and the towns then opened their gates. Æmilius meantime, while he waited for the ten commissioners appointed to assist him in settling the affairs of the province, was travelling through Greece to visit its most remarkable places, carefully avoiding to inquire into the past conduct of the inhabitants. In returning he was met by a crowd of Ætolians in mourning raiment, who complained that Lyciscus and Tisippus, the heads of the Roman party, after surrounding the national congress with a body of soldiers obtained from Aulus Bæbius, a Roman officer, had slaughtered five hundred and fifty of the leading men, driven others into banishment, and distributed to their followers the goods of the slain and the exiles. The præconsul bid them follow him to Amphipolis, where he was to appear on a stated day with the commissioners, in order to settle the government of Macedonia. On the appointed day, his tribunal being set forth, he appeared in state with his ten assistants, and published the decree of the senate to the anxious multitude. He declared that all the Macedonians should be free, should enjoy their cities, lands, and laws, and annually elect their magistrates; that they should pay to Rome but half the tribute they had paid to the king; but that their country should be parcelled into four cantons, having separate capitals, separate magistrates and congresses, and that no one should marry, or purchase lands or houses out of his canton.

After this he called in the Ætolians: but his inquiries were directed to determine, not who had done the wrong, or who had suffered it, but who had favoured or opposed the Romans in the war. He acquitted the murderers, confirmed them in power, and ratified their sentences of exile and confiscation: and only condemned Bæbius for lending Roman soldiers as agents of massacre. This iniquitous decision gave new confidence to the servile tools of Rome in every state: the patriots generally gave way to the season, and the betrayers of their country were appointed without opposition to all magistracies and public missions. Calliærales, Charops, Lyciscus, and the rest, flocked in to Æmilius in Macedonia: they died

with each other in slandering their more honest fellow-citizens; and all whom it pleased them to accuse as secret enemies of Rome, were demanded by the proconsul, and sent to Italy to answer for their conduct.

With the Achaïans only the commissioners went to work more indirectly; for they feared lest they should refuse compliance, and perhaps put Callicrates and his fellow traitors to death. Besides, in examining the writings taken from Perseus, they found no letters from any Achaïan. However, they selected two of their number as ambassadors to the Achaïans. These declared that some of the leaders of the nation had assisted Perseus both with money and otherwise, required a vote condemning them to death, and said that when this was passed they would state their names. The assembly cried out against the injustice of the proposal, and demanded that the men should be named and tried before they were sentenced: whereupon the Romans answered, by the advice of Callicrates, that all who had recently been generals of the Achaïans were involved in the charge. This called up Xenon, a man of high consideration: "I," he said, "have lately been general, but I know myself guiltless towards the Romans, and am ready to answer for my conduct either here or at Rome." The ambassadors caught at the unguarded expression, and demanded that all who were accused should be examined before the senate. Under this pretence they sent to Rome all those whom Callicrates pointed out, in number above a thousand. The senate without hearing them placed them under guard in different cities of Etruria. To an embassy sent by the Achaïans to request that the men might be either brought to trial at Rome, or sent back to be tried in their own country, the senate affected to consider them as already condemned by their fellow-citizens. Driven out of this subterfuge by a second embassy, which fully stated the true features of the case, the senate answered that they deemed it not for the good of Achaïa that those men should return. Many embassies were sent with no better success. At length, after seventeen years, when scarce three hundred of them were left, the rest having died in prison, or suffered death for attempting to escape, the survivors, among whom was Polybius, were allowed to return.

Such was the treatment vouchsafed by Rome to men, whose sole offence was fidelity to their country; and such the paltry trickery by which her oppressions were facilitated.

Æmilius again assembling the Macedonians bade them chuse their council of state, and then published a list of Macedonian chiefs, whom he required to go into Italy with their grown-up children. This, Livy says, though apparently harsh, was really a safeguard to the general liberty against men accustomed to obey the king, and domineer over his subjects. It is far more probable that they were dreaded, not as oppressors, but as leaders, who might unite their countrymen against oppression: especially since the ordinary Macedonian government, though irregular, was far from being despotic. Æmilius gave out a code of laws for the province, of which the Roman historian speaks with high commendation. Lastly, he set forth a splendid feast from the spoils of Macedonia, and then went out from the bosom of rejoicing to do a deed, perhaps the foulest in the black and bloody chronicles of Roman conquest.

The fear of oppression, we may remember, had driven most of the Epirots to revolt; but they do not seem to have been active in the war. All however whom it pleased the Romans to accuse of any disaffection towards them, had already been arrested and sent into Italy. Nevertheless the senate, to gratify the soldiers without diminishing the Macedonian treasure, had resolved to give up all the cities of Epirus to pillage that had shewn any favour to Perseus. Æmilius being ordered to execute the decree sent officers to each, who professed that they were come to withdraw the garrisons, so that the Epirots might be free like the Macedonians. He summoned ten chiefs from every place, and charged them to deliver up the gold and silver in their towns. Troops were sent to the devoted cities, and their departures were so arranged that all might arrive on the same day at their several destinations. The commanding officers had secret orders what to do. On the appointed morning the treasure was collected, and then the signal for plunder was given. Each city was stripped of everything valuable, its walls were demolished, and its inhabitants made slaves. In one day seventy towns were ruined, and 150,000 persons sold into bondage. This was done in time

of peace, for a slight offence, and one for which the sufferers had been taught to believe that their excuses were accepted: yet the body which commanded it was wont to boast itself the only power on earth which never failed in faith, justice, or humanity; and the agent in the villainy esteemed himself, was esteemed by his countrymen, has been registered by annalists, and commemorated by orators, as a spotless pattern of integrity. Contempt of riches was among the virtues which the Romans vaunted as peculiarly their own. Their officers were commonly proof against personal corruption to a degree that surprised the Greeks; and Æmilius himself, after larger revenues had passed through his hands than through those of any former Roman general, was obliged to sell a part of his lands for the purpose of procuring ready money. Yet the only motive to the desolation of Epirus was the wish to avoid diminishing a vast treasure newly won. How can these things be explained? By that disposition, everywhere too common, which prevailed at Rome to a more than usual extent, to make national interest the measure of justice, and national partiality that of truth: by the unexamining self-idolatry, which looks inward only for matter of praise, and is therefore really unconscious of impurities and inconsistencies, because it has never sought to find them out: by that wilful blindness and rooted unfairness of a mind, severe in its judgment of others, but unbouudedly indulgent to itself, which are the sins especially pointed at in the words, that "the heart of man is deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked."

The Roman generals now sailed for Italy, leaving Charops all powerful among the remaining inhabitants of Epirus. He quickly gathered about him a crew of plunderers and ruffians, and partly by their aid, and partly by the fear of Rome, he overbore all opposition. His enmity and his avarice alike required to be satiated by bloodshed. Men were slain in the public market or in their houses; others were waylaid and assassinated in the fields and highways; and confiscation ever followed on the heels of murder. The threat of banishment was another engine of extortion from the wealthy,—women as well as men. By this, Charops drew as much as he could from the principal persons in the city of Phœnice; and then, after receiving the

price of forbearance, he nevertheless commenced the threatened prosecution. The charge he made was of enmity to the Romans; and partly by persuasion, partly by fear, he prevailed on the people to doom the accused—not to exile—but to death. They fled to avoid the execution of the sentence, and Charops went to Rome to get his act confirmed by the senate. Here he was disappointed. Æmilius Paullus, though he had not refused to execute the worst decrees of his employers, had yet virtue enough to be displeased with the encouragement given to flatterers and false accusers. He marked his opinion of Charops, by refusing him admission into his house: and his judgment, thus expressed, prevailed with the senate to withhold their approbation of the proceedings that had taken place. They declared that they would send commissioners to inquire into the matter; but Charops suppressed the real answer, and forged one according to his wishes. He died soon after, probably on his return, for the place of his decease was Brundisium in Italy, the port from which the passage into Greece was commonly begun. Epirus thus was freed from an intolerable tyranny; and about the same time Ætolia was no less fortunate in the death of Lyciscus. These deaths took place in the eleventh year after the defeat of Perseus.

We must return to the affairs of Peloponnesus. The reward of the Achæians for their unfailing fidelity as allies of Rome, was that, as soon as the Romans were strong enough to dispense with their voluntary services, they strove to weaken them as much as possible, that they might be the less able to withstand oppression. Three years after the return of Æmilius to Italy, C. Sulpicius Gallus was sent into Greece, and instructed to sever as many cities as possible from the Achæian league. Among those inclined to abandon the league was the Ætolian town of Pleuron; and Gallus, according to his orders, supported its defection. What other success his mission may have had does not appear.

The Athenians were now in the deepest poverty: for they had been chief sufferers in the Macedonian war, and they had few resources for the recovery of their loss. Driven to extremity by want, they plundered their subjects of Oropus. The Oropians complained to Rome; and the senate, judging that they had suffered

wrong, commissioned the Sicyonians to lay a suitable fine upon the Athenians. The arbiters fined them six hundred talents; but the senate remitted all but one hundred. The Athenians, however, did not pay even this, but prevailed on the Oropians, by promises and gifts, to be reconciled to them, to receive an Athenian garrison into their town, and to give hostages to the Athenians, on condition that, if further wrong were done to the Oropians, the garrison should be withdrawn and the hostages restored.

Misconduct taking place on the part of the garrison, the Athenians were called on to evacuate the place. They denied the obligation; for their community, they said, was not to blame, and they were ready to punish the offending individuals. The Oropians carried their injuries to the Achæians; but they, through friendship to Athens, were loth to act against her. The complainants applied to Menalcidas the Lacedæmonian, who was general of the league, and promised him a gift of ten talents, if he would prevail on his people to assist them. He offered half the bribe to Callierates, and thereby secured his support: and by their joint influence the Achæians were induced to undertake the cause of the Oropians. As soon as this was known to the Athenians they withdrew their garrison from Oropus, having first plundered the inhabitants of every thing worth taking which they had spared before. The Achæians having come too late to save the Oropians from this mischief, Menalcidas and Callierates urged them to avenge it, by invading Attica: but this proposal was vehemently opposed, and the army finally broke up.

Menalcidas had not earned his money, but he did not fail to exact it. He then began to grudge Callierates his share, and after putting him off with excuses for a time, he ended with plainly refusing payment. Callierates revenged himself by a capital charge against Menalcidas, as having gone to Rome on embassies against the Achæians, and done his utmost to sever Lacedæmon from their confederacy. Menalcidas was now in the utmost danger; but he gave three talents to Diæus of Megalopolis, who succeeded him as general; and Diæus exerted himself with such effect that he saved him. How this was done is not recorded, but it seems to have been by some illegal stretch of power; and Diæus, finding that he was generally

condemned, thought it advisable to seek some topic of engrossing interest, which might divert the people from inquiry into his demerits.

There was some land upon the borders of Argolis and Læonia which had been claimed from ancient times as belonging to each. The dispute had been lately brought before the great council of the Achæians; but the Lacedæmonians had appealed from their decision to the Roman senate. That body answered that they must abide by the decision of the congress, except in questions of life and death: but Diæus, in reporting this answer to the Achæians, omitted the exception. The Achæians claimed authority in matters touching life, as well as in all other; the Lacedæmonians charged Diæus with falsehood, and again appealed to Rome: whereupon the Achæians quoted the law, that forbade each single state of the league to negotiate without the sanction of the rest. The quarrel broke out into a war. But the Lacedæmonians, knowing themselves the weaker party, began to treat with the Achæians and their general; and Diæus said he warred not with Lacedæmon, but with certain men who disturbed her quiet. Being asked to name them, he pitched on four-and-twenty men, the principal in Sparta. Agasisthenes, a leading Lacedæmonian, advised the accused, instead of staying and involving their country in war, to go to Rome, and trust to the Romans for their restoration. They departed accordingly, and were capitally condemned by the Lacedæmonians in their absence. Callierates and Diæus, were sent by the Achæians as ambassadors to Rome; Callierates died upon the way, but Diæus came before the senate; and vehement altercation ensued between him and Menalcidas, as the spokesman of the exiles. The senate answered, that it would send commissioners to judge between the contending states: but while the commissioners were journeying at their leisure, both Diæus and Menalcidas returned in haste to Peloponnesus, and each reported to his own community that judgment was given in its favour. Thus fed with false hopes by their respective ambassadors, the Achæians and Lacedæmonians both prepared for war.

About a year before, Macedonia had revolted from the Romans, under one Andriscus, a man of low birth, who pretended to be a son of Perseus. He had invaded Thessaly, but had been

repulsed by the Roman prætor Scipio Nasica, assisted by the Achaïans and some other Greeks. Juventius Thalna, who succeeded Nasica, was defeated and killed, in an attempt to enter Macedonia: and about the time of which we have just been speaking, his place was filled by Q. Cæcilius Metellus. The latter sent to charge the Achaïans that, instead of going to war with Lacedæmon, they should await the coming of the Roman commissioners. His messengers found the Achaïan forces already entered into Laconia. Notwithstanding the mandates of the Roman commander, they fought and won a battle; and it was thought, that if Damocritus, their general, had pressed the pursuit, he might have taken their city, by entering with the fugitives. After this, instead of besieging the place, he carried on a petty warfare of incursions and plundering expeditions; and when he led his army home, he was charged with treachery, and condemned to pay a fine of fifty talents, which operated as a sentence of perpetual banishment.

Dæmus, who succeeded him, paid more attention to the remonstrances, which were now renewed by Metellus. He consented to a suspension of arms, and directed his policy in the mean time so as to win the voluntary adherence of the towns round Sparta. The truce was broken by the rashness of Menalcidas, who had been chosen general of Lacedæmon. He suddenly attacked the town of Iasus in Laconia, which was subject to the Achaïans. The popular voice was loud against him for thus needlessly renewing a hopeless contest, and in a despairing mood he ended his life by poison.

At length the long-expected commissioners arrived at Corinth, and declared the will of the senate: that Lacedæmon, Argos, Corinth, Heracleia, and Orchomenus in Arcadia, should no more belong to the Achaïan confederation. Polybius thought that the senate did not mean this mandate to be executed, but only held it out as a threat, to humble the pride and chastise the disaffection of the Achaïans. If this be true, it little extenuates their injustice. The fidelity of the Achaïans, as allies, had been irreproachable, and their errors had been on the side of undue submission, and not of unjustifiable resistance. They were accused of pride because they wished to be something more than the mere shadow of a nation; because they would not

suffer their popular assemblies to be mere courts for registering the edicts of the senate. Their disaffection had not shown itself in any public action: but, granting its existence, it would have been warranted by foul wrongs repeatedly endured; and the only just means by which the senate could subdue it, would have been by endeavouring to merit kindlier feelings. To insult the nation with a threat of dismemberment was less atrocious indeed, but not less absolutely unjustifiable, than actually to dismember it: and, after all, the excuse which is made for the Romans amounts to no more than this, that they would suffer the Achaïans to continue incorporated, provided that all the acts of the incorporation might be wholly regulated by themselves. The resolution of the senate excited the Achaïans to a burst of intemperate fury, such as often occurs when oppression is brought home to the feelings of the multitude. This is the more lamentable, since the good cause is apt to suffer for the sins of its fallible supporters. Where power is arrayed against right, it goes well with the oppressor if he can put his victim in the wrong in some particular instance; for the greater part of mankind are fitter to scrutinize the details of a quarrel than to comprehend its general bearings; and there are many good men, but weak in goodness, who will scruple to contend for the better cause, unless they altogether approve of their associates. The Achaïans in their anger arrested all the Lacedæmonians whom they found in the streets, and even tore from the houses of the Roman ambassadors such of them as had taken refuge there. The ambassadors, returning home, exaggerated their ill-treatment, and falsely imputed it to the deliberate will of the nation. The senate, however, did not proceed to extremities, but sent Sextus Julius Cæsar, a prudent and temperate man, to settle the matter peaceably, if possible.

This unexpected moderation came too late. There were spirits among the Achaïans that were madly bent on dragging their country into war, whether through mere turbulence, or through the fear that they might be the sacrifice for peace. The old attachment of the people towards Rome had been turned into bitterness by repeated provocations, and they were now readiest to listen to those who spoke most harshly of the senate. When Julius came before the congress, he addressed them mildly, extenuated the insult to the former ambassadors,

and while he exhorted them to forbear further breaches of friendship, said little of atonement for the past. This the turbulent party regarded as a proof, not of moderation, but of weakness; for the Roman arms had suffered some reverse both in Africa and Spain. Nevertheless a friendly answer was given, and the ambassadors were asked to go to Tegea, to be present at a conference which should there be held with ministers from Lacedæmon for the purpose of settling the matters in dispute. Julius went to Tegea, and requested the Lacedæmonians to attend the conference, and to make arrangements for a peaceable discussion of the existing differences, and for the suspension of all hostilities till the Romans should send commissioners to arbitrate between the contending parties. But Critolaus, who had succeeded Diaeus as chief magistrate of the Achæans, was determined that the meeting should be to no purpose. He went indeed himself to Tegea, but he prevented the other delegates from repairing thither: and when the Lacedæmonians were ready to enter into the discussion, he professed that he could not decide on anything, but that he would submit their proposals to the Achæan congress, which would meet within six months. Julius dismissed the Lacedæmonians, and returned to Rome full of resentment. Critolaus, in the course of the winter, visited the several cities, under the pretence of giving an account of the conference at Tegea. Whithersoever he came, he misrepresented the conduct of the ambassadors, and exasperated the multitude to the utmost against Rome. He also directed the magistrates to suspend all actions for debt during the war with Lacedæmon: and hereby he won the rabble to be entirely at his disposal.

Metellus, by this time, had overthrown Andriceus and re-conquered Macedonia. On receiving news of the disturbances in Peloponnesus, he sent thither ambassadors instructed to pursue a conduct like that of Julius. Some few there were among the Achæans who supported the arguments of the ambassadors; but the many derided them, and drove them from the assembly with shouts of insult. Critolaus inveighed against the tyranny of the Romans, and accused his opponents of cowardice and treachery. A vote was passed for the renewal of war with Lacedæmon; and the general, contrary to all the principles of the constitution, was invested with arbitrary authority in

the conduct of it. The Thebans also, and the inhabitants of Chalcis, took part with the Achæans in the contest: the former, on account of a judgment given against them by the Romans, the latter, for some cause unknown.

Metellus, wishing to have the credit of finishing the war before he was superseded by the consul L. Mummius, his appointed successor, again sent to offer pardon to the Achæans, if they would consent to the separation of Lacedæmon from their body, and of the other states which had been named by the senate. At the same time he advanced through Thessaly with his army. His overtures being rejected, he marched against the Achæan forces, then besieging Heracleia, because it would not adhere to their confederacy. Critolaus, on hearing of his approach, retreated hastily. So blinded was he by terror, that he passed through the defile of Thermopylæ without once offering to make a stand there. Metellus overtook the retreating army, and entirely defeated it, near Scarpheia in the eastern Locris. Critolaus was never seen after the battle, but he was supposed to have perished in a neighbouring morass.

It was the custom of the Achæans, when their general died in office, that his authority should devolve upon his predecessor. Diaeus, therefore, took the place of Critolaus, and resorted, forthwith, to the most violent measures, in order to provide the means of carrying on the war. He summoned all the able-bodied citizens to arms, and filled up his battalions with emancipated slaves. He recruited the exhausted treasury, by compelling the rich to make large contributions, which were nominally free gifts. The people now began to feel the evils of the war, and gloomily to anticipate its impending dangers. They were troubled at losing their slaves and their property; and the pride of freemen in a slave-holding community was wounded by seeing their bondmen put on a level with themselves. They praised the fortune of the slain, and pitied those who were going to the war. The women lamented that they had contributed their money, as if it had been intentionally, to the certain destruction of their sons. Yet, though every place was full of discontent and fearful expectation, no attempt was made to stop the measures of Diaeus; but it seemed as if the people were possessed by a spirit of despondency, which alike unfitted them for

timely submission and for vigorous resistance. Most lamentable of all was the behaviour of the Patrians, and the men of certain towns associated with them, who had been discomfited in Phocis, after the battle of Scarpheia. Some slew themselves, others fled wildly from their dwellings, without knowing or thinking whither to bend their steps. Some seized their fellows and delivered them to the Romans; some acted as sycophants and false accusers, though no sign had yet been given that such service would be acceptable; some met the conqueror as suppliants, confessed that they had erred, and besought forgiveness, though their conduct had not yet been brought into question.

Metellus meanwhile advanced to Thebes; for the Thebans had shared with the Achaians in the siege of Heraclia and the subsequent battle. The city was abandoned by the inhabitants at his approach. He entered it, but he would not suffer his soldiers to damage the buildings, nor to kill or make prisoners the fugitives. From Thebes he went to Megara. The Achaian garrison retired at his approach, and the gates were opened to him. He then advanced to Corinth, where Diaeus had shut himself up. Still earnestly desiring to finish the war, he renewed his offers of peace through some leading Achaians; whether prisoners, or, which seems probable, ambassadors who had come to him on some mission from the nation. Thus he endeavoured by moderation to atone for the original injustice of his commonwealth, while the Achaians, who had right upon their side in the outset, still continued to do their utmost towards putting themselves in the wrong. Yet the Romans were partly to blame even for this; for they had robbed the Achaians of their best and wisest patriots, and kept down any who might have worthily replaced them; so that now, when the servile flatterers of Rome had become a curse and a by-word among the people, there were few to take the lead, save reckless incendiaries.

The Achaian chiefs who came from Metellus warmly urged the acceptance of his terms, and they wanted not supporters within the city: but Diaeus and some others, who despaired of forgiveness, were bent to stake their country's fortune and their own upon one cast. To raise an insuperable bar to reconciliation, they accused the ambassadors of traitorous dealings with the enemy, and

threw them into prison. Sosicrates, the lieutenant-general, was joined in the charge. He had supported, it was said, the sending an embassy to Metellus, and, in short, he was author of all the mischiefs—one of those convenient generalities that serve to cloak injustice, when the trick is favoured by loose and arbitrary proceeding. He was condemned and racked to death, without making any of those disclosures which his tormentors looked for. His savage treatment produced a reaction in the popular mind in favour of the ambassadors; yet their release was not obtained without a bribe to Diaeus, who could not forego his wonted venality, even in this extremity of peril.

Meanwhile, the consul Mummius, arriving with a powerful army, sent Metellus and his forces back into Macedonia. He himself engaged in the siege of Corinth. The besiegers were careless through the confidence of strength, and the Achaians, making a sudden sally, drove in their outposts, and killed and wounded many of them. Encouraged by this success, they came out and offered battle. The consul was not slow to accept it. The Achaian cavalry fled at the first onset, but the foot maintained the fight with desperate resolution, against an enemy very superior in force. At length they were broken by an attack in flank, and finally routed. If Diaeus now had retreated into Corinth, assembled the relics of the beaten army, and prepared for a resolute defence, he might probably have obtained some tolerable terms for his country, from the eager desire of Mummius to finish the war before his command expired. Instead of this he fled to Megalopolis, where he killed his wife to save her from captivity, and then ended his own life by poison.

The Achaians who had escaped from the battle into Corinth, thus abandoned by their leader, made no attempt at defence. They silently withdrew in the following night, and most of the Corinthians did the same. The gates were left open, but Mummius hesitated awhile to enter, for he feared an ambushade. On the third day after the battle, he entered the city. He cruelly slaughtered most of the men whom he found there, sold the women and children, and pillaged and burnt the town, after selecting the most celebrated works of art, and shipping them for Rome. The pretence for all this destruction was the insult offered to the Roman commissioners:

the true motive was the wish to deprive the Achaïans of a fortress important both from its strength and situation.

The senate had appointed ten commissioners to assist the consul in settling the affairs of Greece; but before they came he had already demolished the walls and disarmed the inhabitants of the cities that had sided with the Achaïans. The commissioners abolished democracy in all the states, and directed that the magistrates should be chosen according to a scale of property. They also put down the national assemblies, and forbade the purchase of lands by any man beyond the boundaries of his state: though these two latter regulations were soon afterwards recalled. From this time forward Greece, with the exception of Thessaly, was reduced to a Roman province, under the name of Achaia, and a Roman magistrate was annually sent out to govern it. Epirus and Thessaly were included in the province of Macedonia.

Shortly before the arrival of the ten commissioners, Polybius returned into Greece. His qualities had won respect and favour from many distinguished Romans. He had been the most valued friend, adviser, and instructor of P. Scipio Æmilianus, the son of Æmilius Paulus, and the adopted grandson of Africanus. He accompanied Scipio when sent as consul into Africa, and was with him at the taking of Carthage; after which he returned to his native country, in time to try how far his favour with the Romans might enable him to mitigate its sufferings. Among other more serious insolencies of conquest, some worthless fellow accused Philopœmen as an enemy to Rome, and urged the commissioners to break his statues, and abolish the honours paid to his memory. Polybius spoke in behalf of his father's friend. He did not dwell on the poorness of the proposed revenge, nor on the obvious fact that Philopœmen owed allegiance to the Achaïan only, and not to the Roman commonwealth: these considerations, though true and just, would not have been well received. But he spoke of the trying and dangerous occasions on which the Achaïan hero had played the part of a faithful ally to Rome; and either his person or his arguments were so acceptable to the commissioners, that they not only refrained from the suggested baseness, but at his request they restored some statues of Aratus

and Philopœmen which had been taken out of Peloponnesus to be sent to Rome. For this the Achaïans erected a marble statue of Polybius himself.

Another mark of favour was shown by the commissioners to Polybius—the permitting him to fix on any thing, and take it freely, among the confiscated effects of Diæus. However, he declined the offer, and dissuaded his friends from being purchasers at any sales of confiscated property. The commissioners at their departure appointed Polybius to make a circuit among the cities, that he might explain the laws and practice of the constitution which the Romans had given them, and might determine their controversies, until they were sufficiently accustomed to their new institutions to administer the government according to them. This commission he seems to have executed with great ability; and high honours were conferred on him in the Achaïan cities on account of it.

CHAPTER XVII.

Of the state of Greece under the Roman dominion.

SECT. I.—FOR many ages after the fall of the Achaïan confederacy the history of Greece is that of an oppressed and degraded province. The states, indeed, retained, for the most part, a form of government nominally republican, but constituted according to the pleasure of the Romans, and not according to the wishes or interests of the people. All authority was placed in the hands of the wealthier classes; and if any person were aggrieved by a decision of the magistrates, the appeal was not to a more popular tribunal, but to the Roman governor. Few, indeed, have been the cases in the history of the world where the moral superiority of the conquerors to the conquered has been such that an arrangement like this could be beneficial. In ordinary instances the effect must be, either that maladministration would be without redress, the foreign officer being biassed in favour of the delinquent by the love of ease and the habits of personal intercourse; or else that frivolous complaints would be encouraged, so that the magistrates, finding their lives and fortunes at the

proconsul's mercy, might be deterred from opposing his arbitrary will or checking his capacity. In truth, the oppressions of the Roman officers were far greater than any that would probably have been exercised by the native aristocracy: for these, in the want of any immediate popular control, had the natural sympathy with persons allied to them by manners, language, and blood; and the wish, almost universal among men, to stand well in the esteem of those with whom their lives were to be passed: whereas the others were strangers, widely differing in manners from the Greeks, and despising all from whom they differed; sent out for a year, and intending in that time to improve a flourishing, or recruit a shattered fortune.

These were evils of which the full development did not immediately follow the conquest; for personal avarice and corruption were not yet prevalent vices among the Roman magistrates. But the destruction of national energy in Greece, and of all the bolder and manlier virtues, were ends to which the policy of Rome had been continually tending, even before Achaia was reduced to the state of a province. These virtues and that energy were quickly stifled by the pressure of the Roman yoke, and by the exclusion of the Greeks from all important political action: but they had previously existed in a greater degree than was willingly admitted by the Romans, whose pride avenged itself for the loss of their civilization of the Greeks, and for their acknowledged pre-eminence in the refinements of literature and art, and in the heights and depths of philosophical speculation, by proclaiming and exaggerating their inferiority in courage, constancy and practical wisdom. It is a common error, arising perhaps from the evident degeneracy of the two most celebrated commonwealths, those of Athens and Lacedæmon, to suppose that the spirit of freedom was extinct in Greece from the time of Alexander downwards. It was, indeed, violently overborne for a while by the power of his contending successors, assisted by the factious animosities of their respective partisans in the several cities: but though it slept it was not dead, as was shown by the rapid growth of the Achaian league. This latter body need not shrink from comparison with any that Grecian history can show. If it was, as seems in-

separable from a federal community, less prompt and energetic in its conduct than Athens, or even than Lacedæmon, it was superior to both in sound and liberal policy, in justice, and in moderation. Its circumstances, however, were by far less favourable. It had a difficult game to play between the ambition of the Macedonian and Spartan kings and the turbulence of the Ætolians: but from the time when Rome appeared upon the stage, its doom was sealed. The power of Rome might, perhaps, have been resisted by an union of the Greeks, such as was formed against the Persian; but her artful policy completely ensured that no such union would take place: nor ought it to be made a charge against the Greeks, that they failed to withstand the most formidable combination of force and craft which the world had ever seen; especially as in the first instance they wanted the information which would have enabled them rightly to value the pretensions of the senate to disinterested generosity. As the course of history does not confirm their imputed political degeneracy, so it bears the most decided testimony to the preservation of their military courage. Philopœmen's soldiers were no whit inferior in bravery, nor in aptitude for discipline, according to the practice of their nation, to those of Flamininus or Æmilius Paulus. If a Roman army was for the most part a better instrument of war than an equal number of Greeks or Macedonians, the cause of the difference is to be sought in the nature of the phalanx, which, after triumphing over every previous system of tactics, gave way in its turn to the Roman legion, as an organization but little inferior in force, and far surpassing it in pliability and readiness of adaptation to different circumstances.

We cannot, from the scanty notices remaining, completely trace the gradual decay of national energy and prosperity; it may suffice to mention some particulars illustrating the condition of the Greeks, when the Roman empire had reached its greatest extent, and when its system of provincial government had been fully developed. But first we will briefly touch on the war which was waged in Greece before that period, between the Romans and the generals of Mithridates, king of Pontus.* (B. C. 87.)

* The word Pontus, which signifies the sea, is commonly used by Grecian writers for a specific designation of the Euxine sea. From the sea itself it is

When nearly the whole of Lower Asia had been brought under the immediate dominion of Rome, or under that of her vassal monarchs, a rival power arose in that of Mithridates, an able, brave, and high-spirited, but cruel and faithless prince, who had much enlarged and strengthened his kingdom at the cost of his weaker neighbours. War soon broke out between him and the Romans, wherein he vanquished several armies, and quickly mastered Asia Minor, with most of the adjoining islands. In his bitter hate to Rome, he sent letters throughout Asia, commanding the people, on a stated day, to massacre all Italians in the country. The order was obeyed, as well through dislike of the Romans as through fear of the king; and eighty thousand persons are said to have perished in the slaughter. Mithridates then laid siege to Rhodes with all his forces both by sea and land; but the citizens defended themselves resolutely and successfully. After this Mithridates resolved to carry the war into Europe, and sent a fleet to Greece, and an army through Thrace into Macedonia.

The Athenians, for some unknown cause, had been fined by the Romans, and their magistrates forbidden to exercise their functions. Aristion, an Epicurean philosopher, being sent by them on an embassy to Mithridates, persuaded them, upon his return, to side with the king, assuring them that he would restore democracy, and would confer the greatest benefits both on the public and on individuals. The people followed his suggestions, and the chief men retired to Italy. Archelaus, who commanded the Asiatic fleet, subdued the island of Delos, which had revolted from the Athenians, restored it to them, and deposited his booty in their city. Under pretence of guarding it, he sent two thousand soldiers, by whose aid Aristion made himself tyrant of Athens, and slew or gave up to Mithridates all the friends of Rome. Archelaus, likewise, gained the Achaïans, Lacedæmonians, and Bœotians, and conquered the Cyclades, and other islands of the Ægean sea.

frequently transferred to the countries upon its shores, with which the Greeks had very important commercial intercourse; and by the Romans it is made to denote a particular region, comprising the greater part of the Asiatic coast of the Euxine sea, and extending from the skirts of Caucasus to the confines of Bithynia. It is in this last sense that the word is to be understood whenever the kingdom of Pontus is spoken of.

In the following year (B. C. 86) the consul Lucius Cornelius Sylla came into Greece. The command in the Mithridatic war had been disputed by arms between him and Caius Marius; and after a most savagely conducted struggle, Marius being overcome had escaped with difficulty from Italy, and his victorious rival carried his forces into Greece. The Bœotians submitted at his approach, and the other states that had taken part with Mithridates sent ambassadors to offer their obedience. Athens only held out. Sylla left one of his officers to besiege the city, while he himself attacked Peiræus, where Archelaus had shut himself up. After vainly assaulting the place, he set himself to the construction of battering engines upon a vast scale. For timber he cut down the sacred groves of Attica, the trees of the Academy, and those of the Lycæum: for money to carry on his operations, he pillaged the temple of Delphi. When his engines were completed he returned to the siege of Peiræus, which he continued through the winter: but all his attacks were baffled by Archelaus, and at last he desisted from the attempt, and turned all his forces against Athens.

That city was already suffering grievously from famine. Supplies were plentiful in Peiræus, for the fleet of Mithridates commanded the sea: but Sylla had taken and demolished the long walls that protected the communication between the city and its harbour, and his vigilance foiled every attempt of Archelaus to throw provisions into Athens. The miseries of the besieged were enhanced by the insolent profligacy of Aristion and his intimates, who wasted the stores of the garrison in debauchery, while the citizens were feeding on dogs and horses, and even on shoes and leathern bottles. The tyrant wantonly insulted the people in their sufferings. He refused a little oil to feed the holy lamp in the temple of Minerva, and when the priestess begged of him half a bushel of barley, he sent her in mockery that quantity of pepper. At length the people sent the councillors and priests to entreat that he would capitulate with the Romans, but he drove them from his presence with blows. Nevertheless when Sylla came in person against the city, he sent some of his own companions to treat for peace; who, instead of coming directly to the point, began to harangue about Theseus and other ancient heroes, and

the noble deeds of Athens against the Persian. The Roman cut them short by telling them that he came not to study rhetoric, but to punish rebels. Soon afterwards he took the city by a night attack, on a part of the wall that was unguarded. The soldiers by his order slaughtered all they met, till the blood ran out in streams through the gates: and many Athenians killed themselves in despair, expecting the utter desolation of their country. However, at the entreaty of some Athenian exiles, and of all the Roman senators in his camp, the destroyer stayed his course, and said that he would spare the living for the sake of the long since dead. Nevertheless he took from the Athenians the power of choosing magistrates and making laws; and he condemned Aristion to death, with his associates and ministers. After this he returned to the siege of Peiræus, and obliged Archelaus to abandon it, after a most resolute defence, and retire to Munychia. When Sylla had made himself master of Peiræus, he dismantled the ramparts, and burnt the store-houses and arsenal.

Archelaus soon quitted Munychia, and went into Thessaly, where he was joined by the army in Macedonia. With these he again advanced into Bœotia, where Sylla met him. In a great battle near Chæroneia the steadiness and discipline of the Romans triumphed over a vast superiority of numbers. Some time after, a second Asiatic army was sent into Greece, and was likewise overthrown.

Meanwhile the cruelties of Mithridates had driven Ephesus, and many other Asiatic cities to revolt. For fear of a general defection, he proclaimed liberty to the Grecian cities, remitted debts, and gave civil franchise to slaves and strangers. On hearing of the second defeat in Greece, he directed Archelaus to make peace on the best conditions he could obtain. Sylla was no less anxious to put an end to the war, for his enemies had regained the superiority in Italy. The terms, however, were not agreed on till Sylla had passed into Asia. Mithridates at length agreed to give up all his winnings in this war, to pay two thousand talents, and to deliver seventy of his galleys to the Romans. Sylla then prepared for his return into Italy, to wrest the government out of the hands of his foes. (B. C. 84.)

Before embarking he stayed for some time in Asia, to settle the government, and to enrich himself and his soldiers,

He commanded all slaves who had been freed by Mithridates to return to their masters. This gave rise to tumults; some cities revolted, and the Romans gave a loose to confiscation and slaughter. The partizans of Mithridates were every where severely punished, especially at Ephesus. Sylla then called a meeting of deputies at Ephesus, from all the cities of Asia. He reproached them with the benefits received from Rome, and with their ungrateful readiness to join Mithridates, and to execute his cruelties. For this he said they had in part been punished by the rapine and oppression of the master they had chosen; and the chief authors of the mischiefs had already suffered justice at the hands of the Romans. Nevertheless some further chastisement was due; but it should be tempered with regard to the Grecian name and to old friendship. He would only fine them to the amount of five years' tribute, besides his expenses in the war, and the usual taxes due from the province.

He sent parties of soldiers into all the towns to collect the sums required from each. The people were obliged to borrow money at high interest, and to mortgage their theatres and other public buildings. Furthermore, they were given up to the insolence and covetousness of Roman soldiers billeted upon them, each householder being obliged to pay to his unwelcome guest sixteen drachmæ a day (about nine shillings), and to entertain him, and any number of his friends he might think proper to invite. Nor did the proconsul defend them against the pirates, whom Mithridates had encouraged till they grew to such a pitch of strength and boldness, that they not only infested the seas, but attacked the towns. While Sylla was in Asia, they took and plundered Iassus, Samos, Clazomenæ, and Samothrace. After thus administering the affairs of the province, he set sail for Italy.

When the other Grecian states were brought under the dominion of Rome, the Rhodians alone retained their laws and liberties. They had indeed been obliged to lower their pretensions to absolute independence, and to become allies of Rome, which always implied a degree of subjection; but their political institutions were unchanged, and they were free from the interference of Roman magistrates in matters of internal administration. They still kept up their navy, and continued the exercise of

arms; and that they still had much of their ancient strength and spirit was amply proved by their resistance to Mithridates, when they alone, unaided by the Romans, withstood and repelled the fleets and armies of that monarch directed by his eminent ability, and urged forward by his determined will. It was probably in reward of their services on this occasion that Sylla made the town of Caunus in Caria, and many of the islands, tributary to them. They seem to have continued in their then condition till the civil war in the Roman empire, which followed the death of Cæsar, in the course of which their city was taken by Cassius, and plundered of nearly all its riches.

The war with Mithridates was resumed and continued, with many changes of fortune, till that prince was entirely stripped of his possessions, and driven to kill himself that he might not fall into his enemies' hands; but the supremacy of Rome over the Greeks, both in Europe and Asia, was not again brought into question. This supremacy was exercised by the provincial governors, who were usually taken from the principal magistrates of the foregoing year, and styled proconsuls or proprætors, according to the office they had borne. These governors commanded the forces, and directed the general administration; they also exercised the judicial power, at least in all matters concerning the state, and in all wherein either party was a Roman. They were restrained by certain rules in the exercise of authority over their countrymen, whom they could not punish with death or stripes, unless condemned after a regular trial, with all the forms of Roman law. But those who were not citizens of Rome, either by birth or by adoption, might be scourged or slain by the most summary and arbitrary process. Add to this that though the private differences of the provincials were usually decided by their municipal courts, appeal might always be made to the governor, who could overrule the decision and condemn the judges; but if any wrong were done by the governor, redress was only to be sought at Rome, at great expense and even hazard, and with a strong probability that the culprit would be screened by family interest, or by the fellow-feeling of similar delinquents.

This system could not fail to be fruitful in abuses; but all its evils were most fully developed by the manner in which

these offices were filled. In the then corrupted state of Roman manners, the ordinary road to consulships and prætorships was to squander money in bribery and public shows. In so doing the candidates looked forward to the provincial governments, which always followed in the train of high offices in the city; and calculated that, by squeezing the unhappy tributaries, they would more than reimburse themselves for the money which they had lavished on the gratification of the ruling people. We cannot then wonder at the general prevalence of extortion and oppression, which a slight acquaintance with the history of the Roman provinces will lay before us.

"It is admirable," says Cicero in a letter to his brother, "that you should so have governed Asia for three years, that no statue, no picture, no precious vessels nor rich tapestry, no slaves, no offers of money for the perversion of justice, should have turned you aside from the highest uprightness and purity of conduct. But what can be conceived so excellent or so desirable, as that that virtue, that contentedness, that freedom from covetous desires, should not lie hid in darkness, but should be set in the broad light of Asia, in the sight of a most conspicuous province, and in the hearing of all nations? that men should not be frightened by your journeys, exhausted by your expenses, disturbed at your arrival; that whithersoever you come there should be joy, both publicly and privately; the city receiving you as a guardian, not as a tyrant, and the house where you lodge as a guest, not as a plunderer." A goodly picture of the feelings which usually attended the march and welcomed the arrival of a Roman magistrate; not to mention the special praise attached in the beginning of the passage to the abstinence from practices, of which the very suggestion would, in a purer state of morals, have been repelled as an insult. But if a particular instance be needed, hear what Cicero says, when sent into Cilicia, of the state in which his predecessor left the province. "I heard of nothing but complaints of the poll taxes, and that all were selling their estates; I heard groans and mourning in the cities; portentous actions, not of a man, but of a savage beast."

Even when the governor was personally incorruptible, his officers, and even his servants, would often traffic on

the credit of their influence over him, real or pretended. This is a danger inseparable from arbitrary government, and especially when administered by foreign and temporary residents. But the proconsul and his train were not the only privileged oppressors. Large powers were given to the society of publicans,* or farmers of the revenue, who often abused them to a great extent. Of this the senate was not unaware, even so early as the conquest of Macedonia; for in a decree of that period, quoted by Livy, it is observed, that wherever the publicans are employed, either the revenues are cheated, or else the subjects are oppressed. The publicans were all from the class of knights, the second order in the Roman commonwealth; and it will readily be supposed that in any disputes between them and the provincials, the interests and habits of the governor would generally bias him in favour of those who were the most capable of serving or harming him.

The list of bloodsuckers does not end here. There were certain officers at Rome (the *ædiles*) to whose office it belonged to exhibit shows for the gratification of the people; and the display of more than usual magnificence in these was the readiest way to popular favour. If an *ædile* had a friend in any of the provincial governors, he was generally supported in defraying a part of his expenses by forced contributions from some tributary city. Nay, so prevalent was this custom, that if any unfashionably conscientious proconsul refused to countenance such extortions, complaint was made as if of a breach of friendship, or a lawful right improperly withheld. Roman merchants and money lenders swarmed in the provinces, who generally took care to be provided with letters from Rome, recommending them to the governor, and trusted more to favour than to justice in their disputes with the native inhabitants. The money lenders in particular took advantage of the distresses into which the cities were plunged

to make loans at the most exorbitant interest, giving little attention to the question of securities or ability to pay. On these points, instead of exercising an ordinary prudence, they too-often confided in their influence with the governor, that he would support them in the most violent measures for the recovery of their dues. It was common to give them commands in the province, expressly with the view of enabling them to employ their official authority in enforcing the satisfaction of their private claims. Of the length to which this abuse might be carried we have a scandalous instance in the case of one Scaptius, who having a heavy claim upon the city of Salamis, in Cyprus, for a loan bearing interest at 48 per cent., obtained from Cicero's predecessor in Cilicia a command in the island, and a troop of horse to be at his disposal, with which he shut up the council in their hall till five of them were starved to death.

Another instance of the tyranny exercised over the unfortunate provincials is, that they were not only deterred from transmitting complaints to Rome, but frequently compelled to send deputations, at a vast expense, to bear witness to the moderation of their plunderers, and the benevolence of their oppressors. However shamefully a proconsul may have misconducted himself, when he quitted his government it seldom happened but that he was followed by flattering embassies. It was thus even with C. Verres, proprætor of Sicily, against whose unexampled atrocities the voice of the province was lifted almost unanimously, as soon as the people had an opportunity of safely venting their real sentiments.

Having specified some of the evils of Roman dominion, we have now to look for the countervailing advantages, such as they were. When the conquered nations were poor and rude, these advantages were great, though even then apparently insufficient to outweigh the degrading effects of their subjection. They here comprised the introduction of better laws, more polished manners, greater mental culture, and altogether of a more advanced civilisation; the establishment of peace and order, at least to some degree; the increase of riches; the erection of noble works for public utility and magnificence. But few of these benefits could be needed by Greece, or by those countries which had

* These publicans must not be confounded with the low and degraded persons so called in the English translation of the New Testament. The latter were the actual tax-gatherers, mostly Jews of mean condition, and despised by their countrymen for consenting to act as ministers of a foreign usurpation, and servants of a people hated as tyrants, and looked down on as strangers to the law and the promise. The proper publicans, Roman gentlemen of wealth and rank, would have been much surprised to find themselves in the company in which the others generally appear; from whom, indeed, they differed as much as a commissioner of excise from a common gauger.

felt the influence of Grecian civilisation. In intellectual culture, in useful arts and elegant accomplishments, the Greeks were not the scholars but the masters of the Romans. In politics and jurisprudence they may have been, to a certain degree, inferior to them, but assuredly not so far as to need that their errors should be set right by the arbitrary interference of a foreign governor. With respect to the magnificence displayed in public works, there is no doubt that many Grecian cities were largely benefited in this manner by the favour of the emperors; but the sums thus spent in adorning particular places bore but a small proportion to those which were drawn from all the cities of the provinces; and when we consider the taste, the love of splendour, and the public spirit of the Grecian race in general, there can be little doubt, that if the people had been left to develop and employ their own resources without constraint, the aggregate of beauty and conveniences produced would have been far greater than that which resulted from the partial bounty of the distant sovereign.

It appears that the benefits of Roman rule over Grecian cities are chiefly to be looked for in protection against foreign war and civil broils. There were drawbacks, however, even to these advantages. For the fierce debates in the popular assemblies, and bloody struggles which sometimes ensued, there was often substituted a war of slander and underhand intrigue. Power and riches were to be gained by the favour of the proconsul: that favour was to be courted by flattery and corrupt subservency, and to be maintained in its exclusiveness by defamation of rivals; and thus calumny, falsehood, and all baseness, succeeded, if not to virtues, at least to vices of a manlier cast, and less irretrievably degrading. The acute and versatile genius of the nation enabled them, as they had led the way in all more generous arts, to be also preeminent in devising the most ingenious methods of self-debasement. At once depraved and impoverished by the manner of their government, they threw out swarms of adventurers to seek their fortunes as buffoons, as parasites, as ready tools in every mean and contemptible service. For this they are severely lashed by the Roman satirists: though really, in the time of Juvenal, the Romans appear to have been but little less servile, however

their inferiority in suppleness and quickness of perception may have made their adulation less successful.

Even in respect of outward tranquillity, the sway of Rome was not productive of unmixed advantage to the Grecian cities. They were, after the defeat of Mithridates, effectually secured against attack from any foreign enemy of overwhelming power; but they seem to have been more exposed to the attacks of robbers and pirates than while they trusted for their defence to their own energy and warlike spirit. The protecting force was then on the spot, and prompt and vigorous action was ensured by personal interest and danger. But the troops of the Roman governor might be distant, or might be employed against enemies from whom he expected more of profit and of glory; and before they could be brought to the spot, the plunderers might be safe in their inaccessible fastnesses. If the governor failed in his duty, the cities were too much reduced in strength and spirit to be able to supply his deficiency. Accordingly, the trade of robbery seems to have prospered to a vast extent under the Roman government. In the rich and populous Sicily, where Syracuse and Acragas had defied attack from any force inferior to that of the mighty Carthage, it was one of the charges against Verres, that piratical fleets had infested the seas unopposed, and that the fleet of the propraetor had not ventured to face them. For the state of Asia, we may again refer to the praises bestowed by Cicero upon his brother. "You restored many cities ruined and almost abandoned, among which were the noblest respectively of Ionia and Caria, namely, Samos and Halicarnassus: you quelled the robberies in Mysia, put a stop to murder in many places, established peace throughout the province; and not only did you repress the robberies in the fields and highways, but also the greater and more numerous depredations in the towns and temples."

The evils here described were occasionally lightened by the prudence and humanity of a particular governor; nor is it to be supposed, even under the worst administration, that human life was one unmingled tissue of wretchedness and guilt. There is eating and drinking, and marrying, and giving in marriage, in the worst times as in the best; and there are certain pleasures,

pains, affections, and sensibilities, so closely inwoven in man's nature, that they never can be utterly severed from it. The strongest features are those which give their character to the picture. As in the brightest ages of a commonwealth there is much of hidden selfishness and dishonesty, both public and private, which escapes the eye of the historian; so in periods apparently teeming with nothing but tyranny, deceit, and shameless licentiousness, there may be many instances of humble integrity and contented industry in nooks and corners, far below the surface of society, condemned to obscurity by the very position which shelters them from the tide-way of national corruption. So far however as the characters of men are determined by the government under which they live, we need not doubt that the Roman conquest was most pernicious to that of the Greeks; nor that, even though we exclude the positive oppression and spoliation they so often suffered, the stagnation of energy resulting from their servitude was more destructive both to virtue and to happiness than all the storms of their turbulent independence.

That this was so in Greece is proved by its progressive depopulation. The rate of increase is not a measure of national prosperity. In every fully-peopled country it must necessarily be slow, and it is most desirable that it should be kept in check by habits of forethought. But in a happy and flourishing community, the multiplication of the people, however gradual, must go forward. A continued decline of the numbers of men is a proof of more rapid diminution in the means of their subsistence, and an index of long and painful struggles with want and wretchedness. Between the Persian wars and the death of Alexander, Mr. Clinton has inferred, from very careful investigation, that the average population of Greece was little less than that of Britain in 1821. Under the Roman dominion its state was very different. "Returning from Asia," says Servius Sulpicius, in his well-known letter of consolation to Cicero, upon the loss of his daughter, "as I sailed from Ægina towards Megara, I began to look out upon the regions round about. Behind me was Ægina, before me Megara; Peiræus on the right hand, Corinth on the left; all which towns, once so flourishing, now lay prostrate and ruined before my

eyes." The towns of Laconia in its flourishing state were nearly a hundred; in the time of Augustus, Strabo tells us, they were thirty. The condition of Arcadia was not more flourishing. "Mantineia, and Orchomenus, and Heræa, and Cleitor, and Pheneus, and Stymphalus, and Mænalus, and Methydrium, and Caphyæ, and Cynætha, either are no more, or exist but in ruins and faint traces." At the same time Thebes was a miserable village, and the other towns of Bœotia were little more, excepting Tanagra and Thespiae.

In short, the effects of the Roman conquest upon the condition of the Greeks tallied exactly with those of a similar change upon the Italian cities of the middle ages; and they cannot be better described than in the eloquent language applied to the latter by an illustrious countryman of ours, Algernon Sidney. "Whilst Italy was inhabited by nations governing themselves by their own will, they fell sometimes into domestic seditions, and had frequent wars with their neighbours. When they were free they loved their country, and were always ready to fight in its defence. Such as succeeded well, increased in vigour and power; and even those that were the most unfortunate in one age, found means to repair their greatest losses if their government continued. Whilst they had a propriety in their goods, they would not suffer their country to be invaded, since they could have none if it were lost. This gave occasion to wars and tumults; but it sharpened their courage, kept up a good discipline, and the nations that were most exercised by them, always increased in power and number. They sometimes killed one another, but their enemies never got any thing but burying-places within their territories. All things are now brought into a very different method by the blessed governments they are under. The fatherly care of the king of Spain, the pope, and other princes, has established peace among them. The thin half-starved inhabitants of walls supported by ivy, fear neither popular tumults, nor foreign alarms; and their sleep is only interrupted by hunger, the cries of their children, or the howling of wolves. Instead of many turbulent, contentious cities, they have a few scattered, silent cottages; and the fierceness of those nations is so tempered, that every rascally collector of taxes extorts, without fear, from

every man that which should be the nourishment of his family. The governors, instead of wearying their subjects in wars, only seek, by perverted laws, corrupt judges, false witnesses, and vexatious suits, to cheat them of their money and inheritance. This is the best part of their condition. Where these arts are used, there are men, and they have something to lose: but for the most part the lands lie waste, and they who were formerly troubled with the disorders incident to populous cities, now enjoy the quiet and peaceable estate of a wilderness.

"Again, there is a way of killing worse than that of the sword; for, as Tertullian says, upon a different occasion, *prohibere nasci est occidere* (to hinder birth is to kill). Those governments are in the highest degree guilty of blood which, by taking from men the means of living, bring some to perish through want, drive others out of the country, and generally dissuade men from marriage, by taking from them all ways of subsisting their families. Notwithstanding all the seditions of Florence, the horrid factions of Guelphs and Ghibellins, Neri and Bianchi, nobles and commons, they continued populous, strong, and exceeding rich; but in the space of less than a hundred and fifty years, the peaceable reign of the Medices is thought to have destroyed nine parts in ten of the people of that province. Machiavel reports, that in that time Florence alone, with the Val d'Arno, a small territory belonging to that city, could, in a few hours, by the scound of a bell, bring together a hundred and thirty-five thousand well-armed men: whereas now that city, with all the others in that province, are brought to such despicable weakness, emptiness, poverty, and baseness, that they can neither resist the oppressions of their prince, nor defend him or themselves if they are assaulted by a foreign enemy. This is not the effect of war or pestilence: they enjoy a perfect peace, and suffer no other plague than the government they are under. But he who has thus cured them of disorders and tumults, does, in my opinion, deserve no greater praise than a physician, who should boast there was not a sick person in a house committed to his care, when he had poisoned all that were in it." — *Discourses concerning Government*, chap. II. sect. 26.

— Yet great as were the mischiefs,

springing from the triumphant ambition of Rome, it does not therefore follow that her conquests were, upon the whole, a thing to be lamented by the world. Our views of consequences is short and dim; and when we see a mighty scheme of action carried through at a vast expense of blood and suffering, it is but reasonable to conclude, that some great end of a beneficent Providence must have been answered by it, or must be yet in progress, though we may be unable to know that end, and to trace the steps that lead to its fulfilment. The evils just described are natural results of a successful attempt at universal conquest—results which might have been, at least imperfectly, foreseen, and which now, with past experience to aid us, may be confidently foretold as likely to recur, if ever the like attempt shall be carried as far towards its completion. These therefore are the consequences upon which we are to reason in deducing lessons of human conduct, and assigning to each actor in the story his proper meed of praise or blame; and for this it is needless to search into the collateral purposes, of absolute wisdom, which may have been unwittingly carried forward by the oppressor, and opposed by the defender of his country. Nevertheless, in viewing the history of periods when the spirit of evil was apparently predominant, it is gratifying to see and comprehend, instead of darkly guessing, that these things were not suffered in vain. In the case now in question, adequate reasons are manifest. We cannot doubt that the successive conquests of Macedonia and Rome were the appointed, as they were the most effectual instruments, of preparing for the spread of the Christian revelation. A common language was furnished by the one, a common government established by the other; and, by the joint working of both, an easy and unrestricted communication was ensured through the whole of the then civilized world. In one man's life the gospel was preached from Syria to Spain; though it seems to have been in Grecian Asia that churches arose most rapidly and in the greatest number. Thus the very revolution which poisoned the springs of happiness and virtue, so far as either depended on national institutions, local attachments, and ancient habits of thinking and acting, was made the means of introducing a new morality, both loftier in principle, purer in prac-

tice, and more powerfully operative upon the actual dispositions of men.

SECT. II.—Though Athens had lost all political importance, it was not the less, under the empire of Rome, the intellectual capital of the civilized world, the centre of art, philosophy, and literature. Whatever excellence was attained in these departments by the Romans, may be traced, with few exceptions, to the influence of Grecian models. The Roman written drama was a copy of the Attic. The comic writers of the school of Aristophanes could not indeed be presented to a foreign audience, since their constant personal and political allusions, their allegories, their mythology, their burlesque extravagance of incident, were inseparably connected with the government and religion of ancient Athens. Their place was partly filled by the satirists, perhaps as a class the most successful, as they are certainly the most original of Roman writers. But the later comedy, which painted domestic incidents and ordinary characters, was freely imitated by Plautus and more closely by Terence. Even the scene was generally laid in Athens, and the persons, manners, and dresses were Athenian. The Attic tragedies were rendered into Latin by Nævius, Attius, Pacuvius, and others; but less happily, if we are to judge from the scanty fragments that have been preserved to us. We find the traces of Homer and of Theocritus in every page of Virgil's *Æneid* and *Bucolics*; and in the *Georgics*, the most original as well as the most perfect of his compositions, the poet evidently had Hesiod in his eye, though here he has by far surpassed his master. Even the Roman metres, epic, lyric, dramatic, or whatever other, are all derived from Greece; though there is reason to think that the metrical system of ancient times, as it appeared in inscriptions and legendary ballads, was of a kind entirely different.

We will now consider the effect produced by intercourse with Greece on Roman eloquence and philosophy. The first may be quickly dismissed. In a state which is governed by deliberative assemblies, oratory will always flourish, and its style will be generally less determined by any foreign models which the speaker may have studied, than by the temper, tastes, and habits of the people at large, or of the educated classes. From the Attic models, admirable as they are, the Roman orators probably gained less

in persuasive effect than in grace and finish. But in philosophy the case is very different. The genius of the Romans was by far more turned to war and politics than to abstract speculation. Before they had dealings with Greece they were utter strangers to philosophy, and when it was introduced, there were many zealots for old times, who foretold much evil that should arise from it. Even in after years the height of their ambition was to comprehend, enforce, and explain the doctrine of some favourite Grecian teacher, and this in the Greek language more frequently than in their own. An opinion became current that the Latin tongue was unfit for scientific discussions; though Cicero, in combating this prejudice, went so far as to affirm that it was yet fitter for them than the Greek. Even he, for the most part, did not attempt to break new ground, or to enlarge the boundaries of science by his own inquiries; but only to enrich his native speech with the doctrines and arguments of Grecian sages. Yet within these limits the study of philosophy came to be considered as a highly becoming, if not as a necessary part of a liberal education; and the Roman nobility were wont to send their sons to Athens, as to an university, to pass a year or two in hearing the most celebrated masters.

Athens, though the most celebrated seat of Grecian philosophy, was not its birth-place. A richer soil, a kinder climate, a greater freedom from formidable neighbours, had caused the Grecian cities on the coast of Asia to outstrip the mother country in the career of cultivation. The most ancient philosophers were chiefly from them, or from the Italian colonies, which rivalled them in early prosperity. But the growth of science in Ionia was checked by the calamities attending the Persian conquest, as it was in Italy by the widely spreading ruin which fell on the Grecian settlements, from the war in which Sybaris was destroyed by Croton, and the bloody revolutions that followed. Meanwhile in Athens we have seen what a burst of mental activity was produced by the stirring events and glorious issue of the Persian wars, and by the rapid growth of the commonwealth in power and glory. Foreign talent also became plentiful there. The imperial city was the natural resort of those among its subjects, who aspired to display their powers on a larger

stage than their own towns could furnish. Skilful artists of every kind were drawn together by the public and private wealth of the state, and the lavish expenditure of both on objects of popular gratification. Rhetoricians and sophists flocked to the place where the arts of persuasion were most valuable. Upon the whole, Athens acquired the fame, which it retained long after, of being the city where every talent and accomplishment might enjoy its most appropriate exercise, and receive its highest cultivation.

If this preeminence had been wholly founded on the power and riches of the people, it would probably have sunk with these into decay. But the Athenians were singularly fitted by nature and habits for their literary supremacy. The idleness in which they generally lived, when not engaged in military duties, was hurtful to them as men and citizens, but far otherwise as critics. Their activity of mind would not let itself be quenched in sluggish indifference or stupid sensuality; on the contrary, when withdrawn from the business of life, it was weighing beauties and faults of composition, or keenly battling with wit and argument on some disputed topic. In their national assemblies, Demosthenes complained that they were accurate judges of style and reasoning, but careless as to the matter under debate. In short, they were a people of literary idlers, eminently wanting in practical wisdom, but no less remarkable for critical acuteness and severity of taste. In those gifts they probably surpassed all numerous communities, before or since; except indeed upon some points, where a better taste has been inspired by a more enlightened morality.

The fame of Athens as a school of philosophy, was much promoted by the circumstance, that it was the birth-place of Socrates and Plato. The greatest earlier philosophers were commonly the founders of sects, each of which prevailed for the most part in some particular region, and thence received its name. Socrates founded no sect, and left behind him no written body of doctrines; but he improved the spirit of philosophical investigation, and cleared from the path of truth the thorns and briars and tangled weeds, the intricate systems of former philosophers and the quibbles of the sophists. So great was the influence of his cha-

racter and abilities, that of the sects which sprung up in after times there were few which did not rejoice to trace their origin to him. The chief of the Socratic sects were also followers of Plato. Among these was Aristotle, who both learnt and taught at Athens, though a native of Stageirus in Thrace. Nearly all the leaders of the Academy and its branches were either Athenians or foreigners resident in Athens.

The leading subject of inquiry among the Socratic sects was the nature of good and evil, of happiness and misery. Their various opinions on this point must here be noticed, both for its intrinsic importance, and because it was that on which they chiefly split. We need not dwell on their physical or logical science. In the latter they followed the principles of Aristotle, of whose merits we have spoken already; in the former their progress was hindered by the clog which hung upon natural philosophy till the age of Bacon and Galileo; the habit, namely, of attending solely to the process of deduction, and slighting that of observation and experiment, which was needful to assure them that their premises were sound, and that no important qualification had been omitted.

According to the Peripatetics and the old Academy, the highest good which man could enjoy was to live in entire conformity to the constitution of his nature, and in the possession of all things conducing thereto. Of particular good things they made a threefold division, as they belonged to the mind, the body, or the estate. The perfection of the mind was wisdom and virtue; that of the body, health, strength, and beauty, freedom from pain, acuteness of senses, and the like; that of the estate, power, riches, good repute, and personal influence, in such a measure as to furnish scope and means for honourable action. But as the mind is far superior in dignity to the material instruments by which she works—as the body was formed by nature for her, not she for the body—so all outward advantages, natural or civil, are, they said, as nothing, if compared with the transcendent worth of moral goodness. This alone would ensure the well-being of man, without worldly prosperity or bodily accomplishments: yet, if those were added to his portion, his well-being would be more complete. But if virtue were wanting, neither strength, nor beauty,

nor power, nor success, could save the man from being utterly miserable; for all these things were only good as being helpful to good deeds, but were worse than valueless, when made the instruments of vice.

Among the first who quitted the Academy were Pyrrhon and Ariston. They said that virtue was the only good, vice the only evil, and that all other things, such as health or sickness, pleasure or pain, were so utterly indifferent, that a wise man would not even have a choice between them. This, at least, was the doctrine of Pyrrhon, and that of Ariston differed but little from it. These tenets, however, were too violent and unnatural to have many followers.

Another secession was that of the Stoics, so called from a Greek word signifying a portico, the customary resort of Zenon, the founder, and Cleanthes and Chrysippus, his successors. Zenon, offended at the degree of importance allowed to outward things by the Academy, endeavoured to found his system on loftier principles, without running into the extravagance of Pyrrhon. In this he was not altogether successful. His views appear, when broadly stated, to tally with those of the last-named philosopher; when guarded with all the necessary qualifications, to be substantially the same with those of the Academy, but expressed in darker and less usual terms, and made the foundation of stranger conclusions.

He said that virtue was the only good, and vice the only evil, and that nothing else was to be pursued or avoided by the wise. The virtuous man was self-sufficient, and absolutely blessed; and not less blessed when expiring in torments, though death should be the end of his being, than when raised to the summit of temporal felicity, and seeing all his works of beneficence prospering around him. All outward things were indifferent to him; they could neither increase nor lessen his happiness. Nevertheless, of these indifferent things, there were some which he would take, and others which he would reject. They were not indeed properly good or evil; but they were to be chosen, though not to be coveted, or refused, though not avoided. It is obvious that these are really identical with the minor good and evil things of the Academy, which are stated to possess substantial value, but yet of so inferior a kind, that the greatest amount of worldly prosperity could

not be weighed against a single point of moral worth or intellectual perfection.

Zenon's principles, it seems, as far as action was concerned, differed little from those of Speusippus and Xenocrates; but the different manner of setting them forth was not without effect on the feelings of his followers. Their rule obliged them, when no higher duty interfered, to exert themselves for their own temporal advantage, and that of their friends; it also required them, having done their endeavour, to be perfectly careless as to the result. Success was to be chosen, but not to be coveted, since their moral character was unconcerned in it. Love, pity, sympathy with joy and grief, were forbidden as weaknesses unworthy of a philosopher. Even the ruin of the commonwealth was a thing to be prevented, but not to be sorrowed for. The human mind cannot be occupied for ever with abstract contemplation; it must find some object to rest upon with interest, either in itself or in others; and little knowledge of mankind is required to perceive, that if Stoicism had gone to its utmost conceivable extent in the breast of any individual, the affections it displaced would only have made room for the most enormous and intolerable pride.

These are natural results from the manner in which it pleased the Stoics to express their fundamental doctrines; there was another extravagance which seems uncalled for, even granting the truth of those doctrines in their broadest form. Not only was the wise man completely happy in want, captivity, or tortures, but all who fell short in any degree of that self-sufficiency and impassive perfection, all who retained the slightest shade of human affections, were, in their eyes, entirely and equally miserable. Some might be nearer to perfection than others, and might better hope to attain it; but still, as long as they had not reached it, they were not less wretched. If the rule of absolute wisdom were transgressed, there was no distinction in guilt or misery; and a hope, a fear, a feeling of pity or sorrow, was placed on a level with the murder of a father, or the overthrow of a state.

The Stoics differed from the Academic philosophers in the style of their discourses. The latter cultivated the gift of eloquence, as well as of close reasoning. They thought that in setting forth the excellence of virtue it was necessary to bring it home to the imagination and

affections, and not to be satisfied with forcing the understanding to assent to it as an abstract proposition. The Stoics, on the other hand, disdained to address themselves to aught but the pure and naked intellect, on which they worked by hard and dry, but subtle arguments, proceeding from arbitrary definitions. Herein it is obvious that they misconceived the nature of ethical science, and adopted a method by no means the most conducive to the evidence, any more than to the practical influence, of the conclusions which they sought to establish. For moral investigations are not like those of geometry, where the inquirer is only concerned with the consequences of his definitions; but rather like those of physical science, where the most ingenious reasons are worthless, unless the facts on which they rest be first ascertained. The primary facts on which those theories must rest, which uphold the intrinsic worth of virtue, independently of consequences, are certain inward feelings and convictions of the mind, alleged to be inherent in man's nature. Of these if any man be unconscious he cannot be moved by an argument which takes their existence for granted: and the first step towards his conversion must necessarily be to open his inward eye to perceive them, by awakening the imagination and the benevolent emotions. The Stoics acted as if it were enough to prove that their conclusions followed from their definitions, without having made their hearers feel that any reality existed, of which their definitions were the accurate expression; not considering that, however just and logical the reasoning, if the premises appeared to be unmeaning and chimerical, the conclusions could be nothing better.

Contemporary with Zenon, but younger than he, was Arcesilas, the founder of what was called the new Academy. He professed to return to the principles of Socrates, who had been wont to say that he knew nothing. He had ever in his mouth the deceitfulness of the senses, the strong delusions of fancy and prejudice, the endless multiplicity of human opinions, the undoubting confidence of opposing disputants. There was no mark by which a man could certainly distinguish between a right and an erroneous confidence; nor any conviction so strong and clear, but that impressions as irresistible had been produced in cases where they were palpably

false. Among the novelties introduced by Zenon was the doctrine that a wise man would never form a mere opinion, or at all assent to that which he did not certainly know. This tenet evidently proceeded from the wish to save his wise man from every shade of error. Even in this view it is unnecessary: Opinion must be incident, even to perfect wisdom, when at work upon materials supplied by imperfect knowledge. It is, in fact, a judgment of probability, and if the probability be rightly estimated, the opinion cannot justly be considered as an error, whatever be the event. Arcesilas, however, embraced the proposition to its full extent, but turned it to a different use from that intended by the Stoic; for, having made out, as he conceived, that man could have no certain knowledge, he argued that the perfection of wisdom was to keep clear of all opinions, and to preserve the mind as if were suspended upon every question.

The rigour of his scepticism was somewhat softened by Carneades, the second great prop of the new Academy, and a man ranked by many above the founder. He allowed his wise man to form opinions, and to receive some statements, after due consideration, as probable, though not certain. This, he said, was enough for the guidance of life; and more was inconsistent with the fallibility of man. Many things were, therefore, to be received upon the credit of the senses, remembering, however, that nothing was so distinctly perceived, as to make it impossible that a counterfeit should exist which could not be distinguished from it. A wise man would follow every probability, if there were no opposing probability to make him distrust it. "He is not carved from stone, or hewn from oak; he has a body, he has a mind; he is influenced by reason, he is influenced by sense; so that many things seem true to him; but yet they do not seem to have that distinctive mark of infallible perception, which could warrant his unqualified assent."—*Cicero Academ. Quest. IV. 31.*

The philosophers of the new Academy were accustomed to argue in support of every proposition indifferently, with the view, as they professed, of discovering on which side the greater probability lay. It is no doubt the duty of a searcher for truth to give full weight to objections; to state the arguments

against his own opinion with all the force which they seem to him to possess, and to attribute to those which he himself advances, no greater cogency than he really thinks to belong to them. But this was not the sort of impartiality observed by the followers of Arcesilas. They would argue on either side, but in so doing, we have no reason to suppose that they were distinguished above others for a more scrupulous candour, or a more careful avoidance of overstatement. In philosophical discussions, even the spirit of a partisan is better than that of a professional advocate, or of a determined sceptic. It is said of Carneades, that his most intimate friends were unacquainted with his real opinions. This could scarcely have been, had he been an earnest lover of truth. It may have sprung from the fear that his authority might prevent his followers from exercising a proper freedom of inquiry; but more probably from a fondness for displaying his acuteness, without regard to truth or falsehood; or from a delight in increasing uncertainty, and multiplying occasions of triumph over men's credulity. The last is, perhaps, the most fatal error of a speculative mind. A scepticism arising from humility and caution may deserve to be enlightened; but a proud, a willing, a self-complacent scepticism, neither deserves illumination, nor is fitted to receive it.

Arcesilas and Carneades were pitted against the Stoics, as the most vehement upholders of certainty in knowledge; the Cyrenaic and Epicurean philosophers were no less earnest against their doctrines concerning the sufficiency of virtue, and the nothingness of outward things. The former took their name from Aristippus of Cyrene, a hearer of Socrates. Their most remarkable tenets were these:—that pleasure was the only good, and pain the only evil; and that the only facts of which a man could be absolutely certain were his own internal sensations. Little is known of the manner in which they maintained and applied the latter proposition,—the same on which Berkeley has founded that most refined and ingenious train of reasoning, by which he endeavours to establish his ideal theory. Yet as far as our imperfect knowledge may enable us to judge, it seems to have implied far clearer conceptions than were usual in those times, as to the nature of the senses, and of their testi-

mony respecting outward objects. Of the general dimness and confusion of views which prevailed thereupon, a single instance may suffice. Democritus had shown by mathematical reasoning that the sun was many times larger than the earth. This was seriously used as an argument to prove that the senses were not to be trusted; for the sun, said the objectors, appears to us not more than a foot in diameter: as if the eye could form any judgment, right or wrong, of actual magnitude. Epicurus knew not how to vindicate the senses, except by asserting that the sun was no larger than it seemed. Aristippus might probably have answered that the eye had formed a faithful image, and from the apparent magnitude of this, the size of the object might be estimated, if its distance were known. The objectors had neglected the consideration of distance, confounded the size of the object with that of the image, and measured the latter by an arbitrary and wholly inapplicable scale of feet and inches. The fault was not in the eye, but in their manner of dealing with the evidence it furnished; the rashness of which was rebuked by every distant tree or other object, which they had seen to cross the sun on the horizon, and only darken a portion of his disk.

That pleasure was the only good and pain the only evil, was not a tenet first advanced by Aristippus: it had been maintained by most of the sophists anterior to Socrates or contemporary with him, and pushed by them, as has been stated, (p. 90) to the overthrowing of all moral obligations. There seems no reason to believe that the Cyrenaics proceeded to such lengths in licentious audacity; but their ethics could hardly fail to be loose, considering the foundation on which they stood. This applies in part, to the Epicureans also, whose fundamental principle was in terms the same, though they explained it in such a manner as to make it comparatively harmless, at some expense, however, of consistency and clearness.

Every animal, said Epicurus, from the time when it is born, seeks pleasure and shrinks from pain: no arguments are needed to establish the principle that the one is to be desired and the other to be shunned, since Nature herself bears witness to it. But a fool looks only to the immediate effect of his actions, a wise man to their remotest consequences. When these are considered,

the paths of virtue will be found to be the pleasantest. Excessive indulgence in sensual delights is to be avoided as injurious to health and to peace of mind; and labours are to be endured and dangers to be faced, if the objects be worth the inconvenience and hazard. The laws are to be obeyed, for transgression is perilous, and concealment uneasy and precarious; and even in cases unprovided for by law, an upright and benevolent conduct is to be pursued, for good deeds make friends and bad ones enemies, and the benefits of general confidence and esteem, are greater than those which can be expected to arise from any particular act of fraud or oppression.

In directing the conduct of a wise man under the ordinary trials of life, there is no doubt that rational self-love will generally concur with pure morality. Thus far the Epicureans were consistent and reasonable. But when pressed with harder instances of virtue, which, nevertheless, they professed to admire and approve, they were often reduced to miserable shifts. A soldier volunteers on a perilous service, which is necessary to the safety of his country; he does so, says Epicurus, for in its safety he knows that his own is contained. But what if the service were certain destruction, whereas in the ruin of his country he might possibly escape? what is to be said in the case of Leonidas at Thermopylæ? Perhaps that death is not an evil. But men have been who have lived a life of trouble, discouragement, and obloquy, rather than countenance abuses by which they might have profited in quiet, and without an accent of reproach. This is not an Epicurean virtue. On the contrary, the tendency of the system was to form an easy self-indulgent man, free from violent passions, humane and upright according to the notions of his age and his society; a placable enemy, a kind and serviceable, but not a devoted friend, in public life, a lover of peace, a hater of reform, a patron of expedients for putting off state difficulties to the next generation; a time-server in troubled periods, not only from personal fears and interests, but from the desire to see the turmoil at an end, whatever party might be uppermost.

Epicurus, more to his credit as a moralist than as a reasoner, was not content with this measure of goodness. He could not endure that his wise man

should be placed on a lower pinnacle of moral elevation, or more subjected to the dominion of fortune, than the wise men of other philosophers. His boasts on this subject are not less wild than the wildest paradoxes of the Stoics, and are strangely contrasted with the sentiments he uttered when upholding the sovereignty of pleasure. All good, he said, consisted solely in sensual gratifications, all evil in bodily sufferings, apprehended, remembered, or felt: yet he delivered rules for entirely disregarding the severest bodily pangs, and maintained that the wise man would be able to exclaim in the fire or on the rack, "All this is a mere nothing." This contradiction might possibly have been reconciled by one who looked to a life beyond the grave, and hoped that a painful death might be a short rough passage into happiness and glory. But this belief was entirely excluded by the system of Epicurus, nor was there any proposition which he more confidently affirmed, than that death was absolute extinction.

All pleasures, according to the Epicurean doctrine, relate more or less directly to the body; yet the joys of the mind are greater and more numerous than those arising immediately from sense, since the present moment only comes within the ken of the latter, while the former embraces also the past and the future. Hence, it follows that the proper regulation of the mind is the chief ingredient in happiness. He who places bliss in strong excitement, or in lively sensual enjoyments, must exist in perpetual craving and disquiet; for neither the nature of man, nor the constitution of outward things, allows such enjoyments to be constant. But he whose passions are controuled by wisdom and sobriety, may live in habitual serenity, and consequently in happiness; for mere serenity of mind, undisturbed by pain or regret, is, as Epicurus asserted in opposition to the Cyrenaics, a pleasure, and one of the very highest order. Such a man will be free from fear and anxiety, for he covets only what nature needs, which can seldom be difficult to procure. His mind will be full of pleasing recollections; for it rests with ourselves to remember and to forget, and a wise man will cherish every gratifying thought, and carefully banish all such as are irksome. His habits will be such as to make him little subject to bodily disease; yet if it come he will bear it

patiently, remembering that the sharpest pains are short, and the longest light, and thinking on his past pleasures, the delight of which will fully suffice to give him solace. Thus, however situated, the life of a wise man will have more of pleasure than of pain: or if, by any strange and overwhelming calamity, the preponderance should be reversed, at least when life has become an evil, he is able, and will be ready to quit it.

Since Epicurus professed to ground the excellence of pleasure on the common opinions and natural impulses of uninstructed men, it might have been expected that he would use the term in the sense which men in general attach to it. It will hardly be asserted that it is thus used, when absence of pain is said to be the greatest pleasure. That it lies in man's will what he will remember and what he will forget, and that the sting of pain may be effectually blunted by the recollection of pleasures already enjoyed, are positions which every man's experience will immediately contradict. That sharp pains are short, and long ones tolerable, will serve the turn but little better. Short and long are relative terms; and by a man who stretches his views into eternity, a pain may well be said to be short which attends him from the cradle to the grave. But to one who only looks to a period of forty or of fourscore years, it is much that ten years of that should be embittered by the gout or the stone; far more that the whole should be chequered with sufferings arising from hereditary disease. Thus weak must be every attempt to ground the loftier and more difficult virtues on that part of man's nature which is common to him with the beasts that perish. The fair weather sailor may equip himself tolerably from the store-house of Epicurus; but stronger tackle will then be needed, when the masts are bending and the cordage straining in the storm.

Epicurus neglected logic, but attended much to physics, adopting in the main the atomic system of Democritus, but with some alterations, generally for the worse. He was ignorant of mathematical science, in which Democritus excelled; and not only ignorant, but insensible of its value. He asserted, with Democritus, that all things were material, that matter was eternal, that there was no creating or directing Providence. There were gods, he said, eternally, infinitely, and unalterably happy, but

placed apart from the world, and not disturbed in their happiness by any thought or care relating to it. Nothing was to be hoped or feared from them, but yet it was fit to worship them, on account of the excellency of their nature.

With many glaring inconsistencies; with an understanding not remarkable, as far as we can judge, either for largeness of grasp or for subtlety of discrimination; and often, with a very blamable looseness of reasoning and rashness of assertion; Epicurus, nevertheless, became the idol of a numerous sect throughout the then civilized world, by whom he was held in reverence greater than was ever paid even to Plato or Aristotle, till the latter obtained a set of worshippers, not less devoted, in the schoolmen of the middle ages. This was not the effect of eloquent writing, for his style was plain and inelegant. Unfortunately, all his works are lost, so that we cannot tell how far the faults of the outline may have been compensated by the merits of the filling up; but it seems most likely that his leading excellencies were strong practical good sense, displayed in observations on human life and conduct, and inexhaustible fertility in arguments and illustrations, such as might best bring home to ordinary minds the pleasures and rewards of virtue. To these was added the influence of prepossessing manners, and singularly amiable temper and character. Besides, his principles were inviting in themselves, both as they tasked the intellect and attention less highly than those of other philosophers, and also as they seemed to give a somewhat greater latitude in practice. Yet, if any one accused them of sanctioning licentiousness, a ready answer was furnished by the temperate and blameless lives of the founder and his friends. And, indeed, if the rule of the sect was less rigorous than that of others, it seems however, in some points at least, to have been better observed. The Epicureans, as a body, were long remarkable for brotherly kindness towards each other: and if their discipline failed to nerve the mind to the sterner virtues, on the other hand it encouraged natural affection, instead of repressing it, and was free from the danger, which ever attended the affected severity of Stoicism, that, in attempting to make heroes, it might only make hard-hearted hypocrites.

Amidst these ethical and metaphysical

discussions, the field of mathematical science did not lie waste. In the time of Solon, Thales of Miletus had brought from Egypt some important truths in geometry and astronomy. He made known many properties of triangles and circles; asserted the roundness of the earth; explained the nature of eclipses; and actually foretold an eclipse of the sun. His discoveries were pursued by the Ionic philosophers, his disciples. Pythagoras too, however devoted to ethics and theology, did not neglect mathematics or physics. He enlarged the bounds of geometry, and introduced the sciences of numbers and music, though his arithmetical speculations were perverted by dreams of mysterious virtue in certain numbers and combinations. Unfortunately, from his travels, which are said to have reached even to India, he brought back, with the learning of the Egyptians and Chaldeans, their fondness for mysteries and allegorical disguises. His opinions, and those of his followers, were often set down in verse and enigmatically worded, so that it is difficult to ascertain the real extent of their knowledge. They certainly made no mean advances in arithmetic and geometry. In applying these sciences to nature, they seem to have been less happy. Nevertheless, they lighted on some truths as to the system of the world, which their successors rejected; such as that the earth revolves round its axis, and both it and the planets round the sun.

Mathematical studies were pursued by Plato and many of his followers in a spirit like that of the Pythagoreans. He himself is said to have invented the method of analysis, which ascertains the truth or falsehood of a proposition, by examining what will follow from the supposition that it is true. If we thus arrive at falsehood, the proposition must be false; if at known truth, we presume it to be true; and if so, by reversing the steps of the argument, it may be formally demonstrated. As an instrument of discovery, it is plain, that analysis by far excels synthetical reasoning, or that which proceeds from known truths towards the thing to be proved; since, in the latter case, a way is to be found to one particular result, while, in the former, any result, if a known one, will answer the purpose. By this and other discoveries, among which were the leading properties of the three conic sections, the school of Plato much ad-

vanced geometry. Like the Pythagoreans, they were careless observers of nature, and bigoted to notions of symmetry and numerical analogy; but they maintained, against the juster guesses of the others, that the earth was at rest, and the sun, the planets, and the heavenly sphere all revolved about it. They here agreed with Aristotle and his disciples, who seem, however, to have been better observers and reasoners on nature, though not equalling them in pure mathematics.

The most famous seat of mathematical science was the newly founded colony of Alexandria. The commercial greatness of the city concurred with the munificence of its princes in drawing thither men of learning who had their fortunes to seek. The first Ptolemy, the son of Lagus, spared no expense in tempting the most noted teachers to his court. There was plenty, security, and liberal treatment for those who were driven from their homes by want or faction; all sects were alike welcome, and every question that divided the Athenian schools was discussed no less ably in the capital of Egypt. The work began by the founder of the dynasty was zealously pursued by Ptolemy Philadelphus, his son, and princely establishments were formed to promote it. Under them arose the famous library at Alexandria, by far the first in the world, till it was unluckily burnt when the city was taken by the Arabs. They also established a college, which still subsisted under the Roman emperors, where learned men were maintained at the public cost in undisturbed devotion to science. Every study was here encouraged; but those for which the Alexandrine school was most especially distinguished, besides mathematics, were criticism, philology, and antiquities.

Here flourished Euclid, the author of the well-known *Elements of Geometry*, a treatise yet unmatched in clearness, precision, and logical strictness of deduction. Besides arranging and consecutively proving the fundamental truths of the science, he did much to enlarge its scope; though in this we cannot estimate his merit, not possessing the works that would most have shown it. His attention was chiefly turned to pure mathematics; but others of the Alexandrine philosophers were successful cultivators of physical science, especially of astronomy; and they seem to have been the first who practically

acknowledged the importance of accurate and extensive observation.

Meantime there arose in Sicily a mathematician, who not only outstripped all his contemporaries, but went near to anticipate some of the discoveries which have done most honour to modern science. Archimedes of Syracuse extended the bounds of geometry in every direction, but especially where it treats of curvilinear figures and solids. He made a near approximation to the proportion that the circumference of a circle bears to its diameter, and gave the first example of exactly determining the area of a curve, by proving that of a parabola equal to two-thirds of the circumscribed parallelogram. He proved that the paraboloid is equal to half and the sphere to two-thirds of its containing cylinder, on the last of which discoveries he prided himself so much, that he directed the figures of a sphere and a cylinder to be sculptured on his tomb. If he was great as a geometer, he was to the full as eminent as a mechanician. Before his time mechanics and hydrostatics could hardly be deemed to exist as sciences; he established both on sure grounds, and enriched them with valuable discoveries. He struck out the idea of a centre of gravity, and used it very ingeniously in determining the conditions of equilibrium in solid bodies. He first laid down the principle that a body plunged in a fluid loses weight equal to that of the fluid it displaces; showed how to ascertain the specific gravities of substances; and solved many curious problems respecting the equilibrium of bodies in a fluid.

He was no less distinguished in practical mechanic, though many of his most admirable inventions perished with him, through a prejudice he had adopted from the Pythagoreans and Platonists, who deemed it beneath the dignity of a philosopher to keep any record of such contrivances, or to treat them as aught but matters of recreation, in the intervals of his search for abstract truth. He is said to have suggested the power that is gained by the combination of movable pulleys. But his greatest triumph was the defence of Syracuse, when besieged in the second Punic war by the Roman general Mucellus. Superior force in the beleaguering army, and eminent ability in the commander, were baffled merely by the genius of Archimedes. His skill

disconcerted all the projects of the hostile engineers, while they were unable to guard against his more formidable engines. If the Roman ships came near the walls, they were burnt, sunk, or disabled; if the soldiers advanced, they were transfixed with darts, or crushed with masses; at last they absolutely refused to expose themselves to the terrible effect of the Syracusan missiles. It is said that the philosopher's optical science was called to aid, and that he actually burnt the enemy's ships, by so placing a number of mirrors as to throw the sun's rays into a focus upon them. That this is possible has been proved by modern experiments; that it actually took place is hard to believe, considering the extreme difficulty of adjustment, and the chance that the labour of hours might be frustrated by a change in the position of the ships. The fact is vouched by many writers but discredited by the silence of Polybius. Thus much is certain, Marcellus was obliged to convert the siege into a blockade. The city was ultimately taken by surprise. Archimedes perished in the tumult of the storming, against the wish and order of the Roman leader.

About this time Eratosthenes and Apollonius were flourishing in Alexandria. The first was an eminent geometer and astronomer, a rhetorician, a poet, an antiquary, and the father of the common system of early chronology. He attempted to calculate the size of the earth, by observing the zenith distance of the sun at Alexandria at noon on Midsummer day, when upright objects cast no shadow at Syene, which was nearly on the same meridian. He thus ascertained the difference of latitude, from which, the distance of the places being known, it was easy to compute the circumference of the globe, supposing the observations accurate. He left many valuable works, which are mostly lost, both in astronomy and in pure mathematics. In the latter, however, he was surpassed by Apollonius, who seems to have been justly considered as the first of ancient geometers, excepting Archimedes. We can partly estimate the merit of Apollonius by one of his chief works—the Treatise on Conic Sections, which is extant.

From his death mathematics seem to have been nearly stationary, till the time of Diophantus, supposed the inventor of algebra, who lived about the

fourth century of the Christian era. Astronomy, meantime, was much advanced by Hipparchus, and afterwards by Ptolemy, and a few words upon their labours shall conclude this subject. They determined many important points with accuracy, before unknown; made observations unwontedly extensive and precise; and built on them hypotheses concerning the revolutions of the heavenly bodies, which accounted for all the greater irregularities, and gave the means of assigning their apparent motions with no wide departure from the truth.

Hipparchus (who flourished about B. C. 160) computed the length of the solar year more exactly than had yet been done, by comparing an observation he made of the moment when the sun came to the meridian, with one made by Aristarchus of Samos 145 years before. He came nearer than his predecessors to ascertain the comparative magnitudes of the sun, moon, and earth, by observing the apparent diameters and horizontal parallaxes of the sun and moon, and the diameter of the earth's shadow when the moon was passing through it. To account for the irregular apparent motion of the sun, he supposed it to revolve in an eccentric circle, or one where the earth was not in the centre; and he so adjusted his hypothesis, as to calculate solar tables from it with some approach to exactness. He made some steps towards a theory of the moon. He first catalogued the stars; and, comparing his own with earlier observations of their positions, he discovered that change in the place of the equinoctial points, which we call the precession of the equinoxes.

In the second century of the Christian era, Ptolemy took up the work. He made a fuller catalogue of the stars. He adopted Hipparchus's theory of the sun, and constructed one of the moon and the planets. The moon, he imagined, revolved in a circle, which he called its epicycle, round a centre which itself revolved in an eccentric circle round the earth; while the eccentric itself had also a revolution, so as to change the position of the apsides (points nearest to and furthest from the earth.) His contrivances to account

for the motions of the planets were of like nature, and in some of their details still more complex, but he certainly showed exceeding ingenuity in accounting for appearances very difficult to bring under any general laws that suppose the earth the centre of the universe; and produced a system of astronomy sufficient at least for the more obvious practical uses of the science. His system continued to be generally received till within the last two hundred years.

CONCLUSION.

The history of the Greeks has been carried down to the overthrow of their independence, and a sketch has been given of their condition under Roman rule, and of the state of science and philosophy, their still remaining glories. The sects that afterwards arose, the Eclectics and later Platonists, belong to a different age and order of things. The fortunes of Greece now merge in those of Rome. It is true, that after the seat of dominion was transferred from Rome to Byzantium (Constantinople) the sceptre came gradually again into the hands of the Grecian race; but still the story of the Eastern empire may best be treated as a sequel to that of Rome. That empire, long sunk in debility and corruption, gave way at last to the power of the Turks; and the Greeks have long been under their dominion, subdued and trampled on, rather than regularly governed, and subject alternately, sometimes at once, to all the evils of oppression and anarchy. We have seen the progress of their liberation, from the first apparently hopeless struggle to the present time, when a portion at least seems established in independence. It rests with them, under Providence, to make their independence profitable to national happiness and virtue. They have the deeds of their forefathers as a light to cheer, a beacon to warn, perhaps an ignis fatuus to mislead: let them read to judge and choose, and not blindly to imitate. The faults of their fathers will be less excusable in them, who enjoy the benefits of a better religion, and live in an age when wiser maxims of government have been repeatedly propounded and sometimes exemplified.

CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.*

B. C.		Olymp.	
1080	1856		Foundation of Argos.
1080	1556		Foundation of Athens.
1045	1493		Phœnicians settle in Greece and Asia Minor, under the name of Cadmeians, Curetes, &c.
1015	1406		Minos reigns in Crete.
1007	1497		Amphictyonic council instituted.
1006			Minos destroys Pirates.
993			Pelops settles in Peloponnesus.
988			Minos makes war on the Athenians.
968	1234		Reign of Theseus in Attica.
964	1485		Arrival of Danaus in Greece. N. B. This date must be placed by Newton much too low, since the legends concerning him plainly mark him as very ancient, and especially as prior to Pelops.
912	1280	about	Orpheus establishes orgies.
937	1263		Argonautic expedition.
927	1222		Accession of Atreus to the throne of Mycenæ.
919	1201		Accession of Agamemnon.
914	1193		Trojan war begun.
904	1184		" " ended.
870	907		Age of Homer and Hesiod.
844	1124		Æolic migration. Another and larger migration took place in consequence of the return of the Heracleidæ.
824	1104		Return of the Heracleidæ.
804	1104		Death of Codrus. Medon first perpetual archon.
794	1044		Ionic migration.
776	{ 884	1 1	Iphitus establishes the Olympic festival.
	776		Coræbus victor in the foot race. Hence the Olympiads are reckoned.
708	884	18 1	Legislation of Lycurgus.
652	743	32 1	Beginning of the first Messenian war.
647	754	33 2	Charops, first decennial archon.
607	685		Beginning of second Messenian war.
607	684	48 2	Creon, first annual archon.
572	623	52 1	Legislation of Dracon
562	594	54 2	Legislation of Solon.
550	560 (Clinton)	57 3	Peisistratus gains the government of Athens.
544	546	59 1	Sardis taken by Cyrus.
538	538	60 2	Babylon taken by Cyrus. Here the two systems come together.
529		62 4	Death of Cyrus.
527		68 2	Death of Peisistratus.
519		65 2	Plataea puts itself under the protection of Athens.
514		66 3	Death of Hipparchus.
510		67 3	Expulsion of the Peisistratidæ.
499		70 2	Beginning of the Ionian war, and burning of Sardis.
494		71 3	Miletus taken.
490		72 3	Battle of Marathon.
486		73 3	Revolt of Egypt. Recovered B. C. 484.
480		75 1	Battles of Thermopylæ, Artemisium, and Salamis.
			Victory of Gelon at Himera.

* The early chronology of Greece is very uncertain. The dates in the first column are those assigned by Newton; in the second, those of the common chronology. Until the time when the two systems coincide, the Olympiads are given according to Newton. Mr. Clinton's dates have been adopted for the period to which his work extends, that is, from the usurpation of Peisistratus to the invasion of Greece by the Gauls.

- B. C. Olymp.
 479 75 2 Mardonius occupies Athens, ten months after its occupation by Xerxes. Battles of Plataea and Mycale.
 477 75 4 Commencement of Athenian empire.
 471 77 2 Themistocles banished by Ostracism, five years before his flight to Persia.
 466 78 3 Siege of Naxos. Flight of Themistocles. Battles at the Eurymedon.
 465 78 4 Revolt of Thasos. Reduced B. C. 463.
 464 79 1 Earthquake at Sparta. Revolt of Helots. Beginning of third Messenian war. Ended B. C. 455.
 461 79 4 Ostracism of Cimon.
 460 80 1 Revolt of Inaros, and war in Egypt. Ended B. C. 455.
 457 80 4 Battles between the Athenians and Corinthians near Megara. Battle of Tanagra.
 456 81 1 Battle of Cnophyta, sixty-two days after that at Tanagra. Recall of Cimon.
 450 82 3 Five years' truce between Athens and Lacedæmon.
 449 82 4 Death of Cimon.
 447 83 2 Battle of Coroneia. About eighteen months after.
 445 83 4 Revolt of Eubœa and Megara from Athens. Eubœa recovered before the end of the year. Thirty years' truce.
 443 84 2 Athenians send a colony to Thurium, the ancient Sybaris.
 440 85 1 Samian war.
 435 86 2 Sea-fight between the Corinthians and Coreyræans.
 433 86 4 Coreyræan embassy to Athens.
 432 87 1 Sea-fights off Coreyra, in the spring. Revolt of Potidæa, about midsummer.
 431 87 2 The Thebans attempt Plataea. Beginning of Peloponnesian war. Ended B. C. 404.
 430 87 3 Plague at Athens.
 429 87 4 Surrender of Potidæa. Naval victories of Phormion. Death of Pericles. Siege of Plataea.
 428 88 1 Revolt of Mitylene.
 427 88 2 Surrender of Plataea. Coreyræan sedition.
 425 88 4 Occupation of Pylos. Capture of the Lacedæmonians in Sphacteria a little more than seventy days after.
 424 89 1 Cythera occupied by the Athenians. Campaign of Brasidas in Thrace.
 423 89 2 Truce for a year.
 422 89 3 Renewal of hostilities. Deaths of Brasidas and Cleon.
 421 89 4 Fifty years' truce concluded.
 420 90 1 Alliance of Athens with Argos.
 416 91 1 Siege and surrender of Melos.
 415 91 2 Athenian expedition to Sicily.
 413 91 4 Defeat of the Athenians in Sicily.
 412 92 1 Revolt of Lesbos, Chios, and Erythræ.
 411 92 2 Revolution of the four hundred.
 407 93 2 Return of Alcibiades to Athens.
 406 93 3 Battle of Arginusæ. Dionysius becomes master of Syracuse.
 405 93 4 Battle of Ægospotami.
 404 94 1 Surrender of Athens. Tyranny of the Thirty. Their deposition after eight months' rule.
 403 94 2 End of civil war, and restoration of democracy at Athens.
 401 94 4 Expedition of Cyrus. Battle of Cunaxa.
 399 95 2 Death of Socrates.
 397 95 4 Truce of Dercyllidas in Asia.
 396 96 1 Agesilaus sent into Asia.
 394 96 3 Recall of Agesilaus. Battle of Coroneia.
 393 96 4 Corinthian sedition. Long walls of Athens restored by Pharnabazus and Conon.
 389 97 4 Death of Thrasybulus.
 387 98 2 Peace of Antalcidas.

- B. C. Olymp.
 386 98 3 Restoration of Plataea.
 385 98 4 Siege of Mantinea by Agesipolis.
 382 99 3 Beginning of the Olynthian war. Seizure of the Cadmeia.
 379 100 2 End of the Olynthian war. Recovery of the Cadmeia by the Theban exiles.
 378 100 3 Attempt of Sphodrias on the Peiræus.
 376 101 1 Victory of Chabrias off Naxos.
 374 101 3 Expulsion of the Plataeans. Peace made and broken by Lacedæmon.
 373 101 4 Defeat of Mnasiæus in Coreyra.
 371 102 2 Peace between Athens and Lacedæmon. Battle of Leuctra. Foundation of Megalopolis.
 370 102 3 Murder of Jason, tagus of Thessaly.
 369 102 4 First Theban invasion of Laconia. Restoration of the Messenians.
 367 103 2 Death of Dionysius.
 366 103 3 Expedition of Epaminondas into Achaia.
 365 103 4 War of Arcadia with Elis.
 364 104 1 Battle of Olympia.
 362 104 3 Battle of Mantinea.
 359 105 2 Accession of Philip.
 358 105 3 Amphipolis taken by Philip.
 357 105 4 Revolt of Rhodes, Chios, &c. Social war begun. Ended B. C. 355. Phœcian war begun.
 356 106 1 Expulsion of Dionysius the younger.
 353 106 4 Death of Dion.
 352 107 1 Death of Onomarchus. War of Lacedæmon and Megalopolis.
 350 107 2 Expedition of Phocion into Eubœa, and battle of Tamynæ.
 349 107 3 Olynthian war begun.
 348 108 1 Olynthus taken by Philip.
 346 108 2 Peace between Philip and the Athenians. End of the Phœcian war.
 344 109 1 Expedition of Timoleon. In the next year he gains possession of Syracuse.
 342 109 3 Expedition of Philip into Thrace.
 340 110 1 Philip besieges Scyllethra and Byzantium.
 339 110 2 War between Philip and the Athenians. Victory of Timoleon at the Crimisus.
 338 110 3 Philip general of the Amphelyons. Battle of Chæroneia.
 337 110 4 Death of Timoleon.
 336 111 1 Murder of Philip.
 335 111 2 Thebes destroyed by Alexander.
 334 111 3 Alexander crosses the Hellespont. Battle of the Granicus.
 333 111 4 Battle of Issus.
 332 112 1 Siege of Tyre. Conquest of Egypt. Foundation of Alexandria.
 331 112 2 Battle of Gaugamela, or Arbela. Agis king of Lacedæmon defeated and slain by Antipater.
 330 112 3 Murder of Darius.
 327 113 2 Invasion of India.
 326 113 3 Alexander commences his return. Voyage of Nearchus.
 323 114 2 Death of Alexander. Lamian war.
 322 114 3 Submission of Athens to Antipater.
 321 114 4 Deaths of Craterus and Perdiccas.
 318 115 3 Death of Antipater.
 317 115 4 Death of Phocion. Arrhidæus is put to death by Olympias. Agathocles becomes tyrant of Syracuse.
 315 116 2 Death of Eumenes. Death of Olympias. Cassander rebuilds Thebes.
 312 117 1 Seleucus recovers Babylonia. (From hence the era of the Seleucidae commences.)
 310 117 3 Agathocles lands in Africa.
 307 118 2 Demetrius Poliorcetes admitted into Athens. Agathocles quits Africa.

B. C.	Olymp.	
306	118 3	Antigonus, Lysimachus, Seleucus, and Ptolemy, assume the title of king.
304	119 1	Siege of Rhodes by Demetrius, begun in the spring, and continued for a year.
301	119 4	Battle of Ipsus.
299	120 2	Siege of Athens by Demetrius.
296	121 1	Death of Cassander.
294	121 3	Demetrius king of Macedonia.
289	122 4	Death of Agathocles.
287	123 2	Demetrius driven by Pyrrhus from Macedonia.
286	123 3	Pyrrhus driven from Macedonia by Lysimachus.
283	124 2	Deaths of Demetrius and Ptolemy.
281	124 4	Lysimachus defeated and slain by Seleucus.
280	126 1	Seleucus murdered by Ptolemy Ceraunus. Pyrrhus passes into Italy. Rise of the Achaian league. Ptolemy Ceraunus defeated and slain by the Gauls.
279	125 2	Irruption of the Gauls into Greece.
272	127 1	Pyrrhus attacks Lacedæmon.
271	127 2	Pyrrhus is slain at Argos.
268	128 1	Antigonus Gonatas takes Athens.
251	132 2	Sicyon joins the Achaian League.
243	134 2	Achaian League joined by Corinth, Megara, Træzen, and Epidaurus.
240	135 1	Death of Agis, king of Lacedæmon.
239	135 2	Death of Antigonus Gonatas.
232	137 1	Megalopolis joins the Achaian League.
229	137 4	Death of Demetrius, the son of Antigonus Gonatas.
226	138 3	War of Cleomenes with the Achaians.
225	138 4	Revolution effected by Cleomenes in Sparta.
223	139 2	Battle of Sellasia, and flight of Cleomenes from Greece.
221	139 4	War between the Aetolians and the Achaians, with Philip, the son of Demetrius. Ended B. C. 217. Death of Cleomenes.
215	141 2	Death of Aratus.
211	142 2	Alliance of Rome with the Aetolians and Lacedæmonians, against Philip and the Achaians.
208	143 1	Machanidas, tyrant of Lacedæmon, slain by Philopœmen. General peace.
205	143 4	War between Nabis and the Achaians. War between Philip and the Romans and Aetolians.
199	145 2	The Achaians abandon Philip, and ally themselves with Rome.
198	145 3	Battle of Cynoscephala. Peace between Philip and the Romans.
196	146 1	Peace made between Nabis and the Romans and Achaians.
193	146 4	War of Antiochus and the Aetolians against the Romans. Death of Nabis. Lacedæmon enters the Achaian League.
192	147	Defeat of Antiochus at Thermopylae.
190	147	Submission of the Aetolians to Rome.
189	147	Abolition of the laws of Lycurgus.
184	149	Death of Philopœmen.
180	150	Death of Philip.
172	152	War between the Romans and Perseus the son of Philip.
169	152 4	Battle of Pydna. Conquest of Macedonia.
148	158 1	War between the Romans and Achaians
147	158 2	Corinth taken. Conquest of Achaia.

INDEX.

- ASYDOS, 203.
 Academy, old, 152, 281. New, 273.
 Acanthia, 60, 61, 133, 190, 193, 215, 239.
 Achaia, 10, 18, 110.
 Achaian League, 170. See heads of chapters and sections.
 Acharnians, 58.
 Achilles, 9.
 Aclius Glabrio, Man. 229—232.
 Acropolis, 2.
 Acorcorinthus, 171, 177, 222.
 Aegina, 30, 31, 47, 58, 236.
 Aegospotami, battle of, 81.
 Aemilius Paullus, L. 251, 252—256.
 Aetolia, 19.
 Aeschines, 131, 139, 151.
 Aetolia and Aetolians, 61, 154, 179. See heads of chapters and sections.
 Agamemnon, 3, 8, 10.
 Agathocles, 167—170.
 Agesilaus, king of Lacedaemon, 93—95, 98, 100—102, 107, 114, 116.
 Agesipolis, king of Lacedaemon, 99, 100.
 Agis, king of Lacedaemon, son of Archidamus, 72.
 Agis, king of Lacedaemon, son of another Archidamus, 147.
 Agis, king of Lacedaemon, son of Eudamidas, 173—175.
 Alcibiades, 71—75, 77—82, 84, 86.
 Alcidas, 61, 63.
 Alcmon, 19. Alcmonidae, 19, 24—26.
 Alexamenus, 217, 225.
 Alexander, king of Macedonia, son of Perdiccas, 39, 41.
 Alexander, tyrant of Phœræ, 109, 113, 126.
 Alexander, king of Macedonia, son of Philip, 140—151.
 Alexandria, 146, 252, 277.
 Ammon, land of, 146.
 Amphictyons, 127, 133, 136.
 Amphipolis, 69, 125.
 Amphissa, 136.
 Andocides, 74.
 Antalcidas, 97.
 Antigonus, 153, 155, 159—163.
 Antigonus Gonatas, 167, 171.
 Antigonus the regent, 177—179.
 Antiochus the Great, 202, 218, 224, 226—230, 233.
 Antiochus Epiphanes, 250, 252.
 Antipater, 145, 151—156.
 Anti-theus, 152.
 Antiphon, 78. Another, 137.
 Apelles, 189—193.
 Apollonidas, 236, 249.
 Apollonius, 278.
 Aracus, 171, 177, 181, 189, 194, 196—198.
 Arcadia, 17, 107—115.
 Arcesilas, 273.
 Archelaus, king of Macedonia, 125.
 Archelaus, Mithridates's general, 263.
 Archidamus, king of Lacedaemon, son of Zenonidamus, 55, 57, 60.
 Archidamus, son of Agesilaus, 106, 110, 114.
 Archimedes, 278.
 Archon the Achaian, 243, 249.
 Archons, perpetual, decennial, and annual, 19.
 Areiopagus, 21, 49, 137.
 Arginusæ, battle of, 83.
 Argonauts, 8.
 Argos, 2, 12, 30, 70—73, 75, 91—96, 98, 116, 172, 210, 212.
 Aristarchus, 209, 219, 236.
 Aristagoras, 28.
 Aristides, 37, 40, 46.
 Aristeus, 54, 59.
 Aristion, tyrant of Athens.
 Aristippus, 271.
 Aristocratical party at Athens, 123.
 Aristodemus, 16.
 Aristomenes, 16—18.
 Aristophanes, 70.
 Aristotle, 152.
 Artaphernes, 25, 26, 28, 30.
 Artaxerxes, son of Darius, 45.
 Artaxerxes Mnemon, 92, 97.
 Artaxerxes Ochus, 143.
 Artemisium, battle of, 36.
 Astronomy, 279.
 Athens. See heads of chapters and sections.
 Athenians, their character, 45.
 Atreus, 3.
 Attalus, king of Pergamus, 199, 200, 202, 213.
 Babylon, 150.
 Bastarnæ, 241.
 Bœotians, 41, 48, 51, 68, 71, 93, 212, 227, 245.
 Brachyllas, 216.
 Brasidas, 68—70.
 Byzantium, 42, 97, 124, 127, 135, 185.
 Cadmeia, 100.
 Cadmeians and Cadmus, 3.
 Callias and Taurosthenes, 136.
 Callicrates, 242, 252, 255—257.
 Callicratidas, 82, 83.
 Callistratus, 104.
 Cambyses, 27.
 Carnades, 273.

- Carthage, 45, 117, 120, 167—169, 195, 226.
 Cassander, 156—163.
 Cecrops, 2.
 Ceres, 4.
 Chabrias, 102, 104, 127.
 Chalcis, 25, 204, 227.
 Chalcidians of Thrace, 54.
 Chares, 126, 135, 139.
 Charops, 248, 250.
 Chersonese, Thracian, 31, 135.
 Chilon, 188.
 Chios, 29, 77, 124, 137.
 Cimon, 46, 49, 50.
 Cinadon, 93.
 Cios, 202.
 Cleisthenes, 24—26.
 Cleitus, 148.
 Cleombrotus, king of Lacedæmon, 101, 105.
 Cleombrotus II, king of Lacedæmon, 175.
 Cleomenes, king of Lacedæmon, 24—26, 30.
 Cleomenes, king of Lacedæmon, son of Leonidas, 175—179, 184.
 Cleon, 62, 66, 70.
 Cleophon, 85.
 Codrus, 18.
 Comedy, 49, 270.
 Conon, 82, 84, 95, 96, 97.
 Corcyra, 9, 52—54, 63, 67, 103.
 Corinth, 12, 47, 52—54, 71, 84—96, 98, 108, 112, 171, 177, 250.
 Coroneia, battle of, 48, second battle, 95.
 Craterus, 144, 145.
 Crete, 3, 4, 185.
 Critias, 86—88.
 Critolaus, 259.
 Croesus, king of Lydia, 26.
 Ctesiphon, 151.
 Cycliadas, 206, 209, 214.
 Cylon, 19.
 Cynætha, 183.
 Cynics, 152.
 Cynoscephalæ, battle of, 213.
 Cyprus, 29, 56, 95.
 Cyrus, 27.
 Cyrus the younger, 83, 92.
 Danaus, 3.
 Dardanians, 187, 216, 241.
 Darius, son of Hystaspes, 27, 33.
 Darius Codomannus, 143—147.
 Deceleia, 76.
 Delium, battle of, 68.
 Delphi, 8, 36, 166.
 Demaratus, king of Lacedæmon, 30.
 Demetrius, 224, 225, 231.
 Demetrius Poliorcetes, 160—164.
 Demetrius, his grandson, 176.
 Demetrius the Phalerean, 160.
 Demetrius, son of Philip, 240.
 Demetrius of Pharos, 197.
 Democritus, 90.
 Demosthenes, son of Alcisthenes, 64—67, 76.
 Demosthenes the orator, 131—142, 146, 151, 155.
 Dercyllidas, 92.
 Diæus, 256.
 Dion, 119.
 Dionysius, 717, 118.
 Dionysius the younger, 118, 119.
 Diopceithes, 135.
 Diophanes, 231, 235, 236, 252.
 Dodona, 8, 187.
 Dorian, 2, 10—12.
 Dosimachus, 180—182, 186, 187.
 Dracon, 20.
 Egypt, 6, 33, 50, 146, 252.
 Elateia, 138.
 Eleians, 11, 113, 187.
 Epaminondas, 102, 105, 108—110, 114, 115.
 Epaprites, 113.
 Ephesus, 19, 28.
 Ephialtes, 49.
 Ephori, 13.
 Epicurus, 274—276.
 Epidamnus, 52.
 Epidaurus, 72.
 Epimenides, 20.
 Epirus, 183, 187, 227, 248, 252, 253, 255, 256.
 Eratosthenes.
 Eretria, 28, 31.
 Euagoras, 95.
 Eubœa, 31, 36, 51, 124.
 Euclid, 277.
 Eumenes, 153, 155, 159.
 Eumenes, king of Pergamus, 233, 236, 244.
 Euphron of Sicily, 111.
 Eurydice, queen of Macedonia, 155, 158.
 Eurymedon, battle of the, 46.
 Eurymedon, Athenian, 64, 65, 67.
 Flaminius, T. Quinctius, 208—222, 224, 238.
 Gaugamela, battle of, 146.
 Gauls, 165—167.
 Gelon, 35, 45.
 Gylippus, 75, 76.
 Hannibal, 195, 226, 228.
 Harmodius and Aristogeiton, 24.
 Hapalus, 151.
 Helots, 14, 16, 40, 46, 68.
 Heracleida, 10.
 Heracleides of Syracuse, 119.
 Hermocrates of Syracuse, 67, 75, 117.
 Herodotus, 3.
 Hipparchus, son of Peisistratus, 23.
 Hipparchus the astronomer, 279.
 Hippia, son of Peisistratus, 23—26, 31.
 Histieus of Miletus, 23.
 Homec, 7, 9.
 Inaros, 50.
 Ionia, 19, 27—30.
 India, 149.
 Iphicrates, 97, 103, 109.
 Isagoras, 24.
 Ismenias, 100.
 Ithome, 16, 40, 129, 197.

- Jason the Argonaut, 8
Jason of Phææ, 106, 107
- Ker-obleptes, 129, 133.
- Lacedæmon, or Sparta See heads of chapters
and sections
- Lævinus, M Valerius, 198
- Lamachus, 73, 74
- Lamian war, 154
- Leonidas king of Lacedæmon, 73, 74
- Leonidas, king of Lacedæmon, son of Cleonymus, 173—175
- Leontius 190—193
- Lesbos, 61
- Leuctra, battle of, 105
- Long walls 47
- Lyciscus, 248, 252
- Lycomedes of Mantinea, 109—112
- Lycortis, 235, 236—239, 249, 252
- Lycurgus, 13—15
- Lycurgus, king of Lacedæmon, 185, 188,
190, 192, 193
- Lysander, 82—86, 94
- Lysimachus, 153, 160, 163
- Macedonia, 124 See the two Philips,
Perseus, and Imilius Præullus
- Machanitis, tyrant of Lacedæmon, 200, 201
- Magnets, 224
- Manners of the early Greeks, 2, 4, 9
- Mantinea, 71, 98, 107, 113—115.
- Marathon, 31, 32
- Mardonius, 30, 38—41.
- Maroneia, 239
- Megalopolis, 108, 130, 158, 176—178, 194
205
- Megara, 18, 47, 66
- Melos, 73
- Memnon, 143, 144
- Mendicant, 256—258
- Mentor, 113
- Mercenaries, mutilation of, 74
- Messene in Sicily, 18
- Messene in Peloponnesus, 109, 180, 197,
205, 231, 233
- Messeniæ, 16—18, 47
- Messeniæ of Naupactus, 17, 60, 64
- Metellus, Q Cæcilius 236, 258—260
- Metheon in Macedonia, 129
- Miletus, 19, 28, 52, 77
- Miltiades, 31—33
- Minos, 3, 4, 5
- Mithridates, king of Pontus, 263
- Mitylene, 61
- Mississippi, 103
- Monarchy in early Greece, 12
- Mummius, L 260
- Mycale, battle of, 42
- Mycenæ, 3
- Myrmidonæ, 47, 48
- Mysterics, 4, 6, 7
- Nabis, tyrant of Lacedæmon, 205, 212,
219—225
- Naupactus, 47, 60, 64, 231, 232
- Naxos, 28, 31, 40
- Nicias, 66, 67, 73—77.
- Nicostratus, 63.
- Olympia, battle of, 113.
- Olympian festival, 11
- Olympias, 156, 157, 158.
- Olynthus, 99, 100, 126, 131.
- Onomarchus, 129
- Oracles, 7.
- Orchomenus in Boeotia, 51, 94, 112
- Orestes, 10
- Orpheus, 7
- Ostracism, 37
- Parmenion, 141, 148
- Pausanias, commander in chief of the Greeks,
40, 41, 43, 44
- Pausanias, king of Lacedæmon, 89.
- Peiræus, 47, 60, 88
- Pelander, 78—80
- Peisistratus, 22
- Pelagades, 1, 6.
- Pelopidas, 102, 110, 113
- Pelops, 3.
- Peucedon, king of Macedonia, 34, 58, 61,
69
- Perdiccas, regent of the Macedonian empire,
153—155.
- Pericles, 49—52, 55—59
- Perræa, 40, 173
- Peripatetics, 152, 271
- Perses, son of Philip, 240—252.
- Persian, 27—42, 50, 81, 143—148.
- Phalæcis, 130, 132
- Phalæcis, 15
- Pharibazus, 81, 95, 96
- Philip, son of Amyntas, 125, 129—140
- Philip, son of Demetrius, 182—216, 229,
234, 239—241
- Philomelus, 128
- Philopœon, 200, 223, 224, 236, 238
- Philosophy, 90, 152, 270, to the end
- Phlius, 100, 111
- Phocæa, 27
- Phocion, 130, 136, 156, 157
- Phocis, 36, 47, 51, 128—133, 166
- Phœbidis, 99
- Phœnicia, 143, 145
- Phormion, 60
- Piracy, 4, 8
- Plague of Athens, 59, 64
- Plataea, 41, 56, 60, 62, 104
- Plato, 91, 133, 277
- Platonias, king of Lacedæmon, 51.
- Polybius, 249, 250, 254, 261
- Polydorus, 156
- Polysperchon, 156—158
- Popilius, Cn 249, 252
- Potidæa, 54, 59
- Protigoras, 90.
- Prytanes, 21
- Ptolemy, son of Lagus, 153, 155, 160—164,
277.
- Ptolemy Ceraunus, 164
- Ptolemy Philometer and Physcon, 252
- Ptolemy the astronomer, 279
- Pylos, 65—67.
- *Pyrrhus, 164, 172.

